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PREFACE
\
In writing this thesis my object has been to discuss the 
development of the strategy and doctrine of the Conmunist Party of 
Australia from 1945 to the present day. I have been especially 
interested in shoving that the formulation of strategies and the 
periodical modifications of doctrine were affected by the Party's 
problems in Australian politics. While being fully aware of the 
Party's attachment to the Soviet Union land more recently Conmunist 
ChinaJ, and to the ideas and influence of the international Commu­
nist movement, my main concern has been to examine it as part of 
the Australian political system, the demands of which it constantly 
tries to reconcile with the necessity of acting out the international 
Communist line.
Having adopted this emphasis, I have not made a detailed 
examination of such topics as the mechanics of the Party's internal 
organisation, its social composition, its electoral performance, 
or its specific policies e.g. on foreign affairs, for their own 
sake. These subjects have been treated in so far as they are 
relevant to the central theme. Similarly, the doctrinal problems 
of the Party have been discussed in terms of their formulation by 
Australian leaders such as Sharkey and Dixon, rather than in the 
light of European debates on Marxist-Leninist tneory. This is
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justified to the extent that a great deal of the theoretical discussion 
and influence in the Australian Party has been limited to the inter» 
pretations supplied by this handful of leaders.
In the context of Australian politics, the Communist Party must 
be considered an integral part of the Labor movement: it regards itself 
as the real spokesman and defender of the working class; its greatest 
strength lies in the trade union movement; and its political and 
industrial activities naturally bring it into closest contact and 
rivalry with the Australian Labor Party. For this reason I have found 
it necessary to discuss in some detail developments in the Australian 
Labor movement as a whole, such as the Labor Party split of 1954-55 
and trade union politics in the 1950s. The emphasis 1 have given to 
the Communist Party's role in trade union affairs is determined by 
the fact that the Party's main concern throughout the post»war period 
has been to defend its trade union positions. At the same time, 
its efforts to explore the possibilities of a farmer-worker alliance, 
and its use of front organisations to make contact with middle 
class groups, have been dealt with where they become important.
Since the Party does not make correspondence, unpublished sources 
and membership records available, 1 have been forced to rely primarily 
upon the Party press, personal interviews with Communists and ex- 
Communists and information from non-Party sources. Both the monthly 
theoretical journal, Communist Review, and the weekly (previously 
bi-weekly) Tribune were used extensively while the Guardians were
iii
used to follow local Party events in Victoria and Queensland. The 
importance of the Communist press in providing a means of contact 
between the leadership and the rank-and-file has meant that it reveals 
a great deal of the Party's internal affairs, particularly during 
periods of crisis. At the same time, however, it should be noted that 
Tribune 's coverage of industrial affairs leaves much to be desired, 
especially when dealing with Communist reverses, and that this 
deficiency cannot be made good by using the pro-Grouper News-Weekly.
As a result, many non-Party sources have been used to fill in the 
details of trade union politics. The pamphlet collections referred 
to in the bibliography and the Departmental Newspaper Service (Political 
Science Department, Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National 
University) have also been used extensively. Although they were 
used in conjunction with the sources discussed above, Government 
periodicals were not very fruitful; the exceptions were the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates and several Royal Commissions 
relating to Communism and listed in the bibliography.
The research for this thesis was carried out in the course of 
a three-year scholarship in the Department of Political Science at 
the Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University, 
between July 1959 and October 1962. My debt to the guidance of the 
late Professor L.C. Webb is considerable. I should like to thank 
my supervisors, Dr D.W. Rawson and Dr B.D. Graham, for their 
encouragement and advice. I am also grateful to Mr R.S. Parker,
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Professor G. Sawer, Dr. I.A.H. Turner and Dr R.A. Gollan, all of 
whom made helpful suggestions. The object of this thesis was 
discussed with a number of Communists but 1 shall not refer to them 
in footnotes. Finally, my thanks are due to the Librarians at the 
Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University 
(Mr A.L.G. McDonald and Mr J.J. Graneek), the Archivist at the Institute 
of Advanced Studies, Australian National University (Mr B.D. Shields), 
the Librarian of the National Library (Mr H.L. White), and Mrs E.
Martin, who typed this thesis.
J.D. Playford
20 October 19t>2
SUMMARY
PART ONE
Chapter One
The Australian Communist Party was founded on 30 October 1920.
It remained a small, relatively powerless group until the late 
thirties wnen its membersnip grew and its control of certain trade 
unions was established. Having been banned in 1940, it enthusias­
tically supported the Australian war effort after the Soviet Union's 
entry into the war and gained in popularity. After 1947, however, 
its pursuit of 'adventurist* strategies, involving particularly the 
fomenting of industrial strikes for political ends, together with the 
repercussions of the Cold War, lost it a great deal of its former 
support•
Chapter Two
Within the trade union movement, the Communists were able to 
gain acceptance easily in those unions which had militant traditions 
but to gain access to the more conservative unions they had to pay 
respect to the importance of the arbitration system. During the 
late thirties and early forties they gained executive control in 
most of the main transport, mining and heavy industry unions but 
they lost support in the late forties because of their reckless 
political policies.
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Chapter Three
Non-Labor parties have in this century made extensive use of 
the anti-Communist bogey in election campaigns, and have been 
particularly adept in suggesting that as Moscow controls the Communist 
Party so the latter controls the A.L.P. The A.L.P. has been sensitive 
to this charge and has defended itself by displaying an anti-Communism 
almost as intense as that of its opponents. Unlike some European 
Social-Democratic parties, the A.L.P. has never been an enthusiastic 
defender of civil liberties and the Communist Party could not expect 
a strong defence in the regime of civil liberties in Australia.
PART TWO
Chapter Four
In I960 the Liberal-Country Party Government, led by R.G. Menzies, 
introduced a bill to ban the Communist Party; although J.B. Chifley, the 
Labor leader, disliked the measure, the Federal Parliamentary Labor 
Party decided not to oppose it. The bill was passed but was later 
disallowed by the High Court. The Government obtained a double disso­
lution of both houses of Parliament and fought the subsequent election 
campaign on the anti-Communist issue; having been returned to office, it 
held a referendum to decide whether the Commonwealth Constitution should 
be amended to permit the banning of the Communist Party. The referendum 
proposal was defeated by a narrow majority; its rejection was due partly 
to the campaign which Chifley*s successor as Labor leader, Dr H.V. Evatt, 
had waged against the proposed ban.
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Chapter Five
From 1950 onwards the Communist Party readjusted its strategies, 
changing over from an 'adventurist* policy to a united front policy* 
Its leaders, L*L. Sharkey and R. Dixon, revived the doctrine that 
the Party's first task was to defeat reaction (embodied in the Menzies 
Government) and that, to achieve that end, it had to make common cause 
with the progressive and traditionalist elements in the A*L*P* at both 
the industrial and political levels. Once the Labor Party had taken 
power, they suggested, its right wing would lose support and the party 
as a whole would become more progressive; eventually it would fuse 
with the Communist Party and institute People's Power in Australia*
Chapter Six
Between 1950 and 1953, the Communists lost control of many trade 
unions to the A.L.P* Industrial Groups, organisations attached to the 
Labor Party and aimed at combatting Communist influence in the trade 
union movement* The Groups were strongly backed by the 'Movement', 
an organisation of Roman Catholics directed by B*A* Santamaria with 
the approval of the Catholic hierarchy* In defence, the Communists 
developed their united front strategy with great caution, taking care 
not to take conspicuous action which would be resented by the mass 
of traditionalist A.L.P* unionists* This approach did not prevent 
the Groupers from gaining control of such unions as the F.I.A. and 
the F.C.Ü., but it was effective in keeping them out of the more 
militant unions, such as the Miners' Federation and the W*W*F*
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PART THREE
Chapter Seven
The Labor Party split in 1955 following Dr Evatt's attack on 
the influence of Santamaria's ‘Movement* within the A.L.P.; Anti- 
Communist Labor Parties were formed, first in Victoria and later in 
Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia. In New South Wales, 
however, most of the right-wing and Grouper elements remained within 
the A.L.P. and sought to prevent the party as a whole from moving to 
the Left, the direction indicated by the radical foreign policy 
decisions taken at the A.L.P*s Hobart Conference of March 195Ö.
The Communists were disturbed by the implications of the split; on 
the one hand they were frightened that the Anti-Communist Labor 
Parties might obtain mass support and become Christian Democratic or 
even neo-fascist parties; on the other hand they were frightened that 
the right wing remaining within the A.L.P. might force Dr Evatt to 
reunify the party on the basis of anti-Communist and anti-Socialist 
policies.
In the trade union movement, the united front began steadily to 
repulse the Groupers from some of the unions they had captured earlier.
The Communist Party also considered the possibility of estab­
lishing an alliance between the working class and the small middle 
farmers, who they believed shared a common interest in fighting
capitalism
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Chapter Eight
Khruschov's denunciation of the errors of the Stalinist era» 
such as the cult of the individual and excessive rigidity in political 
organisation» sparked off a dispute within the Communist Party of 
Australia. A number of 'revisionists', as they were called, suggested 
that the Australian Party needed to relax its organisational discipline 
and envisage more flexible strategies if it were to take sufficient 
account of the possibility of a peaceful transition to Socialism.
Sharkey and Dixon stood firm by the principles of democratic centralism 
and forced the revisionists to leave the Party -but their arguments 
remained unanswered.
In party politics, the Anti-Communist Labor Parties had become 
Democratic Labor Parties (D.L.P.s) and came more and more to resemble 
Catholic Centre parties in outlook. Within the A.L.P., some were 
in favour of negotiating with the D.L.P., if only to secure an agreement 
to exchange preference votes in elections. Partly through this concern, 
the A.L.P. began opposing the practice of unity tickets (between 
Communist, militant and A.L.P. unionists) in trade union elections.
In fact, however, the united front held together in the trade union 
movement, although it was no longer making much headway against the 
Grouper and right-wing forces.
Chapter Nine
In February 1960 Dr Evatt resigned as Labor leader to be 
replaced by A.A. Calwell. Even before this change of leadership, the
XA.L.P’s attitude towards unity tickets was hardening; in 1961 the 
party made determined efforts to enforce the ban on unity tickets 
which had been declared by the 1957 Federal Conference and reaffirmed 
on later occasions. This campaign intensified the tension within 
the A.L.P. between a left wing, led by the Victorian State Executive, 
and the right wing, led by the New South Wales State Executive. The 
Communists, in commenting on this tension, distinguished three groups; 
a clerical right wing which sympathised with the D.L.P., a traditional 
right wing anxious to stop the practice of unity tickets to improve 
the party's electoral prospects, and a rather weak left wing. They 
nevertheless claimed that the united front should be continued.
In trade union politics, however, the united front was beginning 
to break up with the result that the Communists and their militant 
allies lost control of several important unions, including the A.E.U.
The Communist Party, having survived the revisionist defection, 
also adjusted itself to the switcnover in late 1961 from a pro- 
Chinese to a pro—Soviet position in international Communist affairs. 
Its membership was still small (possibly over 6,000) and its following 
was significant only amongst certain sections of the working class.
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PART ONE
CHAPTER ONE
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION -  BEGINNINGS TO 1950
The A u s t r a l i a n  Comumnist T a r t y ,  fo rm ed  on 30 O c to b e r  1 9 2 0 ,  
b e g a n  o u t s i d e  t h e  m ain  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t n e  L a b o r  movement i n  t h i s  
c o u n t r y ,  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  L a b o r  T a r t y  ( A . L . P . )  an d  t h e  t r a u e  u n i o n s .
F o r  t h e  f i r s t  u e c a d e  o f  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  i t  r e m a in e d  a  s m a l l  i s o l a t e d  
g r o u p ,  h i g h l y  v u l n e r a b l e  and  r e l a t i v e l y  u n i n f l u e n t i a l • I n  t h e  
t h i r t i e s  i t s  m em b ersh ip  began  t o  i n c r e a s e  and  i t s  c a d r e s  made some 
i n r o a d s  i n t o  t h e  t r a d e  u n io n  movement b u t  i t  was s t i l l  n o t  an 
o r g a n i s a t i o n  t o  be r e c k o n e d  w i t h .  Sym pathy f o r  t h e  R u s s i a n  c a u s e  
d u r i n g  t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  W orld  War I I  r e s u l t e d  i n  an i m p o r t a n t  
d e g r e e  o f  p u b l i c  sy m p ath y  and  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  t h e  P a r t y ,  and  from  
t h i s  p e r i o d  o n w ard s  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  w i t h i n  m o s t  o f  t h e  m a jo r  t r a d e  
u n i o n s  becam e c o n s i d e r a b l e .  B u t t h e  p o s t - w a r  y e a r s  a g a i n  fo u n d  t h e  
P a r t y ' s  s u p p o r t  on t h e  w ane ,  i t s  h o l d  i n  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s  c h a l l e n g e d  
and  i t s  r i g h t  t o  e x i s t  a s  a  l e g a l  p o l i t i c a l  body b e i n g  q u e s t i o n e d .
W ith  s u c h  a  h i s t o r y ,  i t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  m a jo r  p ro b le m  
f a c i n g  t h e  Communist l e a d e r s  h a s  b e e n ,  and  r e m a i n s ,  t h a t  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  
f o r  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  s m a l l n e s s  o f  t h e i r  P a r t y  and  f o r  i t s  f a i l u r e  t o  
become t h e  p a r t y  o f  t h e  'm a s s e s '  i n  A u s t r a l i a n  p o l i t i c s .  To a p p r e ­
c i a t e  how t h i s  p ro b le m  h a s  a f f e c t e d  t h i n k i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  Communist 
P a r t y ,  one  h a s  n o t  o n ly  t o  c o n s i d e r  i t s  d o c t r i n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
( w n ic h ,  l a r g e l y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  su d d en  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  ' l i n e ' ,
1
2are legion) but also the attempts which the leaders have made to 
sustain historical myths which add an aura of significance to the 
tarty's ups and downs. To see the development of the Australian 
Labor movement through Communist eyes is to see the evils of 
reformism and economism at work amongst a proletariat which has 
not yet come to appreciate either its real interests or its histor­
ical mission.
The Communist's view of history deserves attention not only 
because it affords an example of the difficulties of applying Leninist- 
Stalinist dogmas to Australian conditions but also because in many 
cases the Communists have come close to a sound appreciation of the 
factors which have inhibited their influence. In one sense, it is 
true to say that the Communists know why history has worked against 
them in Australia, just as it is true to say that they believe that 
nevertheless basic economic factors are gradually creating a situation 
in which history will work for them. The mixture of realism and fan­
tasy which one encounters in the writings of L.L. Sharkey, E.W. Campbell 
and others reflects clearly tne intellectual difficulties which have 
always beset Communism in Australia.
The Labor movement, 1890-1920
Along with Labor historians, Communist writers claim that the 
great strike wave of 1890-94 was the first generalised conflict 
between Capital and Labour in Australian history. According to the
3Communists, the workers' defeat in this struggle taught them 
that, to meet the employers on their own ground, they had to organ­
ise politically as well as industrially, and that the trade 
union organisation could never alone uphold their interests in 
a direct clash with the Right. For this reason, the workers founded 
the Labor Party. But because the workers were indifferent to 
Socialism, and because the Socialists left the new party in despair, 
Labor became a liberal bourgeois party, concerned with the piece­
meal pursuit of concessions for the workers (reformism) and committed, 
as a party within the legal framework of the bourgeois State, to 
administer (when in power) in the interests of the capitalist class. 
The Communist account goes on to claim that the Labor Party, being 
liberal bourgeois in character, was able to attract support from 
a wide range of sources, from the small farmers and businessmen as 
well as pastoral, industrial and clerical workers. But there were 
bound to be tensions between such disparate elements. Campbell 
has noted that struggles such as those within the Labor Party of 
New South Wales before World War I
are rooted in the contradiction between the middle class 
character and outlook of the Labor Party and its mass 
basis in the trade union movement. Periodically, the 
membership, expressing an instinctive desire to free the 
movement of bourgeois influences and to bring it onto 
the correct path, nave revolted against the leadership.
However, chiefly owing to the absence of Socialist
4understanding, these struggles in the past have not 
succeeded. They have usually ended with the replacement 
of one set of opportunities by another.1 2
Whether such tensions could ever be exploited to attract the masses
to a genuinely Socialist party would depend on whether capitalism
became firmly established in Australia. Lenin, writing in 1913,
neld out the hope that 'when Australia is finally developed and
consolidated as an independent capitalist State, the conditions of
the workers will change, as also will the Liberal Labor Party,
wnicn will make way for a Socialist Labor Party.
The Communist thesis becomes least plausible when it attempts
to establish a 'contradiction' between the interests of the workers
and the 'middle classes' and to suggest that this contradiction
will enable a Socialist party, when Australian capitalism has fully
developed, to supplant the Labor Party as the mass party of the
Left. In fact, the evidence suggests that from its beginnings the
Labor Party has been based on a number of socio-economic groups
(wage earners, salaried workers, small businessmen, and some small
farmers), that these groups co-existed in the Labor Party without
a great deal of trouble, and that the trade unionists, apart from
1
E.W. Campbell, 'Historical Introduction to L.L. Sharkey's "Notes 
on the History of the Australian Communist Party"' in L.L. Sharkey, 
An Outline history of the Australian Communist Party, Sydney,
1944, p.ll.
2
V.I. Lenin, 'The Labour Government in Australia' in L. Sharkey 
(ed.), Australia Marches On, Sydney, 1942, p.7.
5their concern with better wages and working conditions, were not 
especially under the influence of radical or Socialist ideas. The 
Labor Party’s reformism appears to nave been acceptable to most of 
the interests which gave it electoral support, and Socialist or 
syndicalist theories of politics and class action found support 
only in certain mining and working-class conanunities. The presence 
of a large Irish Roman Catholic element in the working class was 
another factor ensuring its non-revolutionary character.
The A.L.P’s reformism and lack of doctrine helped it to estab­
lish a broad electoral appeal in the first decade of this century, 
when it expanded rapidly tnrougn the pastoral and small farming 
electorates in the countryside and the lower middle-class electorates 
in the cities. By the end of 1912, Labor was in power at the Federal 
level and in four out of the six States. The legislative achieve­
ments of the Fisher Government in Federal politics; of the Scaddan 
Government in western Australia; of the McGowan-holman Government 
in New South Wales, and of the Labor ministries in South Australia 
and Tasmania gave their supporters adequate proof that reforms for 
the underprivileged could be obtained within the framework of the 
liberal democratic state - in snort, that reformism could produce 
the goods. Socialism, under such circumstances, could hardly 
attract 'interested* support from any important group in the elec­
torate
6The First World War placed the Labor Party under considerable 
strain and to some extent damaged its prestige and political 
effectiveness. Tne main newspapers exaggerated the significance of 
the activities of the Syndicalists (especially members of the 
Industrial Workers of the World - I.W.W.j within the trade unions 
and were especially hosxile towards tne strikers in the industrial 
disputes of 1917. Such attacks affected the A.L.P's popularity 
considerably, but the worst damage was inflicted by the split in the 
party during the conscription debate. Wnen in 1916, W.m . hughes, 
the Prime Minister, tried to introduce conscription he failed not 
only to prevent his policy being defeated in a referendum but also 
to save his party being split on the issue. Along with Holman and 
other prominent figures, he left the A.L.P. to form National Labor 
Parties, which later merged with the Liberals to form the Nationalist 
Party. Their exit did little to radicalise the A.L.P. (indeed it 
emerged from the war rather less adventurous and more subject to 
Irish Catholic influence than hitherto) but effectively deprived it 
of power and office. The Queensland Labor ministry was the only 
Labor administration to survive the war period. There was a slight 
upsurge of radicalism in Sydney and Melbourne after the war, which 
was partly responsible for the adoption of the famous Socialisation 
objective by the 1921 A.L.P. Federal Conference. But this objective, 
accepted by the rank and file without enthusiasm, and ignored there­
after by Labor politicians, remained a vague symbol during the
7twenties. In the post-war period, also, trade union membership 
continued to increase under the stimulus of compulsory arbitration, 
but the unionists thus recruited were often conservative or a- 
political
Thus, between 1890 and 1920, at a time when the European 
Social-Democratic movement was undergoing significant doctrinal and 
organisational stresses, the Australian Labor movement remained 
solidly reformist and negative in doctrine. Given such a contrast, 
it is not surprising that the convulsions in the European Left which 
produced the Communist Parties of France, Germany, Italy and Belgium 
found no counterpart here. The ill-feeling between the pastoral 
workers and the graziers, and between the urban workers and their 
employers in Australia was nothing compared to the tensions which 
separated the industrial proletariat from the capitalists of 
Western Europe. The European Social-Democrats were heirs to a cen­
tury of revolutions, repression and intense class bitterness, 
hardened by their long struggle to g a m  political and industrial 
rights, European urban workers were for the most part militant anu 
open to the influence of revolutionary theories.
Doctrinal controversy, almost non-existent in the A.L.P., was 
of the utmost importance in the European Social-Democratic parties.
3
See D.W. Hawson, 'Labour, Socialism and the Working Class', 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, May 1961, Vol. VII, 
i\o. 1, pp.«7-8.
8The basic cleavage within them arose from different approaches 
to the idea of revolution. The revisionists (such as Eduard 
Bernstein) held that the socialist transformation of society could 
be achieved within the bourgeois order and that a Socialist party, 
in order to gain mass electoral support, had to be a loose, decent­
ralised body capable of enclosing as many socio-economic groups as 
possible. On the other hand, the orthodox Marxists (such as Karl 
Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg) maintained that a violent revolution was 
inevitable before the proletariat could assume power since the 
bourgeoisie would never surrender their privileges peacefully. Thus, 
they believed that a Socialist party, while it could and should 
participate in the politics of the bourgeois State, should at the 
same time be prepared to face the possibility of repression. More­
over, its organisational structure should be such that it could act 
quickly and effectively in the event of a revolutionary situation 
developing. For both contingencies a highly centralised and tightly 
disciplined organisation was essential.
The division within the West European Social-Democratic parties 
over different approaches to the idea of revolution and, in conse­
quence, organisational structure, can be roughly compared to the 
dispute between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in Tsarist Russia. 
Before 1914 the revisionists in France and Germany were gaining 
the upper hand in the Western European dispute, however, the 
orthodox Marxists increased their influence during the First World
9War, partly because of the social dislocation of the war period and 
partly because of the impact of the bolshevik Revolution in Russia.
Under the influence of the Communist International, the ortho­
dox Marxist wings of the West European Social-Democratic parties 
became increasingly militant and aggressive in the immediate post-war 
years. The German Communists soon emerged as powerful rivals to the 
Social-Democrats; a majority of the French Socialist Congress at 
Tours in 1920 decided to form a Communist Party, whereupon a minority 
reformed a new Socialist group. The new Communist Parties were the 
historical successors to the old orthodox Marxist wings of the pre­
war Social-Democratic parties and their power in the new situation 
derived not only from their militancy and their tight organisation 
but from the backing of the Soviet Union, the new citadel of ortho­
doxy. Set against this background, the formation of the Australian 
Communist Party in October 1920 did not seem particularly significant 
it could so easily have been just another adventure in Socialist 
sectarianism.
The Communist Party in the inter-war period
Sharkey has distinguished five broad periods in the growth 
of Australian Communism during the twenties and thirties. In the 
first, between 1920 and 1923, the leadership was mainly concerned 
with the task of welding into a unified wnole the various Socialist, 
revolutionary and anarcho-syndicalist elements which had joined the
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Party. At the same time, an effort was made to place the Party 
in contact with the A.L.P. and the trade unions, as part of the 
strategy of gaining access to the masses. The second period, from 
1924 to 1929, was an unsuccessful one, according to Sharkey. A 
phase of economic stability strengthened the reformist elements in 
the Labor Party, and these used their influence to close A.L.P. and 
union organisations to Communist infiltration. Instead of meeting 
this challenge, the Communist leaders (especially J. Kavanagh and 
J. Ryan) also stressed the need for the Communists to keep themselves 
separate from the A.L.P. and discouraged Party members from accepting 
trade union office unless the members of the union concerned werel
in favour of Communism, iiavanagh refused to follow the line laid 
down by the Comintern in 1928 of waging war on the reformists and of 
making a concerted bid for leadership of the masses. Pointing out 
that Moscow was 15,000 miles away and that it did not understand 
Australian conditions, kavanagh and his colleagues stood their ground 
until they were removed (as right-wing deviationists) from the 
Party’s Central Committee in December 1929. h. moxon became the new 
General Secretary but he was expelled from the Party in 1931 and 
replaced by J.B. Miles, whose ally L.L. Sharkey took over the Presi­
dency in the same year.
The third period (a rather confused episode between 1930 and 
1934) was ushered in by the new leadership's determined intervention 
in the industrial disputes of the depression period. The Party
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helped the miners to combat lock-outs, organised the unemployed, 
and helped resist the Premiers’ Flam and the New Guard movement, 
hut in conformity with the anti-reformist line, it refused to co­
operate with the Labor Party in such 'struggles’. This, as Sharkey 
admitted, reduced its chances of attracting a considerable mass 
following, although its own membership did increase during the 
depression. In particular, in Sharkey’s view, the Party erred in 
not joining with movements inspired by 'Langism’, such as the pro­
tests against the Premiers' Plan and the Labor Army which J.T. Lang 
(the Labor Premier of New South Wales, 1930-32) formed to resist 
the New Guard. Looking back on these years, Sharkey argued that the 
Party correctly criticised Lang but tnat it
did not sufficiently develop proposals of its own, aiming 
at carrying the mass movement beyond Lang, did not develop 
united front tactics sufficiently with the masses supporting 
Lang, did not link itself with and become an integral part 
of this mass movement...,"*
Another opportunity for the Party to establish contact with the 
'masses’ came in the fourth period, that of the Popular Front and 
the struggle against War and Fascism (1935-39). In line with the 
directives of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern (1935), Australian 
Communists sought to work more closely witn the A.L.P. and the 
reformist trade unions (although they continued to oppose Lang's break­
away Labor group in New South Wales). They directed their strategy
4
L.L. Sharkey, An Outline history of the Australian Communist 
Party, p.26.
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to appealing beyond the workers to the 'small farmers' and the 
'middle class' groups wnich appear frequently in the Communist 
writings of this period. The Party's membership continued to grow, 
and for the first time it became important in Victoria and Queensland. 
But despite its efforts to establish a united front of all anti- 
fascists(wno were not very numerous or powerful in Australia in any 
case) the A.L.P. redoubled its efforts to close its ranks against 
the Communists. Its 1937 Federal Conference passed a resolution for­
bidding Labor Party brancnes or members from associating with 
Communists in united front activities. The fifth period began in 
September 1939 wnen the Communist Party, in keeping with the new 
Moscow line, opposed the war against Germany as one waged for 
imperialist purposes. In 1940 the Menzies Government banned the 
Party on tne grounds that it was subverting the war effort, but after 
June 1941, following the invasion of tne Soviet Union by Germany, 
tne Australian Communists threw tnemselves benind tne war effort.
The Curtin Labor Government raised the ban on their Party in the 
following year.
Sharkey outlined tnis view of his Party's first two decades 
snortly afterwards in An Outline History of the Australian 
Communist Party (1944). Perhaps his main purpose was to justify
L.F. Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2nd ed., Adelaide, 1954, p.84.
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the policy of co-operating with the Labor tarty whicn the Communists 
were then pursuing, but he was also concerned to explain why the 
tarty had failed to attract mass support in the inter-war years, 
tart of his explanation was that the Labor tarty’s reformist leader­
ship, as well as the reformist leaderships of the trade unions, had 
systematically sought to isolate the masses from contact with the 
Communists, but he also placed some of the blame on certain Communist 
leaders themselves, such as Kavanagh in the late twenties and Moxon 
in the early thirties, however, he was really evading the central 
issues. Two questions are involved here. The first concerns the 
importance of its Russian connection in determining the prospects of 
the Australian Communist Party; to what extent did the strategies, 
and the frequent changes of line, directed by the Comintern create 
difficulties for the Party in Australia? Further, was the organi­
sational mecnanism of democratic centralism suited to the tasks of 
the Party, particularly those of establishing and maintaining contact 
with the working class, the small farmers and the middle class?
The second broad question is whether an Australian radical party 
which was not so organised and which had no connection with Russia 
could really, given the conditions of the twenties and thirties, 
have taken over the electoral following of the A.L.P. and become 
the new mass party of the Left.
Let us consider the last of these questions first. It is doubt­
ful whether a new radical party, unhampered by foreign connections,
14
could have constituted a serious threat to the Labor Party before 
World War II, Although Labor remained in power in Queensland 
throughout the inter-war years (except for the 1930-32 term), and 
although Labor ministries did hold office for some periods in most 
of the other States, it is nevertheless true to say that the A.L.P. 
throughout this period was virtually a party of opposition, and that 
as such it was able to retain the loyalty of discontented groups 
which might otherwise have looked further Left for representation.
At the Federal level Labor was in power only in the term 1929-31 
during the whole period from 1917 to 1941. Except during the worst 
years of the depression, moreover, the trade unions remained fairly 
content with the treatment they received through the system of 
compulsory arbitration. Only in the more militant unions, such as 
those representing miners and transport workers, was there much 
support for a more radical brand of politics than that provided by 
the A.L.P. In fact the worst depression years (1930-34) were the 
only ones in which the rise of a new left-wing party was at all a 
possibility; and indeed it is possible to imagine that the support 
which centred on J.T. Lang in New South Wales could have gone, under 
different circumstances, to a party of the social-democratic variety. 
Finally, despite the New Guard, fascism was never an immediate 
social danger in Australia and only intellectuals and militant trade 
unionists were seriously concerned about its rise in Europe. In 
France and Belgium, on the other hand, the popular fronts which were
lö
formed to combat fascism provided the Communist Parties in those 
countries with their first important opportunity to win away mass 
support from the Social-Democrats,
There is no doubt that the Australian Communist Party's links 
with the Soviet Union seriously hampered its political activity.
Its foreign connection earned it the reputation of being a subversive 
organisation (which it enhanced by its talk of revolution) and of 
being a foreign agency. The rapidity with which the Australian Commu­
nists fell into line with directives from Moscow, especially in 1935 
and in 1939, increased the impression that it was in fact acting under 
instructions from the Comintern. At the same time, the Party's 
ability to assess Australian conditions correctly and to formulate 
strategies appropriate to them was weakened by its surprising depen­
dence on Soviet doctrine. The orthodox Marxism of pre-war days had 
been difficult enough to apply to situations outside Western Europe 
but Leninist-Stalinist dogmas were even more so. Since the 
Communist Party in Australia remained a small party, relatively iso­
lated from its own society, it tended to become more rigid in its 
acceptance of Soviet direction and showed little of the subtlety 
evident in the way the larger European parties implemented Soviet
directives
16
Democratic centralism and the Australian Communist Partyg
In addition, democratic centralism, which the Party had 
adopted as a method of organisation in the middle twenties, provided 
further obstacles to Party growth during the inter-war period (and 
in subsequent years). Under democratic centralism the basic unit 
of the organisation is the factory or locality ceil, which meets at 
least weekly. Since the late thirties Party cells nave become known 
as branches. Factory cells were a relatively new form of organisation 
when they appeared in the twenties. Unlike the Social-Democratic- 
type branches, they organise the workers at their places of work thus 
making contact between members easier and more intimate. Locality 
cells, designed for housewives, farmers, intellectuals, self-employed 
members and so forth, are akin to a half-way house between the factory 
cell and the Social-Democratic-type branch.
Cells are not allowed to communicate and work with each other 
as are A,L,P. branches but are connected by a series of vertical 
links to higher organs of the Party. Thus cells can only make contact 
with one another tnrough the medium of the next higher organ, the 
section, which is composed of delegates from the various cells. Cell 
delegates to the sections have a dual responsibility both to their
6
For excellent descriptions of democratic centralism, see 
G.W. Grainger, 'Oligarchy in the British Communist Party', British 
Journal of Sociology, June 1958, Vol. IX, No. 2, pp.143-58, and 
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity 
in the Modern State, 2nd ed., London, 1959, pp.47-50, 57-8.
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cell members and to the section. Sections, in turn, can only 
communicate with each other through their delegates at the district 
level. The districts elect delegates to the State conferences and 
both of these bodies send delegates to the supreme Party organ, the 
National Congress, wnich met annually in the twenties but has been 
neld approximately every three years since the early thirties. At 
each level below the National Congress the various organs elect 
committees and executives.
National Congress elects the Central Committee which meets 
three or four times every year. From its members the Central Committee 
elects the Political Committee, which meets weekly and is in charge 
of the Party's day-to-day activities and the Central Control 
Commission which, although it receives little publicity, possesses 
a considerable amount of power on matters of discipline, security 
and finance. The Central Committee is also in charge of the various 
committees (women's, wedical, Arts and Sciences and so forth) which 
cater for professional or social groups. However, it is the Political 
Committee wnich elects the most important body in the Party, the 
Secretariat, comprising the General Secretary ^the key post), the 
President and, since the mid-forties, two other members. The Party's 
Constitution does not make any specific provision for either the 
Secretariat or the positions of General Secretary and President.
The advantages of the cell system over the branch system are 
obvious. The leadership’s existence is not dependent upon the
18
support of strong regional blocks* Furthermore, power is vested 
at the top whereas in the A.L.P. it is situated at the regional 
or district level. Consequently, the Party can manoeuvre rapidly 
in any given situation. Alterations in the composition of the leader­
ship are decided by the leaders tnemselves and approval is invariably 
given by the National Congress, many of whose delegates are full-time 
Party functionaries who could be dismissed by the leadership and all 
of whom are as near to being completely reliable as the system can 
ensure.
Thus, the leadership is secure and virtually self-perpetuating
unless old age, illness or doctrinal heresy intervenes. There have
been remarkably few changes in the top leadership of the Communist
Party since 1931 wnen J.B, Miles and L.L. Snarkey took over the
7two leading positions. Sharkey was then in his early thirties and 
Miles in his early forties. Comparatively young men of promise and 
proven reliability can be rapidly promoted to leading positions under 
this method of organisation and the average age of Party functionaries 
has, in most periods, been low compared with officials in other 
political parties,
7
Miles retired as General Secretary on the grounds of ill-health 
at the 1948 National Congress and was succeeded by Sharkey. R. Dixon, 
who had been Assistant General Secretary since 1937 moved up at the 
same time to become President wnile J.C. Henry of Queensland filled 
the newly created position of Organising Secretary (Tribune, 12 May 
1948).
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Another advantage of democratic centralism is that it can 
effectively resolve divisions within the Communist Party and thereby 
ensure doctrinal unity. At all levels the decisions of higher 
organs are binding on lower Party organs. The vertical link form 
of organisation prevents dissent in one cell spreading to other 
cells. Moreover, sections can be contaminated only by way of cell 
delegates but these have already been selected on the grounds of 
proven reliability and the degree of reliability increases the higher 
the organ involved. Thus, the leadership can intervene with remark­
able effectiveness as soon as dissent is detected within the Party.
As with Social-Democratic-type branches, cells are suitable for 
discussion meetings and, to a lesser extent, electoral activity, 
however, an important advantage of the cell system over the branch 
system is that it enables a Communist Party to convert itself into 
a clandestine body at a moment's notice. This was dramatically shown 
during World War II in Europe when the Communist Parties, particularly 
those of France and Belgium, quickly went underground while the Social 
Democratic underground movements took a considerable time to organise 
themselves after the arrest of their leaderships. Thus, the cell 
system is both an excellent form of organisation for action 
(especially revolutionary action) and an effective form of insurance 
against the possibility of repression.
Democratic centralism also ensures that the leadership does 
not completely lose contact with the rank and file of the Party since
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the leaders at each level not only have to carry out the instructions 
of the leadership but they also have to inform the leadership of the 
response which the directives receive. At the lower levels in 
particular strenuous efforts are made to convince doubting members 
of the correctness of the leadership's decisions. In addition, for 
several months before each National Congress relatively frank dis­
cussion on the Draft Resolution (prepared by the leadership) occurs 
at all levels. In practice, however, the democratic content of 
democratic centralism tends to break down, least of all in the larger 
West European Parties where a feed-back of ideas from the rank and 
file does take place. On the other hand, smaller organisations such 
as the Australian Party are subject to an excessive degree of central­
isation, which in turn enhances the already dominant role of the 
leadership. In all Communist Parties the leadership not only controls 
the organisational apparatus but it also regulates the degree to which 
discussion in the Party operates.
The disadvantage of the cell system is that it is difficult to 
adapt to the needs of a mass party. When the French and Italian 
Communist Parties attempted to expand they relied more on locality 
cells than on factory cells. But these two Parties were already mass 
parties before the cell system was applied to them: they grew, to 
a large extent, in spite of and not because of democratic centralism. 
The Australian Party, on the other hand, was initially a small 
organisation and its prospects of expansion were handicapped by the
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cell system. In spite of this factor the cell system does at 
least ensure that membership losses will be minimised in a period 
when the tarty is either stagnant or declining. However, although 
the European Parties had lost a considerable amount of their initial 
support by the late twenties, the factors which enabled them to 
expand in the thirties were either completely absent or of considerably 
less importance in Australia. Since the Australian Party was small 
from the outset it has always found itself in a vicious circle: 
miniscule because there was no social basis for its growth and its 
smallness in turn leading to an excessively centralised and inflexible 
organisation with a leadership whose sensitivity to changes in the 
international line was well-known among Communists the world over.
In addition, some members, seeing the Party as the vanguard of the 
most class-conscious section of the working class, have not in fact 
wished to see a mass organisation develop. The isolation of the 
Party within Australian society has reinforced the sensitivity of 
the leadership to minor changes in the international line. In 
interpreting the line, they have never taken sufficient account of 
the economic and social conditions existing at any given time in 
Australia itself.
The Communist Party during World War II
Until June 1941, when the Soviet Union was invaaed by Germany, 
the Australian Party was opposed to what it described as an
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'imperialist war'. It was declared an illegal body by the toenzies 
Government in 1940 and although legality was not restored to the 
Party by the Curtin Labor Government until December 1942, it 
operated quite openly after the entry of the Soviet Union into the 
war. The heroic feats of the Red Army led many Australians to shed 
their previous antipathy towards the Party which lost its reputation 
as a subversive body. In fact, its new popularity enabled the 
Communist Party to depict as subversive those groups opposed to an 
all-out war effort. During the war, 4,000 Communists served in theg
armed forces, a very high proportion of total Party membership as 
compared with other political parties. 'One out of every 5 A.C.P. 
members joined the Services, although Party membership is largely 
recruited from industrial workers, including women, called upon to
9do the job of production.' Sharkey reported in 1945 that twelve
members, or more than one quarter, of the Central Committee were ex-
10servicemen of either World Wars I or II.
The war situation gave the Party an important opportunity to 
make a bid for mass membership; for the first time, the Russian 
connection became a positive advantage. The Party's Thirteenth
8
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National Congress, held in March 1943, declared that its objective
was to establish an anti-fascist national front, the most decisive
feature of which would be 'the alliance between the working class
on the one hand, and the working farmers and the mass of middle
class people of the towns, who together form the majority of the
population, on the other.'^ In declaring its support for the Curtin
Labor Government, the Party also appears to have hoped that at last
history was working for its cause, that the Labor Party would provide
the conditions for the final stage of capitalism in Australia. The
1943 National Congress stated that the Curtin Government 'represents
most clearly the historic role of the Labor Party - the development
12of Australia as a unified, independent, capitalist nation.' The 
new confidence wnich pervaded the Party during this period encouraged 
it to entertain electoral ambitions wnich would have been completely 
unrealistic in pre-war days.
The Party's leadership was in the hands of dependable, tough 
and capable men. Many of the leaders, including Sharkey, had spent 
some time training in Moscow and, unlike the leaders in the twenties, 
Sharkey and Miles were completely reliable in the implementation of 
changes in the international line. Indeed, Sharkey had been whole­
heartedly behind the 1935-39 line in spite of being a leftist by
IT
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nature. Sharkey had also served on the Executive Committee of the
Comintern between 1935 and 1943, when it was dissolved. That
Sharkey was determined had been shown in 1929 when, along with only
H. Moxon of the Central Committee members, he gained Moscow’s backing
and succeeded in defeating the existing right-wing leadership of
the Party. The great majority of full-time Party functionaries came
from industrial working-class backgrounds although there was a
sprinkling of middle-class intellectuals such as Ralph Gibson and
later E.F. Hill. Both Sharaey and Miles had held official positions
in small trade unions in the twenties.
Party membership grew rapidly during the 'People's »»ar1 (1941-
1345), In 1940 it stood at only 4,000, but between only May and
December 1942 it increased from 7,200 to 16,000 and by march 1943
had reached 20,000, after which the rate of growth declined conside-
14rably. The membership reached a peak of 22,052 in December 1944, 
but dropped afterwards. A high proportion of the members resided 
in New South Wales - 9,000 out of 20,000 in 1944.^ Some success 
was even recorded among farmers, 300 of wnom joined the Party between
13
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16June and December 1942. Of the 11,000 Communists resident in
New South Wales in 1945, 1,500 lived in ’country areas’ as compared
17witn only 200 in 1943. U.W. Bailee, the Party’s agrarian leader
and a prominent poultry farmer, began to broadcast extensively over
New South Wales country stations in this period.
During the war the administrative expenses of the Party were
not high and at the same time dues and donations kept on increasing.
In May 1943 the Newsletter Printery along with the well-known sporting
paper, the Newsletter, was purchased. The impressive Marx House in
George Street, Sydney, was bought for £30,500 in 1944 to serve as
18Party headquarters. In the final year of the war it was reported 
that the Party was spending £50 a week on the 'Voice of the People’ 
radio session alone.
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that membership duties were 
not particularly onerous during the war, members began to drift 
out of the Party, especially after the establishment of the Second 
Front in Europe in 1944. Many of these members of short duration had 
joined the Party out of a vague sympathy for the Red Army at 
Stalingrad and were later repelled by the fact that Party membership
16
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e n t a i l e d  a l l  a s p e c t s  of l i f e  be ing  in f lu e n c e d  by Communist id e o lo g y .  
That a h igh  tu rn o v e r  o f  members e x i s t e d  i s  r e v e a le d  by th e  d i s ­
c lo s u re  t h a t  between 1 Ju ly  and 31 December 1944 3,500 new members 
20were r e c r u i t e d ,  y e t  th e  t o t a l  membership in c re a s e d  by only 2,052
21between March 1943 and December 1944. These r e s ig n a t io n s  were
coun te red  t o  some e x te n t  by th e  amalgamation of th e  Communist P a r ty
22w ith  th e  S t a t e  Labor P a r ty  of New South  Wales in  1944. however, a
m a jo r i ty  of the  S t a t e  Labor P a r t y ' s  membership, e s t im a te d  a t  10,000 
23in  1943, could  n o t  nave jo in e d  th e  Communist P a r ty .  A f te r  th e  
e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  th e  S ta t e  Labor P a r ty  in  1940, fo l lo w in g  th e  i n t e r ­
v e n t io n  of th e  F e d e ra l  E xecu tive  of th e  Labor P a r ty  (which had 
d ism issed  th e  le f t - w i n g  New South Wales A .L .P . E x e c u t iv e ) ,  i t s  
l e a d e r s h ip  had been in  th e  hands o f  P a r ty  members and sym pa th ise rs  
who had i n f i l t r a t e d  th e  New South Wales A .L .P . in  th e  l a t e  t h i r t i e s .
These l e a d e r s  t r a n s f e r r e d  to  th e  Communist P a r ty  in  1944 and f iv e
24of them were e l e c t e d  to  th e  P a r t y ' s  C e n t ra l  Committee. S h o r t ly  
a f t e r  the  amalgamation o f  th e  two p a r t i e s ,  t h e  Communist P a r ty  of
20
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Australia, as it was then known, changed its name to the Australian
Communist Party, in order to underline its Australian and patriotic
, 25nature.
The circulation of the Party press reached impressive figures
in the mid-forties. Sales of the dull theoretical monthly Communist
26jtteview reached 20,000 in 1945, while those of the Melbourne
27Guardian stood at 18,000 in tne same year“ as compared with a circu-
28lation of 10,000 in 1939. As the 1939 circulation of Tribune, read
29mainly in New South Wales, was exactly double that of the Guardian, 
it is reasonable to assume that its circulation was between 35,000 
and 40,000 in 1945. Tribune1s readership included many left-wing
A.L.P. members who admired its vitality as compared with the prosaic
30A.L.P. papers, while occasionally one of them would contribute an 
article. Tribune1s literary pages included contributions from such 
well-known Communist writers as Katharine Susannah Prichard, Jean 
Devanny, George Farwell and Archer Russell. Cartoonists George Finey
25
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and Will Mahoney, both of whom were dismissed from the Daily
31telegraph in 1944 for refusing to draw anti-Labor cartoons, also 
appeared regularly.
tarty pampnlet sales were also impressive during the war. For
many years the Party had laid great stress on the publication of
cneap and attractively produced pamphlets as a valuable propaganda
medium. Between September 1941 and February 1945 the sales of the
Australian editions of The Socialist Sixth of the World and Soviet
Strength, both by the Dean of Canterbury, were 210,000 and 75,000
respectively. Even the sales of The Communist Manifesto stood at
3216,000 over the same period. By 1946 Len Fox's Guilty Men and a
Party programme pamphlet entitled Vote Yes for Bomes and Jobs had
33sold 64,000 and 70,000 copies respectively.
Before the war, Communist candidates at Federal and State 
Elections had seldom recorded more than a few hundred votes each but 
the pattern changed completely during the war. In 1943, 15 Commu­
nists contested House of Representatives seats at the Federal Election 
and polled 80,427 votes. A considerable number of candidates polled 
between 4,000 and 8,000 votes and in the Queensland seat of Herbert, 
F.s». Paterson recorded the highest vote, 20,629, which represented
31
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34,19 per cent of the valid votes cast. The increase in Communist
electoral support was, however, translated into success on only one
occasion, F.W. Paterson represented Bowen, which formed part of the
Federal electorate of nerbert, in the Queensland Legislative Assembly
between 1944 and 1950. Although a barrister ana a former Hhodes
Scholar, Paterson had a particularly strong personal following in
Bowen wnere many waterside workers, small sugar farmers and sugar cane
cutters were to be found. An excellent local member, he became one
of the most effective back-benchers in State politics in subsequent
years, Notwithstanding his personal popularity he held the seat only
on a minority vote against Labor and Country Party opponents in 1944
and 1947 because of the 'first-past-the-post' system of voting used
in Queensland State Elections, however, in 1949, under the Labor
Government's redistribution of electorates, the seat of Bowen was
abolished and it was widely believed that such action had been taken
34to ensure Paterson's exit from Parliament. Whatever the reason, 
Paterson would have had considerable difficulty in retaining the seat 
during the peak of anti-Communism in Australia.
One of the principal factors contributing to the electoral 
failure of the Party during the war was that its strength was pocketed 
even in the electorates in which its support was relatively high.
These pockets of power were to be found in highly integrated mining
Ibid., 12 October 1949.
34
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and urban working-class areas but Party support did not show any 
tendency to spread outwards into rural and middle-class areas.
This disability disappeared to some extent at the local government 
electoral level, particularly on the coalfields where some impressive 
gains were recorded. F.W. Paterson was Australia's first Communist
Aloerman: ne served on the Townsville City Council from 1939 until
351944 wnen he was succeeded by another Party member. Idris Williams 
of the Miners' Federation was elected to the Wonthaggi Council in 
1944/ and in December of that year, at the New South Wales local 
government elections, 18 Communists were successful. Five of these 
Councillors were elected to the eight-member Kearsley Snire Council, 
which became the first (and only) Communist-controlled Council in 
Australia. Furthermore, both the nine-member Cessnock Municipal
Council and the nine-member Lake Macquarie Shire Council each con-
37tained three Communists.
The membership and electoral gains of the Communist Party during 
the war were, however, unimpressive in comparison with the remarkable 
growth of the French and Italian Parties in the same period. At 
least part of the disparity can be explained by the fact that the 
sympathy towards the Red Army and the Soviet Union that existed in
35
Guardian, 7 July 1944.
36
ibid., 8 September 1944,
37
S.M.h., 22 July 1946; Tribune, 13 December 1946
31
Australia was but a pale reflection of the Resistance kovements in 
Europe in which Communists played a leading role.
The Communist Party after World War II
Encouraged by the amount of support their Party had attracted 
during the war years, the Communist leaders in 1945 were almost cer­
tainly considering the possibility of contesting elections not only 
as a means of advancing the Party's viewpoint but with the object of 
electing members to Parliament. That this was their policy was 
indicated by several tnings - the loosening of the Party organisation; 
a renewed attempt to establisn links with the A.L.F.; the important 
use of various front organisations as means of influencing tne 
progressive sections of the middle class; the increased emphasis on 
the need for a daily Party newspaper in the immediate post-war years. 
The Communist leadership appears to have reasoned that at last the 
workers were close to a realisation that the Labor Party did not 
represent tneir true interests and that they would turn in tneir 
true representative, the Communist Party.
The organisational adjustments of this period strongly suggest 
that this was tneir policy. During the latter stages of tne war 
locality branches had for a time become more important than workplace 
branches. Indeed, tne Draft Resolution issued before the 1945 
National Congress had recommended that factory branches should be
32
replaced by locality branches/ At the Congress, however, Miles
admitted that the Draft Resolution had neen cased on 'wrong views'
39and the recommendation was defeated. This sudden change can be 
partly explained by the fact that attacks had been launched in 1946 
by Communists all over tne world against Browder, the Secretary of 
the Party in the United States of America and nis 'class- 
collaborationist' views. Although the Australian Party was thinking 
in terms of securing representation in Parliament, it was still 
acutely responsive to snifts in the international line.
Browder nad been tne most notable exponent of a trend which 
existed in all Western Parties during the war whereby references to 
Socialism were minimised ana emphasis placed on the need for anti­
fascist unity. Although the Australian Party never officially
subscribed to the extreme position adopted by Browder it did give
40his view's 'widespread publicity'. however, immediately Browder's
views came under heavy attack from European Communists, the Australian
41Party repudiated 'Browderism'. Its main virtue was said to have 
been 'in not going so far as its overseas colleagues, and in having
38
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"got out from under" more quickly.’ Sharkey admitted that some
members had advocated the deletion of all references to Socialism
in the Party press while others had wanted ‘to throw Marx out of 
43the Marx School'. Miles likewise drew attention to the presence
of 'tailism' in the Party which took the form of unconditional
support for the A.L.P. during elections ana even the view that
Communists who had been nominated for the forthcoming Federal Elec-
44tions should be withdrawn. Browder's most prominent Australian
45supporter, E. Thornton of the Federated Ironworkers' Association,
was removed from the Political Committee of the Party and reinstated
46only after he had renounced ’Browderism'.
That the Party was contemplating expansion in 1945 was indicated 
by the fact that tne proceedings of the National Congress in tnat
47year were amplified to non-delegates outside the Sydney Town Hall.
In addition, a financial statement covering the period 1 January 1943
42
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to 30 dune 1945 was publicly issued after the 1945 Congress.^0 The
statement disclosed that receipts amounted to approximately £56,000
49of which £20,000 came from membership dues. The latter figure,
nowever, seems to be an extreme under-estimate since there was an
entrance fee of two shillings ana dues of sixpence a week in 1944
for those earning above £2.10. 0. a week while for members earning
60less the respective figures were sixpence and threepence a week.^
As the average yearly membership during the period under review
was about 20,000 and after taking into account the relatively high
turnover of membership it would appear either that the statement
was consciously presented incorrectly or that a high proportion of
members were unfinancial. Whatever the explanation it is unlikely
51that funds came from overseas during this period. Sharkey stated
that 'Every penny raised by the A.C.P. comes from Australian workers,
52farmers and intellectuals.' Undoubtedly, Party members sub­
scribed generously and continuously and although many anti-Communists
53believed funds did in fact come from the Soviet Union, the Royal
48
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Commission on Communism in Victoria (1949-50) reported that there
54was 'no evidence of funds coming from overseas«' A second
financial statement, covering the period 1 July 1945 to 31 March 1948
was also issued publicly by the Party: it disclosed that receipts had 
55fallen to £48,000. Since then detailed financial statements have 
not been released.
however, even when the Communist Party was most open about its
activities, it did not release lists of the members of various Party
5Öcommittees. The British Party, on the other hand, has always made
such information available to the public. In 1945 there were 35
57members on the Central Committee of the Australian Party.
During the war the Party made strenuous efforts to gain affilia­
tion witn the Labor Party while retaining its organisational
58independence but all attempts, whether at the Federal or State
54
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level, were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, a number of left-wing
60A.L.P. trade union officials favoured the Party’s proposals. Tne
Party leadership hoped for ’something more than a United Front’ and
looked forward in vague terms to the eventual merger of the two
61parties in one united Socialist party. The only occasion at which
any important degree of unity was achieved occurred during the
'Powers’ iteferendum (1944) when the committee which campaigned for
a 'Yes' vote in New South Wales consisted of delegates from the
62Labor Party, the Communist Party and the Labor Council. Sharkey
63stated that co-operation 'reached the highest level yet recorded',
but the defeat of the Referendum proposals nas been attributed to
the unfavourable reaction of the anti-Communist section of the 
64'floating vote'. Until the Cold War really got under way, the Labor 
Party in New South Wales, in contrast with the strongly anti-Communist 
Victorian A.L.P., held a somewhat ambivalent view of the Communist 
Party, perhaps because it was still preoccupied to some extent with
59
S.ivi.ii., 29 January 1944, 2 dune 1944.
60
Tribune, 8 dune 1944.
61
L. Sharkey (ed.) Australia marches On, p.41.
62
In addition to the two Party delegates (N. deffery and H.B.
Chandler) on the six-man committee, one of the Labor Council represen­
tatives (f. Wright) was also a Communist.
63
Communist Review, October 1944^ /?. 33 £•
64
News-Weekly, 3 April 1946.
37
fighting the remnants of J.T. Lang's influence and also because 
the anti-Conmunist 'Movement' was weaker in New South Wales than
in Victoria. The official organ of the Labor Party in New South
Wales stated in 1945 that the Communist Party was not 'a political
menace' and went on to refer to the Soviet Union as 'the only
65Socialist nation'.
At no time during this period did the Communist Party consider
the A.L.P. to be a Socialist party which reflected the workers'
'true interests'. The Party's Political Committee stated:
The Labor Party is a non-socialist, liberal worker 
and middle-class party concerned with striving to reform 
the capitalist system.
The Communist Party is a socialist party of the 
workers... .ot>
Anticipating an increased membersnip, the Party leaders began
to lay ambitious plans for a daily newspaper in 1945, even though
it was estimated that the circulation of the then bi-weekly Tribune
would have to reach at least 100,000 before it would be possible
67to convert it into a daily. In March 1945 it was reported that a
65
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daily Tribune could oe expected 'soon', and in the following
year the People’s Printing and Publishing Society Ltd, one of whose
bdobjects was to bring out a daily Party newspaper, was formed.
The post-war front organisations
The front organisations of the Party were particularly active 
in the mid-forties. They enabled the Party to make contacts witn 
non-Communist progressives, helped to prevent it becoming isolated 
in Australian society, and made it possible for the Party to influence 
sections of the community which the Party by itself could not reach. 
Front organisations were invariably set up on Party initiative and 
were not the result of the taking over of existing organisations.
They were created to promote some particular object, such as friend­
ship with the Soviet Union, or to unite a professional group, such 
as writers, or to mobilize a particular section of the community, 
such as youth or women. Their membership included Party members, 
sympathisers, and idealists as well as those who, while they were 
aware that the organisational control of the fronts was in the hands 
of the Communists, nevertheless believed that the objects of the 
organisations were worthwhile. Usually the key positions of secretary 
and/or organiser were held by Communists while the relatively nominal 
positions of Chairman and/or President were held by eminent
68
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non-Communists tnus providing the fronts witn an outwara appearance
of respectability. Communist 'fractions’ within the fronts ensured
that their activities aid not conflict with the Party line.
The principal fronts in tne immediate post-war period were the
Eureka Youth League (E.Y.L.), the Australian Student Labor Feaeration
(A.S.L.F.), the New housewives' Association (N.H.A.), and the
Australia-Kussia Society (known in Victoria as Australia-Soviet house).
The E.Y.L. had been established in 1941 and was the successor
70to tne Young Communist League and the League of Young Democrats. 
Catering for youth between the ages of 14 and 30, it achieved con­
siderable popularity with young workers in Melbourne and Syaney 
since, at the time, it was one of the few bodies to provide recrea­
tional activities (especially dances and sporting functions) for 
this particular group, hrian Fitzpatrick remarked in 1944 that 
within the Labor movement 'only the Communist Party...has bothered
to go in for systematic cultivation of the interests of young people,
71industrial, political, cultural, recreational.’
Althougn the E.Y.L. was not organisationally bound to the 
Communist Party, its National Secretary nas always been a member of 
the Central Committee of the Party. Some years after the war the
70
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Party's Political Committee issued a revealing statement on the 
Communist Party's relations witn the E.Y.L.:
The League is not a Communist Party organisation, nor 
is it affiliated to the Communist Party, The League, because 
it is a working class Socialist body, is the organisation which 
stands closest to the Communist Party and regards the Party as 
the highest form of class organisation of the working class.
The League draws its ideological guidance from the Commu­
nist Party and its Program, while retaining complete 
organisational freedom and independence,‘2
73The A.S.L.F. was founded in 1940 and from the outset dominated
by the Melbourne and Sydney University Labor Clubs which in turn were
74dominated by a group of exceedingly able Communist student leaders, 
most of whom were ex-servicemen. Melbourne was the stronghold of 
Communist student influence after the war and at its peak the 
Melbourne University Party branch nad 120 members while the Labor 
Club in the same University numbered 400,  ^ Melbourne University 
students have always been more liberal and internationally-minded 
than their Sydney counterparts and Communism never exerted such a 
strong appeal in Sydney, The influence of Melbourne University
72
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The most prominent Melbourne University Communist students were 
Ian Turner, Stephen Murray-Smith, k.D. Gott and Noel Ebbels. A high 
percentage of the immediate post-war students attracted to Communism 
have since left the Party,
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Communist students in the National Union of Australian University 
Students between 194Ö and 1949 was extremely strong.
ine N.H.A. was set up in New South Wales in 194b. Two years 
later a Victorian Branch was formed following a decision of the 
Victorian Housewives' Association that Communists, who had become
influential in several Melbourne suburban branches, could not remain
77members. At no time, however, did either the N.H.A. or mrs Jessie 
Street's United Associations of Women, in which Communists were 
active, represent a threat to the well-entrenched Housewives' 
Association.
During the war a numoer of eminent Australians sponsored organi­
sations sucn as Medical Aid to Russia, Sheepskins for Russia,
7 8Australia-Soviet House and the Australian-Soviet Friendship League
79(which changed its name to the Australia-nussia Society in 194b). 
mrs Street was the first President of the Australia-Russia Society 
but was succeeded after a few months by Professor R.k. Crawford. The 
Society's Organising Secretary, Miss Jean Ferguson, was a Communist.
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Most of the veil-known Australian fronts were affiliated with
international front organisations, e.g., the E.Y.L, with the World
Federation of Democratic Youth; the A.S.L.F. (and the National Union
80of Australian University Students) with the International Union of
Students; and the N.H.A. with the Women’s International Democratic
Federation. These international fronts periodically neld World
Congresses in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to which the
Australian fronts sent delegations.
In addition, some of the cultural bodies set up by the Communists
achieved some success in the mid-forties, notably the New Theatre,
the Studio of itealist Art and the Realist Film Association. At the
time many leading non-Communist cultural figures were sympathetic
towards the Soviet Union. The first two issues of the social realist
Australian New Writing, which was published by the Communist Farty,
81sold over 20,000 copies each. William Dobell, W.E. Fidgeon and
82rial Missingham exhibited their paintings at a Party Art Exhibition;
83Peter Finch entertained at a Marx School concert; and Wilfred
80
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Thomas of the A.Ö.C. appeared in a Tribune Carnival. Most of
these non-Party progressives soon lost their war-time enthusiasm
and the writers were the only cultural group to retain strong
Communist influence until the end of the decade. A number of
vigorous young Communist writers, notably Frank Hardy, Judah Waten
and Eric Lambert joined well-established Communist writers such as
Katharine Susannan Prichard, Jean Devanny and William Hatfield.
Although the general climate of opinion created by the Cold War
led to the decline of the fronts, the strong stand adopted by the
Labor Party was also of considerable importance since it prevented
85the fronts making any real headway among the A.L.P’s left wing. 
However, tne falling away of the memberships of the fronts in the 
late forties did not appear to trouble the Party leadership unduly. 
Such an attitude is understandable since the tough post-1947 
International line meant that trade union affairs more than ever 
occupied most of the Party’s activity.
The Communist Party in the 1946 Federal Election
The Party approached the 194b Federal Election in an optimistic 
mood. The 1943 vote had been impressive and it was expected that the 
war-time enthusiasm for the Soviet Union would be converted into
84
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post-war Communist electoral support. The electoral successes
registered by the r'rencn and Italian Parties in 1945 and early 1946
reinforced sucn expectations, while the Australian Party was at the
peak of it-s power in the trade unions. Althougn the leadership did
not expect a bloc of Communist candidates to be elected, at least
a few successes were anticipated. J.B. Miles nad declared at the
1945 Congress: 'We are going to see to it that Communists go to 
ÖÖCanberra.' It was hoped tnat a small Communist parliamentary group 
would eventually become a viable alternative Left to the A.L.P. 
within the party system at the parliamentary level. The Communist 
Party based its hopes for mass backing on the assumption that the 
workers were beginning to realise that the Labor Party had been 
trying to serve two masters - the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
In the 1946 election, 14 Communists stood for House of Represen­
tatives seats: five in New South Wales; four in Victoria; two in 
South Australia; two in Queensland and one in Western Australia. Ten
of these seats were urban working-class seats, one a farming seat
87and one an urban Liberal Party stronghold (Kooyong). The two 
remaining seats (both in Queensland) both contained urban working- 
class strongholds, although one was held by the A.L.P. and the other
86
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by the Country Party. The occupations» of the Communist candidates 
were: Party functionaries - seven; trade union officials - three; 
layers - two; doctor - one; and farmer - one. In subsequent elec­
tions the proportion of Party functionaries remained fairly constant 
but the proportions of middle-class members of the professions and 
trade union olficials declined and increased respectively.
The 14 candidates polled 64,811 votes but were all defeated. 
After making allowance for sucn factors as the position of the candi­
dates on the ballot paper, changes in the size of electorates and 
the number of candidates, it is clear that the Communists did not 
poll as well as in 1943. For example, the Party vote fell in Herbert 
from 20,629 to 9,404, in Newcastle from 7,271 to 4,616, in Kooyong 
from 6,402 to 5,134 and in Perth 3,639 to 2,004. The A.L.P. vote 
also declined by comparison with its 1943 peak. The highest 
Communist vote was polled in Herbert where it constituted 15.58 per 
cent of the valid votes. Surprisingly, the figure in Kooyong was 
6.42 per cent. In seven other seats, all of them urban working-class 
seats, the vote exceeded six per cent, but only in one of these 
did the vote exceed nine per cent (tiindmarsh - 10.08 per cent).
The Party’s disappointing performance showed that its wartime 
popularity was on the wane. Public opinion was turning against it; 
the Cold War (a continuation of the pre-war hostility towards the 
Soviet Union) was becoming more and more intense; the Catholic hier­
archy was redoubling its anti-Communist campaign; and Party
46
raemoership was declining. Membership fell from 16,280 in 1945 to
8813,450 in 1946 and 12,108 in 1947. Furthermore, the Party was in
acute financial difficulties because the trend of membership had
been inaccurately predicted and over-budgeting had occurred at a
89time when income was falling sharply. Party newspaper circulation 
was also declining: between 1945 and 1948 sales of both Tribune and 
Communist Review declined by 2,000, Tribune was losing £100 an 
issue by 1948, and two of the Party’s three Sydney bookshops had been 
forced to close.
Publicly, the leadership attributed the Party's electoral set­
back in 1946 to the fact that many of its supporters did not fully 
understand the preferential voting system. R. Dixon claimed that
many who would otherwise have voted Communist voted instead for the
91A.L.P. 'from fear of a Menzies-Fadaen Government.' This claim 
could not have been serious, for remarkably few Labor Party prefer­
ences have gone to Communist candidates in the post-war Senate
88
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elections. The A.L.r. has invariably placed Communist candidates
last on its official 'how-to-vote' cards. On the other hand, if
tne Communist Tarty had been assured of A.L.T. preferences, its
92electoral prospects would have improved considerably." As it
was, the principal reason for the poor performance of the Tarty was
the solidarity of the Labor Tarty vote.
The Tarty worked for the re-election of the Federal Labor
Government in 1946, but there were few instances of formal
93co-operation between the two parties at the branch level. In con­
trast to the Australian Party, the British Party advocated an 
all-party 'National Government' in 1945, but this was probably due 
to the fact that Britain had been governed by a National Government 
during the war whereas in Australia a Labor Government had been in 
power. Moreover, Communists participated in a number of post-war 
coalition governments in Europe until 1947.
The Sharkey-Tollitt controversy
In late 1947 another change occurred in the international Comrau 
nist line following the formation of the Cominform, although there 
had been signs of it some time before. Both the Western and 
Communist blocs had been growing further and further apart since
92
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1945. The newly created Corainform declared that the world was
divided into only two camps, the ’peace-loving, democratic’ bloc
led by the Soviet Onion, and the 'imperialist' bloc led by the
United States. In its view there could be no third way; Labor
Governments were firmly placed in the 'imperialist' bloc, and as
a result came unuer increasingly heavy fire from the Communists
as the tough line was implemented. As usual the Australian Party
was quick to change and its concern with the implementation of the
line led to public disagreement between the British and Australian
Parties in 1948. This took the form of a series of strongly worded
letters between Sharkey and the British Party Secretary, harry 
94Pollitt. The main issue in dispute was the British Party's alleged 
failure to follow the new line and Sharkey stated that British Party 
policy towards the British Labour Government did not change 
appreciably in late 1947 and 1948. Previously, in October 1947
Sharkey bad criticized Pollitt's view that Britain was in a period
95of transition to Socialism. v In the 1948 letters (which began in 
March and were not released until August), Sharkey accused the 
British leaders of supporting tne 'class collaborationist' policies 
of the Attlee Government, particularly the latter's export drive
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which involved supporting the Marshall Plan, According to Sharkey 
these views were nothing less than 'Browderism applied to British
conditions’ which had 'reinforced social-democratic illusions among
,. ,9bthe masses•1
The British leaders rejected Sharkey's criticism but evaded the
central issues by introducing extraneous material such as the
97Browderist views once held by Thornton, Eventually, the outcome 
of the dispute was that the British Party announced a sharp break 
with its previous policy and instructed its members to step up resis­
tance to the Attlee Government's 'offensive1 against the workers' 
living standards and also to press for wage increases and oppose 
Anglo-American co-operation,^^
Although hews-Weekly compared Sharkey's role in the affair to
that of the French Communist Jacques Duclos who had attacked Browder
in 1945 and claimed that the Cominform could not act directly against
the British Party since this would evoke nationalist Communist 
99resistance, it seems clear that Sharkey did not in fact act on 
Cominform instructions but rather that he was concerned with doctri­
nal purity ana that, since he was basically an ultra leftist, the
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tough international line appealed to him personally more than 
the iy4l-45 line. It is also possible that Snarkey's interest in 
the British Party was at least partly motivated by a desire to see 
the Australian Party displace the British Party as unofficial 
adviser to the Indian Communist Party. In one of his letters Sharkey 
accused Pollitt of possessing ’an incorrect understanding of the 
present-day manoeuvres of Britisn imperialism in relation to the 
Colonial Revolution.'*^ The British Party had been advocating 
that former British colonial territories should remain in the 
British Commonwealth while the Australians, in accordance with the 
new line, nad been pressing for the complete independence of these 
territories.
At the Indian Communist Party Congress in February 1948, the 
Indian Party Secretary, P.C. dosni, who, according to Sharkey 
^a fraternal delegate at the Congress) represented the 'opportunist 
trend...which was largely influenced by the revisionism of Pollitt 
and Palme Butt', was defeated by the leader of the left-wing faction, 
B.T. itanadive. Sharkey's visit to India, however, assumed signifi­
cant since, in the views of a number of historians specialising in 
Asian Communist Parties, his talks with Malayan Communist leaders 
en route to and returning from Calcutta were connected with the
TÖÖ
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outbreak of the Malayan guerilla war in June 1948.*^* however, at
the time a number of Asian Parties were involved in civil wars and
an intermediary between the Cominform and the Malayan Communists
was completely unnecessary and, even if one had existed, he would
probably have been a Cninese Communist or a World Federation of
Trade Unions functionary. Sharkey supported the Malayan Communists
in their 'struggle for national independence' but added that it was
'a matter for the Malayans tnemselves' as to whether they should
102start an insurrection and decide on its timing ana conduct.
Another indication of the acute sensitivity of the Australian 
Party in endorsing the new international line was its volte-face 
over Yugoslavia, wnich, although previously regarded as tne model 
People's Democracy, was expelled from the Cominform in 1948. 
immediately, the Australian Party denounced the Yugoslav leaders, 
but the only repurcussion of the episode was the split in the small 
League for Democracy in Greece where the Communist majority expelled 
the President, Colonel A.W. Sheppard, and the Cnairman, W.K. Fisher, 
for adopting a pro-Tito stand.
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After the war the Communist Party was not thought of as a 
patriotic organisation by large numbers of Australians and it 
quickly regained its pre-war reputation as an 'alien* body. How­
ever, the Party's leaders have never seen the Party as being 
controlled by a foreign power. Sharkey has claimed that the existence 
of Socialism in the Soviet Union at once establishes 'a community 
of interest1 between Australian Communists and the Soviet Union:
Neither the Australian, nor any other Communist Party 
needs orders from Moscow, It is a question of studying the 
philosopny, the economic and political teaching of Marxism, 
and applying them to Australian problems.
tie continued:
There is no question of subservience to a foreign power, 
but of workers of different countries pursuing...a similar 
or identical policy, because their common starting point 
is the struggle for Socialism and the application of Marxist 
principles to the great national and international questions 
as they arise.
The Australian Communist Party has no relations, official 
or otherwise, with the Soviet Government, nor did we ever have 
such relations.1^ )5
Sharkey, however, fails to distinguish between defending the Soviet 
Union against the sweeping attacks of anti-Socialists and the 
Australian Party's uncritical justification of all Soviet actions 
and policies.
At the domestic level the tough post-1947 line obliged the 
Party to stress its independence and to increase attacks on the
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Labor Party, In addition, Australian nationalism became an impor­
tant feature of Communist policy (in contrast to the stress on 
internationalism in the thirties) and the Party represented itself
as the sole defender of Australian independence against the threat
l ü öof United States domination. At the 1948 National Congress
E.W, Campbell warned that the Federal Government's policy would lead
to Australia being 'deprived of the last shred of national indepen-
107dence by the millionaire bankers of Wall Street.'
The Party on the retreat, 1947-1949.
By the end of 1947 the optimism of the war years had disappeared. 
The establishment of the Cominform and the Soviet Union's refusal 
eitner to withdraw her armies from Eastern Europe or to settle for 
a tolerant peace treaty with Germany had resulted in a turn of feeling 
against her - and the Conmunist Parties in Western Countries suffered 
accordingly. Moreover, the rapidity with which the Australian 
Communist Party fell in with the changed Russian line revived the 
impression that it was no better than a foreign agency. Its attempts 
to exploit its trade union connections for political ends, particu­
larly by excessive use of the strike weapon, did not improve matters. 
The change was startling. In 1945 the Party had stood a good chance
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of considerably extending its electoral base and of breaking through
to the parliamentary level in Australian politics; two years later
it found itself as isolated and as vulnerable as it had ever been
during the tnirties. And yet its leaders persisted with strategies
which could only aggravate the position.
There was an air of recklessness about the way in which the Party
burned its bridges with the Labor Party. At the 1948 Congress,
Sharkey declared that the Party should not devote 'all our time and
energy' towards the re-election of Labor Governments and at the same
time called for ' tne maximum independent activity’ on the part of 
108the Party. Relations between the A.L.P. and the Communist Party
had been growing steadily worse since the great Communist-led strikes
began in 1945. Many A.L.P. leaders felt that they had been launched
109to embarrass Labor Governments. ' Very few pieces of Labor legis­
lation received Party a p p r o v a l . I n  the field of foreign affairs 
the Communists since 1945 had harshly criticized the policies of 
Dr H.V. Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs. As early as dune 
1945 Evatt was alleged to have ’moved to the Right of such Tory and
108
Snarkey, op. cit., p.20,
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These suggestions were denied by Sharkey in Tribune, 28 February 
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Exceptions being the N.S.W. Government's introduction of the 
40-hour week and Chifley's attempt to nationalise the banks and 
establish a national health scheme.
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jingo organs as the London Observer and the Daily Mail1.111 In
the following year he was accused of intriguing against the Soviet
Union,112 and the attacks continued until the Labor Government’s 
n o
defeat in 1949.
The period between 1947 and 1950 was characterised by the 
Party's failure to distinguish between tne various wings of the 
A.L.P. The Australian Party stated that 'as the Rigntwing of the 
Labor Party becomes more discredited, the more the ruling class relied 
on the Leftwing to keep the masses in check...and hold back the move­
ment towards Socialism....in some conditions, the psuedo-Leftwing of
Social Democracy can prove to be even more dangerous than the 
114Right.' No attempt was made to drive a wedge between the Groupers 
and the middle-of-the-road reformists in the A.L.P. and the trade 
unions. By thus neglecting to exploit the divisions which troubled 
the A.L.P. and the trade union movement, the Australian Communists 
ensured not only their continued isolation within the Labor movement 
but the continued presence on their Right of a united Labor Party, 
still assured of the allegiance of those very social groups to which 
the Communists were anxious to appeal.
_
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During the period of the tough international line, Party
115membership remained fairly stable; in 1949 it was about 12,500.
A £40,0u0 Fighting Fund was launched by the Party in 1949 with tne
I i 6object, inter alia, of establisning a daily newspaper, but,
although the Fund was successful, G.H. Prescott admitted that Tribune
sales had declined 'considerably’ over the previous few years and sales
117would have to be increased before a daily could be considered. The
Party's electoral support also declined. In tne New South Wales State
electorates of Balmain, Bulii and LaKemba the Communist vote at the
1944, 1947 and I960 elections respectively was: 5,lbb, 4,016, 4,668;
1,662, 2,174, 1,785; 1,063, 1,422, 678. At the 1947 New South Wales
local government elections the results went heavily against the Party
and all five Communists on tne Kearsley Snire Council were defeated.
moreover, the mass unemployment anticipated by the Party had not
arrived. Sharkey had predicted in 1946 an economic depression 'more
118severe tnan the prolonged crisis wnich broke out in 1929', and he
119continued to make similar predictions.
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The Communist vote in the 1949 Federal Election
By tne 1949 Federal Election the Party's attitude towards the
Labor Party had become extremely unfavourable. R. Dixon declared
that 'Only in minor details' did the Liberal and Country Parties
differ from the A.L.P.: 'It is an illusion to believe that the Labour
120Party is a lesser evil'. Sharkey wrote that although a Labor
Government was to be preferred to a non-Labor Government 'We cannot
121say that it is beneficial to elect the Labour Party candidates'.
he also alleged that Chifley, Calwell and McKenna were 'the main
instrument of the capitalists in tneir struggle against tne...
122working class'. Immediately before the Federal Election Tribune
declared: 'A sober analysis of Labor Party and 'Liberal'-Country
Party policies shows only differences of degree, with the Menzies-
Fadden clique more blatantly pro-fascist, pro-banker, pro-monopoly
and pro-war.’ This paper also stated that whichever of the major
political parties was successful ’the Australian workers...wil1 have
to counter fascist-like onslaughts against their rights to speak, to
124organise, to strike, to defend tneir living standards'._
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More communists contested the 1949 Federal Election than 
the previous election because of the emphasis placed on the Party's 
independent role in the Labor movement. All 35 candidates who 
contested House of Representatives seats lost their deposits and the 
total Communist vote was only 40,941. The nighest vote recorded was 
3,729 (9.58 per cent of the valid votes) in the New South Wales coal­
fields seat of Hunter. Although the Party certainly realised that 
it nad no chance of success candidates were nominated because elections 
provide an excellent opportunity to present the views of the Party to 
the public.
125The 1949 Communist Senate vote of 87,958 was, surprisingly, 
the highest ever recorded by the Party. In Victoria, where the 
Communist team gained the vital first place on the ballot paper,
41,476 votes were polled, while in New South Wales, where the Party 
was much stronger, only 26,677 votes were polled. The lower vote in 
New South Wales can be largely attributed to the Communist team's 
having being placed fourtn on the ballot paper. However, at least 
this enables us to assume that the number of unintentional Communist 
votes in New South Wales was not abnormally nigh whereas in Victoria 
the reverse was certainly the case.
Since Communists did not contest all the House of Representatives 
seats the Communist Senate vote in New South Wales makes it possible
_
Communists did not contest the Senate in either 1943 or 1946.
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to gain a good impression of the regional distribution of Communist 
votes.
COMMUNIST SENATS VOTE, N.S.W., 1949*.
Number of Electorates held byC.P. Vote Number of
Percentage Federal
Range.** Electorates A.L
0-1 17 1
1-2 14 6
2-3 13 13
Over 3 3 3
* Represented 1.70 per cent of valid votes.
** As percentage of valid votes.
The picture that emerges from the above table is that the
Party is strongest in seats held comfortably by the A.L.P. In fact,
tne geographical distribution of Communist votes is strikingly
similar to that of the Labor Party. The Party is weakest in
farming seats (and seat3 containing large country towns), and it
is strongest in mining and urban working-class 3eats. The three
divisions (corresponding to House of Representatives electorates)
in which Communists polled over 3 per cent of the valid votes were 
126West Sydney (3.98), Cunningham (4.44) and Hunter (7.51), the 
two last-named divisions containing strong mining settlements. How­
ever, in these tnree seats we find pockets of Communist strength:
126
That the Communist vote in East Sydney (2.86 per cent) was lower 
than in West Sydney can be explained to some extent by the fact 
that tne Labor M.H.R. for West. Sydney, D. winogue, was on the Right 
of the A.L.P. whereas East Sydney’s E.J. Ward was on the Left of 
the A.L.P. Ward's liberal-anarchist streak appealed to potential 
Communist voters.
öO
the subdivision of Dariinghurst (ö.öl) in West Sydney; the sub­
divisions of Woonoona (6.44), Keira (6.06) and Thirroul (6.01) in 
Cunningham; and the subdivisions of Kurri Kurri (12.49), Weston 
(9.06), West Wallsend (8.94), and Cessnock (8.92) in Hunter. More­
over, within the division of Darling (where the Communist vote 
represented 2.40 per cent of the votes), the Communist vote rose as 
high as 4.32 and 3.60 per cent, in the subdivisions of Broken Hill 
South and Broken Hill North respectively.
The low Communist vote in the countryside indicates that the
Party devotes too much of its time attempting to woo small farmers
and farm labourers. The Party continues to think of Australian small
farmers as the equivalent to the European peasantry but this group
cannot be compared to the depressed peasantries of Europe. The
latter have enabled Radical parties, including the European Communist
parties in France and Italy, to expand outside the cities. At the
turn of the century the Australian small farmers did have some
radical potential wnich took the form of demands for State credit,
marketing boards and so forth, but once these demands nad been met,
they became increasingly conservative and, to some ex-tent, came to
support the Country Party. The small farmers may be considered as
snaring many values with the urban middle class and the Party is
acting unrealistically in continuing to claim that Socialism will be
127introduced in Australia by the 'workers-farmer alliance’.
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Farmers and Workers Together for a Better Life, Sydney, 1956.
This pamphlet, the Party's Agrarian Programme, was careful to point 
out tnat small farmers would not lose their land.
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At t h e  c lo se  of  t h e  f o r t i e s  t h e  Communist P a r t y  found i t s e l f  
once more i s o l a t e d  and exposed a t  the  L e f t  f r i n g e  of  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  
P a r t y  system.  I t s  suppor t  f o r  t h e  S o v ie t  U n ion 's  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  
i t s  obedience of  Cominform d i r e c t i v e s  and,  w i th i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  i t s  
u n q u a l i f i e d  a t t a c k s  on th e  A.L.P ,  nad l e f t  i t  w i th o u t  f r i e n d s .  What 
i n f l u e n c e  i t  r e t a i n e d  was t h e  p roduc t  of  i t s  c on t inued  h o ld  on th e  
m i l i t a n t  t r a d e  u n io n s ,  but  here  again  i t s  f a i l u r e  t o  ho ld  t h e  c o a l ­
miners  on s t r i k e  beyond August 1949 c o n s t i t u t e d  an i n d u s t r i a l  d e f e a t  
of  th e  f i r s t  magnitude ,  f u r t h e r m o r e ,  in th e  c o n t e x t  of  th e  r i s i n g  
wave of anti-Communism i s o l a t i o n  meant extreme v u l n e r a b i l i t y .  Given 
t h e  p u b l i c  mood of l a t e  1949, and t h e  r e t u r n  t o  power of the  n on -  
Labor p a r t i e s ,  i t  could  only be a m a t t e r  of t ime b e f o r e  s e r i o u s  
a t t e m p t s  were made t o  impose l e g a l  s a n c t i o n s  on t h e  Communist P a r t y .  
This  was th e  P a r t y ' s  problem in  A u s t r a l i a n  s o c i e t y .  But i t s  i n t e r n a l  
problems were e q u a l ly  p r e s s i n g ;  Sharkey was now fa c e d  w i th  th e  
ex t remely  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  of  p r e t e n d in g  t n a t ,  in  shunning o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
t o  i n v i t e  mass s u ppo r t  and in provoking t h e  h o s t i l i t y  of  th e  A . L . P . , 
t h e  P a r t y  was pu rsu ing  th e  c o r r e c t  s t r a t e g y  in te rm s  o f  A u s t r a l i a n  
c o n d i t i o n s .  Although he con t inued  to  t a l k  of t h e  impending r e v o l u ­
t i o n a r y  c r i s i s ,  ana of  t h e  v i c t o r y  o f  S o c ia l i s m  on a wor ld  s c a l e ,  
i t  was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y  obvious t h a t  i t  was f a n c i f u l  t o  count  
on r e v o l u t i o n  in  A u s t r a l i a .  But t h e  l e a d e r s  con t inued  t o  w h i s t l e  
in th e  d a rk .  O b je c t iv e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  t h e y  b e l i e v e d ,  would change,  and 
u n t i l  t h i s  o c c u r r e d ,  th e  P a r ty  must r e t a i n  i t s  i n t e g r i t y  and p r e v e n t
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the rank and file from losing heart. Something of this mood was 
expressed by ii. Dixon after the disappointing performance of the 
Communist candidates at the 1946 Federal Election:
It is a very difficult matter for a new political party 
to break through the existing parliamentary political machine 
...which the people traditionally vote for. In the past many 
new parties have attempted to break through...but failed.
We will succeed because we are much more than a parliamentary 
party and do not depend upon election successes for our 
existence ,12b
128
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EXTENSION OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNION MOVEMENT BEFORE 1950
Only amongst trade unionists has the Communist Party estab­
lished an important following in Australia. Why was this so? Part 
of the answer lies in the policies adopted by the Party in its 
relations with various trade unions, and part of it lies in the 
cnaracter of the trade union movement itself. But a further question 
arises. As we shall see the extension of Communist influence in the 
trade unions has always been checked, and firmly checked, within 
certain limits. It is important to determine why such limits exist 
and what effect they have on the Communist Party in the field of 
industrial relations. The significance of this subject is at once 
apparent. As we nave noted, the Communist Party is isolated and 
exposed within Australian society; one of its defences is its tight, 
centralised organisation, which would permit it to move underground 
in the event of repression; another is its connection with the trade 
union movement, its one real access to institutional power in the 
Australian State. Tnis chapter deals with the nature and implications 
of that connection up to and including the great coal strike of 1949.
Trade unionists and the State
at the turn of the century the Australian economy was still 
heavily dependent» on the export markets provided by the United
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Kingdom. Wool, minerals, and various pastoral products were 
Australia's main export conmiodities; local manufacturing was still 
confined to sucn fields as food processing, furniture making, garment 
manufacture, and machinery repairing. The working class in the main 
cities was composed of labourers in small concerns, where the master- 
servant relationsnip was usually a personal one. Only the pastoral 
workers, the miners and workers connected with certain parts of the 
transport system (the railways, the wnarves, the coastal shipping 
services) were used to tninking of themselves as a class in conflict 
witn the capitalists, at home and abroad.
The early Australian trade unions (such as the Friendly Society 
of Carpenters and Joiners, founded in 1845, and the Amalgamated 
Society of Engineers, established in 1852) were essentially craft 
unions, concerned with negotiating for better wages and conditions 
but without resort to violent strike action. After the gold rushes, 
wnich left the colonies witn a nealtny labour market, wage levels 
were generally nigher than their English equivalents, with the 
result tnat tne workers concentrated mainly on obtaining better 
conditions and terms of work. The era of militant unionism was 
ushered in with tne formation in the seventies and eignties of the 
Amalgamated miners1 Association, of seamen's unions in Sydney and 
Melbourne, of the waterside workers' unions, and of tne Amalgamated 
Shearers' Union (a forerunner of tne Australian Workers' Union).
By the late eighties many of these were organised on an inter-state
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basis and had been instrumental in forming Trades Halls or Trades 
and Labor Councils in the main cities. Their militancy derived 
partly from their size (the A.M.A. had 13,000 members in 1886, and 
the Amalgamated Shearers' Union had 22,500 in 1889), which gave them 
a feeling of strength and solidarity in their relations with the 
employers; partly from the fact that many of their members had been 
drawn from overseas labouring coranunities witn militant traditions 
(this was particularly true of the miners); and partly from their 
contacts with working-class movements in the United Kingdom, France 
and the United States.
Before 1890 the unions, whether craft or militant, had been 
reasonably successful in obtaining concessions from the employer 
groups and from the State legislatures, but between 1890 and 1894 
there occurred a series of strikes and lock-outs which had all the 
appearance of an all-out clash between Labour and Capital in 
Australia. As such, it accentuated the militancy of the larger 
unions (except, significantly, the A.W.U.) ana prompted the mass of 
craft unionists to take part in establishing the political Labor 
Parties and to demand a more oraerly and equitable method of settling 
industrial disputes. Within twenty years of the great strikes a 
complicated conciliation and arbitration system had been erected in 
the various States, capped by the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court, kost disputes were now settled within the frame­
work of this system, which also became the means of adjusting wage
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rates in accordance with various estimates of cost-of-living scales. 
In the process, trade unionists became reconciled to the settlement 
of grievances within the legal framework thus provided, with the 
result that the various industrial courts and wage boards became 
important instruments of social control while continuing to serve 
as regulatory agencies. The innate reformism of the craft unionists 
found its institutional expression as much in the arbitration system 
as in the Labor Party.
Australian Socialists appreciated this fact from the outset, 
but many of them hoped that the coming of large manufacturing 
industries would alter the character of working-class politics, 
however, the expansion of Australian secondary production in the last 
five decades has not produced the changes which were expected. The 
growth of iron, steel and textile manufacturing in particular has 
led to the establishment of many large concerns (in 1957-58 there 
were 1,689 factories employing over 100 workers each) and to the 
creation of several industrial complexes (such as Port kembla, 
«voliongong and Newcastle), in which a true industrial proletariat 
now exists, however, the protective tariffs of the inter-war 
period have had the effect of helping to maintain the small manu­
facturing sector which survived from the nineteenth century. Thus, 
in 1957-58, fully 21,000 of the 54,000 factories in Australia were 
employing under four workers apiece.*
1
Figures from the Official lear Book, Commonwealth of Australia 
I960, p.153.
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The expansion of the workforce occasioned by industrial growth 
nas been contained within the institutional structure established 
before the First World War. The first effect of the arbitration 
system was to encourage the proliferation of trade unions (their 
number trebled between 1906 and 1921), but since the early twenties 
the trend has been towards rationalisation, with like unions merging 
to provide more efficient representation of their members, by 1959 
there were 369 unions, with 1,851,000 members, as compared with 354 
unions (with 791,OoO members) in 1935, and 382 (with 703,000 members) 
in 1921.2 Satisfaction with the arbitration system has been wide­
spread (except during the depression period) with the result that the 
unions have come to include a higher proportion of the working class 
than any other western country; 44.7 per cent of the total of adult
employees in Australia had been unionised by 1935, and this proportion
3has now reached a level of between 58 and 59 per cent. Throughout 
this period the machinery of arbitration has been continually refined 
to cope with the growth of the unions and the increased complexity 
of industrial relations, had the arbitration system proved unable to 
adjust itself to the changing circumstances, the trade unions might 
have reverted to the methods of free bargaining which were used
2
Figures (which allow for interstate duplication) from ibid., 
p.464; 1936, p.569; 1922, p.853.
3
Figures from ibid., I960, p.465; 1936, p.571.
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during the nineteenth century. The result would probably have been 
a drastic reduction in the number or unions, an improvement in 
their organisational efficiency, and an increased militancy amongst 
trade unionists in general. But because the arbitration system per­
sisted (despite the stresses of the depression period) most unions 
have remained comfortably reformist in their outlook, easy-going in 
their organisational methods, and anti-radical (if not anti-Labor) 
in their politics. The Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(A.C.T.U.), established in 1927, nas remained a loosely organised 
association of the unions, reflecting more the character of the 
smaller and craft unions than that of the larger unions.
The traditionally militant unions, such as those representing 
the various groups of transport workers, the watersiders and the 
miners, were joined in the inter-war period by a new group of radical 
unions representing the workers of the large factories. In the 
thirties, for example, the Federated Ironworkers' Association, the 
Sheet Metal Workers' Union and the Amalgamated Engineering Union came 
to the fore.
Communist strategies and the trade unions
The Communists, in their policy towards the trade unions, were 
forever coming up against the limits which the arbitration system 
created for them. Wnile it was possible for them to exercise some 
influence in the affairs of the militant unions, they found it 
virtually impossible to make much headway in the smaller craft unions
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and in tne nierarchiai conservative unions such as ^he A.W.U. An 
awareness of this difficulty probably informed Sharkey’s statement 
that:
The function of Arbitrationist legalism is to prevent strike 
struggles and to enforce the acceptance, by law, of a low 
standard of living, it will at once be seen that Arbitration 
is detrimental to the development of the class struggle and 
class consciousness and of that genuine and fundamental 
solidarity and perfected organisation necessary to the revo­
lutionary struggle for Socialism.'*
Campbell, taking the same line, depicted the arbitration system as
Q
•a liberal capitalist and not a working class measure.’ Sharkey 
went even further in describing it as a means of keeping the workers 
'eternally shackled to the capitalist class’.
In their relations with the trade unions, the Communists 
observed two general principles. One was to identify themselves 
with the traditions associated with the militant unions, the other 
was to work within the arbitration system where they had achieved 
union leadership - but only as a means to the end of weaning the 
unions away from that system in the long run. In keeping with the 
first of these principles, the Communist Party has stressed the 
importance of the strike tradition in industrial relations, wnile
4
L.L. Sharkey, The Trade Unions, cited in An Outline History of 
the Communist Party, p.10.
5
Loc. cit.
6
L.L. Sharkey, The Trade Unions, Revised ed., Sydney, 1959, p.20.
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at the same time pointing out that the strike weapon should be used 
for political as well as economic purposes. To quote again from 
Sharkey:
Despite arbitration and reformism, the Australian trade 
union movement has a tremendous record of strike struggles 
and great fighting traditions.
The Communists must base themselves on these traditions, 
popularise them,..showing that it was these struggles, and 
not arbitration court decisions, that really established the 
living conditions of the Australian masses. {
But Snarkey was also aware of the need for ruse ana contrivances
until the majority of unionists are convinced of the real 
damage done to the working class under the arbitration system, 
communists have to represent their unions in the various 
tribunals set up by this legislation, in this way they avoid 
losing contact with tne masses.0
From the outset, then, the Communists set themselves to work 
within the existing trade union structure ^and to accept the 
arbitration system for tactical purposes) rather than embarking on 
tne alternative course of forming their own trade unions on 
specifically Communist lines. Having gained access to the existing 
trade unions, however, the Communists then faced the problem of 
deciding to what lengths their acceptance of trade union customs, 
especially in the matter of strikes for economic purposes and of 
settling disputes peacefully and legally, was to be carried. By
7
Ibid., p.22.
8
Ibid., p.21.
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accepting these customs they were in fact helping to sanctify the 
institutions they were committed to break down, and admitting the 
separation of their policy in trade unions from their policy as a 
revolutionary party, The conflict of aims here has never been 
resolved, While the Communist leaders have been anxious to extend 
their Party’s hold over the unions, they have also been concerned to 
use this nold to further the Party's general strategy within the 
party system. Hence their recurring emphasis on the need to regard 
tue strike weapon as a political weapon, that is, as a means of 
increasing the workers' awareness of their revolutionary role in 
society. Sharkey, having deplored the widespread vogue of 'economism' 
(a preoccupation with wages and work conditions) amongst unionists, 
went on to point out:
Political strikes are a higher form of struggle than economic 
strikes. Such strikes challenge the Government, the State, 
the rule of the capitalist class. One of our chief trade 
union tasks is the politicisation of strikes.^
These two aims are not strictly compatible. There has always been
a tension between the Party’s policy of infiltrating the trade unions
and that of using its trade union influence to ’politicise' strikes.
Communism in the trade unions during the inter-war period
A few of the Communist Party's early leaders, notably J. Garden 
and J. Howie of the New South Wales Labor Council, were prominent
ibid., p.30.
9
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in the trade union movement but most of its leaders after the mid­
twenties were drawn from outside the ranks of senior trade union 
officialdom. It was not until the thirties that Communists were 
again to attain key posts in large unions and strong bases in several 
important industries were acquired. During this decade many of the 
Party’s younger members became active trade union cadres. In many 
ways, the Party at this period was turned into an organisation of 
militant trade unionists.
Communists were elected to the following positions in the 
thirties: W. Orr, General Secretary of the Miners' Federation (1933); 
C. Nelson, President of the Miners' Federation (1934); Dr Lloyd Ross, 
Secretary of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian railways' 
Union (A.R.U.) (1935); T. Wright, Secretary of the New South Wales 
Branch of the Sheet Metal Workers' Union (193ti); J. Healy, General 
Secretary of the Waterside Workers' Federation (W.W.F.) (1937);
E. Thornton, National Secretary of the Federated Ironworkers' 
Association (F.I.A.) (1937); T. Garland, Secretary of the South 
Australian Branch of the Gas Employees' Union (1937); and D. Thomson, 
Secretary of the Building Trades Federation in Victoria (1938). 
Several of these unions already had an established tradition of mili­
tant strike action before the Communists took over their leadership, 
but several of the new unions were introduced to militant industrial 
politics by the Communists. The Communist trade union leaders were 
mostly young, energetic and able men and they were able to infuse new
73
ideas and policies into a movement which had been partly demoralised 
and weakened by the depression. The officials whom the Communists 
replaced were mainly old and tired reformists, whereas their Commu­
nist successors were easily able to identify themselves with a 
tradition of unionist militancy which dated from the days of the 
l.W.W, and the One Big Union, In addition, their task of winning 
and maintaining control was made easy by the lack of interest which 
many unionists displayed in union affairs. As Dr Lloyd koss has 
written:
Communists attend meetings regularly, they are eager to take 
office, they are ready to take the thankless job of shop 
steward, and they are tireless in raising industrial issues. 
Disciplined by their creed and their party, they conquer 
personal ambition, put aside jealousies, ana follow a care­
fully prepared plan in every meeting they attend.
Thus, one should not overestimate the difficulty in actually gaining
trade union positions in this period. Once having achieved power,
the Communists, through their ability to obtain concrete concessions,
gained the support of a large section of the members of their unions,
although most oi these were (and would remain) A.L.P. supporters
during elections. The majority of members of the governing bodies
of unions with Communist secretaries were Labor Party supporters but
most of them approved of the militant industrial stand adopted by the
Communists.
TÖ
Lloyd koss, 'Communism in Australia’, Far Eastern Survey, 26 
December 1951, Vol. XX, J\o. 22, pp.220-1.
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having established important positions in the unions, the 
Communists could have proceeded to establish breakaway unions in 
certain industries. In fact, such a strategy was attempted in only 
one case, when the Pastoral Workers’ Industrial Union broke away from 
the A.W.U. in the early thirties. The Communists in the A.W.U. found 
that the union's right-wing leadership was determined to crush left- 
wing opposition and, since the international line of the period 
stressed the Party’s independence and sanctioned attacks on the 
'social-fascists', an attempt to form an alternative (and Communist- 
controlled) pastoral workers' union was attempted. The experiment 
failed and was not repeated, not only because the Party line softened 
in the mid-thirties but also because it became doubly clear that any 
breakaway union would suffer gravely if it were not recognised by 
the Arbitration Court. With this exception, therefore, the Communists 
chose to work within the existing union framework in the hope that 
their militant attitudes would belie their acceptance of reformist 
practice•
Communists in the trade unions during World War II
During World War II, the Communists consolidated the victories 
of the thirties and made heavy gains in many other unions. Until 
the Soviet Union entered the war in 1941, Communists were opposed 
to the war effort and continued to press for increased wages even 
if such a policy involved frequent strikes (as indeed it did on the 
coalfields in 1940). Communist industrial policy between 1939 and
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1941 was n e a t ly  summed up by Thornton when he s ta t e d  th a t  h i s  
u n ion , th e  F . I . A . ,  had
d e l i b e r a t e l y  and in  a planned way heen in v o lv e d  in  more 
s t r i k e s  tnan o th er  unions in  th e  l a s t  few y e a r s ,  Tnese were 
not j u s t  th e  sp o ra d ic  s t r i k e s  t h a t  are t y p i c a l  o f  th e  
c o a l f i e l d s ,  but planned s t r i k e s ,  because we maue s t r i k e s  out  
b u s in e s s  1
These s t r i k e s  le d  A.W. i'adaen, tn e  A ctin g  Prime M in is t e r ,  t o  admit
12t n a t  he would p r e fe r  even H i t l e r  t o  'Union L e f t i s t s ' ,  Yet because  
a c o n s id e r a b le  number o f  trad e  u n i o n i s t s  f e l t  th a t  th e  war was both  
remote and u n r e a l ,  the  P a r t y 's  o p p o s i t io n  t o  the  'phoney war' d id  
n ot r e s u l t  in  a se tb ack  to  i t s  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r e n g t h ,  Moreover, th e  
presen ce  o f  a non-Labor Federal Government m erely  accen tu a ted  t h i s  
f e e l i n g  among u n i o n i s t s .
A f te r  th e  German in v a s io n  o f  the  S o v ie t  Union in dune 1941,
however, th e  P a r t y ’ s i n d u s t r i a l  p o l ic y  changed com p le te ly  and
Communists oegan to  advocate i n d u s t r i a l  c o n s c r ip t io n ,  w age-pegg in g ,
o v e r t im e ,  th e  su p p ress io n  o f  s t r i k e s  and the  e x te n s io n  o f  compulsory
m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e .  As Sharkey s t a t e d  in  1942:
In c r ea se d  p rod u ct ion , e f f i c i e n c y ,  c o n t in u i t y  o f  work, 
were now as im portant as s t r i k e s  in  o th er  pnases o f  d eve lop ­
ment, T h is  c o n s t i t u t e d  th e  new forms o f  th e  c l a s s  s t r u g g l e . ^
11
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12
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R. Dixon declared that even the objective of Socialism was to be
14'completely subordinated to the winning of the war.1 When the
Party was declared legal again in 1942, the Communists undertook,
in the words of Dr H,V. Evatt, the Attorney-General, 'to do all in
tneir power to assist in the effectual prosecution of the war' and
to 'do their utmost to promote harmony in industry, to minimise
15absenteeism, stoppages, strikes or other hold-ups.' From the 
industrial standpoint, the Party was fortunate in that the great 
majority of trade unionists whole-heartedly supported the war between 
1941 and 1945, particularly after the entry of Japan and the Soviet 
Union into the war and the formation of the Curtin Labor Government, 
although i'rotskyites and Lang Labor supporters continued to press for 
militant industrial action.
Between 1939 and 1945 Communists were elected to the following 
important trade union positions: E.V. Elliott, Federal Secretary of 
the Seamen's Union (1940); J.R. Hughes, Secretary of the New South 
Wales Branch of the Federated Clerks' Union (F.C.U.) (1942); and 
E.J, Rowe was elected to the three-member Commonwealth Council of the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (A.E.U.) in 1943. In addition, 
Communist strength was consolidated in the F.I.A., the W.W.F., and 
the Seamen's Union. The F.I.A., in particular, expanded its 
_
S.m .B., 9 August 1943.
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TT
membership considerably during the war because of the rapid 
industrialisation of the Australian economy and became one of the 
principal trade unions (catering mainly for unskilled and semi­
skilled workers). Together with the A.E.U., in which the Communists 
gained many leading positions, tne F.I.A, dominated the Metal Trades 
Federation, established in 19<*3. There is not space here to list all 
the Party’s advances in the trade union movement, but it is wortny of 
note that the Communists established themselves in two well-known 
middle-class unions, the New South wales Teachers’ Federation and 
Actora' Equity, i’nroughout the war the Party suffered only one impor­
tant reverse. This occurred when Dr Lloyd iioss resigned from its 
membership in 1940 and successfully resisted all subsequent attempts 
to displace nim from his post as Secretary of the New South Wales 
Branch of the A.K.U. The situation in the Miners' Federation at the 
same time provides an interesting contrast; a Communist, W. Orr, 
was its General Secretary on the outbreak of war, and when he retired 
through ill health in 1940 his place was taken by a Labor man,
G.W,S. Grant, Grant, however, co-operated with the Communist officials 
of the Federation, and when C, Nelson, one of the Communist officials, 
resigned his Paruy membership in 1940, he was succeeded at the next 
election held shortly afterwards by another Communist, H.C. Wells.
Apart from unconditionally supporting the war effort, Communist 
union officials sought to amalgamate a number of closely related 
unions into large industrial unions. Most of these attempts were
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unsuccessful although the Munition Workers’ Union was finally merged
with the F.I.A. The main resistance to tnese amalgamation moves came
from right-wing and Catholic trade unionists, who were deeply nostile
to Communism and wnose views were reflected in Freedom (the forerunner
of News-Weekly). Freedom maintained that one of the main points of
Communist industrial policy was
Amalgamation of as many unions into as few groups as 
possible, so as to facilitate, when ready,
The General Strike, as a prelude to,
Bloody Revolution! ^
Those Communists who held key posts in the trade unions were not
only frequently consulted by the Federal Government on industrial
matters but some of them were appointed as members of governmental
agencies; for example, in 1942 J. Healy and E.C. Roach of the W.W.F.
became members of the Stevedoring industry Commission and in the same
year E.V. Elliott of the Seamen's Union joined the Maritime Industry
Commission. Close co-operation also developed during the war between
17the Communists and a considerable number of leading traditionalist
16
Freedom. 2 January 1946.
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The term 'traditionalist' is used to distinguish miadle-of-the- 
road reformist trade unionists from (a) the Communists and the 
militants who agree with them on industrial as well as many political 
issues, and (b) the newly-emerging 'Movement' men and other right- 
wing unionists who were later to become enthusiastic supporters of 
the post-war Industrial groups. The former group are opposed to the 
arbitration system and regard the strike weapon as an important means 
of securing gains for the unions, while the latter group believe 
quite the reverse. Those trade unionists who fit into neither cate­
gory are the traditionalists whose distinguishing characteristics
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unionists, many of whom believed that a united front of all working-
class political parties was desirable, The traditionalists with
such views were mainly to be found in New South Wales. In Victoria,
on the other hand, the A.L.P. declared in 1943 that if an official
of an affiliated union opposed a Labor Party candidate at a Federal,
State or local government election then the union to wnich he belonged
18was to be disaffiliated. In the other States, however, Communist- 
controlled unions remained affiliated with the Labor Party. It was 
not possible for Communists to represent such unions at A.L.P. 
Conferences but militant A.L.P. members were always chosen for this 
role. These were never sufficiently numerous to constitute an impor­
tant voting bloc. During elections Communist-controlled unions
distributed funds both to the Labor Party ana the Communist Party,
19usually in the proportions of three to two respectively.
As we have seen, the two major periods of Communist expansion 
in the unions (1935-39 and 1942-45) were those in which the Party's 
political strategy did not involve extensive use of the strike weapon
1 7 (continued)
are that they are A.L.P. supporters who are mistrustful of the 
political wing of the Labor Party and that their attitude to both 
the arbitration system and strikes is not clear-cut but rather 
pragmatic.
18 f.21^2.
Communist Review. May 1944,a Disaffiliated unions in Victoria soon 
included the A.R.U., the F.I.A., the Ö.W.I.U. and the Seamen's Union. 
This group were subsequently joined by the F.C.Ü.
19
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for political ends (except for a few cases, such as the Waterside 
workers' refusal to load pig-iron for Japan in 1938). Tnis enabled 
the tarty's trade union cadres to exploit economic strikes and the 
rituals of winning concessions through the arbitration system without 
hindrance from the Central Committee. The united front of the anti­
fascist period and the national front of the wartime period were both 
political strategies suited to the maximum Communist penetration in 
the trade union field. Had the national front strategy been projected 
well into the post-war period, and had the Party's relatively high 
wartime popularity been maintained, this penetration might well have 
become deeper and wider. Instead, conditions changed radically; the 
workers' enthusiasm for the war effort was succeeded by their frus­
tration with their living standards in the post-war inflation; 
the development of the Cold War obliged the Australian Communists 
once more to reorient their strategy; anti-Communist feeling became 
increasingly intense. Under the impact of these conditions, the 
Communists' trade union policy changed from one of penetration to 
one of exploitation for political purposes.
Communism in the trade unions after World War II
Communist power in the trade unions reached its peak in 1945.
An American observer has remarked:
The Communist party, through its trade-union power, emerged
from the war as a force in economic and political thinking
b l
in  A u s t r a l i a  unknown in  any o th e r  coun try  of th e  E n g l i s h -  
speak ing  w o r l d , ^
he a l s o  e s t im a te d  t h a t  C om m unist-con tro lled  un ions  in  1945 had a
membership o f  about 275,000 out o f  a  t-o ta l  of 1 ,200 ,000  A u s t r a l i a n  
21t r a d e  u n i o n i s t s .  C om m unist-con tro lled  un ions  d id  in  f a c t  cover
every  b a s ic  in d u s t r y  a t  th e  F ed e ra l  l e v e l  (w ith  th e  ex ce p tio n  of th e
A.W.U., whose r ig h t -w in g  le a d e r s h ip  e f f e c t i v e l y  i f  somewhat c ru d e ly
22 \p rev en ted  th e  Communists making any headway in  th e  union ) .  However,
in  s p i t e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  Communists and t h e i r  m i l i t a n t  a l l i e s
were th e  s t r o n g e s t  group in  th e  t r a d e  u n io n s ,  th e y  were never  as
23s tro n g  as has been sugges ted  s u b se q u e n t ly .  M oreover, t h e i r  power 
was n o t  a c c u r a te ly  r e f l e c t e d  a t  e i t h e r  th e  A.C.T.U. Congress in  
1945 or in  th e  S t a t e  Trades and Labor C ouncils  m ain ly  because th e
20
H e rb e r t  E. W einer, 'The R eduction  of Communist Power in  th e  
A u s t r a l i a n  Trade U n io n s ' ,  P o l i t i c a l  S c ience  Q u a r t e r l y , September 1954, 
V ol. LAIX, Ino. 3 , p .3 9 6 .  Weiner se rved  as U.S. Labor A ttache  in  Sydney 
between 1949 and 1952.
21
Loc, c i t .
22
For a d e s c r ip t io n  of th e  methods whereby th e  A.W.U's F ed era l  
l e a d e r s h ip  d ism issed  th e  m i l i t a n t  N.S.W. E x ecu tive  o f  th e  union in  
1944, see  Communist xteview, December 1944^,'^Some y e a r s  l a t e r  th e  
A.W.Ü. o f f i c i a l l y  excluded  Communists from h o ld in g  any p o s i t i o n  in  the  
union (News-AVeekly, 9 F ebruary  1949).
23
See Tom Truman, C a th o l ic  A ction and P o l i t i c s , M elbourne, 1959, p .149 ,  
and B.A. S an ta m ar ia ,  C a th o l ic s  in  th e  F ig h t  A ga ins t  Communism, roneoed , 
1956. S an tam aria  e s t im a te d  t h a t  t h e r e  were ' a t  l e a s t  h a l f  a m i l l i o n '  
memoers o f  C om m unis t-con tro lled  un ions  w h ile  i'ruman makes w i ld ly  
e x a g g e ra ted  c la im s as  to  Communist s t r e n g t h  in  th e  S t a t e  T rades  and 
Labor C o u n c i ls .
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delegate selection metnods adopted by these bodies strongly favoured
24small right-wing and traditionalist-controlled craft unions. The
A.C.T.U. as well as the important New South Wales Labor Council and
the Melbourne Trades Hall Council remained under the control of the
officials of these small craft unions.
It was only in Queensland that the Communists controlled a
State Trades and Labor Council. Communist control in this case was
made safe for some time by the defection of a number of rignt-wing
unions, notably the A.W.U., in the mid-forties. Communists also
controlled the Newcastle Trades Hall Council, the Illawarra Trades
and Labor Council and a number of other provincial Councils in
Queensland and Victoria. However, one must remember that there was
much common ground in this period between the Communists and their
militant allies and a considerable number of traditionalists.
Tnese groups together constituted a majority - on most issues -
at botn tne 1943 and the 1945 A.C.T.U. Congresses. The former
Congress nad decided by 130 votes to 120 to press for a 'united front
25of all working-class bodies for a nundred per cent war effort.'“ 
Although the alliance of Communists, militants and some traditionalists 
was able to push tnrougn the 1945 Congress a number of motions
24
Tribune, 8 November 1946. See also the figures cited by a 
Communist, L. Maxwell, relating to the Melbourne Trades Hall delegate 
representation as reported in News-Weekly, 26 May 1948.
25 .’ ” ’...
S.m .H., 24 June 1943.
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strongly favoured by the Party, including the election of Thornton
as A.C.T.U. delegate to the international trade union conference in
Paris from which emerged the World Federation of Trade Unions 
26(W.F.T.U.) , it cannot be argued, as Tom Truman nas done, that the
27Communists 'captured' the Congress. Communist delegates were in 
a decided minority but the general mood favoured their kind of approach 
on many issues. Moreover, middle-of-the-road reformists and right- 
wing officials dominated the Interstate Executive of the A.C.T.U.
The Left miscalculated in not opposing to re-election of P.J. Clarey 
to the A.C.T.U. Presidency, for it was Clarey who later was largely 
responsible for the anti-Communist policy adopted by the Interstate 
Executive after the war. In 1945 the Left had a reasonable chance, 
had it so desired, of removing him from his position.
Nevertheless, Thornton termed the Congress 'the greatest...ever
28held'“ and the Communists were particularly pleased that two impor­
tant amendments were made to the A.C.T.U. Constitution. The first 
related to the procedure of electing the Interstate Executive, ten 
of whose fourteen members were previously chosen by the five State
26
For a description of the important part played by Thornton in the 
formation of the W.F.T.U., see Betty Wallace, World Labour Comes of 
Age, London, 1945, pp.22-3, 102, 104-5, 107, 144.
27
Tom Truman, loc. cit. For denials of Communist control of the 
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Tracies and Labor Councils while the remaining four were selected 
by Congress itself. Under the amendment each State Trades and 
Labor Council would elect only one member of the Executive and the 
remainder would all be chosen by Congress, Such a change was 
obviously to the benefit of the Communists, and of the five additional 
Executive members chosen by the 1945 Congress, three were Communists, 
one a militant ally and one a traditionalist, however, the majority 
of State Trades and Labor Councils refused to ratify the change, an 
action which infuriated the Communists since a number of unions not 
affiliated with and antagonistic towards x.he A.C.T.U., such as the 
A.tf.U,, were affiliated with the State Trades and Labor Councils 
and thus able to have some say in the determination of A.C.T.U. 
policy. Tne Communists were also disgruntled by the fact that a num­
ber of Communist-controlled provincial Trades and Labor Councils 
representing more trade unionists than the Hobart Trades and Labor 
Council did not possess any voice in the determination of the A.C.T.U. 
Interstate Executive's composition. The second constitutional 
amendment whereby A.C.T.U. Congress decisions would be binding on 
State Branches was ratified by the branches in spite of strong right- 
wing opposition to such a move.
Following the end of the war, there was a wave of strikes, many 
of which involved Communist-controlled unions and were carried out 
in defiance of A.C.T.U. policy. Since Labor Governments were in 
power at the Federal level and in most of tne States, these disputes
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led right-wing and many moderate A.L.r. leaders to feel that they
were primarily directed against the Labor Party, however, in tnis
period, the rank-and-file of many unions were eager for more direct
action in view of the fact that wages, which had been pegged during
the war, were now depreciating in a steep inflationary wave. The
Communists made no attempt to calm aown the discontented workers and
welcomed the return to strike methods. Even in 1946 H.C. Wells of
the Miners’ Federation could state:
We are not going to rely on arbitration - we are going 
to rely on the labor movement and our own strength, initiative 
and ability and the justice of our claims to gain our objec­
tives in the future. ^
To separate the political and industrial factors which produced these
strikes would be well-nigh impossible, but it would seem that the
disputes were largely the outcome of inuustrial grievances. Sharkey
30claimed they sprang from ’deep-rooted economic causes' while even 
i\ews-Weekiy admitted that the Victorian transport strike in 1946 had 
undeniable economic causes.
Communist trade union officials also performed an important 
role, often neglected by their opponents for obvious reasons, in the 
historic campaign for a 40-nour wee*. This campaign was condemned
29
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by right-wing trade unionists and was not encouraged either by the 
A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive or by the various Labor Governments.
It was largely the unceasing pressure from the Communists and their 
militant allies which led the New South Wales Labor Government in 
the first place to grant the shorter working week to State Govern­
ment workers, after which the Commonwealth Arbitration Court followed 
suit.
Until late 194T the strikes in Communist-controlled unions
were remarkably successful. All of tnem, apart from two to be
examined shortly, were primarily economic in origin and had widespread
support from the rank-anu-file. Sir Charles Lowe stated in 1950 that
there is much eviaence to snow that the strikers have at 
times secured substantial gains by their action, and these 
gains in their turn nave added greatly to the prestige of 
Communist union officials and consolidated the power of the 
C.P. and these officials in the unions.045
ne also noted that these officials were anxious, for political
motives, to retain their positions should a revolutionary situation
arise:
I think the proper conclusion from the evidence before 
me is that where strikes nave occurred under Communist 
leadership or influence, the purpose has been really, in 
the first place, to gain the advantages sought in the men's 
demands. I think, however, that the leaders of the C.P. at 
any rate have never lost sight of what they consider are the
32
heport of Royal Commission Inquiring into the origins, aims, objects 
and funds of the Communist Party in Victoria and other related matters,
p .97,
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further advantages of giving training to the strikers, in 
concerted action against the employers and of striking one 
further blow at the capitalist system.^3
Yet in spite of the successes arising out of a liberal use 
of the strike weapon, at least some leading Communist trade unionists 
were disturbed at the length of the major strikes which had not 
sufficiently strengthened the class-consciousness of the workers, 
depleted union funds and in fact demoralised the rank-and-file.
In 1947 Thornton remarked:
there is too great a reliance on the strike weapon in the 
narrow way, and there seems to be an idea in the organi­
sation that the strike and only the strike wins gains for 
us.
This is a fallacy which must be eradicated from our 
thinking.
It is true that the strike weapon is a very important 
one and we must preserve our right to use it at all costs.
But we must lay more emphasis than we have done on wider 
methods of winning our demands, which can supplement, if 
never replace, strike action....^
Most of the industries affected by the 1945-47 strikes had a 
long history of labour disturbances stretching back into the nine­
teenth century. The Communists, in one sense, were the inneritors 
of a tradition of direct action rather than its initiators. More­
over, the strikes in Australia were not as serious either in 
frequency or duration as those in the United States (where Communist 
influence was noticeably less) in the same period. An American
33
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economist has stated that a 'detailed examination of strike data 
indicates that Communist leadership has probably not had a signifi­
cant influence upon the incidence or pattern of strikes in 
Australia.
During the two years after 1945, Communist-controlled unions
led two overtly political strikes. One directed against a foreign
government and possessing widespread trade union support was
successful, the other directed against the Federal Government and
failing to secure widespread support was a dismal failure. In 1945,
immediately hostilities broke out between the Dutch and Indonesian
Nationalists in the Netherlands East Indies, the W.W.F. and the
Seamen's Union refused to unload or load Dutch ships in Australian 
3 6ports. The boycott was opposed by the New South Wales Labor
37Council, News-Weekly and the Interstate Executive of the A.C.T.U.
On the other hand, it was tolerated by the Federal Government and the 
great majority of traditionalist trade union officials (but not 
those on the Right) came around to its acceptance in time. Many 
trade unionists had been unimpressed by the remaining evidence of 
Dutch rule which they had seen in Indonesia during World War II and
35
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it was this widespread rank-and-file support which enabled the
38W.W.F. and the Seamen’s Union to continue the ban until 1948
39without isolating themselves from other unions. ' Tribune described
the boycott as 'the largest and most famous of its kind in world 
40history.’ Communist Party support for Asian independence move­
ments was in this case reinforced by the fact that many Indonesian 
Communists, interned in .Vest New Guinea before World War II, nad
been transferred to Australia during the war and established close
41contact with Australian Communists.
The second Communist-led political strike, the attempted boycott 
of the Woomera Rocket Range in 1947, attracted very little non- 
Communist support and the unions involved (principally the B.W.I.U. 
and the Painters’ Union) were effectively isolated. Tney capitulated 
in the face of the Federal Government's Approved Defence Projects
38
Tribune, 29 may 1948. In December 1948, following renewed Dutch 
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39
These two unions were supported by progressive middle-class bodies 
such as the Australia-indonesia Association (dominated by the Commu­
nists) and the front organisations. On the other hand, the W.W.F, 
leadership came in for some criticism within the union itself and tne 
pro-Indonesian attitude of the leadersnip, together with the formation 
of an Industrial Group in the union, led to the defeat of the Commu­
nists and militant officials of the Sydney branch in 1946. These 
officials, however, were returned to power in 1947.
40
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Act (1947) whicn provided for heavy fines and long terms of 
imprisonment. Many trade unionists feix» that tne Communists were 
simply following the Soviet Union in its desire not to see the 
Western nations record rocket and missile successes while others 
maintained that the boycott, altnough legitimate, was not wortn so 
much agitation.
Catnoiic Action in trade union affairs
It was practically inevitable that Communist penetration of tne
trade unions would provoke counter movements, both within and without
the trade union movement. The Chifley Labor Government, as Professor
Crisp has shown, was unwilling to use the power of the State to check
the Communist advance. This reluctance stemmed partly from the fear
of many juabor leaders that an open anti-Communist campaign in the
unions would increase the divisions within the Labor Party and the
Labor movement, and partly from the fear that such a campaign would
42increase anti-Communist hysteria amongst the people as a whole.
Chifley is said to have argued that it was for the trade unionists
43themselves to deal with the Communists. Within the trade union 
movement, there were two broad centres of resistance to Communist 
influence; the established union leaderships of the more conservative
42
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and craft unions (who felt their positions were being threatened by
the Communists) and those Catholic unionists connected with Catholic
Action. As opinion became less favourable to the Communists in the
post-war period, these two groups were emboldened to move over to the
offensive. Their early successes were few ana far between, but by
the end of the decade the tide was running firmly in their favour.
The 'Movement', an organ of Catholic Action, had been formed
44in 1942 to fight Communism in the trade unions. Its members were 
prominent after the war in the formation of the A.L.P. Industrial 
Groups, tightly-knit organisations designed to match the activities of 
Communist Party factory branches in trade union affairs. Groups were
Ahestablished in New South Wales in 1945, in Victoria in 1946, and in 
South Australia and Queensland in 1947. Especially when they came 
under the virtual control of the 'Movement's' militants, they soon 
proved themselves to be disciplined and effective in attacking the
44
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Communists’ positions. Naturally, the Party responded to the
challenge immediately; as early as 1945 one of its pamphlets, based
on privately circulated ’Movement1 documents which had come its way,
47took stock of the situation, and in 1946 Tribune was stressing that
the 'Movement' should be criticised solely on political rather than 
48sectarian grounds. Opposition to the ’Movement1 at this early
stage, and again in the early fifties, came also from certain amongst
the traditionalist trade unionists.
In 1947 the Victorian A.L.P. decided to expel any member who
opposed or worked against a Group-endorsed candidate in a union 
49ballot. The Groups in New South Wales also decided in the same year
that it was no longer even necessary to be a Labor Farty supporter
50(as had previously been the case) to belong to a Group. Victoria, 
on the other hand, stipulated that A.L.P. membership was essential 
for Group membership. Apart from their discipline and energy, the 
Groups' principal vote-winning asset was their official connection 
with the Labor Farty, the traditional political party of the great 
mass of trade unionists. Possession of the title A.L.P. Industrial
47
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Groups enabled their supporters to depict union ballots as contests 
between the Labor and Communist Parties. However, few successes, 
and tnese in small unions (not all of which were previously Communist- 
controlled), were recorded by the Groups in the immediate post-war 
years, although they did control the Sydney Branch of the W.W.F. in 
1946-47. This failure to make headway reflected the fact that the 
Cold War had not yet fully arrived and the Communists were still 
firmly in control of the organisational machinery of many important 
unions; the members of the Communist-controlled unions were generally 
satisfied with their leadership and did not taite much notice of the 
anti-Communists' complaints.
Communist representation at the 1947 A.C.T.U. Congress was 
about the same strength as at the 1945 Congress but most of the motions 
supported by the Communists in 1947 were rejected decisively. The 
divisions made it clear that the traditionalists who had voted with 
the Communists in 1945 were now siding with the Grouper and ‘Movement* 
delegates. The Grouper-traditionalist combination was to remain 
dominant until the 1955 Congress. While tne Communists held their 
ground in a number of important unions, notably the F.C.U. and the 
F.I.A., the Party continued to win executive positions in certain 
unions well into 1947. In 1947 the following Communists defeated 
Labor Party candidates in union ballots and were elected to official 
positions: W. Parkinson, President of the Southern District of the 
Miners' Federation; R. Hurd, Secretary of the Western Australian
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Branch of tue Seamen's Union; C. O'Shea, Secretary of the Victorian 
Branch of the Tramways' Union; and A. Wilson joined a fellow- 
Communist, E.J. Howe, on the A.E.U. Commonwealth Council. In addition, 
the Communists counter-attacked with some effect; thus, although 
they lost control of tne Sydney Branch of the W.W.F. in 1946, they 
recaptured tneir executive positions here in 1947. In this year, 
also, the Party proved once more its ability to control appointments 
in the Miners' Federation; when H.C. Wells, tne Federation’s General 
President, was expelled from the Party and, at the same time, resigned 
from tne union anotner Communist, I. Williams, succeeded him within 
the Federation. Meanwhile, Communist strengtn in the B.W.I.U. had 
continued to grow; in 1945 G. Frank became Federal Secretary and in 
the following year E.W. Bulmer became Federal President. Both men 
were Communists.
Communists and tne trade unions during the 'adventurist1 period
By 1947 the Communists were on the defensive within the trade 
union movement, but instead of moderating their policies tney 
embarked on the extreme strategies dictated by the Cominform's new 
tough line, laid down in late 1947. In the years which followed 
(the 'adventurist' periou) tne Communist Party used its trade union 
connections to pursue two strategies, on the one hand to 'politicise' 
industrial strikes (while at the same time ensuring that strikes were 
also about industrial issues^ and on tne other to force certain 
militant unions to break off their affiliation with the A.L.P. The
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results were generally disastrous; tne tarty itself dissipated 
whatever capital of goodwill had been left over from the war period, 
and it left its trade union cadres, by 1949, exposed and weakened.
The Communist Party in Australia is always most vulnerable when it 
is most revolutionary.
51The Queensland railway strike in 1948 was seen by the State 
Labor Government as a direct challenge to its power. Thus, it 
introduced drastic strike-bearing Emergency Regulations and the 
Industrial Law Amendment Act, whose provisions were so far reaching 
tnat they were condemned by many traditionalist unionists.^ These 
measures, coupled with tne effect of tne differences wnicn arose 
as the strike wore on, ensured the strike's defeat - although a few 
minor wage and work condition gains were made. The strike failed 
basically, however, because of the Labor Government's repressive 
policies and tne fact that the non-militant unions could not be drawn 
into the dispute.
An even more important case of a Labor Government's opposing
53Communist-controlled unions was the 1949 coal strike. The strike,
51
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which arose out of miners’ claims for increased wages, better work
conditions and a 35-hour week, was at first supported by the majority 
54of tne miners. It was opposed not only by the Federal and New 
South Wales Governments but also by the A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive, 
the press ' and radio, and, of course, by the non-Labor parties. The 
Federal Government introduced the National Emergency (Coal Strike)
Act (1949) under which action was taaen to freeze the funds of the 
Miners' Federation and of other Communist-controlled unions which had 
offered financial assistance; seven Communist and two A.L.P. trade 
union officials were fined under the terms of the Act and received 
lengthy terms of imprisonment. Communist Party headquarters in Sydney 
were also raided (under the Crimes Act) at the same time. Finally, 
the Federal Government, abandoning the traditional A.L.P. principle 
not to use troops in industrial disputes, sent the Army to work the 
open-cut coalfields in New South Wales. The miners, finding them­
selves isolated from the rest of the non-militant trade union 
movement, also found that the traditionalist and right-wing unions
54
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also opposed the strike because of tne unemployment it had created. 
With opinion swinging against them even within the Federation itself, 
the predominantly Communist leadership tried to prevent the holding 
of a ballot on a proposal to return to work; when, after some delays, 
such a ballot was actually held the miners voted overwhelmingly in 
favour of ending the dispute. Almost all the demands for whicn they
56had struck were subsequently rejected by the Coal Industry Tribunal.
The only 'gain’ the Communists had achieved through the strike 
was the resignation of a few militants from the Labor Party, most 
notably A. Dowling, Secretary of the Newcastle Trades Hall Council, 
wno subsequently joined the Communist Party. Sharkey nevertheless 
drew some interesting conclusions from the defeat and stated that
One mistake made...was its undue prolongation; it is 
always right to call off a strike when it is clear that a 
point of exhaustion may be reached, to preserve unity and 
conserve the organisation of the workers.
This mistake followed from another, an underestimation 
of the ability of tne rightwing to undermine the struggle 
of the workers and a belief that reformism can be easily 
destroyed
Apart from the few important and lengthy 'political' strikes 
during the 'adventurist' period, the numerous and prolonged indus­
trial strikes of the immediate post-war years were less in evidence 
in the Communist-controlled unions after 1947. Methods involving
56
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fewer workers, such as regulation strikes, piecework restriction, 
overtime bans and the rolling strike were used, thereby preventing 
rank-and-file demoralisation and at the same time conserving union 
funds.
The major political strikes of the ’adventurist* period
illustrate how vulnerable were the Communist trade union leaders when
they implemented extreme policies without the continued support of the
unions' rank-and-file. The tough international line of the Party, on
which the extreme strike policies had been based, led to conflicts
58between Communist trade union officials and the full-time Party
functionaries. The former were well aware that 'adventurist1
behaviour jeopardised their union positions, but the latter were
largely concerned with implementing the international line. At the
Party's National Congress in 1948 R. Dixon strongly criticised certain
Communist trade union officials for wishing to conduct 'purely
economic strikes'. Dixon continued: 'We must aim in strike struggles
not only to achieve economic gains, but also to draw the masses...to
59the side of the Communist Party.' Articles attacking economism 
became more frequent in the Party press. However, tne leadership
58
Many of the leading Communist trade union officials, such as 
E. Thornton, L.J. McPhillips, E.V. Elliott, J. Healy, D. Thomson,
E. Ross, I. Williams, E.J. Rowe, J.R. Hughes, T. Wright and A. 
MacDonald, were members of the Party's Central Committee.
59
Communist Review, June 1948^P. \G7.
99
failed to see that the growing importance of factory branches (as 
distinct from locality branches) since the war was in part respon­
sible for the outbursts of economism mainly because factory branch 
members tend to identify Party work with their daily lives and 
concentrate only on those aspects of Party work which were their 
immediate concern.
The stress laid on tne Party's independent role during the
'adventurist' period led to a reconsideration of the affiliation of
Communist-controlled unions with the Labor Party. At the Party's
1948 National Congress Sharkey declared:
To affiliate the trade unions to the reformist party obviously 
strengthens reformist ideology and leads to the belief that 
the A.L.P. is the true party of tne workers. Possibly it was 
tactically correct on occasions in the past to affiliate some 
unions, but in the position today when the Labor Party tends 
ever more in the direction of the camp of the imperialists and 
ever more clearly embraces the sabotaging role of social 
democracy, it is clear that we cannot pursue a policy that 
strengthens tne reformist grip over the trade union masses.
On the contrary, we must work to separate the masses from the 
right wing leaders in the trade unions and elsewhere
E. Thornton of the F.I.A. outlined the following policy at
tne same Congress:
It is time we reconsidered a policy which causes us to finance 
people who attack us all the time; who attempt to break every 
strike conducted by affiliated unions. But it is far more 
important that we should take steps to break with the old 
tradition that the Labor Party is the only party of the working 
class, the political wing of the Labor Movement.
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This allegiance to the Labor Party is very much a formal 
affair anyhow.... Only two members of the A.L.P. are officials 
of the union. But the Communist Party is in a different 
relationship with the union. Many officials are members 
of the Party....
And the general policy of tne union. Is that decided 
in consultation with t<he leaders of the Labor Party? Noi 
The policy of the Ironworkers’ Onion is decided in consul­
tation with the leaders of the Communist Party. The great 
achievements of our Union in the past few years should be 
credited to the Communist Party. But they are not so 
credited. Because the .tarty does not appear as the Communist 
Party to the members of tne union. The achievements of our 
leadership are credited to individuals and not to the Party.
The same thing in many ways applies to the Waterside 
Workers' Federation, the Miners' Federation, and the Seamen's 
Union....
we are proposing in the Ironworkers' Union tnat political 
affiliation in the future should be on a voluntary and not 
an automatic basis.
Immediately, the F.I.A's National Convention decided that the policy 
of affiliating all its members with the Labor Party was no longer 
justified and proposed that affiliation in future should be on a 
voluntary basis, members would each pay (unless exempted) a political 
levy, stating whether they wanted tne Labor Party or the Communist 
Party to receive it; where a member gave no such indication, the levy
öl pp.207-2.
Communist Review, July 1948,A Two years previously ihornton had 
threatened that tne F.I.A. would reconsider its affiliation with tne 
A.L.P. aft-er a strongly worded anti-Coramunist statement nad been 
made by i.E. uunor, President of the A.L.P. Industrial Groups in 
N.S.W. (Tribune, 13 September 1946).
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would be used a t  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  of  t h e  u n i o n ’s N a t i o n a l  Counci l ,  
b ranches  would a f f i l i a t e  with  t h e  A .L .P .  n o t  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e i r  
f u l l  memberships but  only on th e  b a s i s  of  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of  t h e i r
t>2membership who bad s p e c i f i e d  t n a t  t h e  A.L.P .  r e c e i v e  t h e i r  l e v i e s .
S ince  th e  Communist P a r t y ' s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  did  n o t  a l lo w  unions  t o
become a f f i l i a t e d  wi th  th e  P a r t y ,  l e v i e s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  ear-marked f o r
t h e  P a r t y  were donated  to  i t  dur ing  S t a t e  and F e d e ra l  E l e c t i o n s .
These p ro p o s a l s  produced c o n s t e r n a t i o n  in t h e  A .L .P .  which s tood
t o  s u f f e r  a seve re  l o s s  of union f lues.  News-Weekly d e c l a r e d ,  in
somewhat ex ag g e ra ted  te rm s ,  t h a t  th e  F . I . A .  had ' f i r e d  t h e  f i r s t  sho t
in  tn e  Communist p lan  to  f i n a n c i a l l y  c rush  t h e  A . L . P . . . . .  I f
s u c c e s s f u l ,  every  o t n e r  Comm unis t- cont ro l led  union w i l l  fo l low  s u i t ,
Ö3and th e  A.L.P .  w i l l  be f i n a n c i a l l y  r u i n e d . ’ No such e f f e c t  was
produced .  The u n i o n ' s  p roposa l  f o r  p a r t i a l  a f f i l i a t i o n  with  th e
64
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with  t h e  A .L .P . ,  whereas th e  V i c t o r i a n ,  Br isbane  and Newcastle  
Branches were n o t .  T h o r n t o n ' s  p roposa l  was s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
in B r i t a i n  where t r a d e  un ions  a f f i l i a t e  w ith  t h e  B r i t i s h  Labour P a r t y  
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In A u s t r a l i a ,  th e  A.E.U.,  which i s  a branch of  t h e  B r i t i s h  A.E .Ü .,  
i s  th e  only im por tan t  union t o  fo l low  B r i t i s h  custom; t h e  o th e r s  
a f f i l i a t e  w i th  t h e  A.L.P .  on t h e  b a s i s  of  t h e i r  f u l l  membership.
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attempt by the union's South Australian Branch to affiliate with
the Labor Party on the basis of 516 of its 2,000 members was
65rejected by the South Australian A.L.P.
The continued offensive of the Industrial Groups, 1948-50
Between 1948 and 1950 the Groups made further gains in the 
unions as a prelude to their large-scale victories in the early 
fifties. The Communists and militants lost the Melbourne Branch of 
tne W.W.F. in 1948 and in the following year the Communist Federal 
officers of the same union nad their majorities reduced. The Commu­
nist» Vice-Presidents of the Southern and Northern Districts of the 
Miners' Federation were defeated. On the other nand, the Communists 
still managed to record some successes. In 1948 R.E. Wellard and 
J. Coull were elected Secretaries of the New South Wales Branch of 
tne Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union and the Victorian Branch of 
tne Liquor Employees' Union respectively and in 1949 A. Buckley 
became Federal Secretary of the Boilermakers' Society.
It was in tne F.C.U. and the F.I.A. that the Groupers provided 
tue most serious threat to tne Communists. The existing leadership
reacted by victimising and expelling prominent Groupers in tnese 
6Öunions and by reorganising union sections and branches when tnese
65
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came under Group control. Physical violence was used against the
68Group leader in the L. Short, who severed his ties about
tnis time with his anti-Communist ally in the union, N. Origlass,
a Trotskyite. Fraudulent ballots were also employed by Communists in
some (though far from all) unions to maintain their positions. A
leading ex-Communist, C. Sharpley gave wide publicity to charges of
69this nature in 1949 but his claims were only partly substantiated
70by the 1949-50 Royal Commission on Communism in Victoria.
Prior to Sharpley's disclosures a deputation of Victorian
Groupers presented a case for Court-controlled ballots to the Federal
71Conference of the A.L.P. In June 1949 the Federal Labor Government 
made important amendments to the Arbitration Act whereby a Court- 
controlled ballot could be ordered if either the executive officers 
of a union (or a branch thereof) requested it or if, after a complaint 
had been registered by a union member, it was found that irregularities 
had occurred in a union-controlled ballot. As was to be expected, 
the Communists attacked the amendments on the grounds that they were
67
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a prelude to an employers’ attack on wages and work conditions.
J.B. Elake declared that Communists were not afraid of secret union
ballots and referred to the leading right-wing and traditionalist
73union leaders who had been appointed for life. The Communists
fully expected the State to interfere with and ’rig1 Court-
controlled ballots but they were also aware that, although voting
under them would not be compulsory, ballot papers would be posted
to all members and it would be easy for the apathetic union members,
most of whom were assumed to be anti-Communists, to register a
vote. In opposing the legislation, the Communists were joined by
the A.W.U., whose leadership feared that Court-controlled ballots
74would lead to their defeat. On the other hand, the Groupers did 
not feel that the legislation went far enough since it applied 
only to those unions registered with the Arbitration Act (thus ex­
cluding the B.W.I.U., deregistered in 1948) and fraud had to be 
detected after a union ballot had taken place. News-Weekly suggested
that compulsory voting under the direction of State returning
75officers should operate in all ballots. However, it was in large 
part trie 1949 Chifley Government amendments, together with further
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amendments passed by the Menzies Government in 1951, which enabled 
the Groups to defeat the Communists in a number of important unions 
in the early fifties.
At the close of the decade the Communists found themselves
isolated as a result of tbe strategies employed during the 'adverturist'
period, particularly their attacks on the Labor Party and their use of
the strike weapon for overtly political purposes. They completely
dominated many Comoiunist-contro] led unions and made littie attempt
to share the leadership on an equitable basis with left-wing A.L.P.
members. In addition, no skill was shown in meeting the threat from
the Industrial Groups. Communists made no serious attempt to drive
a wedge between the 'Movement1 men and the traditionalists within
and outside the Groups. Indeed, A.L.P. trade union officials and
A.L.P. rank-and-file union members were not differentiated but grouped
together in one reactionary mass - in spite of Sharkey's warning that
Communists should never 'confuse, or lump together, the reformist
7 6leaders and the rank and file.' The trade union movement was, at 
tnis stage, divided into two important anu widely separated groups, 
the Communists and their militant allies on the one hand and the 
Groupers and their traditionalist allies on the otner. The 
traditionalists, unlike the 'Movement' men, possessed no really 
positive ideas but had joined forces with the 'Movement' out of fear
__
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for their positions and because they felt the Communists were out 
to embarrass Labor Governments. Previously, in the mid-forties 
three distinct groups had existed in the trade union movement. 
Throughout the forties a completely independent non-Communist Left 
had failed to emerge in the trade unions. The non-Communist militants 
that did exist not only agreed with the Party on industrial issues 
but on almost all political issues too. Although Communists still 
held on (if rather precariously in some cases) to their unions, the 
Court-controlleu ballot legislation represented a new threat to their 
position - moreover, a Federal Government pledged to drive the Party 
underground had just been elected. In 1951), following a change in 
the international Communist line, the Party began cautiously to modify 
its ‘adventurist’ strategies and to reconsider the united front 
strategy. But these adjustments came too late. The hey-day of the 
Groups was about to begin.
CHAPTER THREE
ANTI-COMMUNISM IN AUSTRALIA BEFORE 1950
having declared its revolutionary intentions from the outset, 
tne Australian Communist Party was soon made tne object of heavy 
legal attacks and of intense nostility on the part of certain social 
groups. In no other Western country, apart from the United States, 
has anti-Communism provided such a favourable climate for the 
imposition of strong legal sanctions on Communist activities. Even 
during World War II, when the Communists were enjoying relative 
popularity, there were some interests in Australia who strongly 
resented their influence and who felt that the Anglo-Saxon powers 
were mistaken in having joined forces with the Soviet Union against 
Nazi Germany. Tnese same interests claimed that the British and 
American forces should have advanced into Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans in 1945, even at the risk of a clash with the Red Army.
The return of tne Cold War in 1947 and 1948, saw the tide running 
strongly against the Party in Australia, especially during the tension 
generated by the Czechoslovakian crisis of February 1948 and tne 
Berlin airlift of the same year.
Any explanation of the limits to Communist influence in 
Australia must take into account tne extent to wnich waves of intense 
anti-Communism nave provided governments here with exceptional free­
dom in employing legal instruments in fignting the Party. Indeed,
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in view of tue strong feelings which it nas aroused at different 
times, t,he Party is extraordinarily fortunate to find itself so 
unhampered in contemporary politics.
social instability as a source of political tension in Australia 
A feeling of insecurity has often characterised Australian 
political life. The great population movements set in train by 
tne gold-rushes; the rapid settlement of agricultural lands in the 
last decades of the nineteentn century; the mushroom expansion 
of tne large cities; the widespread strike wave of the period 
1890-94; the depression of the early thirties - all these prevented 
Australian society from settling down, from establishing a firm 
structure and ordered group relationships. The result was a 
heigntened tension between different sections of the community - 
between workers and employers, farmers and graziers, townsmen and 
countrymen, Catnoiic and Protestant, old residents and migrant 
groups. The sheer pace of socio-economic development created the 
impression that the advantages in tne final settlement would go to 
tnose groups whicn were most forceful and determined in pressing their 
claims and defending their interests. Particularly amongst the 
farmers anu working-class groups, there are long traditions of 
wariness and hostility in social dealings, whether embodied in the 
attitudes of White Australianism or in the narsh xenophobia of the 
small country communities. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
non-British migrant groups have often been treated with suspicion;
109
tiai8 was the experience oi’ the Germans in the late nineteenth 
century, of the Greeks and Italians in the 1920s, and of the 
European migrant groups who came here after 1945.
The presence of a large Irish population, composed mainly of 
working-class people, was undoubtedly a persistent source of fric­
tion in Eastern Australia between tne period of the gold-rushes and 
the First World War. Differences in religion between the Irisn on 
tne one hand and the Scots and English settlers on the otner, were 
accentuated by differences in outlook on educational questions, 
ana also on the importance of the British connection. The predomi­
nantly Anglican and Presbyterian middle class of nineteenth century 
Australia wanted their society to develop a British, liberal and 
Protestant identity; the Irish settlers, on the other hand, were 
more concerned witn the national struggle in their nomeland, with 
obtaining better working conditions, and with maintaining their own 
cultural iaentity. The tension between these two groups, which may 
perhaps be regaraed as two communities in some periods, rarely 
found its way to the surface of politics but contributea to the 
general insecurity and intolerance in public affairs.
From tne outset, political liberalism failed to win wiae 
acceptance amongst Australians, it is true that the acceptance of 
Britisn parliamentary ana judicial forms was unqualified, and that 
tne scope of agrarian and labour reforms in tne Australian colonies 
won the applause of British liberals, but it is also the case that
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tne more abstract liberal traditions, particularly those concerning 
tne preservation of civil liberties ana tne rignt to dissent, were 
not well receivea in a society wnicn nad, in some respects, a 
pronounced liking lor authoritarianism and strict majority rule.
Tne importance oi' this difference can be judged if tne Australian 
ana Britisu reactions are compared in sucn cases as tne outbreak of 
the Boer War; in England opposition to the war was deplored and 
ridiculed, but was tolerated nonetheless; in Australia dissenters 
from the pro-war attitude were hounded and persecuted, as were 
Holman and Professor Arnold Wood in New South Wales. Australian 
liberals of the Deakin tradition were surprisingly intolerant at 
times; few of them took a strong line against the Boer War or against 
the adoption of compulsory military training before the First World 
War. In particular, they were unsystematic and faltering in their 
defence of civil liberties. As K.S. Inglis suggested recently, 
there is a continuum between the Australian position on questions 
of authority and liberty and the totalitarian position.* Liberalism 
would have taken stronger roots in this country had the established 
social groups felt more secure and confident in the nineteentn and 
early twentieth centuries; but, for the reasons suggested above, they 
did not.
K.s. Inglis, The Stuart Case, Melbourne, 1961, p.320.
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Another sympton of insecurity has been the surprising credence 
given at different times to conspiratorial theories of politics, 
whether directed against the Left or the Right. Australian conserv­
atives early fell into the habit of blaming working-class unrest 
and radicalism on the sinister machinations of agitators; from whom 
are descended the anarchist and syndicalist conspirators at» the turn 
of the century, the Raving Red Socialists of pre-1914 days, and 
the I.W.W. men of the First World War. The Communist Party was 
easily assimilated to this pattern, ana soon after its formation 
it was being creaitea with a whole range of Machiavellian designs.
On the other hand, the Australian Left has also exaggerated the 
role of big business in right-wing politics; graziers were supposed 
to have deliberately provoked the pastoral strike of 1890 and to 
have established the Country Party as a tool for tneir interests; 
overseas financiers and land companies were aliegea to be running 
Australian governments from behind the scenes; non-Labor Prime 
Ministers, such as Bruce, were frankly regarded as servile agents 
of the capitalist class. In some cases the stereotypes have had 
some basis in reality - which makes them all the more powerful as 
political symbols.
The anti-liberal aspect of Australian political traditions are 
most pronounced in country areas, where geographical and cultural 
isolation have heightened resentments towards cities, urban 
working-class groups, and radical politicians. The Country Party,
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t o  some e x t e n t ,  embodies in  an ex ag g e ra ted  form r a t h e r  d a ted
a t t i t u d e s  about c i t y  schemers and th e  c o n s p i r a t o r i a l  L e f t .  Indeed ,
an American p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  has  gone so f a r  as  t o  su g g es t  t n a t
tn e  xenophobic ,  anti-Comi u n i s t  and a n t i - S e m i t i c  s ta t e m e n t s  which
have been made by v a r io u s  Country P a r ty  spokesmen gave th e  im press ion
t h a t  i t  c o n ta in ed  ’a l l  th e  seeds  o f  a n a t i v e - A u s t r a l i a n ,  f a s c i s t  
2
m ovem ent'. D.H. Lawrence, in  h i s  h ig h ly  im p r e s s i o n i s t i c  novel 
Kangaroo (1923),  d e p ic te d  what he to o k  to  be th e  e lem en ts  o f  a u t n o r i -  
t a r i a n  movements on botn  tn e  R igh t and th e  L e f t .  H is  c e n t r a l  f i g u r e ,  
Kangaroo, embodies c e r t a i n  f a s c i s t  t r a i t s  which Lawrence may have 
a t t r i b u t e d  to  c e r t a i n  m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  f i g u r e s  o f  th e  e a r l y  
t w e n t i e s .  His w o rk in g -c la ss  l e a d e r ,  W i l l i e  S t r u t h e r s ,  e p i to m ise s  
th e  ty p e  of a u t o c r a t i c ,  n o n - d o c t r i n a i r e  union o f f i c i a l  who came to  
th e  fo r e  under J .T .  L an g 's  l e a d e r s h ip  in  New South W ales.
The Communist bogey in  p a r ty  w arfa re
By th e  F i r s t  World War, non-Labor p o l i t i c i a n s  had become 
accustomed to  a t t a c k i n g  th e  Labor P a r ty  by s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  i t  was 
unduly  s u b je c t  to  in f lu e n c e  from s i n i s t e r  a n a r c h i s t  and ' a l i e n '  
g ro u p s ,  and in  th e  tw e n t ie s  th ey  showed them se lves  e q u a l ly  adep t 
in  c la im in g  t h a t  th e  A .L .P . was be ing  run by th e  Communists. The 
t a c t i c s  adopted  by th e  N a tio n a l  and Country P a r t i e s  in  th e  1925
2
L ouise  O veracker, The A u s t r a l i a n  P a r ty  System , New Haven, 1952,
p .2 2 8 .
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Federal Election provide a convenient example. The .Prime Minister,
S.M. Bruce, claimed that the 1925 Seamen’s strike, led by J. Johnson 
and Tom Walsh, had been the work of 'foreign-born agitators’ and he 
unsuccessfully attempted to deport both these men. During tne 
election campaign later in the year, Bruce had no compunction in high­
lighting the issue of ’Law and Order', implying that while the 
Bruce-Page Coalition could be trusted to deal firmly with revolutionary 
elements the Labor Party, because of its connection with the Commu­
nists, could not be trusted in this respect. A National Federation 
poster distributed in Melbourne depicted Labor as a donkey ridden by
a bewniskered Bolsnevik, wno was dangling a carrot in front of its
0
nose. The Communist bogey was also used to great effect during the 
depression, particularly about the time of tne Premiers' Plan and 
tne Lang scare. By tnis s^age, moreover, the A.L.P. itself was 
becoming extremely sensitive to the charge of 'Boisnevist control' 
and took great pains to dissociate itself from the Communist Party.
Even after the Second World War, the Liberal and Country 
Parties were still using such tactics. True to form, the Country 
Party came first in proposing that the Communist Party should be
3
Argus, 29 October 1925. See also Aaron Wildavsky, 'The 192b 
Referendum', in Aaron Wildavsky and Dagmar Carboch, Studies in 
Australian Politics, Melbourne, 1958, pp.8-9. According to the 
Comintern, Communist Party membership in Australia about this time 
was 250 (cited in Leicester Webb, Communism and Democracy in 
Australia: A Survey of the 1951 Referendum, Melbourne, 1954, p.22).
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banned - and waiting witn relisn for the Labor Government to state
that it should not be banned. The Country Party’s directness in this
context has always been remarkaole. In 1941, commenting upon the
entry of Soviet union into the war, A.G. Cameron (Country Party
leader, 1939-40) had declared - somewhat prophetically:
From our point of view it does not matter who wins the 
Russo-German war, because the British Empire is committed 
to fight the winner.... Let us get very clearly into our 
heads that whicn ever side wins we fight.4 56
At tne 1946 Conference of tne Country Party (N.S.W.), a motion was
5passed recommending the banning of the Communist Party and A.W. 
Faaüen, the Country Party's leader, stated in his policy speech in 
the 1946 Federal Election:
The Country Party regarcs the Australian Communist in 
the same category as a venomous snake - to be killed before 
it kills. Therefore, it stands foursquare for declaring 
the Communist Party an illegal organisation.0
The Country Party's 19^9 Federal Platform and Policy advocated the
banning of the Communist Party and 'affiliated, associated or
substitute associations and organisations.' This has remained
7Country Party policy ever since.
4
Commonwealtn Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 168 (21 August 1941),
p.110.
5
S.M.H., 15 April 1946.
6
Cited in a letter to the writer from tne General Secretary, 
Australian Country Party (N.S.W.), 21 September 19bl.
Ibid.
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The Liberal Party did not fall into line with the Country 
Party on tnis issue until 1948. At the 1946 Federal Election, the 
Liberal leader, K.G. Menzies, declared that ’in time of peace we
Q
do not propose a ban on the Communist party', and in tne following
9year he made the same point. However, tne intensification of the 
Cold War, tne wave of Communist-led strikes and the bank nationali­
sation issue led Menzies to revise nis opinion. In March 1948 he 
stated that Australian Communists constituted a potential fifth- 
column in the event of war with the Soviet Union ana tnat they should 
be treated as 'public enemies':
The day for tolerance has gone and the day has arrived when 
the people must make up tneir minds tnat Communists were the 
enemies of Australia and the British Empire.lu
At tne same time the Federal Parliamentary Liberal Party resolved
that tne Communist Party, togetner witn all organisations controlled
by Communists (with the notable exception of trade unions) should
be banned. Menzies stated that a nan on the Communist Party was
nenceforth official Liberal Party policy ana that 'we are now at
war with the Communists because they are clearly disrupting our
industries and undermining our n a t i o n . T h e  cnange in Liberal
8
Herald, 22 dune 1946.
9
C.P.D., Vol. 191 (15 May 1947), p.2460.
10
Sun, Melbourne, 13 March 1948.
Canberra Times, 12 Marcn 1948.
11
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P a r ty  p o l i c y  was fo llow ed  by th e  d e c i s io n  o f  th e  V ic to r i a n  L i b e r a l -
Country P a r ty  C abinet to  approve l e g i s l a t i o n  banning th e  Communist
12P a r ty  and o tn e r  ’ su b v e rs iv e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s '  in  V i c t o r i a .  The
L ib e r a l  P rem ie r ,  T .T . Hollway, a c te d  c a u t io u s ly ,  s t a t i n g  t h a t  he d id
n o t  fav o u r  i t s  immediate im p lem en ta t ion ,  p a r t l y  on th e  grounds t n a t
i t  would be i n e f f e c t i v e  u n le s s  th e  F ed e ra l  Government had taken
s i m i l a r  a c t i o n .  At th e  beg inn ing  of 1949 Menzies announced t h a t  th e
i s s u e  of banning th e  Communist P a r ty  would f e a t u r e  p rom inen tly  in
13th e  L ib e r a l  campaign a t  th e  fo rthcom ing  F edera l  E l e c t i o n .
Non-Labor p a r l i a m e n ta r ia n s  f r e q u e n t ly  charged t n a t  th e  F e d e ra l  
Government was in  some m y s te r io u s  way c o n t r o l l e d  from 'Moscow1 in  
t h e  p os t-w ar  p e r io d .  The i n t e n t i o n  h e re  was c l e a r l y  t o  encourage th e  
e l e c t o r s  to  equa te  th e  Labor and th e  Communist P a r t i e s .  To d r iv e  th e  
p o in t  home, such p o l i t i c i a n s  o f te n  ex ag g e ra ted  th e  e x t e n t  o f  Communist 
s t r e n g t n  and in f l u e n c e .  The p r in c i p a l  a d ep ts  were Country P a r ty  
members J . P .  Abbott and h .L .  Anthony, L ib e r a l  P a r ty  members A.G. 
Cameron (who had l e f t  t h e  Country P a r ty ;  and E . J .  t l a r r i s o n  ( tn e  
P a r t y ' s  Deputy L e a d e r ) ,  and th e  s o le  Lang Labor member, J . T .  Lang.
W.m . nughes , speak ing  in  1946, pu t t h i s  p o in t  of view in  r e l a t i v e l y  
m ild  language:
HF“
Sun, M elbourne, 15 A p r i l  1948.
S ,M .11. ,  19 January 1949, 21 Jan u a ry  1949.
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To-day, th e  Labour party  i s  c o n t r o l l e d  t o  a g r e a t  degree  
by th e  tra d e  u n io n s ,  and t n e y ,  in  t h e i r  tu r n ,  are c o n t r o l l e d  
by th e  Communist e x e c u t iv e ,  whicn ta k e s  i t s  ord ers  from 
M oscow.^
Another L ib e r a l  member, P .C. Spenaer, r e fe r r e d  t o  th e  Federal Govern-
15ment as 'The S o c ia lis t -C o m m u n is t  P arty  o f  A u s t r a l i a ' . The
non-Labor p a r t i e s  a l s o  attem pted t o  equate Communism w ith  Fasc ism ,
s in c e  th e  a n t i - F a s c i s t  f e e l i n g  engendered during th e  war was s t i l l
c om p ara t ive ly  3 tro n g .  The annual co n feren ce  o f  tn e  N.S.W. D iv i s io n
o f  th e  L ib e r a l  Party  in 1946 d e c la r e d  th a t  the  Communist Party  was a
' F a s c i s t  o r g a n i s a t i o n ' ,  whose aim was t o  e s t a b l i s h  a ' F a s c i s t  t o t a l i -
16t a n a n  regime unter  Russian c o n t r o l . '
In a d d i t io n  non-Labor p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n s ,  both F edera l and S t a t e ,
r e p e a te d ly  cla im ed th a t  l e f t - w in g  members o f  th e  Labor Party  and
ex-com m unists were s e c r e t  members o f  th e  Communist P a r ty .  In 194T
Ü .P . Abbott a l l e g e d  t h a t  an ex-Communist, J .N . n a w lin g ,  who
c o n tr ib u te d  a s e r i e s  o f  anti-Communist a r t i c l e s  t o  News-Weekly some
17
months a f te r w a r d s ,  was s t i l l  a Communist, and he a l s o  su g g e s te d
18t h a t  Dr E .P .  Dark, an A .L .P . member, was a Communist. J . f .  Lang
14
C .P .D . ,  V o l .  186 (7 inarch 1 9 4 6 ) ,  p .9 5 .
Io
S.ivi.H. , 5 May 1948. See a l s o  the  s ta tem ent by H.L. Anthony, 
m .H .R .,  c i t e d  in  T r ib u n e , 14 A p ril  1948.
16
Freedom, 26 dune 1946.
17
News-Weekly, 7 May 1947.
18
C .P .D . ,  V o l .  193 (15 October 194 7 ) ,  p p .8 1 7 -1 8 .
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alleged that D.A. Mountjoy, a member of the Commonwealth Scientific
and Industrial Research Executive (and a brother of a prominent
Western Australian Communist, H. Mountjoy), had ’definite leanings
19towards the Communist party.' Referring to Dr Lloyd Ross, another
ex-Communist, Lang maintained that altnougn Ross 'claims to have
20recanted' this was just 'part of the Communist technique.* State
parliamentarians, such as the Victorian Liberal ivi.L.A., F.L. Edmunds,
were equally suspicious. Edmunds specialised in making ludicrous
charges against the History Department in the University of Melbourne
and teachers in State schools which led the Premier, T.T. Hollway,
to order an investigation into the political beliefs of all teachers
21employed by the Victorian Education Department.
Undoubtedly, the constant repetition of such claims did have 
some effect on public opinion in the late forties. On one occasion, 
however, a Liberal m .H.R., H.E. Holt, placed the Communist issue in 
a different perspective:
I never like to exaggerate the significance of the Communists 
in Australia, because I have always believed that there was 
but fractional support for them among the people.^
19
Ibid., Vol. 197 (17 and 18 dune 1947), p.2296.
20
Loc. cit.
21
Age, 23 March 1948.
C.P.D., Vol. 190 (21 February 1947), p.107.
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Anti-Communism, like anti-clericalism, can easily be converted 
from guarded hostility to hysteria, and the political effects of the 
conversion have often proved extremely dangerous. Important sections 
of the Australian community are particularly suggestible on the 
Communist issue, and are quickly inflamed if they are told that the 
Communist Party, through its hold on the trade union movement, is 
working through the Labor Party to bring about revolution. When anti­
communist hysteria does develop in Australia, the Communists find 
themselves in an unusually difficult position - especially since, for 
reasons we shall discuss in the following section, the Labor Party is 
usually ill-disposed to offer them much protection.
The A.L.P. and Communism
The Labor Party in Australia, by comparison with the British 
Labour Party, the French Socialist Party and other European Social- 
liemocratic parties, has been reluctant to resist attempts to ban or 
legally restrict the activities of Communists, even when such 
attempts threaten important civil liberties. The latter parties are 
wary of anti-Communist campaigns because these can so easily turn 
into attacks on their own left-wing (and predominantly Marxist) 
groups, ana because legal action against the Communist Party will 
usually entail some erosion of the regime of civil liberties.
Further, the Socialists of France and Belgium, for example, are still 
imbued with the old tradition of ’No enemies on the Left!' and are 
therefore disinclined to countenance the repression of an organisation
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which they regard as a genuine institution of the working class and 
which they feel would become extremely dangerous were it to be 
driven underground. Such considerations do weigh within the Australian 
Labor Party, but they seldom determine its policies. Why is this so?
First, as previously mentioned, the constant use of the 
'Bolshevik bogey' by the non-Labor parties since the early twenties 
as a means of politically embarrassing the Labor Party had made it 
extremely sensitive to the Communist issue. The leadership of the 
Labor Party had no wish to be associated in any way with the Commu­
nist Party and many of its leaders denied that the Communist Party 
was even part of the Labor movement (for many years Labor leaders 
have mistakenly equated the A.L.P. and the Australian Labor 
movement).
Second, the Labor Party was non-doctrinaire and pragmatic to a 
much greater degree than the British Labour Party and the West 
Luropean Social-Democratic parties, and hence less ready to defend 
the Communist Party on ideological grounus. J.'f. Lang is a prime 
example of this aspect of the A.L.P. Line the Communists he was 
adept at the art of political manipulation but he loathed the 
Communists on tne grounds tnat not only did they manipulate but they 
also used ideology and read books. Lang was tne first Labor 
politician to organise effectively against the Communists (largely 
out of self-interest) and the attitudes to be found in nis polemics 
against the Communists have influenced later generations of Labor
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leaders. It should also be noted that during the twenties and 
thirties Lang was considered to be on the Left of tne A.L.i .
third, there was the fear of many traditionalist Labor Party 
union officials that tne Communists would replace them, a fear also 
to be found amongst their Britisn and West European counterparts. 
During the forties this fear led many of them in Australia to join 
forces with anti-Communist Catholics and establish the A.L.P. 
Industrial Groups.
Fourth, the anti-Communism of the Roman Catrxolic Church was 
important because the great majority of Catholics supported the 
A.L.P. and Catholics were well represented among tne party's leader- 
snip. For many years the Catholic Church had condemned the 
Communist a.arty not only because of its attitude to religion but 
also because it recommenaed the social ownersnip of a high proportion 
of private property. The Spanish Civil War (1936-39;, during which 
the Papacy supported Franco, resulted in the Catholic Church 
devoting much more attention to Communism and virtually beginning 
an anti-Communist crusade. There was also a fundamental division 
between Catholics and Socialists witnin tne A.L.P. with the former 
advocating 'social justice', a vague concept which, though critical 
of laissez-faire capitalism, stresses the importance of retaining 
private property. With the decline in importance of the Irish 
problem and the movement of some Catholics (hitherto predominantly 
a working-class group) into the middle class, particularly after
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World War II, the Catholic Church became more 'patriotic* and its 
ties with nne A.L.P. became looser.
During World War il, altnougn the Catholic hierarchy refrained
%
from openly criticising tne wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, 
tney were known to be cool towards its existence. However, pre­
dominantly Catholic papers, sucn as Freedom ^whicn was influenced 
by Archbishop Mannix) openly condemned the alliance, in the post-war 
period, the Catholic Church's anti-Communism became even stronger 
and in 1947 the Australian Catholic Bishops stated:
The imminent danger facing this country is that tne 
Communist party will use the power it nas gained over a large 
part of the trade union movement to overthrow tne machinery 
of Government, to seize political power for itself, and to 
achieve tne enas of Communism - the destruction of political, 
social and religious freedom....
This is not a dream or nightmare conjured up by some 
fevered brain. It is not the concoction of some merely 
political opponent of Communism or of some enemy of the trade 
union movement.... To resist Communism...is to secure 
Australia not only from the dictatorsnip of the extreme Left, 
nut to remove tne cause whicn breeds the violence of the 
extreme Right.^
During 1948 Monsignor Fulton Sheen, described by News-Weekly as 'the
24leading authority on Communism in the United States', and Cardinal 
Spellman of New York botn toured Australia and devoted much of their 
time to attacking Communism in the trade unions. Finally, the trial
23
Peace in industry, Official Statement of the Standing Committee of 
tne Catholic Bishops of Australia, 1947.
24
News-Weekly, 5 way 194Ö.
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of Hungary's Cardinal iwmdszenty in 1949, raised Catnolic anti­
communism to an even greater intensity.
As a result of all tnese factors tne A.L.P., during World 
War 11 but. particularly in tne post-war period, set aoout taking 
even greater precautions to seal the party against Communist infil­
tration. Tne Left doctrinaire elements witnin the lanor Tarty were 
excluded (or they resigned) and A.L.P. attacks on the front organi­
sations of the Communist Party were launched. Tne Labor Party's 
Federal Conference in 1945 pledged tne party to campaign against
Communism - although it opposed the idea that the Communist Party 
25should be banned. At tne same time the Federal President ruled
that A.L.P. members could not officially represent the party on
26platforms alongside members of the Communist Party, and the 1946
conference of the N.S.W. branch of the Labor Party declared the
27Communist Party to be its 'permanent foe'. The A.L.P's Federal 
Conference two years later claimed that the Australian Communists, 
acting on Soviet directives, were seeking to destroy democratic 
institutions, retard economic progress and slow down defence
25
S.M.H., 29 November 1945.
26
L.F. Crisp,The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901-1951, London, 
1955, p.178. It was made clear that the ruling was not designed to 
prevent A.L.P. members attending A.C.T.U. Congresses.
27
Tribune, 18 June 1946.
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preparations." However, it must be stressed that the A.L.P’s
attitude towards the Communist Party varied from State to State
with the toughest line being taken in Victoria ana Queensland. One
of the most vocal anti-Communists in the Labor Party was J.J. Maloney,
29Australian Minister to the Soviet Union oetween 1943 and 1946,
who was described by R. Dixon as 'Australia’s chief anti-Soviet
30crusader and slanderer.' Upon his return to Australia he stated
that the Soviet Union was under a dictatorship 'more severe' than
31Germany under Hitler. Maloney's views were attacked by W. slater,
Victorian Labor M.L.A. and Australian Minister to the Soviet Union
before Maloney, and Professor R.M. Crawford, a former First
32Secretary at the Australian Legation in Moscow.
Nevertheless, the Labor Party did not advocate the banning
33of the Communist Party after World War II, although a few branches
34did so at the N.S.W. Labor Party's Conference in 1948 and
28
Australian Labor Party, Official Report of Proceedings of the 18th 
Triennial Conference, 1948, p.50.
29
See d.J. Maloney, Insiae Red Russia, Sydney, 1948.
30
Tribune, 4 dune 1946.
31
News-Weekly, 20 March 1946.
32
Reply to Maloney: The Real Facts About Russia, Melbourne, n.d.
33
See statements by d.B. Chifley and Dr H.V. Evatt in C.P.D., Vol. 196 
(7 April 1948), pp.610, 613, 619.
34
S.M.H., 16 June 1948.
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35Senator 1). Grant proposed a ban during the 1949 Coal Strike.
News-Weekly opposed such a move on the grounds that
tne Party would go underground, be publicly martyred, would 
win a lot of support from liberal humanitarians, and would 
flourish accordingly. They were banned once before and it 
didn't work.^0
Occasionally, Labor politicians would take a leaf out of their
opponent's book and attempt to identify the Liberal and Country
Parties with the Communist Party. In 1947 the Minister for the Army,
C. Chambers, alleged that the Communists were 'more closely allied
with tne Liberal party and the Australian Country party than they
37are with the Labor party.’ Many Labor politicians also followed 
their non-Labor opponents in equating Communism ana Fascism. Chifley
38asserted that Communism in the Soviet Union was a ’brand of fascism',
and News-Weekly, very close to the A.L.P. until 1954, referred to
the 'Fascist doctrines' of Communism and claimed that the Communist
39Party was 'the refuge of...Marxist Nazis.'
35
Sun, Sydney, 25 July 1949.
36
Neirs-Weekly, 2 July 1947.
37
C.P.D., Vol. 190 (21 February 1947), p.109. This attitude still 
persists: in 1961 the Australian Worker, organ of the A.W.U., claimed 
that Liberal and Country Party members had 'forged secret links with 
the lied stooges to injure the Labor Party' (cited in Tribune,
6 December 1961) while Labor Senator A.M. Benn alleged that three 
Liberal and two Country Party Federal parliamentarians were members 
of a Communist Party cell (C.P.D., Vol. S.19, 15 March 1961, p.180).
38
Ibid., Vol. 198 (2 September 1948), p.67.
39
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In tn e  post-w ar  per iod  a number o f  S o c i a l i s t s  in  th e  Labor
Party  were e x p e l l e d  on charges o f  Communist membersnip or sym p ath ie s .
In some c a s e s  aual membersnip was c l e a r l y  an e s t a b l i s n e d  f a c t  but
in  o t n e r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in V i c t o r i a  and Q ueensland, ‘many b e l i e v e
t n a t  tn e r e  nave been in s ta n c e s  in  wnich tn e  charge o f  Communist was
d i r e c t e a  a g a in s t  members wno were to o  independent o f  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  
40p arty  h i e r a r c h y . 1 Anti-Communists in th e  A .L .P . who m ainta ined
c lo s e  t i e s  w ith  News-Weekly m ainta ined  t h a t  Communism, not
c a p i t a l i s m ,  was T h e  Enemy' and f r e q u e n t ly  equated l i b e r a l s  and
S o c i a l i s t s  w ith  th e  Communists. 'Movement' p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n s ,  such as
S.iiA. Keon, M .L .A ., in  V ic t o r ia ,  were as r e c k le s s  as tn e  L ib e r a l
M .L.A ., F .L . Edmunus in  branding d i s s e n t e r s  as 'Com munists'. Amongst
t n o s e  e x p e l l e d  from tn e  A .L .P . were th e  h i s t o r i a n  Brian F i t z p a t r i c k , 41
Mrs E. Jon n ston , S e c r e ta r y  o f  tn e  South A u s t r a l ia n  Branch o f  th e  
42F .C .U . ,  B .d .  M i l l i s s ,  S en ior  V ic e -P r e s id e n t  o f  tn e  Macquarie D i s t r i c t
43Assembly o f  th e  p a r ty ,  and Ivo B a r r e t t ,  V ig i la n c e  O f f ic e r  o f  th e
44Sydney Brancn o f  th e  W.W.F. M i l l i s s  su b seq u en t ly  jo in e d  tn e
40
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41
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42
Freedom, 23 way 1945. Mrs jo n n sto n  was a lm ost c e r t a i n l y  a member 
o f  th e  Communist P a r ty .
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44
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45Communist Party and the Charter of the Katoomba Branch of the
A.L.P., in which he (and Dr E.P. Dark) had been active, was withdrawn
46by the New South Wales Executive of the Labor Party.
The strong stand taken by the Labor Party against the Communist
front organisations contributed towards their decline in the late
forties. After about 1948 the fronts were not able to make any real
headway amongst left-wing A.L.P. members following tne imposition of
a series of bans on them by the Labor Party. In 1941 the A.L.P’s
Federal Executive had declared the Australia-Soviet Friendship League
to be dominated by the Communists and ruiea that none of its members
47could belong to the League or any other Communist-aominated body.
During and immediately after World War II tnis ruling was frequently
ignored although the Labor Party in Victoria was quite strict in its 
48enforcement. The E.Y.L. was declared out of bounas for A.L.P.
members in New South Wales and Western Australia in the early post-war 
49years and in 1948 the New South Wales A.L.P. banned the Australia- 
Russia Society, whereupon its President, Clive Evatt, M.L.A.,
45
Ibid., 8 August 1947.
46
S.M.H., 10 March 1947.
47
L.F. Crisp, loc. cit.
48
See Australia and tne U.S.S.R. and Some Victorian Labor Party 
Leaders, Melbourne, 1944.
49
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resigned from the organisation. A former President, Mrs d. Street,
resigned from the Labor Party so as to remain a member of the 
51Society.^ Sanctions were not applied against all the A.L.P. members
52who remained in the fronts, partly because the A.L.P., unlike the 
Britisn Labour Party, did not publish a list of proscribed front 
organisations, and partly because the various State Branches of the 
A.L.P. were not consistent in banning the well-known fronts.
Thus, as the end of the decade approached, the Labor Party, the 
only political party to which the Communist Party could look to for 
protection or to act as a buffer, became increasingly anti-Communist. 
It made strenuous attempts to keep the two working-class parties 
quite separate at all levels of political activity.
The question of civil liberties
In Western countries during periods of intense anti-Communism, 
the main defence of Communist rarties has usually been the machinery
50
S.M.H., 28 August 1948, 1 September 1948.
51
News-Weekly, 19 January 1949. In 1946 Mrs Street had been informed 
by the Labor Party in New South Wales that she could continue as the 
then President of the Society since it was not covered by the Federal 
Executive’s ruling of 1941 (S.M.H,, 13 July 1946J. Mrs (later Lady) 
Street, who was the wife of a New South Wales Supreme Court judge, had 
unsuccessfully contested the 1943 and 1946 Federal Elections as an 
A.L.P. candidate. The New South Wales A.L.P. also banned the N.H.A. 
(ibid., 10 August 1948) and the Sydney University Labor Club (ibid.,
26 September 1949). The Victorian A.L.P. banned the N.H.A. in 1949 
(News-Weekly, 26 January 1949).
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For example, Senator F. Ward remained as President of the Austraiia- 
Russia Society in South Australia.
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of civil liberties built up in previous uecades. In Australia the
defence of sucn liberties has not been a major concern for any party*
Observers of varying political beliefs have testified to this aspect
of Australian society. Professor Crisp has remarked that 'Australia
53has not, an unblemished record in the field of civil liberties.'
Brian Fitzpatrick has commented that 'all parliamentary parties
contributed, over a number of years, to serious modification of the
54Australian democratic system in a retrogressive direction', while
Douglas McCallum has written: 'Most Australians could not care less
55about the liberties of others, at home or abroad.'
It is generally accepted that the deterioration set in during
World War I with the War Precautions Acts, the conscription issue
and the Unlawful Association Act of 1916 (under which the I.W.W.
56was outlawed;. But the general trend may he observed before World 
War I, particularly during tne introduction of compulsory military 
training. In the inter-war period, civil liberties were at a 
discount and books, films and radio broadcasts were frequently
53
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Australia, 2n d ed., Adelaide, 1954, p.55.
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Australian Civilization, Melbourne, 1962, p.26.
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censored. However, the great majority of Australians were not 
disturbed at these developments and it was left mainly to small 
groups of intellectuals and to Brian Fitzpatrick's Australian Coun­
cil for Civil Liberties (founded in 1936) to protest - in some 
cases, be it added, successfully.
We have already noted the weakness of the liberal tradition in 
Australian life. At the parliamentary level, unfortunately, it has 
been at its weakest. The first Federal Parliament was elected 
during the patriotic fervour engendered by the Boer War, and ever 
since 'disloyalty* and 'nonconformity' have become powerful instru­
ments of political abuse. The defeats of the conscription referenda 
during World War I and of the referendum to ban the Communist Party 
in 1951 could perhaps be cited as evidence that a concern for civil 
liberties and dissent has persisted despite the surface signs. But 
in all three cases the results were affected by other important 
issues; what is significant is that they were not defeated by large 
majorities. Perhaps the matter may be summarised by saying that, 
when they are called to declare themselves on a specific issue 
concerning civil liberties, a majority of Australians will usually 
decide for tolerance - but this tolerance has not found significant 
and continued expression in the party system itself.
In a society susceptible to anti-Communist hysteria and 
perfunctory in its protection of civil liberties, anti-Communist 
pressure groups can exercise a disproportionate degree of influence.
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An extremely strong stand against Communism was adopted after World
War II by the Returned Servicemen's League (R.S.L.). Communists
57(of whom 4,000 had served in World War II ) began to play an active
part in the R.S.L. after the war, not with the aim of turning the
organisation into a Communist front but simply in order to neutralise
it politically, since the Party feared that it would again become
(as in the inter-war period) a right-wing, anti-Communist pressure
group. The League's leadership, mainly well-known non-Labor
personalities, immediately took strong action against those of its
members whom it considered Communists. Many left-wing Socialists
58came into this category. In 1946 the Victorian Branch of the R.S.L.
59decided that Communists could no longer retain League membership.
In contrast, the New South Wales Branch at first refused to exclude
60members on political grounds but by 1948 the views of its leadership
had changed and tne State Executive banned Communists from member- 
61ship. One of those expelled, A.R. Bergeest, a member of the A.L.P.,
57
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appealed to the courts, but the League's decision was eventually 
62upheld. At the Federal Conference of the R.S.L. in 1948 the
League became anti-Communist with a vengeance; motions were passed
that the Communist Party be banned, Communists removed from the
Commonwealth Public Service and executive positions in trade unions,
63ana foreign-born Communists deported from Australia. By 1950 the
League's official organ was declaring:
If America bans a Red, then Australia should ban him too.... 
Australia snould be getting tougher, and the tougher it is 
with Communists the better returned men will like it.^4
Developments in the second largest ex-servicemen's organisation,
the Legion of Ex-Servicemen and Women, followed a similar course. Its
1946 Federal Conference debarred Communists and 'Communist sympathi-
65sers' from holding executive positions and the next Federal
66Conference banned 'Communists' from membership in the Legion. The 
Victorian Branch, at first, did not strictly enforce this decision 
and it was completely ignored by the Queensland Branch which had been 
controlled by Communists and left-wing Socialists since 1945. The
62
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Queensland Branch was expelled by the Federal Executive of the 
67Legion in 1949« A number of the smaller ex-servicemen's associ—
6Sations also banned Communists from membership.
Relatively small, extreme right-wing groups found willing 
listeners during the post-war years. The Sane Democracy League was
mainly concerned with inserting anti—Labor advertisements in the
09 jopress. The more active People's Union, formed in 1945, also
published anti-Labor advertisements referring to the 'Communist-
Socialist • Federal Government and it became particularly active
during the bank nationalisation crisis. The Victorian affiliate of
People's Union was the Victorian League of Rights whose Director,
Eric D. Butler, was a prominent Douglas Crediter and member of Mel-
71bourne's Anglican Synod as well as Australia's leading anti-Semite.
67
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The leaders of People's Union were A.G. Hebblewhite who had been a 
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For details of Butler's activities, see Nation. 26 September 1959; 
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Butler acquired an enviable degree of respectability and was called
upon to address Rotary Clubs, Anglican groups and Liberal Party branch
72meetings. He also contributed a regular column to the Argus. A 
more 'respectable* anti-Communist group was tne Australian Constitu­
tional League in Melbourne, founded in 1944, wnose first secretary was
73 74J. Somerville Smith. Smith, however, soon resigned and was
succeeded by Colonel N.A. McArthur. in Sydney, the Political Research
Society Ltd was formed in 1945 to conduct research into and to fight 
75Communism. J.A. McCailum, later a Liberal Senator, opposed the
organisation ana stated that its conclusions on Communism had been
T 6reached before any research had been carried out. The Society was 
aiso condemned by the New South Wales Labor Council ana F.D. Kelly,
72
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suaded the Postmaster-General, II.L. Anthony, to prevent a well-known 
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Clive Turnbull in Argus, 2 June 1951). in 1959, after an address by 
Butler, Melbourne Anglican Synod passed a strongly-worded anti- 
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the President of the A.L.P. in New South Wales, who claimed that its
purpose was to conduct ‘heresy hunting in the manner of the
77notorious Dies Committee of America'. News-Weekly was yet another
critic on the grounds that the Society opposed all strikes, irres-
78pective of origin or motive. A similar organisation in Sydney
79was the Citizens’ Rights Committee, formed in 1946 and termed by
80News-Weekly ’a stooge organisation for the Liberal Party*. In
fact, both these bodies disappeared when the Liberal Party adopted
a stronger anti-Communist position. Largely on the initiative of the
Lord Mayor of Brisbane the Freedom League was formed in Queensland
in 1949. News-Weekly feared that it 'could easily develop into 
81Fascism'. Most of the Freedom League's leaders were non-Labor
political leaders and prominent clergymen although the Catholic Arch-
82bishop of Brisbane hastened to withdraw his support.
Tne entry into Australia of a large number of Central-East 
Europeans after the war strengthened the anti-Communist elements in
77
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the community, but since few were proficient in English they made
83little impact within the anti-Communist groups at the time. The 
arrival of these anti-Communist immigrants was viewed by the Commu­
nist Party with alarm. Since 1947 it had been the unofficial practice 
of the Federal Government not to allow into Australia prospective
migrants who are members of European Conmunist Parties or hold views
84sympathetic to Communism.
The press also played an important role in intensifying anti-
Communist feeling. During World War II the Bulletin, widely read in
country areas, had continued to attack not only Australian Communism,
85but also the Soviet Union. The Sydney Morning Herald ran numerous
83
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own anti-Communist organisations. In 1957 the right-wing Anti- 
Bolshevik Bloc of Nations was formed and two years later the more 
moderate Assembly of Captive European Nations was set up. Sir 
Wilfred Kent-Hughes, M.H.R., E.A. Willis, M.L.A., Senator J.G. 
Gorton and Senator F.P. McManus have associated themselves with the 
former while W.C. Wentworth, M.H.R. has allied himself with the 
latter. Numerous other New Australian anti-Communist groups also 
emerged, including the United Council of Migrants from Communist 
Dominated Europe (formed in Sydney in 1952), the Russian Anti- 
Communist Centre (formed in Sydney in 1953) and the Committee of 
Nations from Behind the Iron Curtain (formed in Melbourne in 1953).
84
When pressed on this matter in 1949, A.A. Calwell, the Minister 
for Immigration, strongly implied that security checks designed to 
exclude Communists were strictly applied by the Australian Military 
Intelligence officers who conducted the political and security 
examinations (C.P.D., Vol. 202 (1Ö uune 1949), p.1103).
85
E.P. Dark, The World Against Russia?, Sydney, 1948, pp.270-84.
137
fc6articles attacking the Australian Communist Party. As tne Cold 
War developed in the post-war period the press in general increas­
ingly distorted or exaggerated almost everything related to 
Communism or Communist Parties.
The intensification of anti-Communist feeling was accompanied by
the occasional use of violence, often with the open assistance of
R.S.L. branches, at Communist Party meetings. R.S.L. members attacked
a Party meeting in Shepparton, Victoria, in 1948, with such violence
that the Secretary of the Victorian A.L.P., D. Lovegrove, referred to
87this and similar episodes as 'disgraceful outbreaks of hooliganism.'
In 1949 Dr H.J.P. Mciueekin, Communist candidate at the Cobar By-
Election had to seek police protection during a meeting in Bourke in
88which a Communist was admitted to hospital with severe concussion.
86
See, e.g. S.M.H., 19 July 1943, 20 July 1943, 21 July 1943, 22 July 
1943, 14 August 1943. In 1945 the same paper declared: 'Communism 
in Australia has reached a stage where its potential to destroy the 
social and economic structure...has become a real danger.' (ibid.,
19 January 1945). Some years later a leading article described how 
the Communist Party in Australia 'Plans Revolution' (ibid., 15 July 
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A.A. Calweil, M.H.R., stated that the incident savoured of ’New 
89Guard violence*.
Legal action against tne Communist Party before 1950
The Chifley Labor Government was undountedly disturbed after 
World War II by the way in which the Communist Tarty, in keeping with 
its post-1947 tough line, kept exploiting strikes for political 
purposes. Such strikes not only hampered industrial recovery but 
also gave some substance to the suggestion that tne Labor Tarty was 
too compromised with the Communist rarty to deal with it firmly.
It was not surprising, then, to find tne Federal Government, and 
several of the State governments, using their legal powers to curb 
Communist activities in tne late forties. In 1949 tne Federal Govern­
ment had introduced important amendments to the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act and passed the National Emergency (Coal Strike)
Act. The latter Act, in particular, gave the State unusually strong 
powers to deal witn the 1949 coal strike and established a precedent 
with disturbing implications. In addition, the Cnifiey Government, 
following the visit to Australia of the British k.I.^ chief, Sir 
Tercy Sillitoe, established the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation in March 1949. Its main object was to prevent
_____ -
Ibid., 23 April 1949. In the late forties, moreover, the Commu­
nist Tarty and the front organisations found it difficult to hire 
halls for meetings (see, e.g. John Rodgers, Report on the Soviet Union, 
Melbourne, 1949).
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Communist espionage and to keep check on tne Party's activities, 
i/ith the change of government in December 1949, the Labor Party's 
attitude to the Security Service began to cnange and charges were 
made that it had been converted into an anti-Labor as well as anti­
communist organisation. When it was first established, however, 
the organisation had been vigorously condemned by E.J. Harrison, the 
Deputy Leader of tne Liberal Party, who asserted that 'Australians 
are subjected to more prying and more extensive snooping tactics 
than possibly are the Russians.' He continued:
Things have come to a pretty pass when the Government estab­
lishes a security service...to compile dossiers that may 
subsequently be used to embarrass people.... These moves 
are the forerunners of a political police force - a gestapo, 
tne C.G. P.U. of Soviet Russia and the like.^1
The Chifley Government also made use of legislation passed by
previous non-Labor administrations to deal with subversive activities.
92Under the Crimes Act three leading Communists were prosecuted in 
the late forties on the charge of promoting 'feelings of ill-will 
and hostility between different classes of His Majesty's subjects 
so as to endanger the peace, order or good government of the Common­
wealth.' (Section 24A(l)). In October 1948 Gilbert Burns, a
90
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member o i th e  T a r t y ’ s Queensland S t a t e  Committee, was sen ten ced
t o  s i x  months' imprisonment a r i s i n g  out o f  a r e p ly  wnich he had
93g iv e n  to  a q u e s t io n  a t  a p u b lic  m ee t in g .  The q u e s t io n e r  had
asked what th e  P a r t y ' s  stand would be in th e  event  o f  a war between
th e  S o v i e t  Union and the  Western Powers. Burns had r e p l i e d :
I f  A u s t r a l ia  was in vo lved  in  such a war i t  would be between  
S o v ie t  R u ss ia  and American and B r i t i s h  im p e r ia l i sm . We 
would oppose t h a t  war, we would f i g h t  on tu e  s id e  o f  S o v ie t  
R u s s i a . *
Im m ediately  a f t e r  Burns' s ta tem en t had been r e le a s e d  t o  th e  p r e s s ,  
R. Dixon d e c la r e d  t n a t  i t  d id  not r e f l e c t  tne  v iew s  o f  th e  P a r t y 's  
C entral Committee:
The A u s tr a l ia n  Communist T arty  w i l l  in  a l l  c ircu m stan ces  
defend th e  independence o f  A u s t r a l ia  a g a in s t  any and every  
t h r e a t  to  e n s la v e  u s . . . .  We are convinced th a t  S o v ie t  
R u ss ia  in no way, now or in th e  f u tu r e ,  th r e a t e n s  our 
country
During th e  t r i a l ,  Burns' counse l a l s o  s a id  th a t  th e  s ta tem en t  did
96n o t  r e p r e s e n t  P arty  p o l i c y .
The second (and most im portant)  t r i a l  in v o lv e d  Sharkey " * i who 
was found g u i l t y  in  October 1949 and sen ten ced  to  th r e e  y e a r s '  
imprisonment fo r  s u g g e s t in g  tn a t
93
The q u e s t io n e r  was Bruce Wight who, in th e  f o l lo w in g  y e a r ,  was 
e l e c t e d  L ib e r a l  ivi.H.R. fo r  L i l l e y .
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I f  S o v ie t  f o r c e s  in  p u r s u it  o f  a g g r e sso r s  en tered  
A u s t r a l i a ,  A u s tr a l ia n  workers would welcome them. A u s tr a l ia n  
workers would welcome S o v ie t  f o r c e s  pursuing a g g r e ss o r s  as th e  
workers welcomed them throughout Europe when the  Red tro o p s  
l ib e r a t e d  tn e  peop le  from th e  power o f  the  N a z i s . . . .  In v a s io n  
o f  A u s t r a l ia  by f o r c e s  o f  th e  S o v ie t  Union seems very  remote  
and h y p o t h e t ic a l  t o  me. I b e l i e v e  th e  S o v ie t  Union w i l l  go t o  
war on ly  i f  she i s  a t ta c k e d ,  and i f  she i s  a t ta c k e d  I do not  
see  A u s t r a l ia  b e ing  invaded by S o v ie t  t r o o p s .  The job o f  
Communists i s  to  s t r u g g le  t o  prevent w a r . . . .  The Communist 
P arty  a l s o  wants t o  bring th e  working c l a s s  to  power, but i f  
F a s c i s t s  in  A u s t r a l ia  use  f o r c e  t o  prevent th e  workers g a in in g  
t h a t  power Communists w i l l  a d v is e  th e  workers t o  meet f o r c e  
w ith  f o r c e .
S ta tem en ts  made by th e  t r i a l  judge , Mr J u s t i c e  Dwyer, during pro­
nouncement o f  s e n te n c e  were i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  s ta te m e n ts  made r e l a t i n g  
t o  th e  conduct o f  tn e  t r i a l  by th e  Federal A ttorn ey -G en era l ,  Dr h .V. 
E v a t t ,  and th e  Crown P rosecu tor  during th e  t r i a l ,  W.R. Dovey. E v a tt
had remarked: ’The f a c t  t h a t  th e  accused  was a member o f  th e  Commu-
99n i s t  party  would not put him in  a b e t t e r  or worse p o s i t i o n . '
Dovey d e c la r e d  t h a t  th e  t r i a l  'was not a p r o se cu t io n  a g a in s t
Communism or a Communist, but a g a in s t  a p r iv a te  c i t i z e n . . . th e  f a c t
th a t  Sharkey was General S e c r e ta r y  o f  the  Communist Party  was o f  no
i m p o r t a n c e Y e t ,  th e  t r i a l  ju a g e ,  Mr J u s t i c e  Dwyer, s ta t e d :
The lam entab le  f a c t  i s  th a t  you occupy a p o s i t i o n  in  which 
you, and o th e r s  a s s o c ia t e d  w ith  you, e x e r c i s e  an e v i l  and 
d is p r o p o r t io n a t e  in f lu e n c e  over th e  l i f e  o f  th e  c o u n t r y . . . .
Your w o r d s . . .w e r e  tn e  r e s u l t  o f  a r e v i s e d ,  c a r e fu l  and
98
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d e l i b e r a t e  p re d e te rm in a t io n  to  e f f e c t  a m align and t r a i t o r o u s  
p u rp o se .  That purpose was to  p r e s e n t  and recommend a p o l ic y  
invok ing  d i s l o y a l t y  to  A u s t r a l i a ,  so as  to  e x c i t e  d i s a f f e c ­
t i o n .  *01
On th e  same occas io n  he a l s o  t o l d  Snaraey :
You spoke on b e h a l f  of y o u r s e l f  and on b e n a l f  of th e  
Communist P a r t y .  What you s a i d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  haa a s ig n i f i c a n c e  
and a p o s s ib le  in f lu e n c e  f a r  g r e a t e r  than  i f  you had spoken 
m ere ly  as  a s im ple c i t i z e n . *0^
Snarkey appea led  a g a i n s t  h i s  sen ten c e  to  tn e  Court o f  C rim inal
Appeal whicn dec ided  t h a t  h i s  s e n te n c e  was to o  sev e re  and a c c o rd in g ly
103reduced  tn e  te rm  of imprisonment t o  e ig h te e n  months. I t  i s
p o s s ib le  t n a t  S n a rk e y 's  sen tence  would have been more l e n i e n t  had
ne n o t  adop ted  a D im i t ro v - l ik e  s ta n d  in  th e  dock, b u t  such b eh av io u r
was c o n s i s t e n t  w itn  th e  view e x p re s se d  in  a P a r ty  pam phlet:
Our t a c t i c s  in  tn e  p u b l ic  p ro cee d in g s  of tn e  law c o u r t  a r e  
n o t  t a c t i c s  of defence bu t o f  a t t a c k .  Without c l in g in g  to  
l e g a l  f o r m a l i t i e s , th e  Communist must use th e  t r i a l  as  a means 
o f  b r in g in g  n i s  in d ic tm en t a g a i n s t  tn e  dominant c a p i t a l i s t  
regim e and courageously  v o ic in g  tne  view of tn e  p a r t y .^04
In  th e  t n i r d  c a se ,  K.M. H ealy , Chairman of th e  P a r t y ' s  Western
A u s t r a l i a n  S t a t e  Committee was a c q u i t t e d  in  November 1949 fo r  making
th e  fo l lo w in g  s ta te m e n t :
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Communists in Western Australia will give whole-hearted 
approval to the statement of the party’s general secretary... 
tnat should the Soviet Army ever find it necessary to pursue 
an imperialist aggressor to Australia's soil they would be 
welcomed by Australian workers,
Wnile such an eventuality as regards Australia seems 
exceedingly remote, tne reported statement of Mr. Sharkey, 
following those by M. ihorez of France, and Mr. Togliatti, 
of Italy, is a warning to Wall Street and their fellow 
monopolists who are preparing for a tnird world war which 
is not only directed against the Soviet Union and the people’s 
democracies, but aims at the destruction of tne national 
independence of all countries, including Australia.
iiealy's lenient treatment is probably explained by tne fact that the
Communist Party was comparatively weak in relatively non-industnalised
Western Australia, a State also isolated from the Eastern States
which were more aware of the 'Communist menace*. Yet the different
outcomes of tne three cases were remarkable. Burns' statement was
mucn more forthright tnan Sharkey's and lacked all the latter's
qualifications; and yet Burns received a milder sentence. In addition,
Burns had maintained that Communists would ’fight1 on the side of tne
Soviet Union whereas Sharkey had merely stated that 'Australian
1U Öworkers would welcome Soviet forces'. tiealy, on tne other hand,
was acquitted for expressing 'whole-hearted approval' of Sharkey's
statement but as the Western Australian Crown Prosecutor remarked,
107healy went 'much further' than Sharkey since the latter had not
105
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accused  'Wall S t r e e t '  and ' f e l l o w  i m p e r i a l i s t s '  o f  preparing fo r  
World War i l l .  Not on ly  did  tn e  Courts s t r e t c h  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t io n  
o f  the  Crimes Act in  th e  Burns and Sharkey c a se s  but even i f  t h e i r  
s ta te m e n ts  were s e d i t i o u s ,  j u s t i c e  was unevenly  meted o u t .
how ever, i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  p r o s e c u t io n s  were p r im ar ily  
p o l i t i c a l  a t ta c k s  on th e  Communist P a r ty .  As P r o fe s s o r  P.H. 
P a r tr id g e  remarked:
t h e r e  was n o th in g  unusual or p a r t i c u l a r ly  dangerous in  what 
Sharkey s a i d . . . .  We can on ly  conclude t h a t  th e  charge was 
brought in  t n i s  in s ta n c e  because  Sharkey was g en era l  s e c r e t a r y  
o f  th e  Communist Party  and because tne  p r e sen t  a d m in is tr a t io n  
does n o t  dare ign ore  the  p r e s e n t  outcry  f o r  th e  su p p ress ion  
o f  tn e  Communist P a r t y . . . .  A la r g e  number o f  s ta tem en ts  which  
are made every  day in  th e  cou rse  o f  p o l i t i c a l  c on troversy  would  
conform t o  ivir J u s t i c e  Dwyer's d e s c r ip t io n  o f  Sh ark ey 's  s t a t e ­
ment a s  ' c a l c u la t e d  to  promote i l l - w i l l  and h o s t i l i t y  between  
d i f f e r e n t  g r o u p s ' .* 00
Tne s e d i t i o n  t r i a l s  were a l s o  condemned by P r o fe s s o r  W. Friedmann, 
P r o f e s s o r  o f  I n t e r n a t io n a l  Law at th e  U n iv e r s i t y  o f  Melbourne, who 
drew a t t e n t i o n  t o  th e  f a c t  t h a t  B r i t i s n ,  French and I t a l i a n  Commu­
n i s t s  had n o t  been prosecu ted  under th e  s e d i t i o n  laws o f  t h e i r
109r e s p e c t iv e  c o u n t r ie s  fo r  s im i la r  s ta te m e n ts .  Some y e a r s  l a t e r  
J .II . W ootten, who a c te d  as cou n se l  f o r  th e  I n d u s t r ia l  Groups in  many 
Court c a s e s ,  d e c la r e d  th a t  ' i t  cou ld  not be s e r i o u s l y  m ainta ined  
x,hat tn e  s ta te m e n ts  by Sharkey . .  .were a r e a l  t h r e a t  to  the  s e c u r i t y
108
S«fri .11. ,  3 November 1949.
T r ib u n e , 7 January 1950.
109
145
o f  tu e  c o u n t r y . ’ He concluded t n a t  t h e  Federa l Labor Government 
had ’m e r e ly . . .  sought p o l i t i c a l  advantage' by tn e  p r o s e c u t i o n s . i iU  
The t h r e e  Communists could  not have been g iv e n  a f a i r  and re a so n a b le  
t r i a l  during  a p er iod  when anti-Communism was approaching i t s  c lim ax  
and th e  Labor Party  car in g  l e s s  and l e s s  about c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s .
The stop -w ork  p r o t e s t  m eet in g s  c a l l e d  by th e  Communists and 
m i l i t a n t s  in  th e  tr a d e  un ions  a f t e r  S h a r k e y 's  s e n te n c e  had been  
imposed were n o t  a s u c c e s s .  P arty  s t r a t e g i e s  during  th e  ’a d v e n t u r i s t ’ 
p er io d  had i s o l a t e d  th e  Communists and t h e i r  a l l i e s  in  th e  Labor 
movement and i t  was on ly  in  some o f  th e  C om m unist-contro lled  un ion s  
t h a t  any resp on se  was forth com in g . Sven on th e  New South Wales 
c o a l f i e l d s  no major stoppage o c c u r r e d .  The Sydney Branch o f  the  
W.W.F. was the  on ly  branch to  implement th e  u n io n 's  F edera l E x e c u t iv e
d e c i s io n  t o  s to p  work in  p r o t e s t :  th e  B r isb a n e ,  M elbourne, Hobart
111and N e w ca s t le  branches r e fu se d  t o  endorse  th e  d i r e c t i v e .  The New
South Wales Labor Council a d v ised  t r a d e  u n i o n i s t s  not  to  c a l l  s t o p -
work m e e t in g s .  Although th e  Mosman Branch o f  the  A .L .P . p r o te s te d
a g a in s t  S h a rk ey 's  s e n te n c e ,  i t  was r e b u f fe d  by th e  p a r t y ' s  New
112South Wales S e c r e t a r y .  The v a r io u s  R e le a se  Sharkey Committees 
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set up were comprised mainly of progressive and Communist middle-
class intellectuals and trade unionists.
Communists in the Public Service and semi-Government agencies
suffered from discrimination during the late forties. In June 1949
A.W. Rudkin was dismissed from C.S.I.R. and another employee of the
same institution, Dr T.R. Kaiser, met tue same fate in September 1949
after participating in a demonstration outside Australia House in
London protesting against the Federal Government's handling of the 
113coal strike. J.T. Lang alleged that C.S.I.R. was strongly
114infiltrated with Communists. As a result of a speech by the
Chairman of C.S.I.R., Sir David Rivett, advocating free trade in
scientific knowledge, A.G. Cameron declared that 'the proper thing to
115do with...Rivett would be to relieve him of his duties.' The
Federal Government capitulated to these attacks on C.S.I.R. and they 
re-organised the body in March 1949 and at tne same time required 
its employees, only a handful of whom were Communists, to take the 
oath of allegiance. Tne new Chairman, I. Clunies-Ross, warned
113
Returning to Australia, Kaiser could find employment only as a 
telegraph linesman whereupon he took up an academic appointment in 
Britain.
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employees n o t  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  ' c o n t r o v e r s i a l  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s . ,116
In 1947 A.W. Fadden, th e  Leader of t h e  Country P a r ty ,  a l le g e d  t h a t  tn e
Comraonwealtn P u b l ic  S e rv ic e  was 'w n i te - a n te d  w ith  Conmiunist sympath-
117
i s e r s  and p r a c t i t i o n e r s ' .
Fo llow ing  th e  d e f e c t io n  in  1949 from th e  Communist P a r ty  of C e c i l
S h a rp le y ,  a member of th e  P a r t y ' s  V ic to r i a n  Committee, th e
V ic to r i a n  Government e s t a b l i s h e d  a Royal Commission to  in q u i re
w hether th e  P a r ty  advoca ted  th e  overth row  of Government by f o r c e ,
w hether  t h e  P a r ty  nad used f r a u d u le n t  p r a c t i c e s  in  t r a d e  union b a l l o t s ,
w hether  tn e  P a r ty  a t tem p ted  to  d i s r u p t  p ro d u c tio n  and e s s e n t i a l
118s e r v i c e s  and a number of r e l a t e d  m a t t e r s .  A V ic to r i a n  Supreme
Court Judge , S i r  C h ar le s  Lowe, who had fo rm erly  been a P a tro n  of
119A u s t r a l i a - S o v i e t  house was a p p o in te d  Royal Commissioner and th e
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A spec ts  of th e  Royal Commission on th e  Conmiunist P a r t y , M elbourne, 
1949, and Tne U nnecessary  P o l ic e  S t a t e  B i l l , M elbourne, 1950.
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During th e  p ro cee d in g s  one w i tn e s s ,  John i todgers ,  D i r e c to r  of 
A u s t r a l i a - S o v i e t  House (and a son o f  A .S. R odgers , a N a t i o n a l i s t  
M in i s t e r  in  th e  Hughes M in is t r y ,  1920-23),  r e f e r r e d  to  Lowe's 
w ar-tim e pa tro n ag e  o f  th e  House, t o  wnich th e  Commissioner r e p l i e d :
' I  aim n o t  go ing  to  a l low  t h a t . . . . w h e n  tn e  war was f in i s h e d  my 
p a tro n a g e  was w i tn d ra w n . . .any a t te m p t to  su g g es t  t h a t  I ever  had any 
sympathy w ith  any Conmiunist a s p i r a t i o n s  i s  something e n t i r e l y  devoid  
of fo u n d a t io n  and I am n o t  going to  s i t  h e re  and h ea r  such n o n s e n s e . '  
(H e r a ld , 10 August 1949).
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Commission s a t  from June 1949 u n t i l  March 1950. In O ctober, i t  was
d e s c r ib e d  by th e  Leader o f  the  Labor P arty  in V i c t o r i a ,  John Cain,
as 'a  r e c k l e s s  w aste  o f  p u b l ic  m oney', w h ile  th e  O pposit ion  Leader,
J .G .B .  McDonald, d e c la r e d  th a t  i t  had 'a ch iev ed  l i t t l e  or n o th in g  
120o f  v a lu e '  . On trie other  hand th e  Royal Commission had s tron g
support from th e  'Movement's' S t a t e  p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r ly  
121S.M. Keon. The 'e x p e r t '  w i t n e s s e s  on Communism c a l l e d  by the  
S e n io r  Counsel a s s i s t i n g  th e  Commission were a m ixed-bag o f  a n t i ­
communists: J .N .  R aw ling , who had l e f t  tn e  Party  in  1939; another  
ex-Communist, T.C. M c G ill ick  o f  th e  P e o p le ' s  Union; and iU.H. E l l i s ,  
a B u l l e t i n  j o u r n a l i s t  ana th e  autnor o f  two t e n d e n t io u s  books on 
Communism in A u s t r a l i a .  The more r e c e n t  o f  t h e s e  attem pted  t o  prove  
t n a t  th e  Labor P a r ty  was 'iv ioscow -controlled' and t h a t  ex-Coramunists
in th e  A .L .P . ,  such as  Dr Lloyd R oss ,  o .A .  Ferguson, R.A. King and
122j . A .  B e a s le y  were s t i l l  part o f  the  'Communist p l o t ' .  One w i t n e s s ,
Noble Kerby, even a l l e g e d  th a t  tne former c o n s e r v a t iv e  Lord Mayor
123o f  M elbourne, S i r  Thomas N e t t i e f o l d ,  was a ' f e l l o w - t r a v e l l e r ' .  
Snarp iey  h im s e l f  a l l e g e d  th a t  d .E .  B en n ett ,  e d i t o r  o f  th e  Melbourne
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Trades Hall Council organ, Labor Call, and endorsed A.L.P. candidate
for tne Federal seat of La Trobe, was a Communist. The Secretary of
the A.L.P. electoral campaign committee in La Trobe remarked tüat tne
cnarge was 'hardly in accord with the violent attacks on Bennett
124circulated tnroughout the electorate by the Communist Party', 
however, in view of the Labor Party's sensitivity to the cnarge of 
being associated with Communism in any way, Bennett had nis endorse­
ment for La Trobe withdrawn before the Federal Election. Sharpley's 
allegations relating to A.R. Wallis, a Commonwealth Conciliation
Commissioner, and S. Merrifield, Victorian Labor M.L.A., were found 
125to be incorrect.
In contrast to the many reckless statements made before the 
Commission, Sir Charles Lowe's report proved to be moderate and 
balanced. His main conclusions were: (1) Until 1943 tne Communist 
Party had been affiliated with the Comintern but since then there was 
'no evidence to show control from abroad but generally the policy of 
tne A.C.P. is in harmony with tnat of the C.P. elsewhere'; (2) The 
Party 'is prepared to use any means to acnieve what it thinks to be 
a desirable object, so long as it regards the means as fitting 
and tne result as not on the wnole disadvantageous' (the same could
__
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be said, with some reservations, of all political parties); (3)
Tne Party's funas 'come from various local sources anti there is no 
evidence of funds coming from overseas'; (4) Tne Party 'seeks to 
overthrow representative and democratic institutions as we know 
them, wnen a revolutionary situation arrives. In the meantime it is 
willing to make use of tnese institutions in order to further its 
own aims'; (5) 'In a period when there was a ban to its operation 
it carried on, as far as it could, its usual activities and it has 
made preparations to meet any revival of those conditions';
(6J 'There are a number of instances...of the A.C.P. or members of 
it using violence, intimidation and fraudulent practices to achieve 
tneir aim, but of tne allegations of the fraudulent 'rigging' of 
ballots only one is completely establisned, tnough tnere are circum­
stances of suspicion in regard to most of tne others'; and (7) Tne 
Party has 'dislocated, disrupted or retarded industrial production,
but claims tnat tnis effect was only a concomitant to the struggle
126to obtain better conditions for the workers.'
a s to Snarpiey's credioility as a witness, Sir Charles Lowe 
stated:
in cross-examination tnere was much to make one doubt parts 
of nis evidence, and tnere is much otnerwise against him 
....there were occasions...in his cross-examination when nis 
statements were snown to be unreiianie, and in his published 
articles there were some exaggerations and mistatements.
_
Ibid., pp.104-7
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JLastiy m s  roie was akin to tnat of an informer on those he 
had for years associated with, and for his disclosures to tne 
Press ne naci been paid at a rate wnich must nave seemed to him 
munificent.
fne credibility of such a witness is neavily suspect, and 
had it not been for unexpected corroooration of his evidence 
at a number of points, I should nave been inclined not to act 
on it at a l l . (
fne findings of tne Royal Commissioner disappointed those anti­
communists who noped for sensational revelations. No evidence was 
brought to light which suggested that the Party’s activities con­
stituted a clear and present danger. Sir Charles Lowe’s Report was 
not acted upon by tne Victorian Government, probably because on 
the day before it was published, the Menzies Government introduced the 
Communist Party Dissolution Bill into Federal Parliament. Nevertheless, 
the Royal Commission was a significant portent of what was to come 
later and it pointed towards more oppressive moves by the State.
It did succeed, however, in uniting the Communist Party during a 
period when because of strong anti-Communist feeling and the Party's 
isolation from Australian society, the membership had become 
dispirited. The only really cheerful piece of news for the Party in
the late forties was the Communist victory in China in 1949 wnich led
128Snarkey to comment: 'They've got Snarpley, but we've got Shanghai.’
12T
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Communism, together with bank nationalisation and petrol 
rationing was one of the principal issues at the 1949 Federal
152
Election, ine Liberal and Country Parties laid great stress on tiie
•menace of Communism’ and Chitley's difficulties in ending the coal
strike. Fadaen, in his policy speech, stated that tbe Country
Party stood for banning trie Communist Party, preventing Communists
from holding official positions in the trade unions or being employed
in the Commonwealth rublic Service. He also declared the objectives
129of the Labor Party and the Communist Party were identical. Later,
he said that if the Labor Government were re-elected 'the Hammer
1 dOand Sickle' would become *the coat of arms of Australia’. Menzies' 
policy speech stated that tne Liberal Farty also stood for banning 
the Communist Party and debarring Communists from official positions 
in trade unions and employment in the Commonwealth Public Service, 
he condemned Communists as 'unscrupulous opponents of religion,
131of civilised government, of law and order, of national security'. 
Tnroughout tne campaign Chifley referred to Communism as a
129
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'side-issue’ and a 'bogy'. “ The result ol' the election was a 
decisive Liberal-Country Tarty victory and altnougn stalwart anti­
communists such as J.P. Abbott retired and d.T. Lang was defeated 
their places were filled by W.C. Wentworth (Liberal) and a group of 
’Movement' Labor Tarty parliamentarians from Victoria, notably 
S.M. Keon, J.ivi. Mullens and W.M. Bourne. Hearing the electorate's 
verdict Chifiey wrote to a friend that
the constant harrage over the radio and in the press, whereby 
the Opposition succeeded in linking Communism with Socialism 
and Socialism with tue Labour rarty, and so creating a fear 
complex in tne minas of a percentage of the middle class vote, 
was tne outstanding reason for tne Government's aefeat.*33
Indeed, it was ironical tnat the Labor Government, wnich nad adopted 
such a strong attitude to tne Communists during 1946-49 snouid have 
been defeated in an election in which the coal strike and Communism 
featured prominently. But it nad found it impossible to outdo the 
Liberal and Country Parties in denouncing Communism.
By the close of the decade the Party had lost many of the 
advantages it had held in tne immediate post-war years by tne strat­
egies of the ’adventurist’ period and, of course, the repercussions 
of the Cold War. It was isolated in the Labor movement and had lost 
much of its previous political support. In a period when Australians 
had been drifting to the Right ana the demands for social reform
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diminishing, the Party had shifted to a more militant Left position.
In a community which has never had a strong tradition of civil 
liberties it was extremely vulneraole and already under strong 
attack from all the major political parties and the State. Anti- 
Communist feeling was nearing its peak and a Federal Government pledged 
to ban the Party had just been returned to power. The Party was 
disturbed at what the future had to offer and anxiously began to 
seek friends by modifying its 'adventurist' strategies. However, for 
the Party, worse was still to come.
PART TWO
CHAPTER FOUR
MOVES TO BAN THE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1950-1951
The period of 1945-49 had seen the Communist Party acting out 
the fantasy of a revolutionary movement, apparently certain of 
potential mass support, pursuing militant industrial strategies*
In the process, its resources of public goodwill and trade union 
power had been seriously depleted, and it entered the decade of 
the fifties in an extremely vulnerable and exposed position. In 
1950, the Menzies-Fadden Government brought in a bill to declare 
the Party illegal; the A.L.P., unwilling to commit itself against 
the ban, refused to use its Senate majority to ensure the bill's 
defeat; the bill, duly enacted, was declared unconstitutional by 
the High Court. Having fought and won the 1951 Federal Election on 
the issue of anti-Communism, the Menzies Government next submitted 
to referendum a proposal for banning the Party. This time the 
A.L.P., now under the leadership of Dr H.V. Evatt following 
Chifley's death, came out clearly against the depreciation of civil 
liberties involved in the proposed ban. The referendum proposal 
was defeated - but by a disturbingly narrow margin. The Coranunist 
Party, exhausted and uncertain, cautiously began adjusting its 
strategies to the harsh exigencies of politics in the fifties.
Its ordeal had not been herioc, and the defeat of the 
referendum had not been a triumphant occasion. If anything,
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anti-C om m unist f e e l i n g  had been whipped up to  a new p i t c h ,  and 
th e  A .L .P . ,  which had been most unhappy p la y in g  th e  r o l e  of S t 
George f o r  c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s ,  red o u b led  i t s  e f f o r t s  to  i s o l a t e  th e  
Communists w ith in  th e  Labor movement. The I n d u s t r i a l  G roups’ 
m i l i t a n t s ,  who had ga in ed  in  in f lu e n c e  th rough  th e  c r i s i s ,  were 
now s t ro n g  enough to  demand a t t e n t i o n ,  and in  l a t e  1951 they  reached  
an agreem ent w ith  Dr E v a t t  about anti-Com m unist p o l i c i e s .  The 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n  had ta k en  a dec ided  tu r n  f o r  th e  worse; th e  
Korean War, th e  sp read  o f  McCarthyism in  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  and th e  
uncompromising and h o s t i l e  S o v ie t  p o l i c i e s  o f  th e  l a t e  S t a l i n i s t  
e r a  made th i n g s  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  Communist P a r t i e s  in  W estern c o u n t r i e s .  
The A u s t r a l i a n  Cooanunists, t h e i r  con fidence  a t  a low ebb, were more 
concerned  w ith  q u e s t io n s  of s u r v iv a l  than  w ith  th e  s t r a t e g i e s  of 
r e v o lu t io n i s m .
In  th e  p e r io d  1950-54, t h e r e f o r e ,  th e  a t te m p t to  ban th e  P a r ty  
i s  o f  th e  u tm ost im p o rtan ce .  Our f i r s t  concern must be t o  d ea l  
w ith  th e  c r i s i s  p r e c i p i t a t e d  by th e  Communist P a r ty  D is s o lu t io n  
B i l l  o f  1950.
The a t te m p t  to  ban th e  P a r ty  by l e g i s l a t i o n
There had been s e v e ra l  p re v io u s  a t te m p ts  to  ban r e v o lu t io n a r y  
o r g a n i s a t io n s  by l e g i s l a t i o n .  During th e  F i r s t  World War, th e  
High Court had h e ld  t h a t  in  tim e o f  war th e  Commonwealth C o n s t i t u t i o n  
p e rm i t te d  th e  F e d e ra l  Government to  i n t e r n  any person  whose a c t io n s
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were considered to be detrimental to the war effort1 and the
2decision was followed in the Second World War. The l.W.W. was
declared illegal under the unlawful Associations Act (191b) which 
was directed mainly against organisations advocating the destruction 
of property or whose activities were considered harmful to the war 
effort. The validity of this legislation, however, was not 
judicially tested. Nor, when the Communist Party was banned in 1940 
under tue National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations 
(1940), did it attempt to challenge the decision in the courts. In 
addition, during the inter-war period, various non-Labor Federal 
Governments had made attempts to ban the Party in a rather circuit- 
ious way under the Crimes Act. This Act, originally passed in 1914, 
was substantially strengthened in 1920, 1926 and 1932 to deal with 
Communists in particular. The 1920 amendments, introduced by the 
Hughes Government, made sedition an indictable offence (Sections 
24A-D). A seditionist was defined as any person who promoted 
'feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of 
His Majesty's subjects so as to endanger tne peace, order or good 
government of the Commonwealth' (Section 24A(g)). Proceedings could 
be instituted against any person who wrote, printed, uttered or 
published 'seditious words' (Section 24D). In 1926 the Bruce-Page
1
Lloyd v. Wallach (1915), 20 C.L.K., pp.299-314.
Ex parte Walsh (1942), A.L.R., pp.359-61.
2
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Government added further amendments to the effect that any 
organisation which advocated sedition could be declared an 'unlaw­
ful association' (Section 30A(lj). Professor Sawer has declared 
that the 1926 amendments were 'aimed chiefly' at the Communist 
Party.3
In further amending the Crimes Act in 1932, the Lyons Govern­
ment wished to provide ways of declaring an association unlawful 
without resort to trial by jury. Under the 1926 amendments, trial by 
jury could be demanded and it was felt that jurors could not always 
be relied upon to be sufficiently anti-Communist to convict those 
charged with sedition. Thus, Section 30A (AA) was introduced in 
1932, under which the Federal Attorney-General could apply to the 
High Court or a Supreme Court, sitting without a jury, to decide 
whether or not an organisation was an unlawful association as defined 
in Section 30A (1). If the Court decided against any organisation 
then the latter, in law, became an unlawful association.
In 1932 the Lyons Government instituted proceedings, under 
Section 30D of the Crimes Act, against F.H. Devanny, the publisher 
of the Workers* Weekly, the official organ of the Conraunist Party, 
for soliciting funds for an anti-war committee which the Government 
termed an 'unlawful association'. The prosecuting counsel alleged
3
Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929, 
Melbourne, 1956, p.267.
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t h a t  th e  funds s o l i c i t e d  by Devanny were fo r  th e  Communist P a r ty
w hich , i t  a s s e r t e d ,  c o n t ro l le d  th e  a n t i-w a r  com m ittee . Devanny
was sen ten c ed  to  s ix  m o n th 's  im prisonm ent bu t th e  High C ourt
su b se q u e n tly  upheld  h i s  a p p e a l.  A m a jo r i ty  o f th e  High C ourt ju d g es
s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  was n o t i l l e g a l  to  r a i s e  money to  oppose th e  t h r e a t
o f  war b u t th e y  were n o t o b lig e d , and d id  n o t comment on th e  q u e s tio n
w h eth er th e  Communist P a r ty  was an u n law fu l a s s o c ia t io n  under th e
Crim es A c t. T hus, th e  Devanny case  was n o t a s a t i s f a c t o r y  t e s t  o f
4
th e  A ct a s  a weapon a g a in s t  th e  Communist P a r ty .  In d eed , i t  would 
ap p ea r t h a t  th e  A tto rn ey -G en e ra l a t  th e  tim e , S i r  John Latham, was 
n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y  e n th u s i a s t i c  abou t s a n c tio n in g  th e  p ro s e c u tio n ;  
n o t o n ly  had th e  charge  been made a g a in s t  an in d iv id u a l  bu t Devanny 
had been p ro se c u te d  under th e  1926 amendments r a th e r  th a n  th o s e  o f 
1932.
Lven more s t r in g e n t  amendments to  th e  Crimes Act were p roposed  
in  1935 and 1937. In both y e a r s ,  p ro ceed in g s  a g a in s t  th e  F r ie n d s  
o f  th e  S o v ie t un ion  were u n d ertak en  bu t on each o c c a s io n  th e  
p roposed  amendments and p ro s e c u tio n s  were w ithdraw n fo llo w in g  
v ig o ro u s  p r o te s t  from m id d le -c la s s  i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  th e  m i l i t a n t  wing 
o f th e  t r a d e  un ion  movement and, o f c o u rse , th e  Communist P a r ty .
4
For d e t a i l s ,  see  L e ic e s te r  Webb, Communism and Democracy in  
A u s t r a l i a , p p .19-20 .
5
B rian  F i t z p a t r i c k ,  The A u s tra l ia n  Commonwealtn, p .9 7 ; A P u b lic  
K em onstranee, p»19.
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In 1949 tne Crimes Act was effectively used against two of the 
three leading Communists charged with sedition and several references 
to its utility were made during the parliamentary debates on the 
Communist Party Dissolution Bill in 1950. Many Labor Party politic­
ians maintained that the Crimes Act was an adequate means of 
curbing the Communist Party, should its activities endanger the 
security and gooa government of Australia.
In keeping witn promises made during the 1949 Election, Menzies 
took steps early in 1950 to have the Communist rarty declared 
illegal. He faced a choice of means. Either he could use the 
Crimes Act - roughly in the same way that the Truman Government had 
employed the Smith Act (1940) to prosecute leaders of the Communist 
Party of the United States in 1949 - or he could introduce legis­
lation to ban the Party. Resort to the Crimes Act would have 
several disadvantages. The procedures which it embodied offered
Ö
Leicester Webb, op. cit., p.25.
T
In the United States, under its Federal system of government, 
the Federal legislature cannot introduce legislation banning a 
political party but, as in the case of the Smith Act, it can 
legislate to the effect that certain offences, such as conspiring 
to advocate the forceful and violent overthrow of the government, 
are unlawful. In 1949 eleven leading Communists were charged under 
the Smith Act. The decision in the case of these individuals 
carried implications that the American Communist Party would probably 
be treated as an illegal organisation in subsequent prosecutions, 
it is important to note that it was left to a judge and a jury to 
determine whether or not the activities of the eleven Communists 
came under the legislation.
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the Communists important avenues of legal redress; under the 1926
amendments trial by jury would be required (and Menzies may not
have been certain that Australian juries would always be anti-
Communist ) while under Section 30A (AA) (the 1932 amendment) the
High Court or Supreme Court would have to decide whether or not a
particular organisation should be deemed an unlawful association,
and even this would have required the presentation of detailed
evidence. Under the circumstances, Menzies preferred a measure
which would not only declare the Communist Party to be subversive
but also dissolve it. One way of obtaining this result would have
been to persuade the six State Governments to pass acts banning the
g
Communist Party, but in 1950 there were Labor Governments in power 
in Queensland, New South Wales and Tasmania, and these would have 
been most reluctant to fall in with such a scheme. Even had the 
non-Labor Governments of Victoria, South Australia and Western 
Australia passed such legislation on their own account, there would 
have been nothing to stop subsequent Labor administrations from 
repealing the acts in question.
8
During the debate on the Communist Party Dissolution Bill Menzies 
was firmly opposed to the trial by jury of any organisation or 
individual declared under the proposed legislation, (C.P.D., Vol. 
208 (20 June 1950), pp.4562-3).
9
It should be noted that during the First and Second World Wars 
the Federal Government had general powers, under the defence power 
of the Commonwealth Constitution, to deal with subversive organi­
sations but that in time of peace its authority in this respect was 
much more restricted.
Federal legislation banning the Communist rarty was the 
course finally chosen. On 27 April 1950 Menzies introduced 
the Communist Party Dissolution Bill, whose preamble declared 
that the Communist rarty was engaged in activities of a 'treasonable 
or subversive nature', such as espionage and sabotage, as well 
as in activities ‘designed to bring about the overthrow or dis­
location' of the Australian system of government. The Bill proposed 
to dissolve the rarty ana 'affiliated* bodies, whose property 
would pass into the hands of the Commonwealth. Party members and 
'other persons who are communists' would be disqualified from 
employment by tne Commonwealth and from holding executive position» 
in those trade unions whose members were engaged in a vital industry. 
The names of suspect organisations and individuals would be pub­
lished in the Commonwealth Gazette and it would be up to those 
named to establish that they were not Communists or lin the 
case of organisations) Communist-controlled. A 'declared' organi­
sation or person could appeal to a judge of the High Court but 
there was no provision for trial by a jury. A 'communist' was 
defined as any person who supported or advocated 'the objectives, 
policies, teachings, principles or practices of communism, as 
expounaed by Marx and linin', and the legislation, as applied to 
organisations or individuals, was made retrospective to 10 May 1948,
Iö3
t h e  l a s t  day o f  th e  l 5 t h  N a t io n a l  Congress of th e  Communist 
P a r t y . 10
In  e x p la in in g  th e  B i l l ’ s purpose to  th e  House o f  R e p r e s e n ta t i v e s ,
M enzies j u s t i f i e d  th e  proposed d i s s o l u t i o n  of th e  Communist P a r ty
as  a m easure n e c e s s a ry  f o r  A u s t r a l i a ' s  defence i n t e r e s t s . 1* The
Cold War, he su g g e s te d ,  o b l ig e d  th e  Western c o u n t r i e s  t o  ta x e
s e c u r i t y  p r e c a u t io n s  which would noi, no rm ally  have been con tem pla ted
in  p e a c e t im e ,  he d e p ic te d  th e  Communist P a r ty  a s  a  s i n i s t e r  f i f t h
column, p rep a red  f o r  sabo tage  and d i s r u p t i o n .
We would n o t  have t o l e r a t e d  a f i f t h  column in  A u s t r a l i a  from 
1939 to  1945. We, c e r t a i n l y ,  do n o t  propose t o  t o l e r a t e  
one in  1950, a t  a t im e  when m i l i t a n t  communism, chectced f o r  
t h e  t im e  be ing  in  Western Europe, i s  moving e a s t  and so u th ­
e a s t  t o  c a r r y  ou t i t s  p la n s  to  put down democracy and to  u sn e r  
in  th e  r e v o l u t i o n .  Coax-mining, i ro n  and s t e e l ,  e n g in e e r in g ,  
t r a n s p o r t ,  b u i ld in g  and power a r e  key i n d u s t r i e s . . . . i t  would 
be an a c t  o f  c r im in a l  f o l l y  to  leave  r e v o lu t io n a r y  Communists 
in  key p o s i t i o n s  in  th o s e  i n d u s t r i e s  so t h a t  w ith  a l l  t h e i r  
s m a l ln e s s  o f  numbers th e y  may ach iev e  d e s t r u c t i v e  r e s u l t s  which 
f i v e  army co rps  could  h a rd ly  hope t o  a c n i e v e .1^
The s p o t l i g h t  now tu rn e d  to  th e  Labor P a r ty ,  whose p o s i t i o n  was
ex tre m ely  d i f f i c u l t .  The A .L .P . had n ev e r  been s e r i o u s l y  concerned
to  p r o t e c t  t h e  Communist P a r ty ,  and th e  C h if le y  Government, in d e ed ,
10
'A B i l l  f o r  an Act To p ro v id e  f o r  th e  D is s o lu t io n  o f  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  
Communist P a r ty  and o f  o th e r  Communist O rg a n iz a t io n s ,  to  d i s q u a l i f y  
Communists from h o ld in g  c e r t a i n  O f f ic e s ,  and f o r  pu rposes  connec ted  
t h e r e w i t h ' ,  The P a r l i a m e n t  o f  th e  Commonwealth o f  A u s t r a l i a .  House 
o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  B i l l s  In t ro d u c e d .  S ess io n  1950-51, V o l . l ,  p p .73 -84 . 
11
C .P .D . ,  V o l . 207 (27 A p r i l  1950), p p .1994-2007.
I b i d . , p .2004 .
12
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was said to have valued the Crimes Act us a means of dealing with
13recalcitrant Communist leaders. On the other hand, the A.L.P.
had not been forced seriously to consider the question of outlawing
the Communist Party until its own anti-Communists, particularly those
associated with the ’Movement1 and the Industrial Groups, began urging
such a step after 1945« The Federal A.L.P. Conference of 1948 had
declared against a ban, but the fact that the matter had been given
significant attention at this level was ominous in itself. By 1950
the anti-Communists within the A.L.P. were more articulate and
self-confident than ever, and the gap between them and the tradition-
14alists and left-wing members had become wide and deep. In fact, 
Labor's anti-Communists would probably have agreed heartily with 
Menzies' view of the Communist Party, and they probably favoured 
the Dissolution Bill without any reservations. Chifley, who was 
personally opposed to the proposed ban, had to plan his course of 
action with great care. His task would have been simpler had the 
A.L.P. been in a minority in both the Senate and the House, for then 
it might have been possible for it to have opposed the Bill tongue- 
in-cheek. But Labor's Senate majority gave it the power to check 
the Bill - and thus could provide Menzies with a pretext for 
obtaining a double dissolution and for fighting the subsequent
13
See statements by Dr H.V. Evatt in ibid., pp.2286-7.
14
L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley. pp.382-4.
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election on the issue of anti-Communism. Such a course would 
have imposed great strains on the A.L.P* itself, and perhaps even 
have divided it. It was not surprising, therefore, that Labor refused 
to block the Bill* The Communist Party was learning two lessons; 
the first, that the A*L*P. could not be relied upon to stand firm 
on questions of civil liberties at the cost of electoral advantage; 
the second, that Communism in Australia could not depend on mass 
support in a crisis*
After a period of confusion, the Federal Labor Party began its
tactical retreat* In May 1950 it decided not to oppose the Bill's
provisions for banning the Communist Party (on the grounds that
the Government had received an electoral mandate to execute such
a ban) while putting forward amendments designed to soften the Bill
in certain respects, especially with regard to the 'onus of proof'
15clauses* The Government pressed its advantage, accepting some
16of the proposed changes but rejecting the most important amendments. 
The Labor Party tried to use its Senate majority to secure their 
adoption with the result that the Bill was shuttled back and forth 
between the two chambers, with neither side willing to give way*
An impasse was developing* Unless Labor dropped its remaining 
amendments, it was clear that Menzies would go to the country despite
15
Ibid., p.387.
16
Ibid*, p.388.
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the fact that the ban proposal had not been in dispute* Labor's
parliamentary party began to weaken; at one caucus meeting, 18
17members out of 59 voted for dropping the amendments. Finally,
with feeling running high, the A.L.P* Federal Executive met in
October and voted (by eight votes to four) that the parliamentary
18party should be instructed to let the Bill through. The Bill was 
passed on 19 October.
Before another week was out, the Communist Party and ten
Communist-dominated unions had asked the High Court to consider
19the question of the Act's legality. Dr H.Y. Evatt, the Labor 
Party's deputy leader, agreed to act as counsel for one of the 
unions, the Waterside Workers' Federation. A new phase in the crisis 
was beginning.
The Double Dissolution
Evatt's decision to take part in the High Court proceedings 
produced contrasting reactions within the A.L.P. It was welcomed 
by those who had seen in the Bill both an attack on civil liberties 
and a means of persecuting, not just the Communist Party, but any
Tr
Ibid., p.390.
18
Ibid., p,395; S.M.H., 17 October 1950. Professor Crisp has 
stated that the decision was 'almost certainly' ultra vires 
of the 1948 Federal Conference decision (L.F. Crisp, The 
Australian Federal Labour Party 1901-1951. p.180).
19
S.M.H., 24 October 1950.
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a s s o c ia t io n  o r p erso n  w ith  le f t -w in g  v ie w s . S ev e ra l rem arks made
by th e  G overnm en t's  le a d e rs  l e f t  th e  im pression  th a t  th e  l a t t e r  f e a r
was j u s t i f i e d .  A.W. Faiiden, th e  C ountry P a r ty  le a d e r  and Deputy Prim e
M in i s t e r , had s a id  in  November 1949 t h a t  th e  o b je c t iv e s  o f th e  Commu-
20n i s t  and Labor p a r t i e s  were i d e n t i c a l .  M enzies h im s e lf ,  d u rin g  th e
d e b a te s  on th e  D is s o lu tio n  B i l l ,  had su g g es ted  th a t  i t  would be 'e a s y '
to  'd e c l a r e '  a  Labor S e n a to r  (presum ably  S e n a to r  W. Morrow) and th a t
' a t  l e a s t '  one L abor M.H.R. 'm ig h t escape on ly  by th e  sk in  of h i s  
21t e e t h . '  A lthough th e  B i l l  had now been p a sse d , C h if le y  s t i l l
22rem ained  opposed to  i t  a long  w ith  th e  A .C .T .U . e x e c u tiv e , s e v e ra l
23le f t - w in g  Labor members and g roups o f  m id d le -c la s s  l i b e r a l s . “ On th e
o th e r  hand , E v a t t 's  d e c is io n  to  go b e fo re  th e  High C ourt was b i t t e r l y
re s e n te d  by th e  A .L .P 's  an ti-C om m unist members and s u p p o r te r s ,  who
a c c e p te d  th e  new A ct in  i t s  e n t i r e t y .  The V ic to r ia n  A .L .P ., in
24p a r t i c u l a r ,  to o k  him to  ta s k  f o r  h i s  a c t io n .  A lready th e  l i n e s  o f 
c leav ag e  which were to  le a d  to  th e  1955 s p l i t  had ap p ea red .
20
I b i d . ,  8 November 1949.
21
C.P«D. . V o l• 207 (4 May 1950), p .2 2 1 9 .
22
L .F . C r is p , Ben C h if le y . p .3 9 5 .
23
S ee , e . g . ,  th e  fo u r  pam phlets p u b lish e d  in  M elbourne in  1950 
by th e  A u s t r a l ia n  C ouncil f o r  C iv i l  L ib e r t i e s :  A B i l l  f o r  a  P o lic e  
S t a t e .  The Amended B i l l  f o r  a P o l ic e  S t a t e .  Some O pinions from 
O u tsid e  th e  P a r l ia m e n t ,  and The U nnecessary  P o lic e  S ta te  B i l l .
24
L e ic e s te r  Webb, op . c i t . .  p .4 0 .
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From the evidence we have, it would appear that the Communists 
were by this stage fully resigned to being outlawed and having to 
organise themselves as an underground organisation. This possibility 
had been seriously envisaged since 1948, when the Liberal Party had 
first decided that it would proceed to ban the Communist Party 
if returned to power at the Federal level. Many Communist records 
were either destroyed or dispersed at about this time; in 1950 Sir 
Charles Lowe reported
all the Communist evidence I have had agrees that the Party 
records in Victoria were destroyed when the Party feared in 
1948 that it would be declared illegal or its premises 
raided and its property seized.25
Towards the end of 1949, Marx House in George Street, Sydney, was 
26sold and less impressive Party headquarters in Market Street
acquired. The Party press in Melbourne and Australia-Soviet House
27were also sold about the same time. The well-known Communist
author, Frank Hardy, has written that when he visited the Party's
Melbourne headquarters in 1950 all he found was 'the telephone girl,
a table and a chair.... The Party was apparently preparing for 
28illegality.' In late 1950 and early 1951 the Communist Review
25
Report of Royal Commission Inquiring into...Communism in Victoria 
and other related matters, p.43.
26
S.M.H., 12 December 1949.
27
News-Weekly, 29 March 1950.
28
Frank Hardy, The Hard Way: The Story Behind Power Without Glory, 
London, 1961, p.19.
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did not appear and on illegal monthly Review was given a trial 
29run.
Although preparations for illegality were expensive and time- 
consuming, particularly during a period when membership was 
declining, the Party treated the task with the utmost seriousness* 
There was the added difficulty that Sharkey was in gaol until 
December 1950. Special care was taken to see the membership was 
consolidated and purified. Contrary to the assertions of some 
anti-Communists that the Party welcomed the prospect of going under­
ground and thereby gaining the sympathy of progressives and 
liberals, it did not welcome the prospect. The previous period of 
illegality (1940-42) had presented the Party with many difficulties: 
a number of Central Committee members had deserted their posts, 
the Western Australian organisation had virtually ceased to exist
and the power of the Central Committee had been usurped by the
30New South Wales State Committee. Before the Party had been declared 
illegal in June 1940 it had made some preparations but the diffi­
culties of maintaining a clandestine organisation intact had been
29
The 111th issue of the Communist Review is dated November 1950 and 
the 112th issue did not appear until April 1951. There were four 
issues of the illegal Review (December 1950-March 1951), published 
by the Henry Lawson Press, Eurunderee, N.S.W. Eurunderee is a tiny 
settlement in the Central Tablelands (Shire of Cudgegong) where 
Henry Lawson spent his childhood.
30
L.L. Sharkey, An Outline History of the Australian Communist 
Party, pp.41-2, 51-2.
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clearly evident. Sharkey later coamented on this episode in the 
following terms:
the ban hampered the work of the Party....the Communist 
Party has no desire for illegal conditions of work. An 
open legal Party has greater opportunity for growth and 
mass contact than an illegal one. The Communist Party 
only works illegally when there is no alternative course 
open to it....^
The Party was aware of its isolation and lack of widespread 
outside sympathy, particularly after the A.L.P. had given way 
during the parliamentary debates on the Communist Party Dissolution 
Bill. Its insecurity was accentuated by the outbreak of the Korean 
War in dune 1950 which led many Australians to believe that ruth­
less action against the Party was urgently required. The moderate 
and right-wing unions had failed to protest over the imprisonment 
of Sharkey in the early part of 1950 and, although most opposition 
to the Dissolution Bill came from these unions, it was not 
sufficient to reassure the Party. There was a disheartening 
response to the nation-wide 24-hour strike called by Communist
and militant-controlled unions in June to protest against the 
32Bill. The A.W.U. and a number of other right-wing unions had 
favoured passing the Bill in its original form. This was an 
extreme position; most of the important reformist-led unions as
31
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well as the Interstate Executive of the A.C.T.U. held that the Bill,
without the insertion of all the amendments proposed by the A.L.F.,
33would be contrary to the interests of the trade union movement. 
However, only the Communist and militant-controlled unions went to 
the length of opposing the Bill’s central proposal - for dissolving 
the Communist Party.
The Communist Party was really involved in two situations, each 
with its own strategic difficulties. On the one hand, as we have 
seen, it was preparing for a period of clandestine activity, with 
all the difficulties in communication, solidarity and industrial 
action which that would have involved. Cn the other hand, it had to 
cope with the developing crisis which the Bill's enactment had set 
in train. It was quick to scrap what remained of its adventurist 
strategies, and to implement the more moderate policies made possible 
by the softening of the international line in late 1950. (This was 
probably due to Russian fears that the Korean War would spread and 
that the Communist Parties in Western countries could prevent this 
happening by desisting from provocative action). The Australian 
Communists, painfully aware of their isolation, began a fresh search 
for allies amongst middle-class intellectuals and left-wing A.L.P. 
members. The language of the Popular Front of 1935-39 and of the 
National United Front of 1941-45 came back into vogue; ’united front
Ibid., 25 June 1950.
33
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from below' became the new slogan. But these adjustments were in 
the nature of insurance policies; the real question was whether or 
not the High Court would declare the Dissolution Act invalid.
The High Court, on 9 March 1951, declared that the Act was 
unconstitutional and that it constituted an unwarrantable inter­
ference with property rights and civil liberties. Six of the seven
judges (Sir John Latham, the Chief Justice, alone dissenting)
34declared the Act wholly invalid. The majority of the judges main­
tained that the Communist Party could not, in time of peace, be 
dissolved and Communists barred from trade union and Public Service 
positions under the defence power of the Constitution. They did 
not consider the Korean War to be a major war placing Australia on 
a war footing. Latham, C.J., on the other hand, stated that the 
Commonwealth Parliament could itself decide whether a political party 
constituted a threat to the nation's security and constitutional
government - whether in time of peace or war. It is false to suggest,
35as Colin Clark has done, that the allegedly bad drafting of the Act 
had anything to do with its being declared invalid. The drafting 
of the Bill, in either its original or amended form, was of no 
importance as to the outcome of the High Court decision. The basic 
problem lay not in the drafting but in the essential principle,
34
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namely, that the Parliament and the Executive, not the Courts, 
presumed to make the decision as to whether the Communist Party was 
a seditious organisation or a menace to the defence of the country. 
The Commonwealth had no power to deal with the Communist Party merely 
because it was an association. General control of associations 
belongs under our Constitution exclusively to the State Parliaments. 
Hence, the Commonwealth could deal with the Party only because of its 
alleged seditious or anti-defence qualities. The High Court said 
that in peacetime only the Courts could judge whether a particular 
person or association has the factual attributes attracting Federal 
power; it held, for the first time, that the decisions on internment 
giving power of conclusive decision to the Executive (and any 
inference from those decisions as to dissolution of associations) 
were restricted to time of ’hot' war.
Checked at this point, the Government tried another approach. 
When Labor's Senate majority refused to accept the Commonwealth 
Bank Bill Menzies sought and secured a double dissolution on 19 
March. The date for the subsequent election was given as 28 April. 
From the opening shots of the campaign, Menzies and Fadden made 
it clear that for them the central issue at stake was not the Bank 
Bill but their proposal to ban the Communist Party. They set 
their theme that the Australian Communists were a subversive and 
disruptive group against the background of the Korean War and 
the general international tension. Menzies stated that if his
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Government were re-elected he would propose a constitutional
amendment enabling the Federal Parliament to declare the Communist
Party illegal* On the other hand, the A.L*P* attempted to divert
attention away from the anti-Communist issue and concentrated on
the Governments failure to cope with the problem of inflation
and the threatened retrenchments in the Comnonwealth Public Service.
As early as October 1950 Chifley had written that an election
fought on the provisions of the Dissolution Act would result in
the Labor Party losing seats and proposed that the A.L.P. make
36inflation the key issue.
The results produced few surprises. Labor held its ground
surprisingly well, and it succeeded in winning five seats from the
Government. But it was unable to prevent the Government achieving
its main objective, a Senate majority. Nor was it able to prevent
its vote from falling significantly in a number of urban electorates;
in fact, its losses might have been heavier but for the fact that
in country areas it was reaping the benefit of resentment against
the Government's wool income levy. This factor was probably the
37main reason for Labor’s having won four of its five new seats. 
Chifley commented: 'The 'Commo' stuff...worked very well for our 
opponents.
36
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The Communist Party’s vote increased significantly; it is
quite probable that many left-wing Labor members and trade unionists
had felt the need to express their disapproval of the Government's
action by voting Communist. In 1949 the Communist Party's 35 House
of Representatives' candidates had polled 40,941 votes whereas in
1951 27 candidates polled 45,759 votes. In almost all the electorates
contested by the Party in both elections the Communist vote rose
sharply. The Party’s percentage of the valid votes increased from
3.48 to 8.41 per cent in Cook, from 3.54 to 10.05 per cent in
39Gellibrand, and from 5.01 to 10.45 per cent in West Sydney. The 
Party's senate vote rose slightly from 87,958 in 1949 to 93,561, but 
this rise should not be treated too seriously since 61,713 of these 
votes were polled in New South Wales where the Party was fortunate 
enough to gain first place on the ballot paper. Nevertheless, the 
increase in the Communist vote was small compensation for the fact 
that the Menzies Government was once again in the political saddle, 
but this time with a Senate majority.
Menzies* next move was to request the six State Governments 
to transfer to the Commonwealth the powers necessary to declare the 
Communist Party illegal. Although the non-Labor Governments of 
Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia were prepared to
39
The preferences of Communist candidates were decisive in two 
seats - Leichhardt and Perth - where they enabled the sitting 
A.L.P. members to be re-elected.
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accede to the request, the New South Wales and Queensland Labor
40Governments refused to do so. In the following month the 
Menzies Government introduced the Constitution Alteration (Powers 
to Deal with Communists and Communism) Bill for a referendum to be 
held on 22 September 1951 asking the electorate to grant to the 
Federal parliament wide powers to deal with the Communists and the 
Communist Party, and so that the Communist Party Dissolution Act 
could be re-enacted. Under the provisions of the Constitution, the 
Government's proposals would have to receive the support of not only 
the majority of the electors but a majority in a majority of the 
six States before they could proceed to ban the Communist Party.
Only four referenda had been successful previously, but the Govern­
ment was confident that anti-Communist feeling was running high 
enough for it to carry the day.
The anti-Communist referendum
Before and during the referendum, the divisions within the
A.L.P. continued to grow. While the party's Federal Executive
decided to oppose the referendum proposals, the latter were favoured
41by the Victorian Central Executive of the A.L.P. The party’s leader, 
J.B. Chifley, had died in June 1951 but the opposition to the
40
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Government's proposals was energetically conducted by the new leader,
Dr Evatt. While Evatt and many A.L#P. politicians did not neglect
the civil liberties aspect of the referendum, the Labor Party's
general strategy was again to make inflation the key issue. The
Communist Party drew attention to the threat to civil liberties and
claimed that Australia was perilously close to Fascism. As Sharkey
42remarked: 'Essentially, Menzies sets out to fascise the country'.
But the Communist Party also saw the need to play up other issues 
and its propaganda included references not only to inflation and to 
the threat of conscription, but also on the dangers of Australia's 
signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty. The Labor Party, realising 
that the Government was passing through an unpopular stage, set out 
to make the referendum a test of the Government's general popularity, 
rather than a straight poll on the proposed ban. Indeed, in view 
of its traditional lack of concern with civil liberties issues, it 
is difficult to see what else it could have done. However, its 
campaign was hindered by 'Movement' members of the Federal parliament 
who refused to participate in the campaign and made their support 
for the Government's proposals obvious. In addition, a considerable 
number of Federal and, more important, State Labor politicians 
failed to give Evatt enthusiastic support.^
42
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Members of the Communist Party were advised by Sharkey that
'the united front from below must be made a living reality* if the
44
referendum were to be defeated. They were also urged to set up
'No* committees embracing not only Communists but also A.L.P. members
and non-Party persons, though the non-Communist members of these
committees were not to be subjected to any pressure to accept the
45Party's overall objectives. However, the Party came up against 
some difficulties since some of its members found difficulty in 
accepting the new strategy and were ill disposed towards working
46with non-Communists. Warnings were issued against 'sectarianism'.
During this period the Party was also taking a very active part
in the peace campaign and a number of branches were advised not to
47devote all their attention to the referendum's defeat. Although
the 'No* committees were relatively successful in a number of
Communist and militant-controlled trade unions, their widespread
establishment was prevented by the Labor Party's placing a ban on
48its members participating in them. The ban was quite rigidly
49enforced, particularly in Victoria. Nevertheless, in spite of
44
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these obstacles, Tribune subsequently claimed that 'a wide unity
of action was established between the Communists and the ALP members
50in the unions and factories.'
The Communist Party, alarmed at the prospect of a ban, spent
a large amount of money during the referendum campaign. In Sydney
51alone five million leaflets and 140,000 posters were distributed.
52In addition, a £40,000 Referendum Fund was established. Professor
Webb has estimated that approximately half the total 'No' expenditure
came from the Communist Party, front organisations and Communist- 
53controlled unions. Although a Liberal D.R. Berry,
4
subsequently alleged that the Party had given £12,000 to the A.L.P.
54to fight the referendum, the two parties conducted quite separate 
campaigns.
On the initiative of the Communist Party a new front organi­
sation, the Democratic Rights Council, was established to meet
55the threat to the Party's legality. Almost all the Council's
50
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secretaries and organisers in the various States were Coammnists, 
although a number of non-Communists, particularly clergymen 
active in the Australian Peace Council, held some of the presidencies 
and vice-presidencies. The Council was banned to Labor Party
56members by the Queensland and Victorian Branches of the A.L.P., 
whereupon the New South Wales Branch and the Federal Executive 
followed suit.^
The role of liberal academics and a section of the Protestant
clergy was of some significance in eventually turning public opinion
58against the Government's proposals. Even a section of the Liberal
Party, particularly its university student members, were in favour 
59of the 'No' case. Many of these persons were disturbed by the 
fact that if the referendum were to be passed then the wide and 
vague definition given to a 'communist' under the Dissolution Act 
could not be subsequently whittled down. There was no built-in 
process of reducing the ambit of the definition and it would have been 
left to the Government to interpret the Act's provisions as it 
thought fit.^
56
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The referendum poll, held on 22 September 1951, produced a 
close result. The Government's proposals were defeated by 
2,370,009 votes to 2,317,927, a margin of 52,082. In three of the 
six States, majorities were recorded against the proposal. The 
negative result solved the Communist Party’s immediate problem of 
avoiding a ban, but it left it to come to terms with the uncomfort­
able fact that nearly half the electorate had favoured the procedures 
laid down by the Government. It is possible that some people who 
voted against the proposals favoured banning the Communist Party 
under somewhat different terms. It is even more probable that only 
a small minority of Australians thought of the referendum in the 
context of a threat to civil liberties since the referendum had been 
successfully turned by the A.L.P. into something like an election 
campaign and previous referenda had been almost invariably defeated 
when the Opposition adopted such an approach. Professor Webb has 
suggested that it was possible the referendum's rejection was due to
'the unpopularity of the Menzies Government and not to uneasiness
61over the Act itself.' Even Tribune considered that the 'real
meaning' of the result was 'a notice by the people calling for the
62resignation of the Menzies Government.' On the other hand, it 
must be recalled that while Gallup polls had shown that 80 per cent
61
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of those interviewed in June 1951 favoured banning the Communist
Party, the percentage in favour had fallen to 73 in August and to
63only 53 in September,
If the referendum had been carried and the Party outlawed its
prospects would have been sombre in comparison with its position
in 1940, In 1951 the Party was under much greater pressure from
the State. During the illegal period of 1940-42, in spite of a
number of arrests and raids on its offices and bookshops, the Party
had maintained its organisation, held meetings, and contested
elections (its candidates standing as Independents) with some 
64degree of success. It had also retained its hold in the trade 
union movement without much hindrance. In the early fifties, 
however, although the exclusion of Communists from the Commonwealth 
Public Service would not have worried the Party unduly their 
exclusion from executive positions in the trade unions would have 
drastically reduced the Party*s influence in the one organised 
section of the community where its presence was still of considerable 
importance. Anti-Communism was much stronger in 1951 than in 1940 
and the results of the ‘adventurist* strategies had left it with 
all too few allies.
63
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In spite of the revitalisation and consolidation of the Party
and its fronts which resulted from the assaults by the State, and in
spite of the limited contacts made with left-wing rank-and-file
members of the A.L.P., the defeat of the referendum proposals did not
increase the Party's security. The Korean War was still being
fought; anti-Communism was at an extremely high level; and, apart
from the Communists, only liberals, left-wing A.L.P. members and
independent Socialists were very concerned about preserving the
Party’s legality. The weak mechanism of civil liberties protection
still left it in a dangerously vulnerable position.
In the early fifties, indeed, the Party existed in a virtual
state of siege. During the debate on the Communist Party Dissolution
Bill in 1950, W.F. Burns, the publisher of Tribune, was charged under
the Crimes Act with publishing seditious words relating to the Korean 
65War. The Party was opposed to the intervention of the United 
Nations in the war and its viewpoint was summed up in a Tribune editor 
ial: 'Not a man, not a ship, not a plane, not a gun for the aggressive 
imperialist wars in Korea and M a l a y a . B u r n s  was sentenced to nine 
months' imprisonment for advocating, in the words of the magistrate 
who pronounced sentence, 'non-support of the Government in relation
65
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to an actual war' which was intended 'to promote in the minds of
67people a feeling of hostility to the Government,' Burns appealed 
against the sentence and was given, considering the strong anti­
communist feeling prevalent in the community, a remarkably fair hearing 
by Judge Berne of the New South Wales District Court who even went so
far as to claim that the Menzies Government was 'vindictively 
66pursuing' Burns, However, following Judge Berne's removal from the 
court of the Crown Prosecutor dn the grounds of disrespectful be­
haviour, the New South Wales Supreme Court ordered that the appeal
69be heard instead before Judge Lloyd who upheld the conviction
but reduced the sentence to six months’ imprisonment.70
Almost one year after the referendum's defeat, security police
71raided Tribune office and the home of one of its journalists on
the grounds that the journalist concerned, Rex Chiplin, had written
an article nine months previously giving details of an unpublished
72draft Australian-United States treaty. In the meantime R.G.
Casey, the Minister for External Affairs, had referred to a 'nest of
67
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traitors1 in his department who had leaked details of the draft 
73treaty to Chiplin, The security raids, however, did not result
74in any charges being laid against either Chiplin or Tribune«
In July 1953 security police again raided Tribune offices as
well as the headquarters of the Communist Party and a number of
private homes from all of which a large quantity of documents were
seized« The official pretext for these raids was an innocuous article
on the British Royal Family which had appeared in the Communist 
75Review♦ Subsequently, three leading Communists, who were the
journal's printers, were prosecuted under the Crimes Act for printing 
7 6seditious words. The prosecution was strongly condemned by many
non-Communists. One political columnist commented: 'I find it hard
to treat seriously the idea that the Communist Review article had
77anything to do with the raid on Communist premises in Sydney.'
78The magistrate before whom the case was heard dismissed the charges.
73
C.P.D., Vol. 217 (27 May 1952), pp.870-1.
74
For further details, see Rex Chiplin, Where is the 'Nest of 
Traitors'?, Sydney, 1952. During the Royal Commission on Espionage 
(1954-55) it was disclosed that the External Affairs officer who had 
provided Chiplin with a copy of the draft treaty had in fact 'planted' 
it with the approval of the Australian Security Intelligence Organi­
sation (Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage. Sydney, 1955, 
p.205).
75
The article concerned, 'The Democratic Monarchy' (by 'R.C.') 
appeared in Communist Review, June 1953.
76
Tribune, 5 August 1953.
77
'Onlooker' in the Sun-Herald, 26 July 1953.
78
Tribune, 23 September 1953.
186
It is almost certain that the security raids had been carried out 
to obtain Party documents.
Throughout the period, Federal parliamentarians continued to
make vildly exaggerated claims as to the strength of the Communists
in Australia and frequent denunciations of Communist and non-
Communist progressives were made. A Communist academic, Dr R.E.B.
Makinson, was denounced by W.C. Wentworth as having conducted 'a
79campaign of treason.' Wentworth later attacked Bishop Burgmann
and a number of Australian National University academics and stated
that their views and those of Tribune showed a 'remarkable parallelism'
80in relation to the Indo-China War. Both the Australian National
University and the Commonwealth Literary Fund were frequently charged
with being under strong Communist influence, particularly by Liberal
members Wentworth and H.B.S. Gullett and Labor 'Movement' members
81S.M. Keon and J.M. Mullens. Inevitably, a considerable number of
progressives were labelled as 'Communists'; for example, in 1952,
Wentworth alleged that the novelist Kylie Tennant, a non-Communist, was
82'very actively connected' with the Communist Party.
79
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Moreover, not only were a number of Communists denied visas to
enter the United States but some liberal non-Communist academics
found themselves in the same situation, for example, Professors
83Marcus Oliphant and C.P. Fitzgerald. A Communist research scholar
at the Australian National University, P.M. Worsley, was excluded from
84New Guinea because of his political views. An ex-Communist, H.W.
Maley, Deputy Technical Superintendent of Trans-Australia Airlines,
was refused entry into the United States, whereupon he was dismissed
85from his position. A number of persons active in the Australian
86Peace Council were also dismissed from their positions.
Finally, the Communist Party’s security was not increased 
because of the A.L.P's failure to endorse the cause of civil liberties 
during the attempt to ban the Party. If anything, the position of 
the Communists became worse as the Labor Party began to drift to the 
Right. For a short time after the defeat of the referendum proposals 
the anti-Groupers in the A.L.P. were in the ascendancy. The ’Movement' 
parliamentarians who had refused to participate in the campaign were
83
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condemned but, on Evatt’s recommendation for leniency, they were not 
87disciplined. The ‘Movement1 paper, News-Weekly, which had strongly
88supported the referendum proposals, was banned to A.L.P. members, 
but the ban was later removed. The anti-Grouper ascendancy was short­
lived and the Groupers quickly began to make important gains. The 
Labor Party began an all-out drive to rid the unions of Communist 
officials. The New South Wales Branch of the A.L.P. came under the 
control of the Groups (and the A.W.U.) in 1952. It was also signifi­
cant that the Labor candidates who had consistently spoken out against 
the attempt to ban the Communist Party had their majorities reduced
appreciably at the 1951 New South Wales State Election, held after the 
89referendum. On the whole, the divisions within the Labor Party after 
the referendum were wider than in 1950. The Menzies Government’s 
attempt to outlaw the Communist Party had polarised tensions within the 
A.L.P., thus providing ex post facto justification for Chifley's pro­
phetic comment, made when the Dissolution Bill was first introduced in
April 1950, that it was 'a political measure aimed at splitting the 
90Labour Movement.'
87
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE COMMUNIST PARTY READJUSTS ITS STRATEGIES
A lthough th e  a tte m p t to  ban th e  Communist P a r ty  had f a i l e d ,  
th e  Communist le a d e r s  were f a r  from re a s s u re d .  J u s t  a s  th e  c o l la p s e  
o f th e  1949 coal s t r i k e  had re v e a le d  th e  l i m i t s  of t h e i r  power 
w ith in  th e  t r a d e  union  s t r u c t u r e ,  so th e  o rd e a l o f 1950 and 1951 
had shown t h a t  t h e i r  P a r ty  could  n o t ex p ec t th e  A .L .P . to  ta k e  a 
s tro n g  s ta n d  on an is s u e  o f c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s .  F o r tu n a te ly  fo r  them , 
a 's o f t e n in g ' o f th e  in t e r n a t io n a l  Communist l i n e  made i t  p o s s ib le  
f o r  them to  r e a d ju s t  th e  P a r t y 's  s t r a t e g i e s  in  o rd e r  to  r e p a i r  th e  
damage o f th e  a d v e n tu r is t  p e r io d .  The A u s t r a l ia n  Communists now s e t  
ou t to  s tre n g th e n  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  in  th e  t r a d e  u n io n s , to  r e - e s t a b l i s h  
c o n ta c t  w ith  th e  l e f t  wing o f  th e  A .L .P . and to  win th e  sympathy 
o f p ro g re s s iv e  m id d le -c la s s  g ro u p s . U n ti l  1949, th e  P a r ty  a c te d  
a s  i f  a r e v o lu t io n a ry  s i t u a t io n  had been c r e a te d ;  betw een 1951 
and 1954 i t s  main concerns were to  reduce  i t s  i s o l a t i o n  in  A u s t r a l ia n  
s o c ie ty  and to  b u i ld  up i t s  o rg a n is a t io n  a g a in s t  th e  e v e n tu a l i ty  
of r e p r e s s io n .
S t r a t e g ie s  f o r  s u rv iv a l
As we have n o te d  in  th e  p rece d in g  c h a p te r ,  th e  Communist 
le a d e r s  roughed in  th e  o u t l in e s  of new p o l i c i e s  d u rin g  th e  h e ig h t 
o f th e  1950-51 c r i s i s ,  bu t i t  was a t  th e  P a r t y 's  16 th  N a tio n a l 
C ongress o f A ugust 1951 t h a t  th e  a d ju s te d  s t r a t e g i e s  were c l e a r ly
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foreshadowed. A programme adopted on this occasion declared that 
Socialism would be achieved in Australia through parliamentary 
and peaceful means and that
Australia will...find her own path to People’s Democracy 
and Socialism in accord with her own historical conditions, 
her own level of economic, political and cultural develop­
ment and political institutions and forms of organisation.^
The doctrinal setting for the new strategies was worked out by
Sharkey, Dixon, Blake and others in a series of articles published
in the Tribune and the Communist Review. Sharkey's 'The Labour
Party Crisis', published in the Communist Review of August 1952,
was the most influential of these. He and the other leaders accepted
the view of Australian history formulated during the earlier united
front periods, but sought to show that the events of the post-war
years pointed inevitably to the advent of People's Democracy in
Australia. Their story had a deceptive simplicity. Immediately
after the war, the Chifley Government had enjoyed great popularity,
not only because it had led Australia in the anti-fascist struggle
but because the post-war boom had reinforced the illusion that the
development of Australian capitalism would also produce considerable
benefits for the workers. Partial disillusionment came when the
Chifley administration proved unable to check the inflation which
developed in the late forties, and the Menzies-Fadden coalition
1
Australia's Path to Socialism: Program of the Communist Party 
of Australia. Sydney, 1952, pp.20-1.
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ministry was voted to power in the 1949 Election, The stage was 
now set for the politics of the fifties. Menzies committed Australia 
to be an agent of United States imperialism, and accordingly adopted 
a policy of war preparations and hostility towards the Communist 
countries. But the cost of rearmament aggravated the difficulties 
of Australian capitalism, with the result that an economic crisis 
of the first magnitude had begun. Discontent amongst the masses, 
claimed Sharkey, had now reached the point where the return to power 
of the Labor Party was only a matter of time. However, since the 
Labor Party's right-wing leadership had also accepted the policy of 
serving American interests, the masses would soon turn from the new 
Labor Government and endorse the policies of peace and progress 
advocated by the Communist Party. The way would then be open for 
the formation of a truly Socialist party, and for the institution 
of People's Power.
In developing this line, the Communists used several striking 
symbols. Few of their articles were devoted to seriously discussing 
the class composition and character of the Liberal and Country 
Parties, but from the Tribune cartoons by McClintock and Reade 
emerged 'Menzies', the epitome of the Australian Right. 'Menzies' 
the symbol was given the corpulence, the sagging jowls, the slit 
eyes and the weak mouth of Eisenstein's early villains. In his 
cartoon adventures, he revealed all the qualities expected of his 
role - servility to the United States, callousness in his dealings
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with the people, arrogance, fear of the Left, moral cowardice and 
corruption, 'Menzies* was the Right in Communist mythology; an 
article reproducing J.D. Blake's comments on the general political 
situation in 1953 was headed, 'Menzies-Labour Party-Communist Party', 
as if all three were comparable. One of the banners for Sydney's 
May Day celebrations in 1953 showed 'Menzies' as a 'YANKEE PUPPET'
being manipulated by an American monopolist, complete with cigar,
2monocle and ten-gallon hat.
The crude oversimplifications involved in the making of 
'Menzies' contrasted with the care given by the Communist leaders 
to the analysis of the various tensions within the Labor Party, 
Although they continued to draw attention to the efforts of the 
Groupers to undermine reformist leaders within the party and the
ßtrade union movement, they placed most importance on the traditional 
cleavage between Left and Right within the A.L.P, On occasions 
they wrote of this cleavage dividing politicians from the rank-and- 
file, or reformists from progressives, or right-wing leaders from 
their followers, but they were agreed that, whatever form it took, 
it would reappear in the near future, Sharkey claimed that Labor's 
return to power would be the prelude for the final disillusionment 
of the masses, who would at last see their leadership for the
2
Tribune, 22 April 1953.
See, e,g., E.F. Hill in Communist Review, July 1950,
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liberal-bourgeois politicians they were. They agreed with Menzies, 
he pointed out, in supporting the pro-American policy of war 
preparations.
The ALP leaders do not repudiate the [Government's] 
anti-Sovietism and rearmament programme but, in its 
essentials, support it. They support the policy of trans­
forming Australia into a dependency of Wall Street 
imperialism.... Independence, in fact, is sacrificed to 
US imperialism in order...to defend monopoly capitalism 
against the spread of world socialism.♦..4
Sharkey depicted the A.L.P's leadership as trying to serve two
masters, the workers and the middle class, and as usually favouring
the interests of the latter when these clashed with those of the
workers. Even amongst the workers, he claimed, it preferred to
base itself on the highly skilled, 'the "aristocracy of Labour",
who look to a continuous improvement of their economic position
through the growth of capitalist industry and a policy of reforms
within the capitalist system.' As a result, the A.L.P. had become
'the second party of capitalism, part of the two-party system of
controlling the masses, an essential part of the capitalist set up*.
Given this situation, claimed the Communist leaders, the
Communist Party had several important strategic opportunities.
In the first place, it had to strengthen the left wing of the Labor
Party against the right-wing leadership. Objective conditions
4
Ibid., August 1952, p.229.
5
L.L. Sharkey, The Labour Party Crisis. Sydney, n.d., pp.13-14.
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were highly favourable for the success of this approach; again in 
terms of Sharkey’s analysis, ’the basis of reformism is contracting 
as the economic crisis grows*.^
Capitalism's crisis is advancing rapidly. The old 
basis of reforms, upon which the rightwing based its 
manoeuvres, will be undermined as the crisis develops.
An 'orthodox* Labour Government acting on the present 
capitalist basis, in succession to Menzies, can only, as 
Lenin taught, make clear to the masses the limitations of 
Labour Governments. It would serve to finally expose 
rightwing policy. Labour Governments have no answer to 
capitalist decay, to the general crisis of capitalism, to 
the warmongering policies of the monopolists.
...Our criticism must lay bare the nature of reformism, 
its role as defender of capitalism, its many connections 
with the bourgeoisie, lack of principle and rejection of 
Marxism-Leninism, which means rejection of the socialist 
objective of the working class.^
At the tactical level, the Communists were required to blur the
edges between their membership and that of the A.L.F. or, in
Dixon's words, to 'spare no effort to overcome the differences
with members of the Labor Party and non-Party workers in the
gfactories and unions.' The object here was to reach agreement 
on specific economic and social issues even while there was 
disagreement on general matters; unity of action to achieve
6
Ibid., p.17.
7
Ibid., pp.22-3.
8
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195
9limited objectives would lay the foundations for common policies. 
Sharkey declared:
It is a question for us of setting out consciously to 
foster a leftwing in the Labor Party, to encourage all 
the incipient revolts expressing themselves in the Labor 
Party .10
But he and the other writers were careful to stress that the object 
was to alter the balance of power within the Labor Party without 
splitting it, to curb the present leadership without driving them 
into opposition. The assumption here was that a premature split, 
precipitated over irrelevant issues, would do more harm than good; 
only when the masses were completely disillusioned with the reformism 
and class-collaborationism of their leadership would they be in a 
position to alter the A,L.P*s policies fundamentally*
To hasten this process, the Communist Party had to secure 
popular acceptance of* a progressive policy with international peace 
as its prime objective. It should therefore oppose war preparations 
and propaganda against Communist countries; advocate the ending of 
the American connection and the adoption by Australia of the 
principle of peaceful co-existence; declare for the expenditure 
of public funds on housing, education, social welfare and general 
economic development. This, Sharkey admitted, was not a socialist
9
Ibid** 18 June 1952*
10
Communist Review* July 1952, p.208.
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programme, 'b u t  one t h a t  could  be implemented by a p ro g re s s iv e  ALP 
Government. '* *  I t  was such a p o l i c y ,  moreover, on which th e  l e f t  
wing o f  th e  Labor P a r ty  could  base i t s  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  r ig h t -w in g  
l e a d e r s h ip  and on which th e  Communist w orkers  could  e s t a b l i s h  
l i a i s o n  w ith  t h e i r  a l l i e s  i n s id e  th e  A .L .P . T h is  was th e  r a t i o n a l e  
o f  th e  'u n i t e d  f r o n t  from below ' s t r a t e g y  which th e  Communists were 
now to  pu t i n t o  o p e r a t io n .  Sharkey hoped t h a t  i t  would f in d  i t s  
f i r s t  e x p re s s io n  in  u n i t e d  a c t io n  f o r  th e  overthrow  of th e  M enzies 
Government bu t t h a t ,  once t h i s  had been ach iev ed ,  i t  would n ex t  
e x p re s s  i t s e l f  in  a r a d i c a l i s a t i o n  o f  th e  Labor P a r ty  and th e  over­
throw of th e  E v a t t  l e a d e r s h ip .  The ground would th e n  be l a i d  f o r  
th e  fo rm a t io n  o f  a 'u n i t e d  w o rk ers '  p a r t y '  th rough  th e  fu s io n  of 
th e  Communist P a r ty  and th e  A .L .P . ,  and f o r  th e  adop tion  o f  'M a rx is t  
s c i e n t i f i c  s o c i a l i s t  p r i n c i p l e s '  by th e  new p a r t y . ^
«
We s h a l l  d ea l  w ith  th e  Communist P a r t y ' s  t r a d e  union p o l i c i e s  
in  th e  n e x t  c h a p te r .  Our concern  h e r e  i s  w ith  i t s  a t tem p t to  win 
a cc ep tan c e  f o r  t h e  b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e s  of i t s  ' p r o g r e s s i v e ' ,  o r  peace 
p o l i c y .  For t h i s  p u rpose ,  th e  P a r ty  had few r e s o u rc e s  in  th e  way 
o f  r e s p e c t a b l e  f r o n t  o r g a n i s a t io n s ;  most of them had been l e f t  w ith  
d e p le te d  r e s o u rc e s  and t a t t e r e d  r e p u t a t i o n s  a f t e r  th e  e x ig e n c ie s
11
L .L . Sharkey , The Labour P a r ty  C r i s i s , p .2 1 .
12
I b i d . ,  p .2 2 .  See a l s o  a r t i c l e  by Sharkey in  Communist Review,
J u ly  1952.
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of the adventurist period. The Australia-Russia Society (whose 
name had been changed to the Australian-Soviet Friendship Society 
in 1953) remained small as did the A.S.L.F. and the N.H.A. (which 
had become known as the Union of Australian Women in 1950)• The 
E.Y.L. remained a pale shadow of its former self. The Australia- 
China Society, founded in 1951, had failed to get off the ground.
As a result, the Party concentrated most of its hopes on the peace 
movement which, as early as 1949, had been described by J.D. Blake 
as 'the keynote of the whole work of our Party in the present con­
ditions'
The Australian Peace Council (A.P.C.) was formed in Melbourne 
14in 1949 and it became the Australian section of the Communist- 
dominated World Peace Council (which emerged from the World 
Committee of Partisans for Peace, established in Paris in April
1949). The leading men in the A.P.C. were mainly middle-class, non-
15 16Communist figures, including several Protestant clergymen.
13
Tribune, 1 October 1949.
14
Ibid., 10 September 1949.
15
For a full list of the original members of the A.P.C., see 
News-Weekly, 14 June 1950. An A.P.C. leader, Rev. A.D. Brand, 
stated that only seven per cent of the Council's foundation 
members were Communists (Tribune, 30 August 1950).
16
Notably Rev. A.D. Brand (Methodist), Rev. Dr E.E.V. Collocott 
(Methodist), Rev. A.M. Dickie (Presbyterian), Rev. Neil Glover 
(Church of England), Rev. Frank Hartley (Methodist), Rev. Victor 
James (Unitarian) and Rev. G.R. van Eerde (Methodist).
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However, a t  th e  o rg a n is a t io n  le v e l  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  th e  Communists
was c l e a r ly  e v id e n t;  Ian  T u rn e r, a  Communist, was ap p o in ted  th e
17f i r s t  N a tio n a l O rg an is in g  S e c re ta ry  and he was succeeded  by a n o th e r
Communist, A lec R o b e rtso n . Many o f th e  non-Communist le a d e rs
ten d ed  to  be vague and se n tim e n ta l b u t th e  C om nunists knew what th e y
w anted . In  any c a s e , th e  non-Com nunist ’p r o g r e s s iv e s ' a s s o c ia te d
w ith  th e  A .P .C . a g re e d , on tie w hole, w ith  th e  Communists as  to  th e
so u rc e s  o f th e  t h r e a t  to  p eace , and th e  o r ig in s  o f b o th  th e  Cold War
and th e  Korean War. Thus, th e r e  was no need f o r  th e  Communist P a r ty
to  d i r e c t  th e  A .P .C ’ s a c t i v i t i e s  in  a crude manner and J .D . B lake
cou ld  q u i te  t r u t h f u l l y  adm it in  1953 t h a t  th e  P a r ty  was a g a in s t
18'im p o s in g ' i t s  l i n e  on th e  peace movement.
Not s u r p r i s in g ly ,  th e  A .P .C . and i t s  S ta te  a f f i l i a t e s  were
a t ta c k e d  a s  Communist f r o n t  o rg a n is a t io n s  by th e  L ib e ra l  and C ountry
P a r t i e s .  But i t  was th e  s tro n g  s ta n d  adop ted  by th e  A .L .P . w hich
p rev en ted  th e  peace movement making much im pact on A u s tra l ia n  o p in io n .
In  1950 th e  New S outh  Wales and V ic to r ia n  B ranches o f  th e  A .L .P .
banned p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f th e  A .P .C . to  i t s  members
19and a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n s , and t h i s  was fo llo w ed  by an A u s tra lia -w id e  
"l7
News-W eekly. 14 June 1950.
18
T rib u n e , 16 Septem ber 1953.
19
I b i d . , 22 F eb ru ary  1950; Labor C a l l , 10 March 1950
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20ban imposed by the party’s Federal Executive.“ Many of the A.L.F. 
members who disobeyed these directives were expelled, for example,
21Miss Nell Simpson, Secretary of the New South Wales Peace Committee. 
Senator W. Morrow, who defied the ban and whose line on the Korean
War was similar to that of the Communists, lost his Senate pre-
22 23selection in 1952“1“ and was later expelled.“ A number of delegates
selected to attend the Peking Peace Conference in 1951 were also
24expelled from the Labor Party. The 1951 Federal Conference of the
A.L.P. denounced ’so-called Peace Councils' as ’instruments of Soviet
25Imperialism.’ Some years later Dixon admitted that the Labor Party 
ban on the A.P.C. had seriously impeded the work of the peace 
movement
The main activities of the peace movement were the holding 
of peace conferences and the circulation of peace petitions.
The Stockholm Declaration Against Atomic War secured over 200,000
20
News-Weekly, 17 May 1950.
21
Tribune, 13 May 1950.
22
News-Weekly, 30 April 1952.
23
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24
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25
Australian Labor Party, Official Report of Proceedings of the 
20th Commonwealth Conference, Adelaide, 1953, p.28.
26
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200
s ig n a t u r e s  bu t th e  subsequen t P a c t  o f  Peace Appeal was s igned
28by on ly  125,556 A u s t r a l i a n s . “ The two l a r g e s t  peace co n fe ren c es
were th e  A u s t r a l i a n  Peace Congress in  Melbourne in  1950, a t te n d e d
by 10,000 peop le  a t  i t s  opening s e s s io n  and add ressed  by th e  Dean
of C an te rb u ry ,  and th e  Convention on Peace and War in  Sydney in
1953. The l a t t e r  con fe rence  en joyed  a somewhat w ider sp o n so rsh ip
th a n  th e  1950 Congress b u t  i t  f a i l e d  to  b r in g  in  many new e lem en ts ,
29m ain ly  because i t  was condemned by th e  F edera l  Government and
banned to  A .L .P . members by th e  New South Wales E x ecu tiv e  of th e  
30p a r t y .  Vague r e s o l u t i o n s  abounded a t  both  co n fe ren ces  bu t t h e
1953 m eeting  r e f r a i n e d  from p a ss in g  seve re  judgment on th e  West f o r
3 1c r e a t in g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t e n s i o n .
The peace movements succeeded in  so f a r  as c o n ta c t  was 
e s t a b l i s h e d  w ith  some non-Communist p ro g re s s iv e s  th e re b y  red u c in g  
th e  P a r t y ’ s i s o l a t i o n  to  some e x t e n t ,  bu t i t  f a i l e d  in  t h a t  i t  
d id  no t a t t r a c t  to  i t s e l f  many people who d id  n o t  belong to  th e  L e f t  
a l r e a d y ,  excep t f o r  some p a c i f i s t s  and th e  Q uakers. I t  d id  no t
27
T r ib u n e , 15 May 1951. 85,000 of th e s e  s ig n a tu r e s  came from New
South W ales. The D e c la ra t io n  was s igned  by s ix  Labor S e n a to r s .
28
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30
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develop any depth despite the fact that use was made of powerful
emotive symbols such as the misery and sufferings of World War II,
Hiroshima and the fear of atomic bomb tests. One of the main
factors contributing towards the peace movement's failure was its
refusal to admit that the Communist bloc could conceivably threaten
world peace and its uncritical support for the Conmunist line on the
Korean War. ^ Indeed, peace movement leaders Rev. A.D. Brand and
Rev. G.R. van Eerde delivered eulogies in honour of Stalin after
33the Soviet leader's death.
Other powerful emotive symbols, particularly those bringing out
anti-American and anti-Japanese feeling, were used by the Party
during this period. The Committee Opposed to the Rearming of Japan,
34established in 1951, and the Society for the Non-Ratification of
35the Japanese Peace Treaty, also established in the same year, 
were mainly organised by the Party although the public leaders, 
notably Rev. G.R. van Eerde, Dr J.W. Burton and Clive Evatt, M.L.A., 
were non-Communists. On both these issues - the rearming of Japan
32
See The Truth About Korea, Melbourne, 1950 and Germ Warfare in 
Korea, Melbourne, 1952. In June 1950 three prominent members of 
the A.P.C. - the author, Leonard Mann, Rev. G. Miller, and J.F. 
Cairns (later a Labor M.H.R.) resigned because of the Council's 
decision to place the blame for the war's origins solely on the 
South Koreans and the United States.
33
Tribune, 11 March 1953.
34
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35
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and the Japanese peace treaty - the Party discovered it could call
on greater public support and it found itself in company with people
on the political Right such as W.M, Hughes, M.H.R., A Downer, M.H.R.
and Lieut-General Gordon Bennett as well as many textile and light
industry manufacturers. The Committee Opposed to the Rearming of
Japan quickly collected 100,000 signatures against both Japanese
3 6rearmament and the trade clauses of the Japanese Peace Treaty.
However, although the A.L.P. was opposed to the Peace Treaty it
37banned both organisations to its members. In any event, they both 
disappeared after the Peace Treaty was ratified by the Federal 
Parliament.
The Communist Party also attempted to exploit anti-American 
38feeling. American cultural penetration was attacked and an
39Australian Culture Defence Movement established. The anti- 
American campaign approached its peak during the trial and execution 
of the Rosenbergs. Save the Rosenberg Committees were set up 
and appeals for clemency sent to President Eisenhower from a number
36
Ibid., 15 November 1952.
37
As a result of the ban Clive Evatt, M.L.A., and A. Thompson, 
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of prominent clergymen. However, the A.L.P. refused to condemn
the United States Government over this issue and the A.C.T.U.
Interstate Executive declined to endorse a move calling for 
41clemency. The Rosenberg affair had the additional advantage of 
enabling the Party to direct attention away from the trials of a 
number of prominent Jewish Communists in Eastern Europe.
The failure of the peace movement, and of the parallel move­
ments to excite popular resentment against the signing of the 
Japanese Peace Treaty and against the American alliance in general, 
robbed the 'united front from below' strategy of much of its content. 
This made it all the harder for the Communist leaders to keep the 
cadres and militants to the lines of action dictated by the new 
approach. The problem of discipline and of Party solidarity, to 
which we shall now turn, soon became one of the utmost importance.
Problems of solidarity
The changeover to the new strategies was, by all indications, 
far from smooth. Hardened by the years of the adventurist strategies, 
many of the Communist Party's cadres and workers were reluctant to 
fall in with the new line. Their indiscipline took the two usual 
forms; ‘left sectarianism' and 'right opportunism'. Those guilty
40
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of the former offence continued to act as if the Labor Party was,
42to quote Sharkey, *a single reactionary mass.® They attacked 
its leaders without reservation and kept stressing the divergence 
between the Labor and Communist Parties on general issues while 
ignoring their common interest in certain fields. Refusing to 
accept the dictates of the 'united front from below' strategy, 
they made no serious effort to establish unity of action with the 
A.L.P's rank and file. In justification of their stand, they pointed 
out that after the referendum defeat the A.L.P. had appeared to move 
even further to the Right and that Dr Evatt had come to an agreement 
with the Groupers about methods of dealing with Communists. On t W  
other hand, those guilty of ’right opportunism' wanted the Commi/nist 
Party to give unqualified support to the A.L.P's leaders, andyto 
refrain from criticising their policies. They wanted a united front
I
before an agreement about a 'progressive' policy had been obtained
f
within the A.L.P. In September 1951 Dixon wrote in the Tribune
that the Communist Party would not, as some members wanted, 4bandon
43 tor modify its criticism of Labor leaders. >
In particular, the development of the peace campaign presented
I
serious organisational problems for the Communist leaders. In 
1950, J.D. Blake condemned those members who considered fighting
42
L.L. Sharkey, The Labour Party Crisis, p.22.
43
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the attacks on the Party’s legality more important than the peace 
44issue. Later he revealed that it took ’some time’ for the Party's
Central Committee 'to grasp the central position which the struggle
45for peace must occupy in the activity of the party,’ Members
were repeatedly reminded that both the peace and the economic issues
were inter-related, Sharkey stated that the 'struggle for peace is
46the struggle for bread.* In the early fifties, with the sharp
rise in unemployment, the rejection of margins claims and the
cessation of the quarterly cost-of-living adjustments to the basic
wage, the Party found difficulty in persuading trade unionists to
worry more about peace than bread. Attacks against economism became
47regular features in Tribune and Dixon declared in the Communist
Review that there was 'a lot of lip-service to the cause of peace,
but not enough activity' in the trade unions. He also denied that
the ’difficulties' which the Communists were meeting in some trade
unions were related to the Party's increased concern with political 
48issues.
44
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The importance of eliminating left sectarian and right 
opportunist approaches to the peace movement was particularly impor­
tant when it appeared likely that the Korean War would become a 
global war. This led Party members in the peace movement to talk 
less about the peaceful intentions of the Socialist nations and the 
aggressive actions of the American imperialists and more about the 
urgent need for a cease-fire in Korea. But the twin evils were never
completely eliminated, Dixon attacked Party members who treated the
49peace movement as a Party organisation while J.D. Blake berated 
those who wished to ’submerge1 the Party in the peace movement and 
play down references to Socialism,^
As a result of the concerted attacks on the Party, its member­
ship declined alarmingly in the early fifties although those who 
remained were drawn closer together and the fighting spirit of the
organisation was raised. An American observer has estimated that
51membership fell from 12,000 in 1949 to 6,000 in 1953, but the 
latter figure is too small compared with the figure of 8,000 given 
by Alan Barcan for 1955. u‘ In 1951, during the height of the moves 
to ban the Party, a verification campaign was conducted amongst the
49
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membership to raise the ‘fighting quality* of the Party although
a warning was issued to branches not to drop inactive members in
large numbers. In the following year (July-September 1952) an
all-out attempt was launched to increase the Party’s membership; in
New South Wales this resulted in the recruitment of 319 new members and
54a rise of 4,622 in Tribune sales. However, after the immediate threat 
of illegality had been removed, the membership remained fairly stable 
until 1954, L, Aarons reported to the Party’s 17th National Congress 
in 1955:
Between 1952 and June 1954 there was a small but disturbing 
decline in Party membership,.only a few new factory branches 
have been established.
There has been some recruiting, but the number of new 
members is not sufficient to balance the loss of membership 
by natural and other causes.^
On the same occasion, Aarons gave some interesting figures relating 
to the composition of the Party’s membership in New South Wales.
45 per cent were industrial workers, 17 per cent housewives, 14 per 
cent clerical and professional workers and only 0,8 per cent 
farmers. Of the industrial workers in the Party, 79 per cent come 
from the basic industries (building, mining, metal trades and land 
and sea transport)
53
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Most of the members who dropped out of the Party in this
period were rank-and-file members. None of the leaders defected or
resigned but three leading Communist trade union officials were
expelled from the Party: A.N. Carruthers, Secretary of the South
57Australian Branch of the Gas Employees’ Union; R.C. Morgan, former
58Secretary of the Newcastle Branch of the F.I.A.; and Don Thomson,
soon after he had resigned from the Secretaryship of the Victorian
59Building Trades Federation.
The death of Stalin on 5 March 1953 appears to have made a strong
emotional impact on the membership, some of whom had almost believed
the Soviet leader to be immortal. Tribune referred to Stalin as 'the
60greatest man and the dominating figure of our time' and stated that
although he never visited Australia he was 'in a very real sense...
the greatest Australian.... For he showed how to make a country pros-
61perous, free and great.' Two Australians, E. Thornton and Mrs Street, 
were present at Stalin's funeral in Moscow. ^
57
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Membership decline was accompanied by a decline in Tribune8 s
position. As a result of the paper’s 'heavy loss’, it was converted
from a bi-weekly to a weekly in 1950: ’The price does not cover its
cost of production, and there is no advertising revenue to offset 
63the loss.’ During the membership drive its sales rose to 24,708
in September 1952 but the figure had dropped to 23,116 by August 
641953. In 1952, J.C. Henry reported that the paper’s financial
position was so ’serious’ (it was losing £120 a week) that the
possibility of dispensing with the 12 page lay-out, introduced in
651951, was considered.
Rank-and-file membership consolidation was accompanied by the 
leadership’s consolidation. During Sharkey's absence in gaol (he 
was released in December 1950), two members of the four-member 
Secretariat, J.D. Blake and J.C. Henry, had increased their authority 
at the expense of Dixon and Sharkey. After Sharkey's release, 
nothing was done at first since both Blake and Henry enjoyed con­
siderable popularity amongst the membership and precipitous action 
might well have divided the Party at a time when unity was essential. 
But Sharkey (and Dixon) slowly but surely checked the gains made at 
their expense. In 1953 Blake admitted that he and Henry had held a
63
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210
’narrow State parochial outlook’ which 'for a time caused injury
66to the unity of the Party and its leadership.’ Blake continued:
As a result of ideological struggle...and considerable 
ideological growth, ably assisted by Comrade Sharkey and Comrade 
Dixon, it is now a fact...that there is a...deep-going 
unity in the Secretariat••.under the leadership of the ^
leader of our Party, our General Secretary-Comrade Sharkey.
The logical conclusion to these statements came just over a year
later. Blake was accused of being preoccupied with the peace campaign,
even to the extent of advocating that Communist preferences at the
1951 Federal Election should have gone to 'peace supporters' and not
necessarily to A.L.P. candidates. According to the Central Committee
this would have 'seriously affected* the Party’s relations with A.L.P.
members and 'undermined' its efforts to build the united front. Blake
was also condemned for having devoted insufficient time to trade union
activities and economic issues. Henry was termed an 'anarcho-
syndicalist' who had overestimated the militancy of the workers. Both
were accused of 'State rightism' and it was admitted that Henry and
Blake had been transferred to Sydney in 1949 to break their strong
68support in Queensland and Victoria respectively. Blake and Henry 
were also alleged to have been associated with a sympathy for
66
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' n a t i o n a l  communism', t h a t  i s ,  f o r  th e  d e te rm in a t io n  o f  P a r ty  p o l i c y
69s o le y  w ith  r e f e r e n c e  t o  l o c a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  Both were removed from
70th e  P a r t y ' s  S e c r e t a r i a t  and r e p la c e d  by two r e l i a b l e  s u p p o r te r s  
o f  th e  Sharkey-D ixon l i n e  -  E .F .  H i l l  and L. A arons. However, a l th o u g h  
th e  Sharkey-D ixon v e r s u s  Blake-H enry d i s p u te  was fo u g h t  o u t  p u b l i c ly  
in  p u re ly  id e o lo g ic a l  te rm s i t  was a s t r u g g le  f o r  power as w e l l .
Power s t r u g g le s  in  th e  P a r ty  a r e  alw ays fough t in  id e o lo g ic a l  te rm s ;  
t h e r e  i s  no o th e r  a re n a  in  an o r g a n i s a t io n  whose l e a d e r s  c la im  t o  be 
s e l f l e s s  and d e d ic a te d  men who have made c o n s id e r a b le  m a te r i a l  s a c r i ­
f i c e s  f o r  th e  sake o f  th e  P a r t y .
A nother im p o r ta n t  f e a t u r e  o f  th e  P a r t y ' s  i n t e r n a l  l i f e  was th e  
t r a n s f e r r i n g  o f  th e  o v e rseas  t r a i n i n g  o f  f u n c t i o n a r i e s  from Moscow 
to  P ek ing  in  1951, th e  y e a r  in  which th e  A u s t r a l i a n  P a r ty  v i r t u a l l y  
ceune under th e  t u t e l a g e  of th e  Chinese P a r ty .  The A u s t r a l i a n  P a r ty  
l e a d e r s h ip  n o t  on ly  f e l t  a t t a c h e d  to  t h e  en thusiasm  e v id e n t  in  
Communist China b u t  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  China would p o l i t i c a l l y  p lay  a  p re ­
dominant r o l e  in  t h e  Asian Communist movement, of which A u s t r a l i a  
i s ,  g e o g r a p h ic a l ly ,  an i n t e g r a l  p a r t .
From th e  s u r f a c e  s ig n s ,  th e n ,  we o b ta in  th e  p i c t u r e  o f  a  P a r ty  
p a s s in g  th rough  a p e r io d  o f  c o n s id e r a b le  s t r e s s .  The in c id e n c e  o f
69
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right opportunism and left sectarianism; the struggle between 
different leadership groups; the difficulties in carrying out the 
peace campaign - all reveal that the problems of solidarity created 
first by the attempt to ban the Party and then by the strategic 
readjustment had sapped the Party’s vitality and inner discipline.
On the other hand, the period had proved the value of Sharkey and 
Dixon as leaders in a crisis, particularly their ability to work out 
and apply the new strategies and also their ability to win out in 
the struggle with Blake and Henry. Moreover, the Soviet and Chinese 
connections boosted confidence amongst the Party's membership. Even 
if things were moving slowly in Australia they were going well on 
the world scale.
After the Referendum
In the events of 1952 and 1953, the Senate election of the 
latter year stood out most clearly. According to Sharkey's analysis, 
this should have provided the proof that the Menzies-Fadden Govern­
ment was losing ground rapidly to the Labor Party, and that the latter 
would take power after the next Federal Election. The actual result 
was disappointing. The Government lost ground, but it retained its 
Senate majority without much difficulty although the A.L.P. vote was 
considerably higher than the combined votes of the Government parties. 
Sharkey explained Labor's failure to gain even more votes on the 
grounds that the downward economic swing 'appears to have temporarily 
stabilised itself’ and that Labor's leadership had refused to have
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anything to do with the progressive policies of peace and opposition
to war preparations. He derived some satisfaction from the increased
Communist vote, which rose from 95,561 in 1951 to 140,243 (the increase
was largely due to the fact that the Party*s candidates had secured
first place on the ballot paper in both New South Wales and Victoria).
From these figures Sharkey drew new inspiration.
This support will continue to grow as the Menzies Govern­
ment continues its attack on the working class, and the 
reactionary nature of the policies of the A.L.P. right wing 
becomes ever more clearly discerned by the masses, as the 
crisis of capitalism itself inevitably grows sharper.
All these factors point to the early defeat of the 
Menzies Government
A few local government successes were also recorded in this
period. J.H. King, a Miners* Federation official, was elected to the
72Lithgow City Council. Eight Communists were successful at the New
South Wales local government election in 1953 (as compared with only
one in 1950), the most important being the return of T. Wright and
73R.A. Maxwell to the Sydney City Council. Wright and Maxwell*s 
election was in part due to the fact that they had drawn first place 
on the ballot paper and also to the fact that a new proportional 
representation system of voting had been adopted in 1953. From the
71
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o u t s e t  t h e y  w ere, in  t h e  words of th e  Sydney Morning H e ra ld ,
74’models o f  decorum’ and Wright l a t e r  adm itted  t h a t  'we cannot
75cla im  to  have made any g r e a t  im p a c t . '
What, th e n ,  were th e  Communists' e x p e c ta t io n s  e a r l y  in  1954?
T h e i r  co n f id en ce  was r e tu r n i n g .  Having su rv iv ed  th e  a t tem p t t o  
ban i t s  le g a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  th e  P a r ty  had s u c c e s s f u l ly  r e a d j u s t e d  i t s  
s t r a t e g i e s  to  meet th e  demands o f  th e  new p e r io d  and , d e s p i t e  th e  
f a i l u r e  o f  th e  peace movement, i t  had improved i t s  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  
p ro g re s s iv e  g roups in s id e  th e  t r a d e  union and Labor branch s t r u c t u r e .  
I t  was, a s  we s h a l l  see in  th e  n e x t  c h a p te r ,  a lm ost h o ld in g  i t s  own 
a g a i n s t  th e  G roupers w ith in  th e  t r a d e  union movement, and was w inning  
th e  su p p o r t  o f  some t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s  (and A.W.U. members) in  opposing 
them. As f o r  th e  P a r t y ' s  f u t u r e ,  Sharkey could  s t i l l  p o in t  w ith  
co n f id e n ce  to  th e  p ro s p e c t  he had d e p ic te d  in  1952; th e  d e f e a t  of 
M enzies, L a b o r 's  r e t u r n  to  power, th e  w orkers ' d i s i l lu s io n m e n t  w ith  
th e  new Labor G overnm ent's  r e f o r m is t  p o l i c i e s ,  a new move to  th e  
L e f t  in s id e  th e  A .L .P . and f i n a l l y ,  th e  fo rm ation  o f  a u n i te d  P e o p le ’ s 
P a r ty  and th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  of P e o p le 's  Democracy in  A u s t r a l i a .  But 
th e  Communists were unprepared  f o r  th e  two major e v e n ts  of th e  y e a r s  
im m ediately  ahead -  th e  P e tro v  c a s e ,  and th e  s p l i t  of th e  A .L .P . 
a long  unexpec ted  l i n e s .
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CHAPTER SIX
BATTLE IN THE TRADE UNIONS
At one level, as we have seen, the Australian Communist Party 
in the early fifties was concerned to formulate strategies which 
would reduce its isolation in Australian society and at the same 
time provide it with the hope that its political action would bring 
it the support of the masses. At another level, however, it was 
waging a bitter and hard-fought battle to retain its bridgeheads 
of power and influence inside the trade union movement. For it was 
clear, to both the Communists and their enemies, that the Party's 
only real access to the masses was through those trade unions in 
which its influence was decisive. Dixon once put the problem in 
these terms:
The majority of the Australian working class are 
organised in the trade unions, which are the main mass 
organisations of the working class. We cannot seriously 
approach the struggle to win the majority of the working 
people for People's Power without the trade unions..••
We must draw the trade union movement into the general 
stream of the people's movement. We must prepare the 
working class to take its place at the head of the struggle 
for peace and people's power and this is possible only 
providing we strengthen the work in the unions.*
By 1950, after the exhausting and wasteful tactics of the 'adven­
turist' period, the Communist Party's trade union cadres had been
1
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l e f t  d is h e a r te n e d ,  aware t h a t  th e y  were i l l - e q u ip p e d  to  w ith s ta n d  
a pow erfu l a t t a c k  a g a in s t  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s .  The a t t a c k  was n o t 
long  in  com ing. In  1951 th e  M enzies Government p assed  a m easure 
s tr e n g th e n in g  th e  power of th e  A r b i t r a t io n  C ourt to  s u p e rv is e  th e  
conduct o f t r a d e  un ion  e l e c t i o n s ,  and in c lu d ed  in  th e  Communist 
P a r ty  D is s o lu tio n  A ct p ro v is io n s  to  en ab le  th e  S ta te  to  remove 
Communists from p o s i t io n s  o f le a d e r s h ip  in  th e  t r a d e  u n io n s . A lthough 
th e  l a t t e r  A ct was d isa llo w e d  by th e  H igh C ourt, th e  1951 amendments 
to  th e  A r b i t r a t io n  A ct d id  s tre n g th e n  th e  hand o f  th e  S ta te  in  d e a l in g  
w ith  en tre n ch ed  t r a d e  union o l i g a r c h ie s .  On to p  o f t h i s ,  th e  A .L .P . 
I n d u s t r i a l  G roups red o u b led  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  b reak  th e  Communists' 
h o ld  over th e  key u n io n s .
The Communists saw in  th e s e  two th r e a t s  th e  sp ea rh ead  o f a 
g e n e ra l o f fe n s iv e  from th e  R ig h t .  They s e t  th e m se lv e s , in  th e  f i r s t  
in s ta n c e ,  to  f i g h t  a de term ined  re a rg u a rd  a c t io n ,  abandoning th o s e  
p o s i t io n s  which were t h i n ly  h e ld  and f a l l i n g  back on th o se  in  which 
th e y  were more c e r t a in  o f t h e i r  g ro u n d . The G roupers  p re s se d  t h e i r  
i n i t i a l  advan tage  as  f a r  as  th e y  c o u ld , and even succeeded  in  shak ing  
th e  Communists' h o ld  over such t r a d i t i o n a l l y  m i l i t a n t  u n io n s as  th e  
A.R.U. and th e  F .I .A .  But by 1954, th e  Communists had checked t h i s  
advance and were b u ild in g  up t h e i r  s t r e n g th  f o r  a c o u n te r - a t ta c k ,  
more c o n f id e n t o f u l t im a te  su c c e ss  th a n  th e y  had been a t  any tim e
s in c e  th e  Second World War
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Strategies of defence
The Communists did not overestimate their chances of checking 
the onslaught on their trade union power. Although they claimed 
that the deepening economic crisis was making the workers restless, 
they admitted that it had not yet made them aware that the Govern­
ment’s war policy was mainly responsible for the decline of Australian 
living standards. Most workers, according to the Communists, were 
still subject to illusions about the efficacy of reformist and 
arbitrationist methods of realising demands, and as a result they 
were unable clearly to perceive the true significance either of the 
1951 amendments to the Arbitration Act or of the Groupers5 renewed 
industrial activities. The Communists designed their trade union 
strategies to meet such difficulties and made their defensive arrange­
ments with a care which contrasted sharply with the recklessness of 
their operations during the 'adventurist5 period. Before we discuss 
these arrangements, however, we shall first deal with the Communists' 
reading of the enemy's intentions and their assessment of his 
resources.
The Bill to amend the Conciliation and Arbitration Act was 
introduced by the Menzies Government in March 1951. It was 
intended to strengthen the powers of the Arbitration Court in 
enforcing the acceptance of industrial awards (heavy penalties for 
non-acceptance were prescribed) and to smooth the way for unionists 
who wanted the Court to control ballots for positions in their trade
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unions* Applications for court-controlled ballots under the 1949 
amendments, put through by the Chifley Government, had usually 
involved recourse to lengthy and costly legal proceedings; under the 
1951 amendments, a court-controlled ballot could be held if it were
a branch, or by ten per cent (or 1,000 members, whichever was the less) 
of the federal body of a union. Heavy penalties were imposed on 
unionists who impeded the conduct of court-controlled ballots*
The Communists claimed that the amendments were aimed at 
helping the Groupers and their allies to displace Communist cadres 
from positions of influence in the trade unions. At a later date,
J.C. Henry suggested that the ‘real purpose' of court-controlled 
ballots had been 'to remove from office genuine workers' leaders
and to replace them with men subservient to the reaction'• *“
object, the Communists claimed, was to be achieved through the
I
different forms of ballot-rigging which the new procedures made
alleged that Security men would interfere with genuine papers and 
fake others to ensure the defeat of Communist or progressive can­
didates; the counting of votes, it was further suggested, would 
provide a further means of affecting the ballot* Such claims were
requested by ten per cent or 500 members (whichever was the less) of
2
possible. Drawing attention to the fact that the ballot papers were 
to be sent through the post in 'distinctive' envelopes, the Communists
2
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repeated throughout 1952 and 1953. Why was the Government going to 
so much trouble to help the Groupers? Because, claimed the Commu­
nists, it wished to use the Groupers in its general policy of reducing 
the workers* living standards to provide more resources for its war 
effort in the interests of American imperialism. E.F. Hill drew 
attention to ’the striving of the bourgeoisie in its battle to impose 
a war economy, a war plan and a war ideology upon the Australian 
people.*
And in order to develop the process by which that plan 
can be operated the whole position of the Arbitration Court 
has been strengthened, and it has been drawn far more sharply 
into the battle than in previous periods,...,^
Although the amending legislation had been opposed in the
Federal Parliament by the Labor Party, and although both the A.L.P’s
Federal Conference of 1951 and the A.C.T.U. Congress of the same year
had criticised the amendments, the Communists were not mistaken in
estimating that the workers would not resist the changes with much
feeling. Their attachment to the arbitration system, it was
3
3
See Ballot Riggers at Work*.. Melbourne, n.d., and the series of 
articles by John Mclsaac in Tribune, 11 February 1953, 18 February 
1953, 25 February 1953. See also the statement by D. Holmes (an 
A.L.P. member who had fallen foul of the Groupers in a F.C.U. 
ballot) in S.M.H., 23 March 1955.
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be extremely close (17 votes to 16) and it appears that the A.W.U. 
delegates (who had opposed the 1951 amendments to the Arbitration 
Act) had formed an important part of the majority.
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recognised, was too strong for that. This attachment, according to 
Dixon, had been strengthened by the post-war boom.
Arbitration and conciliation received a big build-up 
during World War II and immediately after it. In this 
period the trade union movement, with the militant unions 
showing the way, forced the employers to make big con­
cessions to the workers - the 40 hour week, increases in 
the basic wage, margins, women's wages, week-end penalty 
rates and so on. Although these gains were the result of 
trade union struggle or pressure, they were invariably 
conceded through the arbitration courts. The reformists 
and right-wing labour leaders talked loud and long in praise 
of arbitration and conciliation.^
Only experience, he suggested, would convince the workers that their 
interests were being attacked through that same Arbitration Court 
which they had come to regard with such affection.
Although they took some time to appreciate the importance of 
the Industrial Group movement within the A.L.P., the Communists 
were aware from an early date of its power within the trade unions.
In particular, they recognised the fact that the Groupers had won 
the sympathies of many amongst the rank-and-file unionists and 
that the earnestness and moral outlook of Groupist cadres were widely 
appreciated. Above all, the Groups possessed a great advantage 
in being the official organisations of the A.L.P. in the unions, 
which they used to effect by representing election battles between 
themselves and the Communists as part of a general struggle between 
the Labor and Communist Parties. Thus, during the 1952 ballot
6
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in the Victorian Branch of the A.R.U., News-Weekly placed the 
following interpretation on the rivalry between J.J. Brown, a Commu­
nist, and J. Ryan, the Groupers* nominee.
A vote for Mr J. Ryan...is a vote for the Labor Party. Any 
other issue, such as that J.J. Brown is a great union secretary, 
is but a decoy to inveigle Labor men to desert their own cause 
for that of the Kremlin.^
Dr Evatt strengthened this identification by referring to Communist 
defeats in the trade unions, 'not as Industrial Group successes, butg
as Labor Party victories.1
In looking for the interests behind the Groups, the Communists
were careful not to lay too much blame on the hierarchy of the Roman
Catholic Church, partly because they knew that several of the
prominent Groupers were Protestants and partly because they were
anxious not to reduce their struggle with the Movement to one between
Catholics and others. It suited them at this time to suggest that
the Industrial Groups were the agents of the capitalists. Thornton
claimed with complete confidence:
We know that the Industrial group leaders have been helped 
to their present position by the Menzies Government and the 
Federal Arbitration Court, and have been financed by the 
Australian employers and the United States Government.
We also know that a helping hand has been given to them 
by Labour Party leaders, including Dr. Evatt.7 89
7
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For t h i s  ve ry  r e a s o n ,  th e  Communists su g g e s te d ,  th e  I n d u s t r i a l  
Group le a d e r s  would e v e n tu a l ly  be disowned by th e  r a n k - a n d - f i l e .
But t h e r e  was a l s o  need to  ta k e  account o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  
immediate fo l lo w in g  was e x t e n s iv e .  In  th e  same a r t i c l e  c i t e d  above, 
Thornton made t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n :
The A .L .P .  I n d u s t r i a l  g ro u p s ,  a l th o u g h  th e y  c o n ta in  
many h o n e s t  w o rkers ,  many good t r a d e  u n i o n i s t s ,  who belong 
t o  th e  g roups  because  o f  t h e i r  l o y a l ty  to  th e  Labour P a r ty ,  
a r e ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  le d  in  t h e  to p  l e v e l s  by most unscrupu­
lo u s  peop le  who have caused g r e a t  damage t o  th e  independence 
and f i g h t i n g  s t r e n g t h  of th e  un ions  in  th e  l a s t  few y e a r s . ^
The e s s e n t i a l  p o in t  in  th e  Communist a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  
s i t u a t i o n  in  th e  e a r l y  f i f t i e s  was t h a t  th e  I n d u s t r i a l  Groups and 
th e  Government were working t o g e t h e r .  The A r b i t r a t i o n  Court had 
been empowered to  a s s i s t  th e  G roupers in  w idening th e  ran g e  and 
in c r e a s in g  th e  p r e s s u r e  o f  t h e i r  campaign a g a in s t  t h e  Communists 
in  th e  t r a d e  u n io n s .  The danger was t h a t  t h i s  campaign would do 
i r r e p a r a b l e  harm t o  th e  freedom and dem ocra tic  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  
t r a d e  u n io n s  b e fo re  t h e  workers r e a l i s e d  the  n e c e s s i t y  o f  r a l l y i n g  
to  th e  on ly  f o r c e  which u n d ers tood  t h e i r  t r u e  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e  Commu­
n i s t  P a r t y .  To p re v e n t  t h i s  happen ing , th e  Communists s e t  th em se lves  
to  p lay  a w a i t in g  game and g iv e  t h e i r  opponents t im e  t o  a l i e n a t e  
s e c t i o n s  of th e  t r a d e  u n i o n i s t s  who had fo rm erly  been d isp o se d  to  
t r u s t  them. The u n i t e d - f ro n t - f ro m -b e lo w  s t r a t e g y ,  as  a p p l ie d  in
Loc. c i t .
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the trade union field, was essentially one of caution; Communist 
cadres were enjoined to refrain from pressing for political strikes, 
to strive wherever possible to establish common ground between 
themselves and rank-and-file unionists, and to moderate the attacks 
on the Groupers until such time as the Groups had been clearly shown 
to be the agents of American and Australian capitalism. Moderation 
was to be the keynote of the Communists' revised industrial strategy. 
In October 1951, for example, Dixon complained that there had been 
too great an emphasis placed on political issues in some of the W.W.F. 
branches and that economic issues needed to be given more attention.
There was a tendency for our people to get out too far 
in front of the workers. It is most important that we link 
the economic, the day-to-day issues with the general political 
questions.... We will not succeed in building a firm united 
front of the working class unless we do this. *
In fact, there was a sharp decline in strike activity after
1951, especially on the part of Communist-controlled unions. This
was partly a result of the new deterrents against strikes provided
by the 1951 amendments to the Arbitration Act (which gave the Court
powers to impose severe penalties for the non-observance of awards),
and it was partly because the Government had shown its willingness
to use the Crimes Act to deal with strike leaders, as when it
intervened to break the strikes of the Miners’ Federation and the
W.W.F. in 1951. But it was also because the Communist trade union
11
Ibid., October 1951, p.945
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cadres were making a deliberate effort to maintain good relations
with the rank-and-file unionists and with the A.C.T.U. leadership.
Thus, in mid-1951, the W.W.F. stopped boycotting New Zealand shipping
(the New Zealand waterside workers were out on strike at the time)
12when the A.C.T.U. threatened it with censure. From 1951 onwards, 
the Communist-controlled unions were singularly passive in strike 
action; instead of taking the whole union out, the leadership would 
organise token strikes by key sections of an industry, more as a 
demonstration than as a challenge to the employers. Sometimes inter­
national considerations obliged them to stage political strikes, as
when the W.W.F’s leadership tried to prevent arms ships leaving for
13the Indo-Chinese war theatre in 1954, but these were discontinued 
when it became clear that the rank-and-file were not interested.
What is surprising here is that the Communists’ trade union 
strategies were put into effect without much difficulty, apart from 
the sectarianism amongst some of the militants which we shall discuss 
later. The inclusion in the Central Committee of so many important 
trade union leaders, such as Thornton and McPhillips of the F.I.A., 
Williams and Ross of the Miners' Federation, Healy of the W.W.F., 
Elliott of the Seamen’s Union, Rowe of the A.E.U., Hughes of the
12
News-Weekly, 18 July 1951.
13
S.M.H., 15 April 1954. For the unsuccessful attempt by the W.W.F. 
and Seamen's Union leadership to prevent their members loading war 
supplies for Korea in 1950, see News-Weekly, 30 August 1950.
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F.C.U. and Wright of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Union, meant that the 
formulation of the Party’s general strategy and of its tactics in 
the trade union movement would be reconciled and harmonised at the 
level of the Party’s top leadership* Thus, there was little danger of 
a gap developing between the formulation of the Party's trade union 
policy and its execution* This situation contrasted with that of the 
’adventurist’ period when strong disagreement was evident on the 
Central Committee between the Party functionaries and the trade union 
leaders*
Aware that their single-minded drive for leadership positions in 
certain unions had lost them support in the pa3t, the Communists changed 
their policy* They were now prepared to support for union leadership 
not only non-Communists who would serve as front figures but tradition­
alists who had earned the confidence of the ordinary unionists* This 
approach, which culminated in the practice of 'unity tickets' (in 
which Communists were bracketed with progressive A.L.P. candidates), 
was strongly advocated by both Thornton and Dixon. Thornton, who 
admitted that the Communists' attempt to monopolise executive positions 
in the F.I.A. (of which he had been the National Secretary) had 
enabled the Groupers to win control of it, did not mince his words:
'It is not for the Communists to select the type of Labour Party men
they will work with; we must be prepared to work with whoever is the
14spokesman for Labour Party workers.' Dixon pointed out that the
Communist Review, September 1954, p.268.
14
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united front strategy required that the Communists should accept as
legitimate trade union leaders anyone, provided he had a following,
who was opposed to the industrial groups.
To set out to monopolise the leadership of a union, a shop, 
job or strike committee, is a denial of the united front.
...the unions in which we are now experiencing the 
greatest difficulties are those unions where the Communists 
have monopolised the leadership,...15
In some cases, the Communists were prepared to tolerate Groupist
leaders who were trusted by the rank-and-file. For example, in the
1954 election in the Melbourne Branch of the W.W.F., the Communists
backed a unity ticket which included some of their members alongside
A.L.P. and non-party workers, but nevertheless refrained from
opposing the sitting President, J.H. Cummins, who was a Grouper.
Dixon brought out the implications of this incident: ’To have attempted
the elimination of the whole of the Industrial Group candidates would
have caused the A.L.P. members and supporters - the majority - to
feel they were being denied representation on the Federation Branch 
16leadership.’ The unity-ticket practice was used in such unions 
as the W.W.F., the F.I.A., the F.C.U. and the A.R.U. but the Labor 
Party soon began imposing sanctions on those of its members who 
co-operated with the Communists. In 1952, for example, the A.L.P.
15
Tribune, 12 December 1951.
16
Communist Review, September 1954, p.261.
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expelled J. Young and S. Davis, President and Vice-President 
respectively of the Sydney Branch of the W.W.F., for allowing their 
names to appear on a unity ticket opposing Industrial Group 
candidates.^
At no time do the Communists appear to have considered the 
possibility of forming their own trade unions, not only because they 
wished to maintain the broadest possible front with the other 
unionists but also because they realised that there was no real basis 
for legal union activity outside the structure of the arbitration 
system. Their respect for the conventions of Australian unionism 
is illustrated by their refusal to group their unions into a federa­
tion rivalling the A.C.T.U. The opportunity was offered in 1949, 
when most of the important Western trade union movements had broken 
away from the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. 
When the A.C.T.U. followed suit at its 1949 Congress, News-Weekly
predicted that the Communist-controlled unions would soon be formed
18into a trade union federation affiliated with the W.F.T.U. But
the Communists made no such move, even after the 1951 A.C.T.U.
Congress affiliated with the anti-Communist International Confedera-
19tion of Free Trade Unions, which had been established in December
17
News-Weekly. 22 October 1952.
18
Ibid.. 21 September 1949.
19
According to Barcan (op. cit., p.30), the decision was taken by 
236 votes to 152.
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1949 by the organisations which had left the W.F.T.U. Later, in
keeping with the united front strategy, several of the Communist-
controlled unions, including the Seamen's Union, the Miners'
Federation and the W.W.F., broke off their connection with the
W.F.T.U*s Trade Departments when threatened with expulsion from the 
20A.C.T.U.
This apparent timidity was coupled with the Communists' caution 
in attacking the arbitration system before they were certain that the 
workers' illusions about arbitrationism had been shattered. From 
1952 onwards, a few straws in the wind gave cause for hope. Although 
the 1951 amendments to the Arbitration Act had not much worried the 
rank-and-file unionists, they became concerned later when a steady 
rise in prices cut down the value of their real wages, when unemploy­
ment began to spread, and when the Arbitration Court proved 
unsympathetic on several important issues. In the Galvin award of 
1952, for example, the Court had rejected the claim of the metal 
trade unions for increased margins; several other awards refusing 
additional margins followed, resulting in widespread discontent, 
and in 1953 the quarterly cost-of-living adjustments to the basic 
wage were terminated. The fines on those unions which disregarded 
the Court's decisions did not improve matters. By 1954 Thornton 
was able to observe, with some justice:
20
See Tribune, 30 November 1949, 7 December 1949; News-Weekly,
31 December 1952.
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Exasperation with the Arbitration Court is growing 
rapidly following a string of punitive orders against the 
trade unions.
Right-wing trade union officials are finding greater 
and greater difficulty in holding the workers back and in 
many cases have been forced to give a lead for strike action 
as the only alternative to being isolated from the workers.
The faith in arbitration and in reformism which has for so 
long affected the majority of the Australian workers, has 
been shaken by recent events.21
From 1953, the Communists coupled their criticism of the 1951 
amendments with specific criticisms of the way in which the arbitra­
tion system had blocked the realisation of mass demands. But the 
fact remains that their main concern between 1951 and 1954 had been 
to isolate the Groupers within the trade union movement, and to 
identify them as the enemies of the workers.
Their tactics in this field of action had two objects; one 
was to drive a wedge between traditionalist trade unionists and 
the Groupers, and the other was to separate the Group leaders from 
their mass support. In 1950 E.F. Hill had drawn a line of ’some 
importance* between ‘Mr Monk and his colleagues* and the Group 
leaders who wished to see a
Nazi-like Labour Front in which they would have every claim 
to be the leaders and in which they might even menace the 
position of people such as Mr Monk. Consequently, the mass 
united struggle must take into account this process.•.and 
must soberly estimate the differences between the various 
reformist leaders.^3
21
Communist Review, September 1954, p.267.
22
On the latter tactic see Dixon in Tribune, 12 December 1951.
Communist Review, July 1950, p.586.
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The Groupers, instead of building on their earlier successes, aided 
the Communists by spreading their attacks indiscriminately and by 
attempting to defeat not only Communists but also traditionalist 
leaders whom they considered to be ideologically unreliable or pro- 
Communist, Wherever a traditionalist or reformist leader was faced 
with opposition from the Groupers, the Cononunists gave him their 
unconditional support. Many of the traditionalists amongst the trade 
unionists now began to change their minds about the Communists, whom 
they had treated as enemies in the late forties. It was not simply 
that the Communists proved to be dependable allies in the struggle 
against the new enemy, the Groupers, but it was also that the 
traditionalists were in many cases deeply disturbed by the policies 
being advocated by the Industrial Groups. In particular, the 
traditionalists agreed with the Communists in opposing the practice 
of court-controlled union ballots, partly on principle (as an 
unjustified intrusion of the State in union affairs) and partly through 
expediency - for the Communists were not the only group which stood 
to lose from a secret ballot system. The well-entrenched oligarchy 
of the A.W.U. broke with the Groupers when the latter threatened to 
employ the court-controlled ballot provisions within the A.W.U. 
Santamaria has ruefully admitted:
Politically, it might have been more ’prudent' to 
confine attacks on corruption and ballot-rigging to 
instances in which Communists were involved. The Groups 
refused to make that type of distinction. Accordingly
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many non-Communists, v u ln e ra b le  to  th e s e  c h a rg e s ,  went 
in t o  o p p o s i t i o n . ^
Many t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s  were a l s o  d i s tu r b e d  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  
G roupers  were h o s t i l e  tow ards  th e  id e a s  o f  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  and 
S o c ia l i s m ,  which, a l th o u g h  t h e i r  c o n te n t  had been d ra in e d  away by th e  
f i f t i e s ,  were s t i l l  im p o rtan t  symbols in  th e  Labor movement. The 
G roupers had a l i e n a t e d  p o t e n t i a l  s u p p o r te r s  by p r e s s in g  t h e i r  more 
extrem e demands to o  e a r l y ,  and th e  Communists, by h o ld in g  t h e i r  f i r e  
from tim e to  t im e ,  were a b le  to  earn  th e  sympathy o f  many t r a d e  
u n i o n i s t s  who had opposed them in  th e  f o r t i e s .  The I n d u s t r i a l  Groups 
were d i s c o n c e r t i n g l y  v ig o ro u s  in  packing union m ee tings  w ith  t h e i r  
s u p p o r te r s ;  in  recommending th e  banning o f  th e  Communist P a r ty ;  in 
p r a i s i n g  American f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ;  in  a t t a c k in g  such p o l i t i c a l  and 
i n d u s t r i a l  t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s  as  J .A .  Ferguson , Clyde Cameron, A.A.
C a lw e l l ,  F . J .  K e n n e l ly ,P . J .  C la rey  and A.E. Monk; in  openly a c c e p t in g  
th e  pa tronage  of th e  C a th o l ic  S o c ia l  Movement, and in  s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  
th e  A .L .P . needed to  ta k e  a to u g h e r  l i n e  w ith  Communists and p ro g re s s iv e s  
g e n e r a l l y .  S ev e ra l  Labor l e a d e r s  formed th e  im press ion  t h a t  th e  
G roupers would l i k e  to  see th e  A .L .P .  become a C h r i s t i a n  Democratic 
P a r ty  on th e  European model. The South  A u s t r a l i a n  Branch o f  th e  A .L .P . ,  
l a r g e l y  on th e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  Clyde Cameron, had d isbanded  th e  Groups
24 '
B.A. S an tam aria ,  ' ’The Movement': 1941-60 -  An O u t l i n e ' ,  in  Henry 
Mayer, C a th o l ic s  and th e  F ree  S o c i e t y , p p .8 4 -5 .
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25as early as 1951; the New South Wales and Victorian Branches were 
under firm Grouper control, but by 1954 the Groupers in these States 
were finding themselves faced with growing opposition.
The Communists, despite their over-dramatisation of the situation, 
nevertheless devised strategies which were well-suited to preserving 
a bridgehead in the trade union movement. Their industrial action 
in the early fifties was based on the principle of keeping in line 
with the mass of the trade unionists, even if this meant a qualified 
acceptance of the arbitration system, the support of non-Communists 
in trade union elections, and the abandonment of political strikes.
In giving way before the Groupers, the Communists calculated that 
their enemies would over-extend themselves, and that they would attempt 
to achieve more than their resources would permit. This, then, was 
the strategy. We shall now study its application.
The course of the battle
Although the battle metaphor has its limitations, it is helpful 
in many ways to regard the Groupers’ campaign against the Communists 
in the trade unions as an offensive against fortified positions.
The disposition of the Communists’ forces may be represented as 
follows. They were solidly entrenched in a number of important 
unions with long traditions of militant action - the W.W.F., the 
B.W.I.U., the Boilermakers' Society, the Sheet Metal Workers' Union,
News-Weekly. 31 October 1951.
25
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the Seamen's Union, and the Miners' Federation. They were also 
well-established in a number of small unions, such as the Ship 
Painters and Dockers' Union, the Hotel Employees' Union (N.S.W.), 
and the Blacksmiths' Society. Although the position varied from 
branch to branch in each of these unions, generally speaking their 
membership respected and trusted the Communists not only as trade 
union workers but as political radicals. (Although no details have 
been released about the distribution of the Communist Party's factory 
branches or cells, indirect evidence suggests that they were most 
numerous and most effective amongst the well-established militant 
unions such as the W.W.F., the Miners’ Federation and the Seamen's 
Union). These unions were the fortresses. Immediately beyond them, 
making up an inner defensive ring, were the Communist-held branches 
of the A.R.U. (Communists held the Victorian Branch and were strong 
in the Queensland and Tasmanian Branches), the F.I.A., the A.E.U. 
and the Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union, in which the Communists' 
influence had been to a large extent a function of their effectiveness 
as conventional trade union leaders in the business of winning 
concessions from the employers and the Arbitration Court. This 
effectiveness, however, had been placed in question by the Communists' 
recklessness during the 'adventurist' period. Constituting the outer 
defensive ring was a medley of craft and white-collar unions which 
the Communists had penetrated, in many cases, during the Second 
World War and in which their position had been insecure from the
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beginning. (The absence of a good Party cell network in unions
such as the F.C.U. added to the difficulties of the Communists
during the period of the Grouper offensive). In the period from
1950 to 1954, the Groupers had usually little difficulty in sweeping
through these outer defences and in most cases they were able to
capture the main positions of the inner defences. In some cases,
indeed, they were able to penetrate the branches of the fortress
unions; but their advance was checked at this point and, by 1954,
they were slowly being forced back again.
Many of the Grouper victories in the unions of the outer defensive
ring were recorded in 1950-52, and gave an exaggerated impression
of the Communists' weakness within the trade union movement as a
whole. In 1952 the Groupers took over control of the North Australian
26Workers' Union and the New South Wales Teachers' Federation. In the
same year, the Grouper-controlled Amalgamated Society of Carpenters
and Joiners, set up in opposition to the de-registered (and Communist-
controlled) B.W.I.U., won over a considerable number of members from 
27the latter union.“ Although the Carpenters and Joiners' union was 
later registered with the Arbitration Court, it still remained 
smaller than the B.W.I.U. However, the most important union of the 
outer defensive ring to fall to the Groupers was the F.C.U. in
26
Ibid., 26 March 1952, 23 April 1952.
Ibid., 1 October 1952.
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which the Communists were strong at the Federal and New South 
Wales and Victorian Branch levels, but not elsewhere. It was a 
lengthy battle, involving appeals to the Court under the 1949 
amendments to the Arbitration Act and court-controlled ballots.
The Victorian Branch was the first Branch to be lost by the 
Communists and militants; finally, in 1952, H.A. Thorne, the mili­
tant Federal Secretary and J.R. Hughes, the Communist Secretary
28of the New South Wales Branch were displaced.
In most of the cases discussed above, victory came comparatively 
easily and, with the exception of the New South Wales Teachers' 
Federation, finally to the Groupers. In the unions of the inner 
defensive ring, however, the battles were often long-drawn and 
bitterly contested. This was especially so in the struggle for 
control of the F.I.A., which the Communists had controlled at both 
the Federal level and in all the Branches until 1949. The F.I.A. 
had a membership of between 30 and 40 thousand. In 1949 the 
Groupers were able to take over the executive of the F.I.A. Branch 
in Newcastle, where many steel-workers had been thrown out of 
employment by the great coal strike, for which they had blamed the 
Communists.~ The Communists maintained their position elsewhere
in the F.I.A. and E. Thornton, a Communist, defeated L. Short,
28
Ibid., 29 March 1950, 30 August 1950, 30 July 1952.
Ibid., 11 January 1950.
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the Grouper candidate, in the ballot for the National Secretaryship.
Short alleged that the ballot had been rigged, and applied to the
Arbitration Court (under the 1949 amendments) to have Thornton's
election declared invalid. A long court battle ensued, during
which Short was first expelled from the F.I.A. and then reinstated
(by an order of the Arbitration Court). In 1950, Thornton resigned
as National Secretary to take up a W.F.T.U. post, and the ballot
for his successor resulted in the election of L.J. McPhillips,
another Communist. Then, in November 1951, Mr Justice Dunphy
announced his findings on the Short case. He declared that Thornton
had been re-elected in 1949 with 1,800 forged ballot papers in a
poll characterised by 'forgery, fraud and irregularities on a grand 
30scale.' Short's installation as National Secretary was followed
by a total rout of the remaining Communists. Court-controlled ballots
saw the Communists ousted from executive positions in the Sydney
Metropolitan and Queensland branches of the union, from its National
Executive and National Council and finally, at the December 1952
ballot, all the remaining Communist and militant officials were 
31defeated.
30
Ibid., 5 December 1951. For details of McPhillips' election 
see ibid., 23 August 1950, 20 September 1950. Two accounts from a 
pro-Grouper standpoint of this affair are James R. McLelland 'Experi­
ences of the Australian Labor Movement under Government Control', in 
Michael Harrington and Paul Jacobs (eds), Labor in a Free Society, 
Berkeley, 1959, pp.146-54, and J.R. Kerr, 'The Struggle Against 
Communism in the Trade Unions', Quadrant, Spring, 1960, Vol. IV,
No. 4, pp.30-3.
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Another good example of the way in which the Groupers used
the amended Arbitration Act to fight the Communists is the case
of their victory in the Victorian Branch of the A.R.U. The
Groupers* first gain was registered in 1952, when they won control
of the Branch's State Council, but were unable to secure the defeat
32of the Secretary, J.J. Brown, who was a Communist. Ian Turner,
Vice-President of the Central Council of Railway Shop Committees
and a former student leader at Melbourne University, was generally
regarded as Brown's successor but he was dismissed in 1953 by the
Victorian Railways Commissioners, primarily because he was a 
33Communist. Brown's downfall came in 1954, when he was defeated 
in the ballot for the Secretaryship and was subsequently refused 
re-employment on the Victorian R a i l w a y s T h e  Groupers' campaign 
to win control of the three-member Commonwealth Council of the A.E.U. 
took three years to succeed. In 1952, a Communist, C.G. Hennessy 
had been elected to the Council to replace an A.L.P. member who had 
died, but another Communist member, E.J. Rowe, was defeated by a 
Grouper in a ballot held shortly afterwards. The coup de grace 
came in 1954, when a second Grouper defeated A. Wilson, a Communist,
32
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33
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in the election to the Council. The Communist Secretary of the 
New South Wales Branch of the Amalgamated Postal Workers’ Union,
O ß
R.E. Wellard, was also defeated in 1954.
In most of these cases, the Groupers’ victories were based 
on their skill in exploiting the procedures for court-investigation 
and court-control of union ballots, in outdoing the Communists in 
the techniques of stuffing and rigging union meetings and in 
winning the confidence of traditionalist and A.L.P. unionists who 
had resented Communist control in the past. The Groupers had the 
advantage of being the newcomers, the crusaders, and many of their 
cadres appealed to the rank-and-file by their forthrightness and 
industry in union work. On the other hand, the Communists were 
handicapped by the unpopularity they had earned for themselves 
during the late forties, both by their recklessness in launching 
strikes and by their ruthlessness in driving for executive positions. 
This was particularly the case in the F.I.A. Under such circum­
stances, the Communists' strategy of biding time and working for a 
united front had little chance of saving the day.
The Communists were also handicapped by indiscipline in the 
ranks of their own workers. 'Sectarianism' in the Party's trade
35
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union work apparently took several forms; in some cases, Communist
cadres continued to apply the principle they had been taught during
the ’adventurist* period, namely, that all non-Communist workers
except the militants were prey to reactionary illusions. But this
did not concern the Communist leaders so much as the sectarianism
which led Party workers to ignore the distinction between the
leaders of the Industrial Group movement and their rank-and-file
followers. Writing in July 1952, Dixon pointed out that the united
front strategy required that Communists should work with rank-and-
file Groupers when the common objective was an economic one, such
as increased margins. He insisted that the 'great majority* of
37Industrial Group members were not 'corrupt* and 'venal*. Earlier
Dixon had attacked those sectarians who insisted on identifying the
Industrial Group movement with Catholic Action, not only because
he knew that many of the Groupers were Protestants but also because
he did not want the conflict to be drawn on religious lines. 'There
can be no genuine united front', he maintained, 'that does not
38include the Catholic workers.' In 1954, the Party's Central 
Committee went to the length of drawing up a statement on 'Party 
Consolidation', the discussion of which was intended to dispel
37
Communist Review, July 1952, p,199.
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sectarian illusions. As late as September 1954, however, Thornton 
could still write:
But sectarianism is a chronic disease. Although few 
comrades will disagree openly today about the necessity for 
a proper policy of unity in the trade unions, of unity 
between the Communist and the A.L.F. workers, many are re­
luctant, or even opposed, to putting such a policy into 
operation in their union.
Many of our comrades do not accept in practice the 
principle of working class unity.^9
In their 'fortress' unions, however, the Communists were in a 
much better position to withstand the Groupers' onslaught. In the 
first place, Communist Party members were more numerous amongst the 
rank-and-file of such unions as the W.W.F., the Miners' Federation, 
the Seamen's Union, the B.W.I.U., the Boilermakers' Society and the 
Sheet Metal Workers’ Union. In the Australian trade union movement 
only about sixteen unions had over 20,000 members and of these the 
Communists were firmly entrenched, at the federal level, in five - 
the A.R.U., the B.W.I.U., the W.W.F., the Sheet Metal Workers' Union 
and the Miners' Federation. In his report to the 17th Congress in 
1955, L. Aarons estimated that of the Party's members engaged in 
industrial work, 30 per cent were metal workers and 25 per cent 
maritime workers, and that 79 per cent of the Party's 'proletarian 
membership' in New South Wales were employed in the 'basic industries 
metal, land and sea transport, mining asd (sic) building'.^ In
39
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th e  second p la c e ,  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  non-Communist m i l i t a n t s  was h ig h e r  
in  t h e s e  un ions  th a n  i t  was in  th e  w h i t e - c o l l a r  and c r a f t  un ions  and , 
in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  many of th e  C a th o l ic  w orkers in  th e s e  un ions  were 
luke-warm in  t h e i r  re sp o n se  to  th e  G roupers '  p l e a s .  In  th e  t h i r d  
p la c e ,  th e  p r a c t i c e  of u n i ty  t i c k e t s  was e s t a b l i s h e d  in  th e  e a r ly  
s t a g e s  of th e  u n i t e d  f r o n t  s t r a t e g y  in  such un ions  a s  th e  W.W.F. and 
t h e r e  was a p p a re n t ly  much l e s s  ' s e c t a r i a n i s m '  amongst th e  Communists 
th a n  in  th e  more v u ln e ra b le  un ions  -  v u ln e r a b le ,  t h a t  i s ,  t o  th e  
G ro u p ers '  a t t a c k .
The p a t t e r n  of th e  s t r u g g le  in  th e  ' f o r t r e s s '  un ions  was t h e r e ­
f o r e  one o f  e a r l y  G ro u p e rs '  g a in s  ( in  1951 and 1952) ana th e n  of a 
s u c c e s s f u l  Communist c o u n t e r - a t t a c k  ( in  1953-54).  In  th e  M iners ' 
F e d e r a t io n ,  f o r  example, a C om m unis t-m ilitan t a l l i a n c e  l o s t  c o n t ro l  
o f  th e  C e n t ra l  Council in  December 1952 and s h o r t l y  a f te rw a rd s  th e
Communist V ic e - P r e s id e n t ,  W. P a rk in s o n ,  was d e fe a te d  in  e l e c t i o n
41by a G rouper, G.H. N e i l l y ,  These r e v e r s e s  l e f t  th e  G eneral P r e s i ­
d e n t ,  I .  W ill iam s ,  a s  th e  only  Communist on th e  F e d e r a t i o n 's  t h r e e -  
member C e n tra l  E x e c u t iv e ,  and in  1953 N e i l ly  became G eneral 
S e c r e t a r y  fo l lo w in g  th e  d ea th  of t h e  form er S e c r e t a r y ,  G.W.S. G ran t ,  
an A .L .P .  member. But by t h i s  t im e ,  th e  t i d e  had tu rn e d  in  favou r  
o f  th e  Communists. P a rk in so n  was e l e c t e d  to  ta k e  N e i l l y ' s  p la ce  
a s  V ic e - P r e s id e n t ,  th u s  g iv in g  th e  Communists a tw o - to -o n e  m a jo r i ty
S.M.H. ,  3 February  1953.
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on the Executive, This ratio was maintained in 1954; when Williams
died, Parkinson was elected to the Presidency and a militant
42J, Comerford, became Vice-President, Grouper influence in the 
Miners* Federation was strongest in the Northern (N.S,W.) District 
and for a few years, in Queensland. However, the Southern (N.S.W.), 
District and the Victorian District remained under strong Communist 
control. Communists and militants lost some ground to the Groupers 
in the Brisbane Branch of the W.W.F. in 1951 and 1952, but they 
recovered their balance in 1953 and 1954. The Communists and their 
militant allies regained control of the Melbourne Branch of the 
W.W.F, in 1954 after the Grouper Secretary, H.E. Clarke, had been 
charged with stealing union funds in the previous years. The 
Communists in the Seamen's Union and the Sheet Metal Workers' Union 
held firm during this period.
The Communists' losses in the unions of the outer and inner 
defensive rings seriously reduced their representation at the A.C.T.U. 
Congresses of the early fifties, but they were able to retain control 
of the Queensland Trades and Labor Council and the Newcastle Trades 
Hall Council.
By mid-1954, then, the Communists had effectively checked the 
Groupers' advance against their trade union strongholds. Despite 
their initial disadvantages, the Communists had shown themselves
42
Ibid., 19 December 1953, 4 December 1954; Courier-Mail, 17 February 
1954.
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more adept than their rivals at learning the techniques of the new
union warfare and there was every possibility that a Conmunist
counter-offensive might yield results. Sharkey was not being
unduly optimistic when he wrote: ’The conditions for success in
43this struggle are becoming increasingly favourable.*
43
Communist Review, July 1954, p.197
part three
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S REACTION TO THE LABOR SPLIT, 1954-1956
The period 1954 to 1961 forms a unity in Australian politics. 
Throughout these years the Menzies-Fadden plater Menzies-McEwen) 
Government appeared to be unassailable in office; following the 
instability of the early fifties, the economy prospered until the 
period of unemployment in the years I960 and 1961; the Labor Party, 
weakened by the formation of the Anti-Communist Labor Party (later 
the Democratic Labor Party) in 1955, was given little chance of 
achieving power. Only after the election of December 1961 was this 
situation substantially altered.
The Consnunist strategies of the period are also of a piece, 
although they were adapted as circumstances altered from year to 
year. In general, the Party's leaders insisted that the first task 
was to develop a mass movement aimed at removing Menzies from office; 
at the same time, they directed the Party's energies towards 
combatting the Industrial Groups in the industrial field and the 
Anti-Communist Labor Party in the political field; and they urged 
the importance in this struggle of maintaining a united front with 
the A.L.P's forces. Fortunately for the Communists, these general 
strategies suited the international Communist line, and the Party was 
able to enjoy the luxury of pursuing strategies required by the local 
situation without offending its overseas mentors. But this was also a
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period of considerable internal stress for the Communist Party; its 
solidarity in the past had often been a function of its isolation, 
of its vulnerability in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds, but 
in the late fifties the application of the united front strategy 
created the idea amongst some of the Party’s members that association 
with the Labor Party should be carried much further. There were 
also members during this period who felt that Khruschov's message to 
the C.P.S.U's 20th Congress of February 1956 had meaning in Australian 
terms, that the Party’s hierarchy had become too rigid in applying 
Marxism-Leninism in the Australian context, and that the Party's 
organisation required loosening and reforming.
This chapter deals with the Party’s progressive responses to 
the unfolding of this situation - the Petrov case, the split in the 
Labor Party, and the victory of the Liberal and Country Parties in 
the Federal Elections of 1954 and 1955. On the one hand, the Party 
was doing its best to keep abreast of events and to adjust its 
strategies accordingly. On the other, it was striving to maintain 
its relative position in the trade unions while at the same time 
exploring the possibilities of widening its social basis. Above 
all, the Party was profoundly disturbed by the trend of events. The 
emergence of the Anti-Communist Labor Party raised perspectives which 
alarmed those Communist leaders who knew something of the social 
power of Christian Democracy in Belgium, France and Italy.
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From the Petrov affair to the 1955 election
Early in April 1964, Vladimir Petrov, a member of the Russian 
Embassy staff at Canberra, asked for and was granted political asylum 
in Australia.1 2 On 13 April, the Government, with the approval of the 
Opposition, pushed through a special measure under whose terms a 
Royal Commission on Espionage was later established. Throughout the 
campaign for the Federal Election of 29 May 1954, the shadow of these 
events loomed large. Menzies himself did not refer to the affair (he 
hardly needed to) but many of his followers went to the length of 
suggesting that prominent Labor figures would be appearing before the 
Commission and that, if justice were to be hone, a strongly anti­
communist administration was required. With his customary felicity,
Sir Arthur Fadden, the Country Party leader, pointed out that Menzies
2would be the ’safest' man to act on the Commission’s findings.
Country people, in fact, were only too willing to spell out all the 
implications of the affair; the Farmer and Settler of New South Wales 
noted that 'Communist scares, when properly used, are almost certain 
election winners.’" There is indeed the possibility that the Petrov
1
For details relating to both Petrov’s defection and the subsequent 
Royal Commission on Espionage, see Michael Bialoguski, The Petrov Story, 
Melbourne, 1955; W.J. Brown, The Petrov Conspiracy Unmasked, Sydney, 
n.d.; Brian Fitzpatrick, The Royal Commission on Espionage, Melbourne, 
1955; Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, Empire of Fear, London, 1956; and 
Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage, Sydney, 1955.
2
Russell H, Barrett, Promises and Performances in Australian Politics 
1928-1959, New York, 1959, p.84.
Farmer and Settler, 7 May 1954, cited in W.J. Brown, op, cit., p.97.
3
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affair, especially in its timing, was partly designed to influence the 
outcome of the 1954 election and to damage the A.L.P., and it is highly 
probable that the use of the Communist bogey in the election may have 
influenced the results.
In the event, the Government was returned to power, although its 
majority in the House of Representatives was reduced from fifteen seats 
to seven. The Liberal Party's strength fell from 51 to 47 seats, Labor's 
increased from 53 to 57, while the Country Party's following remained 
stable at 17. The Communist Party’s vote declined considerably in most 
electorates which it contested; its 42 candidates polled 53,968 votes 
as compared with the 45,759 secured by 27 of its candidates in 1951.
Its vote fell in 18 of the 23 seats which it fought in both elections. 
The only significant increase occurred in the blue-ribbon Labor seat 
of Port Adelaide, but this seat was not contested by the Liberal Party 
in 1954. In his post-election review, Sharkey showed less interest in 
this development than in the ease with which the Government had won the 
contest. This, he suggested, was due to 'the temporary stabilisation 
of the economy' and to the Labor Party's having adopted an anti­
communist line, which actually worked against it. Sharkey also blamed 
the Industrial Groups for having reduced the efficiency of Labor’s
campaign, and he criticised Labor’s leaders for not having come out
4more strongly against the Government's reactionary policies. Dixon 
4 "
Communist Review, July 1954, pp.195-6.
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later accused the Government of having used the Petrov Affair 
’as an election stunt.... It was intended to promote McCarthyism 
in Australia and to smear the Communist Party, the Labour Party and 
other organisations and persons,'^
It is important to establish the main outlines of the Communist 
leaders’ view of the situation immediately after the 1954 election. 
Sharkey, in the article cited above, was certainly thinking in terms 
of the strategies of the early fifties. There were, however, signifi­
cant shifts in emphasis; for one thing, Sharkey was now more ready to 
point out that the essential tension in the A.L.P. was not that between 
the right-wing leadership and the rank-and-file, but between the 
Groupers and the rest.
The situation is that more and more the Industrial Groupers 
are working to turn the A.L.P, into a 100 per cent, party 
of capitalism, one that will not have any working class flavour 
about it whatsoever. Can they succeed in doing this?
Undoubtedly they can.
Within the A.L.P., he suggested, the Groupers were pitting themselves
against 'the older type of liberal-reformist Labour politician.' The
Communist Party's role in this struggle was to resist the Groupers,
while not neglecting to foster 'the best elements’ amongst them.
We must further extend all the time the united front with 
the Labour Party from top to bottom, with the Labour 
Council delegates, shop committee members, shop stewards 
who are Labour Party but not Industrial Group, we must
5
Ibid., November 1954, p.327.
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work with these honest people against the Industrial 
Groupers and win the struggle for a genuine working-class 
policy.®
There is no evidence that Sharkey was thinking at this time about
the possibility of a split in the Labor Party; his remarks suggest
a belief that the battle ahead would be waged on conventional lines,
and that final victory would come once the Industrial Group leaders
had been shown up in their true colours as agents of Menzies. In
fact, the Communists may not have wanted a split in the Labor Party
before the issues had been brought out clearly, for fear that the
defecting Grouper leaders may have taken with them a substantial
proportion of the rank-and-file. Looking ahead, Sharkey envisaged
the isolation of the Group leaders being achieved in the context
of a mass struggle against the Menzies Government, whose economic
policies, directed as they were to serve the aggressive war interests
of the United States, would soon precipitate the economic crisis,
and the attacks on the workers' living standards, for which Sharkey
7had now been waiting for four years.
The events of the next few months must have taken him by 
surprise. The lloyal Commission on Espionage provided little that 
was new regarding Soviet intelligence operations but its proceedings 
gave rise to political controversies of the first order. The
6
Ibid., July 1954, p.197.
Ibid., p.I95.
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Commission consisted of three judges, chaired by Mr Justice Owen.
It met first in Canberra on 17 May for preliminary hearings, and
later in Sydney for a number of sessions the first of which began
on 16 August. On the basis of documents given it by Petrov, the
Royal Commission set itself to discover whether espionage had been
conducted in Australia by Soviet diplomatic personnel and, if so,
whether any Australian organisations or persons had assisted them.
An air of melodrama surrounded it from the outset; anti-Communist
organisations had a field day suggesting that at last the sinister
connections between Moscow and the Communist Party, and between the
Communist Party and the A.L.P., would be revealed. Short, the
Federal Secretary of the F.I.A., announced that the documents would
a
reveal the existence of a Red industrial spy-ring plot. The 
Communist Party itself was prepared to have counsel represent it 
before the Commission until W.J.V. Windeyer, the chief counsel
assisting the Commissioners, announced that it would not be involved
9’as a political organisation in the spy-ring allegations’. Indivi­
dual Communists, including several journalists, were mentioned in 
the Commission’s subsequent proceedings, but the man who suffered 
most harm was one whose name was not associated with any document - 
Dr H.V. Evatt, the leader of the Federal Labor Party. Throughout
8
S.M.H., 28 May 1954»
Sun, Sydney, 1 June 1954.
9
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August and September he fought a long battle to obtain permission 
to appear before the Commission to defend certain members of his staff 
who had been allegedly connected with certain documents. He eventually 
succeeded, but already he had become the object of heated criticism 
within his own party. His allegations that Menzies, Petrov and the 
Security Service had conspired to injure both the A.L.P. and himself 
earned him the scorn of the Groupers and News-Weekly. The immediate 
result of the Petrov Commission, therefore, was to heighten the 
tension within the Labor Party.
Evatt chose this occasion to act. On 5 October he accused 
certain Victorian members of the Federal Party plater identified as 
S.M. Keon, J.M. Mullens and a number of others) of being disloyal 
to the Labor Party and of being subject to 'outside influence' in the 
form of the ’Movement'.^ His attack provoked a press discussion 
which brought out clearly the extent to which the activities of the 
Industrial Groups had been directed by B.A. Santamaria, Director 
of the National Secretariat of Catholic Action; it was also suggested 
that Archbishop Mannix and other members of the Catholic hierarchy 
were supporting Santamaria in this role. The forces ranged against 
Evatt were formidable and for a time the issue seemed in doubt. He 
was strongly opposed by the Victorian and New South Wales Executives 
of the A.L.P. ^both of which were under strong Grouper influence) and
io. . .
Advertiser, 6 October 1954.
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by th e  l e a d e r s  o f  s e v e ra l  G ro u p -c o n tro l le d  t r a d e  u n io n s ,  most 
n o ta b ly  S n o r t  of th e  F .I .A .* *  E v a t t  was backed in  th e  f i r s t  in s ta n c e  
by E . J .  Ward and S e n a to r  P . J .  K ennelly  o f  th e  F ed e ra l  P a r l ia m e n ta ry  
Labor P a r ty ,  by th e  South  A u s t r a l i a n  E x e c u t iv e ,  and by most o f  th e  
t r a d e  un ions  which were n o t  under Grouper c o n t r o l .  A d e c i s iv e  f a c t o r  
in  t i l t i n g  th e  b a lan ce  in h i s  favou r  was th e  su p p o r t  he r e c e iv e d  from 
th e  A.W.U., which had broken w ith  th e  G roupers in  1953. T. D ougherty , 
th e  G enera l S e c r e t a r y  of th e  A.W.U., im m ediate ly  endorsed E v a t t 1s
12s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  th e  ’Movement’ was aiming to  ta k e  over th e  A .L .F .
Both in  V i c t o r i a  and Q ueensland, a l s o ,  th e  A.W.U. formed a pow erful 
e lem ent in  th e  p ro -E v a t t  f o r c e s .  E v a t t  fanned  th e  re sen tm en t a g a in s t  
him to  a w h ite  h e a t  a t  th e  end o f  O ctober,  when he q u es t io n e d  (w ith  
j u s t i c e )  th e  a u t h e n t i c i t y  of Document ’J 1, which th e  Commission
13a l l e g e d  had been d r a f t e d  by R upert  Lockwood, a Communist j o u r n a l i s t .  
The f i r s t  t e s t s  were now upon E v a t t .  On 20 October he was a b le  to  
d e f e a t  by 52 v o te s  to  28 a motion put b e fo re  th e  caucus of th e  F ed era l  
P a r l i a m e n ta ry  Labor P a r ty  d e c l a r in g  a l l  p o s i t i o n s  v a c a n t .  The f i r s t  
m ee tings  of th e  A .L .P ’ s F ed era l  E x ec u tiv e  c a l l e d  to  c o n s id e r  E v a t t ' s  
ch a rg es  were he ld  on 27 O ctober and 9 November, bu t no d e c i s io n  
was ta k e n .
TT
For th e  charges  o f  th e  V ic to r i a n  E x e c u t iv e ,  see News-W eekly, 13 
O ctober 1954.
12
A u s t r a l i a n  Worke r ,  20 O ctober 1954.
13
S.M.H. ,  27 O ctober 1954
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By November 1954 it was clear that the forces backing Evatt
were in the ascendant and it was equally clear that they would
press their advantage to the utmost. What would the Groupers and the
Movement do? Accept defeat and remain within the party, or leave it
and found another party of their own? After a series of adjournments,
the A.L.P. Federal Executive finally decided on 3 December that a
special conference of the Victorian A.L.P. should be held on 26
February 1955 and ordered the Industrial Groups in Victoria to disband
as from 31 December. This decision set in motion an involved struggle
inside the Victorian A.L.P., but finally the special conference was
held and elected an anti-Grouper Central Executive, sponsored by
trade unions who had been critical of the Cain Labor Government in
Victoria, The previous executive, however, refused to resign and both
it and the ’new' executive sent delegates to the A.L.P’s Federal
Conference at Hobart in March 1955. The Federal Executive then voted
by 9 to 3 to admit the delegation from the 'new* executive, whereupon
the Conference was boycotted by 17 of the 36 delegates appointed by
the various State branches to attend the Conference; most of the 17
14were in sympathy with the Groupers.
The parting of the ways had come. As early as January News- 
Weekly had warned that if the Federal Executive continued on its
14 '
The clearest contemporary account of these events is that given in 
L.C. Webb’s 'Political Review', Australian Quarterly, March 1955,
Vol. XXVII, No. 1, pp.103-6; June 1955, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, pp.96-8.
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course (of holding the special conference in Victoria) a second 
(presumably anti-Communist) Labor Party would be formed, v and the 
decision of the Grouper delegates to boycott the Hobart Conference 
indicated that such a course was now seriously contemplated. The 
remaining 19 delegates, unperturbed by this prospect, continued with 
the conference and passed resolutions instructing all State Branches 
to withdraw recognition from the Industrial Groups and laying down the 
bases of a radical foreign policy, including the recognition of 
Communist China, its admission (along with others) to the United Nations 
and the withdrawal of Australian troops from Malaya. SEATO and nuclear 
testing were also criticised. The Groupers were prone to over­
emphasise the extent of the change involved, for it was evident that 
the Labor Party still envisaged co-operation with the United States 
and Britain in international affairs, Norman Harper aptly described
Labor’s policy as 'a social democratic approach to world problems with
16faint overtones of the isolationism of the ’thirties’. Branches
were directed to expose ’the international Communist conspiracy against
17democratic Trade Unionism'. These decisions were later endorsed by
15 "
News-Weekly, 26 January 1955.
16
N.D. Harper, ‘Problems of Australian Foreign Policy, January-June, 
1956’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, November 1956,
Vol. II, No. I, p.3.
17
Australian Labor Party. Official Report of Proceedings of the 21st 
Commonwealth Conference, 1955, p.51.
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all the State Branches; except in Victoria, where the tension between
the rival executives was heightened, differences were smoothed over
for the time being. It was widely known, however, that Grouper influence
remained strong in the New South Wales and Queensland Branches and in
several of the important unions affiliated with the A.L.P. In April
1955, following some criticism of his leadership, Evatt resigned as
Leader of the party but was re-elected by 52 votes to 27 at a subsequent 
, . 18caucus meeting.
In Victoria a split in the party was unavoidable. The rival 
executives continued in existence until, in late March, the split 
extended to the State parliamentary party, 17 of whose members were 
expelled by the ’new* executive. These voted with the non-Labor 
Opposition parties on 19 April and brought down the Cain Government.
At the subsequent State Election the A.L.P. was decisively defeated 
although the expelled Groupers iwho contested the election as the 
Coleman-Barry Labor Party) lost all but one of their seats. Neverthe­
less, the latter polled extremely well, particularly amongst the 
traditional Catholic Labor element; but this was not surprising since
a few weeks previously the Australian Catholic Bishops had come out
19in support of the Groups, " and Archbishop Mannix said that the 
18
S.M.H., 19 April 1955.
19
The Menace of Communism. Joint Pastoral Letter of the Australian 
Hierarchy, 1955. Australian Catholic Truth Society, 1220.
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Labor P a r ty  could  n o t  expec t to  s ecu re  th e  C a th o l ic  v o te  because
20of i t s  a t t i t u d e  tow ards  Communism.
Im m ediate ly  th e  F ed e ra l  P a r l ia m e n t  reassem bled  in  A p r i l ,  th e
seven V ic t o r i a n  M.H.R’ s who had a l s o  been e x p e l le d  from th e  A .L .P .
by th e  ’new’ V ic to r i a n  E x e c u t iv e ,  formed th e  Anti-Communist Labor 
21P a r t y .  They a s s a i l e d  E v a t t  as  a f r i e n d  of th e  Communists and e a s i l y  
o u t r i v a l l e d  th e  Government p a r t i e s  in  nanging th e  Communist l a b e l  
around th e  Labor P a r t y ' s  neck .
The Communists were deeply  a f f e c t e d  by th e  c o n f l i c t  w i th in  th e  
A .L .P . , and th e  pace w ith  which th e  c r i s i s  developed took  them 
co m p le te ly  by s u r p r i s e .  A lthough th e y  had long been aware o f  th e  
im portance o f  th e  I n d u s t r i a l  Groups in  th e  t r a d e  union movement, and 
a l th o u g h  th e y  had t a lk e d  o f te n  in  e a r l y  1954 about th e  need to  
i s o l a t e  I n d u s t r i a l  Group as w ell as  r ig h t -w in g  le a d e r s  w ith in  th e  
Labor P a r ty ,  th e  f a c t  rem ains t h a t  th e  Communist l e a d e r s  had framed 
t h e i r  s t r a t e g i e s  on th e  assum ption  t h a t  th e  A .L .P . would n o t  s p l i t  
b e fo re  a Labor Government had come t o  power. They va lued  i t s  o rg a n i ­
s a t i o n  and i t s  numerous p o in t s  of c o n ta c t  w ith  ’ th e  m asses’ , and t h e i r  
w r i t i n g s  show t h a t  th e y  env isaged  i t  e v o lv in g ,  under th e  s t im u lu s  
of th e  u n i t e d  f r o n t  campaign, from a l i b e r a l - b o u r g e o i s  in t o  a s o c i a l -  
dem ocra tic  p a r ty ,  and from t h a t  s t a t e  to  a p ro g re s s iv e  mass p a r ty
20
A dvocate , 28 A p r i l  1955.
S,M«H. ,  17 A p ril  1955, 18 A p r i l  1955.
21
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with which the Communist Party could fuse. Within the Labor 
movement, the united front strategy had been designed to isolate 
and unmask the right-wing and Group leaders - but this object was 
to have been achieved without splitting the A.L.P. In the events 
of June 1954 to June 1955 three things appear to have particularly 
shaken the Communists; the damage done to the A*L,P. by the use of 
the Communist bogey in incidents arising out of the Royal Commission's 
enquiry; the willingness which Dr Evatt showed to have out his 
differences with the Groupers - and with the Roman Catholic hierarchy 
in Victoria; and the confidence with which the Groupers contemplated 
the prospect of their having to establish a mass party of their own.
It took the Communists some time to recover their doctrinal balance.
Tribune's coverage of the crisis months is marked by tension, 
which also reveals itself in tne articles which Dixon and Sharkey 
wrote for the Communist Review. It is evident that the Communist 
leaders were alarmed by several possibilities which they believed 
were inherent in the new situation. Their great fear was that the 
Groupers would succeed in forming a mass party based on a number of 
powerful trade unions and drawing electoral support from the lower 
middle class and white collar groups. In particular, they were 
anxious that the Groupers' party should not become a Christian Demo­
cratic party, backed officially by the Roman Catholic Church not 
only in Victoria but in all Australia. Writing in the Communist 
Review shortly after Evatt had made his first accusations about Keon
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and Mullens, Dixon complained that the capitalist press had deliber­
ately fostered the impression that Evatt was in fact not only attacking 
Santamaria and the 'Movement', but also the Catholic Church in general. 
On the contrary, Dixon claimed, the majority of Catholics in the Labor 
movement probably supported Evatt.
The divisions among the adherents of the Catholic 
church are just as marked in the ranK and file of the labour 
movement as in tne leadership and probably more so. The 
Catholic masses cannot be forced to follow political policies 
that are contrary to their interests.
In view of this any recurrence of religious sectarianism 
would play into the hands of the class enemy. It would weaken 
the movement towards working-class unity in which the Catholic 
workers are participating.^^
In January 1955 Dixon warned cadres that Catholics were numbered
amongst 'the most determined and most bitter opponents* of the
Groupers and that Communists should therefore avoid 'religious sec- 
23tarianism' , but by the time of the Party's 17th Congress in May
he had lost much of his cautiousness. In a speech to the delegates
he sketched in the part which Santamaria had played in directing both
the Catholic Rural Movement and the Groups, pointing out that, as
for the latter, 'beyond doubt...they were established at the instance
24of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy.'
22
Communist Review, November 1954, p.326.
23
Tribune, 26 January 1955.
24
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This subject must have kept Dixon awake at nights. He returned 
to it again in 1956, after the Anti-Communist Labor Party had been 
established in Victoria. Stating that Catholics constituted 25 per 
cent of the Australian population, he claimed that the Roman Catholic 
Church had chosen to work its influence through the Labor Party 
rather than to form a Christian Democratic party of their own. After 
the war, a decision had been taken to extend Catholic influence in the 
Labor Party.
Although there are many non-Catholics in the Industrial 
Groups, it is now known that the groups were formed on the 
initiative of the Catholic Hierarchy and that Catholic Action 
dominates the organisation, Santamaria was the nominee of 
the Hierarchy to direct the work of the Groups and to capture 
control of the trade unions and the Labour Party.
Although the Church had used its influence to ensure that Catholics 
supported the Anti-Communist Labor Party in the 1955 elections, in 
fact the Catholic vote had been split, Dixon attached great signifi­
cance to this.
The fact that a majority of Catholics refrained from 
supporting the Anti-Communist Labour clique is most 
important and indicates that providing we politically 
explain the issues involved, avoid religious sectarianism 
and develop correct United Front activity, many of those 
who now support the Groups can be won away and the Anti- 
Labour and anti-working class policies of the Groups will 
fail.25
Advice of this kind was different from that which Dixon had 
given earlier. In 1952 and 1953, when dealing with trade union
25
Ibid,, February 1956, pp.37-8
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affairs, he had refused to admit any Catholic direction of the 
Industrial Groups at all; now he was prepared to acknowledge that 
such direction existed in the hope that Catholic workers would con­
tinue to support the A.L.P. despite Santamaria’s directives and that 
the example of the Victorian hierarchy would not be emulated else­
where, The importance of the differences of opinion amongst the 
Catholic clergy was further stressed in August 1956 by J.R, Hughes, 
who claimed that Archbishop Mannix, Santamaria and the Apostolic 
Delegate, Archbishop Carboni, were following a policy identical to 
that advocated by Cardinal Spellman in the United States, and that 
Cardinal Gilroy of New South Wales, 'with the support of a large 
section of the bishops, follows the traditional policy of supporting
the Labour Party and working within it to influence and control its
26direction and policy.'“ But it took the Communist leaders a long 
time to grasp the nettle of the Catholic connection with the 
Industrial Groups.
The fear that the Groupers might succeed in establishing a mass 
party sprang from Communists' early fear that Evatt had forced the
26
Ibid., August 1956, p.261. It is important to recognise the 
role of press controversy in bringing before the public the role of 
Santamaria's 'Movement' in the A.L.P. and the extent of the divisions 
within the Labor Party and the Catholic hierarchy (see, e.g. S.M.H.,
6 October 1954, 7 October 1954). For the views of the then editor 
of the Sydney Morning Herald on the ramifications of the 'Movement's' 
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c r i s i s  to  a head w ithout s u f f i c ie n t  preparation , and th a t the
In d u str ia l Group le a d e r s , because th e is s u e s  a t stake had not been
exp la in ed  c le a r ly  to  the r a n k -a n d -f ile , might a t tr a c t  away s u f f i c ie n t
mass support to  permanently weaken the A .L .P , There i s  no doubt
th a t the Communists would rather th a t E vatt had manoeuvred w ith
g rea te r  s u b t le ty , s t r iv in g  above a l l  to  i s o la t e  th e  Group le a d e rs,
whom Dixon and Sharkey in s is te d  on c a l l in g  a ’ sm all c o t e r ie ’ or a 
27
’ sm all c l iq u e ’ . The time fo r  E vatt to  have s tr u c k , in  th e ir  e s t i ­
m ation, was when the Group lead ers had been revea led  for  what they  
w ere, the crude agen ts o f  the M enzies Government, B rigad ier  Spry's  
S e c u r ity  S e r v ic e , and U nited S ta te s  im p eria lism . There i s  a lso  the  
p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t ,  when the c r i s i s  forced  the Communists to  th in k  
co n cre te ly  about th e  q u a lity  o f the A ustra lian  Labor movement, tney  
may have thought more than tw ice  about the Groups forming the nucleus  
for  a n e o - f a s c is t  rather than a C h ristian  Democratic p arty . They 
must su re ly  have r e a l is e d  th a t the Groupers' e a r l ie r  su ccesses  in  
th e trade unions had been due, not only to  the backing which they  
r e c e iv e d , a l le g e d ly ,  from the Government and th e  em ployers, but a lso  
to  th e  response which t h e ir  id ea s evoked amongst some se c t io n s  of 
the working c la s s .  Always in  the background, to o , was the memory o f  
th e 1951 referendum to  ban the Communist P arty , in  which the l ib e r a l ­
ism in  th e Labor movement had been conspicuous by i t s  fa in tn e s s .
S ee , e . g . ,  Dixon in  Communist Review, November 1954, p .327 .
27~
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Such fears did not prevent the Communist Party from supporting 
the Evatt forces wholeheartedly once the battle had actually begun.
Evatt became a people’s hero overnight; as late as February 1954,
E.F. Hill had accused him of being 'concerned with two things, his
28anxiety to serve big business and his overpowering personal ambition',
29but by November Dixon was praising him for opposing the Groups.
From the first, the Communists sought to interpret the conflict in 
ideological terms; Dixon had set the themes well before the Hobart 
Conference. He argued that the Evatt forces were critical of American 
foreign policy and particularly of the disabilities which Australia 
suffered through its ties with the United States, while the Groupers 
and right-wing Labor leaders supported American interests. Further, 
while the former stood out against the Government's use of police 
state methods the latter approved of it. For this reason, he agreed 
with Evatt's approach; the Groupers, he pointed out, were bent on 
destroying the A.L.P. and the trade union movement: 'The A.L.P., in 
its own interests, must get rid of the canker that is destroying 
it,'1 As the Labor split became more open, therefore, the Communists 
supported the Evatt side without question; referring to the decisions 
taken at the Hobart Conference, for example, Sharkey said that they
28
Ibid., February 1954, p.39.
29
Ibid., November 1954, p.325.
30
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had created ’tremendous possibilities for united front work with
31Labor Party members*' At the Communist Party's 17th Congress in 
May, also, several speakers urged that the Labor Party should go 
anead with the business of expelling the Groupers, even if the 
latter did succeed in forming their own party. They admitted that 
the split would temporarily weaken the A.L.P*, and strengthen the 
forces of reaction, but they went on to argue that the Labor Party
32would benefit in the long run from ridding itself of the Groupers.
Present in such exhortations was another element - the 
Communists' anxiety that, now it had begun, the battle against the 
Groupers should be fought through to complete victory. Two things 
were necessary here; the first was that the Grouper elements which 
had already been expelled from the Labor Party in Victoria should be 
isolated from the Labor movement, stripped of their mass support, 
and driven over into the camp of 'reaction'; the second was to 
ensure that those Groupers who remained within the Labor Party in 
New South Wales and Queensland were expelled and isolated as soon as 
possible. Sharkey dealt with the first of these considerations at 
tne May Congress:
The 'anti-Communist' Party is a valuable reinforcement for 
the Menzies reaction; it will be a useful tool for them in
31
Tribune, 11 May 1955.
32
See Dixon in Communist Review, June 1955, p.175, and E.F, Hill in 
ibid., July 1955, p.196.
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promoting the Red bogey in future elections, a point of 
support for their reactionary foreign and domestic policies. 
That is the anti-working class role which the 'anti­
communist* Party will play, as a bitter enemy of democracy, 
progress, improved living standards and of the peace movement 
of the people.
The Groupers must be driven out of the labour movement, 
to the camp of Menzies, where they belong.33
Dixon drew a further moral when he made the point that the Groupers
should be identified as the enemies of the Labor movement as a whole
rather than of the Communist Party alone - otherwise the campaign of
tne Evatt forces would lose all its meaning.
The Industrial Groups which declared that their aim was 
to fight Communism are revealed as bitter enemies of the 
working class as a whole. They are not only enemies of the 
Communist Party, they are not only anti-Communist, they are 
anti-trade union movement and anti-A.L.P. Anti-Communism 
from whatever source it emanates, becomes anti-everytning 
tnat the working class movement stands for.34
There is no doubt that the Communists were uncertain about Evatt*s 
ability to maintain his position against a strong right-wing and 
Grouper offensive within the A.L.P. The outcome, they feared, might 
be that the A.L.P. would come under the sway of a violently anti­
communist leadership and that the Communist Party's isolation within
35the Labor movement might become more complete than ever before.
33
Ibid., June 1955, p,171. Sharkey later called the Groupers a 'semi- 
fascist* element (ibid., January 1956, p.3).
34
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35
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The events which preceded the Federal Election of December
1955 also gave the Communists grounds for misgivings. In August
the pro-Evatt forces in New South Wales suffered a serious reverse.
On 13 and 14 August a special conference ordered by the A.L.P.
Federal Executive resulted in the election of a new State executive
3 6dominated by a mixture of Group and right-wing leaders; one
report said that Group supporters had won 29 of the 32 places on
37the new Executive. In the following month, the report of the Royal 
Commission on Espionage, which had concluded its hearing, was made 
public. With reasoning which was not always clear, and with melo­
dramatic virtuosity, the Commissioners claimed that Soviet diplomatic 
representatives had attempted espionage in Australia but without 
much success since the formation of the Security Service in 1949.
They suggested that Communists and Communist sympathisers would have 
helped the M.V.D, given the opportunity, that some Communists had 
'knowingly’ assisted Soviet officials but that the Soviet Union 
had refrained from 'using the Australian Communist Party, as a Party,
for espionage purposes lest exposure should lead to its serious
38political embarrassment, and possibly, to its outlawry.' The
36
See S.M.H., 12, 13, 14 and 15 August 1955, and L.C. Webb, ’Political 
Review', Australian Quarterly, September 1955, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, 
pp,88-90.
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S.M.H., 18 August 1955,
38
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Commissioners also found that Sharkey had received 25,000 dollars
39from M.V.D. funds in October 1953 although the evidence on this
40point was faulty in some instances. When the decision to form the
Commission had been taken in April 1954, the Communist Party feared
that it might be used as another method of banning its activities
but the early proceedings had made it clear that this was not the
purpose of the exercise. The incidents sparked off by the Commission's
enquiries had certainly heightened anti-Communist feeling in Australia,
and many prominent Communist journalists (such as Chiplin and Lockwood)
had been involved in several of the hearings, but the Party as such
had not been seriously threatened. The Commissioners, in their final
assessment, concluded that 'prosecution of none of the persons whose
41acts we have considered in our Report would be warranted.'
The possibility that the Government had political purposes in
mind when establishing the Commission cannot be excluded. The
Security Service could have investigated Petrov's documents and
avoided the public identification of agents and methods. In addition,
no significant revelations were made by the Commission and, as News-
42Weekly itself admitted, 'many of the facts were already known'.
39
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40
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When the Commission’s Report came before the House of Representatives
in October 1955, Dr Evatt questioned several of its conclusions, cast
doubt on the reliability of the Petrovs’ testimony and on the
authenticity of several documents, and suggested that Menzies had
known of Petrov’s defection long before it was actually announced.
He concluded his speech with the startling revelation that he had
written to V. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, to obtain his views
43on the reliability of the evidence brought before the Commission.
This was on the 19th. On the 25th, the Prime Minister defended the
Commission’s findings and launched a bitter personal attack on Dr Evatt,
who had already come under strong criticism, even within his own
party, for having asked Molotov’s opinion about the affair. Dr Evatt,
Menzies said, ’for his own purposes, in his own interests and with
the enthusiastic support of every Communist in Australia, sought to
discredit the judiciary, to subvert the authority of the security
organization, to cry down decent and patriotic Australians and to build
44up the Communist fifth column.’ The very next day, Mr Menzies
announced that a Federal Election would be held on 10 December,
45although one was not due until mid-1956. There can be little doubt 
that this decision was influenced by the Government’s desire to
43
C.P.D., Vol. H of R. 8 (19 October 1955), p.1695.
44
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exploit to the full the difficulties created for the A.L.P. by 
Dr Evatt's passionate but injudicious criticism of the Royal Commis­
sion * s Report.
Witnin a fortnight the country was involved in the election
campaign. The Government parties made the most of the Communist issue
and harried Dr Evatt unmercifully, while the Anti-Communist Labor Party,
led by R, Joshua and supported openly by Archbishop Mannix, concentrated
on extracting every possible implication from the Petrov Affair. It put
forward Senate teams in Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western
Australia and contested a number of House of Representatives seats in
Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia. Tne election resulted in the
Government's increasing its majority in tne House from 7 seats to 28.
The Liberal Party's representation rose from 47 to 57 and the Country
Party's from 17 to 18, while Labor's strength fell to 47. The Anti-
Communist Labor Party lost all its House seats and polled only 6.1 per
cent of the Senate vote; in Victoria, however, its vote was sufficiently
high in the Senate contest to return one member of its ticket. This
meant that the position in the Senate, once the newly elected members
had taken their seats on 1 July 1956, would be 30 Government members,
28 Labor and 2 Anti-Communist Labor, one of whom had not been required
46to stand for re-election on this occasion. No one supposed,
46
G. Sawer and L.C. Webb, 'Political Review’ Australian Quarterly,
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however, that the two Anti-Communist Labor men would use their
balance of power position to embarrass the Government so long as
their differences with the A.L.P, remained outstanding. But their
party had certainly achieved one of its objectives; News-Weekly
exulted that the Anti-Communist Labor vote had 'prevented the
national disaster of an Evatt Government....the Communist Party will
never rule this nation by remote control, pulling the strings of a
47puppet Labor Government.’
As for the Communist Party, its vote increased in several 
working-class and mining electorates. Its 27 candidates for the House 
election secured 51,001 votes, which compares favourably with the 
totals obtained at both the 1951 (45,759 votes, 27 candidates) and 
1954 (53,968 votes, 42 candidates) elections. The Party’s vote 
increased in 15 of the 24 electorates which it contested in both the 
1954 and 1955 polls (.bearing in mind, of course, that there had been a 
redistribution of electorates before the latter contest). Fewer 
Communist candidates than usual stood in Victoria, where the Anti- 
Communist Labor Party was most determined in its efforts to weaken the 
A.L.P's position; the four Communists who did stand in Victoria lost 
votes, probably because most left-wing electors were anxious to support 
the A.L.P. against its new enemy. The Communist Party's Senate total, 
swelled by good votes in New South Wales and Queensland (in both States
News-Weekly, 4 January 1956.
47
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the Communist teams obtained first place on the ballot paper), reached 
the unusually high figure of 162,680, or 3.6 per cent of the valid votes. 
This figure, however, should not be taken too seriously, for when the 
preferences of J. Healy, the first nominee on the New South Wales list, 
were distributed, fully 74 per cent of them went to the third Liberal 
candidate, and ensured his re-election. The Liberal team was placed 
second on the ballot paper, suggesting that perhaps two-thirds of the 
Communists' votes were ones given by electors voting ’straight down’ 
the Senate ballot paper.
Sharkey, however, took the result as an indication that his Party
was 'on the eve of breaking through in a big way in the electoral
48field and polling a mass vote.' In commenting on the Government's
victory, he explained that it was due to several factors, including
the effects on the A.L.P. of the struggle against the Groupers, the
unjust operation of the preferential voting method and the fact the
post-war economic boom had continued right up to the election (a whole
chapter could be written about Sharkey's use of his extensible 'post-
49war boom’ in explaining election results). " Dixon wrote claiming
that the Catholic vote had been split, and that the Anti-Communist Labor
50Party had not been able to command the allegiance of Catholic workers. 
_  ■
Communist Review, January 1956, p.3.
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If one reads between Dixon's lines, however, it becomes evident that 
the Communists had been shaken by the showing of the Anti—Communists 
in Victoria - and with good reason. They had won about one quarter 
of the votes in several of the traditional working-class seats, 
and had polled well elsewhere in the State; amongst the highest 
Anti-Communist Labor votes were those recorded in Scullin (30.0b 
per cent), Yarra (27.14 per cent), Melbourne Ports (25.23 per cent), 
Darebin (25.10 per cent), Wills (24.70 per cent), Ballarat (23.58 
per cent) and Melbourne (21.41 per cent). In most of these cases, 
the candidates were ex-Labor members who had defected to the Anti­
communist Party before the election, but the Melbourne Ports vote was 
achieved by a newcomer, S.T. Corrigan. These figures were disturbing 
proof that the new party had begun with a substantial mass following - 
and amongst the same social groups from which the A.L.f. drew, and 
the Communists hoped to draw, support.
Looking ahead, Sharkey forecast that the Menzies Government, as 
economic conditions worsened, would become insecure and vulnerable, 
and that its defeat would be the main object of the Left. At the 
same time, he predicted:
The crisis of the Labor Party will continue.
The strategy of the groupers, both within and without the 
A.L.P., was to effect a crushing defeat on the Party, to con­
vince the leadership that the A.L.P. cannot win in the face 
of their electoral opposition commanding, as they do, a 
considerable, mainly Catholic, vote.
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They wanted the d efea t of Dr E vatt in  H u r s tv il le  £sicT |, 
or h is  replacem ent as le a d e r , blaming him fo r  th e shambles, 
and w ith th e a s s is ta n c e  o f th e  r igh t-w in g  o f th e  A .L .P ., 
t h e ir  own return  to  th e A .L .P . fo ld  on the b a s is  of an extreme 
rig h t-w in g  p o lic y .
T his danger o f  a change o f  lea d ersh ip  and a return to  a 
re a c tio n a r y , b i-p a r t isa n  p o lic y  with th e M enzies Government w i l l  
rep resen t an acute danger to  th e  workers now th e e le c t io n s  are 
o v e r .51
T his statem ent c le a r ly  exp resses  th e  Communists' fe a r  th a t the r e s is ta n c e  
to  E vatt* s p o l i c i e s ,  which had appeared so ir r e s o lu te  in early  1955, 
was now hardening and th a t th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  for  a r e c o n c il ia t io n  between 
Labor r ig h t-w in g  le a d e rs  and the Groupers was now a ser io u s  one. Events 
in  New South Wales la t e r  in the year confirmed t n i s  im p ression . In 
June, the A .L .P . Federal E xecu tive  met in  c o n su lta tio n  w ith  a sp e c ia l  
Federal Conference and decided to  d ism iss the P a r ty 's  New South Wales 
E x ecu tiv e , which was dominated by Groupers, and appointed a new one 
composed o f equal p roportions o f Groupers and anti-G roupers and 
uncommitted members. “ The V ic to r ia n  pattern  was not repeated; 
in s tea d  o f  s p l i t t in g  away to  found t h e ir  own p arty , th e  Groupers 
chose to  accept t h i s  d e c is io n  (though with i l l  grace) and to  continue  
t h e ir  f ig h t  a g a in st Communism and Dr E vatt w ith in  th e A .L .P . On 29 
September, a kindred o rg a n isa tio n  to  the Anti-Communist Labor Party
51
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52
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of Victoria was formed in New South Wales and named the Democratic 
53Labor Party, but its support was extremely limited, mainly because 
of the stand adopted by the Catholic hierarchy in New South Wales which 
was anxious to see the right-wing State Labor Government remain in 
power.
By the spring of 195b, the perspectives opening before the 
Communist Party were far from heartening. Evatt's attacks on the 
Groupers had taken the Communists by surprise, but they had pinned 
their hopes on tne possibility that Evatt would have sufficient backing 
to drive out all right-wing and other reactionary elements from the 
A.L.P. It was now clear that such an outcome was unlikely. The 
Communist Party found itself living with the fear that either the 
Labor Party would reunify, and become more anti-Communist than it had 
ever been before the crisis of 1954-55, or that the Anti-Communist 
Labor Party and its associated groups would develop into a mass party of 
Christian democratic or even neo-fascist potentialities.
United front in the trade unions
The crisis in the Labor Party improved the chances of pushing the 
Groupers out of several trade union positions tney had won in the early 
fifties. To revert to the battlefield metaphor applied to the 
industrial field, we may say that the Communists during this period
53
Ibid., 30 September 1955. See also Denis Strangman, The Formation 
of the Democratic Labor Party in New South Wales, Sydney University 
D.L.P. Society, Monograph No. 1, September 19b2.
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consolidated their position inside the fortress unions, such as the 
W.W.F. and the Miners* Federation, and that they launched operations 
to weaken the Groupers' hold on the unions of the inner defensive ring, 
such as the F.I.A. But the keynote of these operations was the 
application of the united front; Communist trade union cadres continued 
the tactics of keeping in line with the mass of the unionists, of not 
pressing Communist candidates for union posts where good non-Communists 
were offering, and of isolating the Groupers at every opportunity. 
Thornton put the approach in these terms: 'We are...for a united 
leadership which represents ail shades of opinion in the union....
54We desire no one to be left out, and no one to dominate the union.'
After the Hobart Conference had declared that the industrial Groups
should be disbanded, however, the Communists dropped their earlier
habit of tolerating the election of popular Grouper figures such as
J.H. Cummins, the President of the Melbourne Branch of the W.W.F.
It was now possible to represent sucn figures as 'anti-Labor' men and
55to justify excluding Groupers from united front activities.
Even before Evatt's attack on the Groupers, the Communists had 
formed the opinion that the Groupers’ crude attempts to win control 
of the A.W.U., various Trades and Labor Councils and the A.C.T.U. 
had alienated large numbers of ordinary non-Communist unionists.
54
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Dixon claimed in September 1954 that 'important sections of the
A.L.P. have entered the arena to struggle against the Industrial
Groups. This means that in the Trades Union Movement and the A.L.P.,
the centre grouping has emerged as a more clearly defined force than
hitherto.*' There was the possibility that the ’centre grouping’
would develop cohesion, and resist Communist as well as Grouper
influence. The A.W.U., for example, gave priority to its fight against
the Groupers, but as C.T. Oliver, its New South Wales Secretary,
pointed out in February 1956, it retained its hostility towards the
Communist P a r t y . T h e  Communists, however, hoped that the ’centre
grouping* would fall in with the united front and make common cause
with Communist trade unionists in fighting the Groupers. Unity tickets,
whose use became widespread in 1954 and 1955, became the symbol of
sucn co-operation in trade union affairs; they provided the means
whereby the Groupers were ousted from the Victorian Branch of the
A.E.U. (j.J. Brown, a Communist, was elected Assistant Secretary in
1955 and Secretary in 1956),  ^ and were challenged in the F.I.A.
The Groupers lost the A.E.U. in 1955 when a militant A.L.P. member,
J. Stone, defeated a sitting Group member of the union’s Commonwealth 
59Council. Stone invariably voted with C.G. Hennessy, a Communist,
56
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against the third member of the Council, J.J. Babbage, a Grouper.
In 1956 Babbage was defeated by a Communist, A, Wilson, who had
60previously been a Council member. G.H. Neilly, the General Secretary
of the Miners’ Federation, broke with the Groups after the Labor Party
split and developed a working relationship with the Communists in the
union; both he and the President, W. Parkinson, a Communist, were re-
61elected unopposed at the 1956 ballot.
These setbacks weakened the Groupers’ position in the A.C.T.U.
and the State Trades and Labor Councils. Although they retained
control of the unions of the outer defensive ring, and held on to the
F.I.A. in the inner defences, their retreat before the ’united front’
offensive had caused them great concern. Their attacks on the
Communists were failing to make any impression, mainly because the
latter were deliberately effacing themselves in union affairs and
because they were not using their influence to foment unnecessary
industrial disturbances. In the large waterfront strike of early 1956,
for example, the Communist leaders of the W.W.F. and the Seamen's
Union ended the strike when the A.C.T.U. Executive decided that it had
62served its purpose. “ The shifting balance in trade union affairs was 
clearly shown at the 1955 A.C.T.U, Congress; at the Congresses of 1951
6CT
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and 1953 the main line of cleavage amongst the delegates had been
between the Communists and their militant allies on the one hand and
the A.L.i’. supporters, constituting the majority, on the other. But
now the division was threefold - Communists and their allies, A.L.F.
traditionalists, and Groupers. The importance of the second or
’centre grouping’, to use Dixon's term, soon became clear; the
traditionalists’ main concern was to counter the Groupers, and in this
they were willing to side with the Communists in voting on important
issues. Together they voted to pass motions condemning the arbitration
system, favouring the recognition of Communist China and opposing the
63despatch of troops to Malaya. The traditionalists, however, remained
firmly in control of the A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive. The Congress
rejected a motion that the A.C.T.U. should favour reconciliation between
64the W.F.T.U. and the I.C.F.T.U., but the A.C.T.U. Executive did not
take any action against those Australian trade unionists who attended
W.F.T.U. conferences. The Communists were delighted with the results
of the Congress, and J. McPhillips was moved to compare it with the
65last Congress when the Left had been predominant, that of 1945.
63
Age. 6 September 1955. See also Australian Council of Trade Unions. 
Executive Report for consideration of All Australian Trade Union 
Congress...commencing September 5, 1955. Melbourne, n.d., pp.25-9.
64
Tribune, 12 October 1955.
65
Communist Review, November 1955, pp.344-5.
278
Grouper influence also declined considerably in the New South
Wales Labor Council and, to an even greater extent, in the Melbourne
Trades Iiall Council. The latter body, in 1956, disaffiliated the
Grouper-controlled Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners
and advised the union's members to join the unity ticket-controlled 
66B.W.I.U. After the A.L.P, split, A.L.P. union leaders such as
J. Stone (A.E.U.), J. Heffernan (organiser, Sheet Metal Workers'
Union), and J. Egerton (Secretary, Queensland Branch, Boilermakers'
6TSociety) visited Communist countries and, in return, trade union
delegations from the Soviet Union and Communist China attended the
681956 May Day celebrations in Australia. During the Queensland
pastoral workers' strike in 1955 and 1956, the Queensland Trades and
Labor Council gave strong support to the A.W.U. which affiliated with
69the Council in July 1956.
The success of the united front strategy depended on the extent 
to which the A.L.P. was willing to accept the practice of unity 
tickets, and the parallel re-establishment of Communist influence 
in the trade unions and the Trades and Labor Councils. During the
66
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opening battles of Dr Evatt’s campaign against the Groupers, unity
tickets were openly tolerated, especially in Victoria. The Prime
Minister suggested in July 1955 that by using such means to combat
the Industrial Groups, Dr Evatt was in fact assisting the Communists.
’These monstrous things deserve to be well known and understood by
the public,’ he said, ’as it becomes abundantly plain that the
association between the Labor Party at Canberra and the general
Communist policy is extremely close.’ In reply, Dr Evatt said that
his object was to prevent the trade union movement from falling under
the control of the anti-labor, semi-fascist Santamaria ’clique’, and
that the Hobart Conference had refused to sponsor the Groups any
further because it did not want to interfere with the complete right
70of self government in trade unions. Shortly afterwards, at an
A.L.P. rally in Sydney, Evatt made his point clearer:
Trade-unions must maintain their close integration with 
the Labour Party.
But the Labour Party must not interfere with the rights 
of trade-unionists to elect to office the people they want.^
It is difficult to know whether Evatt was prepared to countenance
a Communist resurgence in the trade union movement as the price of
victory over the Industrial Groups, but the fact remained that within
the narrow confines of trade union politics the Communists counted
70 —
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for a great deal. As soon as the resistance to Evatt's policies began
to build up inside the A.L.P., efforts were made to set limits to the
use of unity tickets. Although in October 1955 the Victorian Executive
of the A.L.P, (the ’new' executive) declared that it would not direct
T2Labor members in their trade union activities, the New South Wales
Executive (Grouper-controlled at the time) in November suspended from
A.L.P. membership five unionists who had stood on a unity ticket
73for an F.I.A. ballot. In 1956, the A.L.P. Federal Executive ordered
State Branches to expel those of its members who co-operated with
74Communists in unity tickets. These, however, were the first signs 
that the A.L.P’s attitude on unity tickets was hardening; throughout 
1956 the practice was used in ballots in most of the big unions. 
Certainly, the Communists were extremely heartened by the results of 
the united front campaign. Sharkey reported to the Central Committee 
in late 1955:
The struggle within the A.L.P. and the trade unions, 
against the groupers and their alliance with the Menzies 
Government, their McCarthyist politics, resulting in severe 
blows being dealt the groupers; this is a development of the 
greatest significance to the labor movement.
It is, in my opinion, a struggle of a higher quality, 
at a higher stage of development, than the previous struggles, 
such as those against the Conscriptionists, against the
72
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Premiers’ Planners, against the Lang dictatorship and the 
like in the past history of the broad labor movement.^
By 1956, indeed, the Communists were aware that the main chance of
putting new life into the campaign against the Groupers in the Labor
movement was to maintain the pressure against them in the trade unions.
there was even some speculation as to what the Groupers' next move
would be; J.R. Hughes raised the possibility that they might try to
form a rival trade union federation to the A.C.T.U. and base it on
T 6such units as the F.C.U. and the F.I.A.
It is important to note that politics inside many of the large 
trade unions had by the mid-fifties become institutionalised to the 
point where they resembled a two-party system. Seymour Martin Lipset, 
Martin A. Trow and James S. Coleman, in their study of the internal 
politics of the International Typographical Union (I.T.U.), in the 
United States, have shown how its members were divided into two highly 
formalised groups, each with its own distinct administrative insti­
tutions, leadership conventions, and press, and each competing within
77formal election campaigns for executive office in the union. Nothing 
approaching this degree of organisation has yet emerged in Australia,
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but it is possible, in dealing with such unions as the W.W.F., the 
F.I.A. and the Victorian Branch of the A.R.U., to make close comparisons 
with the work of Lipset and his colleagues on the I.T.U. The crystals 
for union factions in Australia were the Industrial Groups on the one 
hand and the Communist work-place cells (or branches) on the other; 
each would impose strict discipline on its own members, publish roneoed 
bulletins, and seek to influence as wide a section of the union’s 
membership as possible. Their object was to achieve power within the 
union, which meant controlling its key governmental positions, parti­
cularly the Secretaryship, and tne posts of Shop Steward, Shop Committee 
members, and Labor Council delegates, and which also meant gaining 
control of the union press (which produced pamphlets and such newspapers 
as Common Cause (Miners' Federation), The Maritime Worker (W.W.F.) and 
Labor News (F.I.A.)). Control of a union enabled a faction to win 
the good opinion of unionists by sound management, by effective 
representation in arbitration court proceedings, by fruitful informal 
bargaining with the employers, and by the skilful mixing of propaganda 
and service. Several of the draft resolutions for the Communist Party’s 
17th Congress brought out the Communists' approach to the problems of
factional politics; L. Aarons, for example, reported on the need for
7 8improving the training of cadres for work in factory branches, while 
L. Donald described how the members of a factory branch should go about
Communist Review, September 1954, pp.26t>-7.
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forming a faction and ultimately winning control of the union. He 
urged that the branch members should first frame a programme which 
fitted the needs of the unionists, then publicise it through their 
branch bulletin and, ’by organised oral explanation to the workers’, 
then secure its adoption by the Shop Committee and by mass meetings 
of the union's members. ’Thus the branch programme becomes in whole 
or in part the programme around which the workers are united and 
organised for action.’^
This, of course, was an idealised picture. What usually happened 
was that the Groupers and Communists would first organise their tight 
cores of members within a union, and then work to commit the A.L.P. 
traditionalists to their cause; in this the Communists, because of 
their skilful use of unity tickets, were by far the more successful. 
The pattern would vary according to which faction had won the upper 
hand; when in power the Groupers would use the union journal to attack 
and ridicule the Communists while at the same time trying to win over 
the A.L.P. unionists by moderating their own policy demands; when in 
opposition they would maintain their integrity as a group and organise 
constantly for a comeback. The Communists also varied their tactics 
according to whether they were in power or in opposition. As a two- 
party system developed along these lines in a union, so its elections 
became closely fought affairs, characterised by a stability of voting
Ibid., pp.278-9.
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remarkable for such groups. Take for example, the executive elections
for the Victorian Branch of the A.R.U. in uune I960, in a court-
controlled ballot. J.J. Brown, a Communist, was elected State
Secretary by 5,038 votes to his Grouper opponent's 4,201; note how
closely this division of the votes compares with the votes in the
contests for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency, in which militant
candidates (4,973 votes and 4,933) defeated two Groupers (4,256 votes 
HOand 4,307)•
There is not space here to discuss at length the two-party
phenomenon in the trade unions, but it may be illustrated with reference
to the Grouper-dominated F.I.A. Although E. Thornton and L.J.
McPhiliips had been excluded from the union's key executive positions
in the early fifties and had become full-time Communist Party function- 
81aries, they maintained their contacts within the various Branches, 
especially with Communist factory branches and with militants. In 
August 1954, for example, Thornton addressed a closed meeting of iron­
workers in the Newcastle Trades hall on his recent visit to China; 
the meeting was advertised by a special circular distributed amongst 
the local ironworkers and was attended by many described by the press
80
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as leftwingers and well-known Communists. The F.I.A. election 
of December 1955 revealed clearly the extent to which the union*s 
44,000 members had been grouped into two parties. Both sides 
conducted a vigorous campaign. The Communists, militants and left- 
wing A.L.P. members were represented by a Rank-and-File Committee, 
whose leading lights were Ken McKeon, C. McCaffrey, and N. Martin. 
They attacked the leadership of the union for being Group-controlled 
and therefore anti-Labor and anti-Evatt. The ‘government party', led 
by L. Short, the Federal Secretary, claimed that the Rank-and-File 
Committee was in fact a Communist front, denied that it (the 'govern­
ment') was disloyal to Evatt, and claimed that its administration was 
much better than that carried out by Thornton and McPhillips. The 
'government' also distributed how-to-vote cards (tne Rank-and-File 
Committee was of course sponsoring a unity ticket) and distributed
pamphlets in 14 languages to the F.I.A's 10,000 New Australian
. 83members.
In the ballot, just over 23,000 valid votes were registered in 
the election for the Federal posts and the voting showed a remarkably 
firm pattern. The detailed results were as follows:
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Grouper Candidates *']Lie Independents
National
President D. Ahearn 15,193 A.J. Smith 8,179
National
Secretary L, Short 14,485 F.R, Gascoigne 6,642 S. Rogers 2,198
Assistant
National
Secretary
H. Hurrel1 15,071 C.T. Douglas 8,292
National
Vice-
Fresident
A. Cameron 15,793 C, McCaffrey 7,582
Both at the Federal level and at the Branch level the Groupers were 
returned to power with secure majorities. What was most signifi­
cant about the campaign, however, was that it had established a 
connection between the Rank-and-File Committee, the 'opposition party', 
and a mass support which its semi-clandestine organising work had 
made possible. Its defeat was nevertheless a sobering one, and 
indicated how far the Communists still were from recovering their 
former ascendancy in some of the unions in the inner defensive ring.
The Communist Party explores its agrarian front;
During this period, the Communist Party appears to have devoted 
most of its resources to united front activities in the trade union 
field. Its various front organisations, although they were partly 
designed to excite sympathy for the Party's policies amongst progressive 
84
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sections of the middle classes, were relatively quiescent. The
E.Y.L's decline was attributed by its National Secretary, Charles
Bresland, to its having become a ’junior edition' of the Communist
85Party isolated from the 'youth masses.' Student support continued
to fall away; the membership of the Melbourne University Branch of the
86Party, for example, numbered only 40 in 1956. On the other hand,
the peace movement continued to make headway and to draw increasing
support from A.L.P. members (although the Hobart Conference had
resolved that the ban on A.L.P. members' participating in the movement
snould be maintained^. Dixon nad reason to complain that the trade
unions had not devoted sufficient attention to 'the struggle for
,88peace.'
In 1954 and 1955, however, the Communist Party did consider the
possibility of winning over small farmers of average means to its side.
An ambitious agrarian programme was drafted in 1954 and published in
89the Communist Review; it formed the subject for several articles by
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90 91J.W. Bailes and J.C. Henry and was approved by the Party's 17th 
Congress of May 1955, It was subsequently published in 1956 as a 
pamphlet. Little attempt was made to carry the platform into action, 
or to set about organising a farmers-workers alliance, but the debates 
associated witn the programme brought out clearly the Party's doctrinal 
problems in a relatively obscure, but nonetheless important, area of 
its activity. In the programme, it was argued that the cycle of booms 
and slumps in agricultural prices had weakened the economic basis for 
small farmers in Australia, many of whom had been driven to bankruptcy 
and despair.
The fanner's problem of finding a stable and profitable 
market for all his produce is indissolubly linked with the 
worker’s problem of winning a higher living standard.
Both worker and fanner are confronted with a common enemy, 
monopoly capital, which bars the way to the realisation of their 
ideals.^
Farmers, again according to the programme, were differentiated 
into small, middle and rich men; while the small and middle farmers 
were being exploited by monopoly capital, the rich farmer had 
sufficient economic independence to make common cause with the enemies
90
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of his poorer neighbours - the land companies, the proprietary produce
trading firms, the banks and absentee landowners. It was with the
small and middle farmers, therefore, that the workers wouid have to
ally themselves. In this may be detected the familiar outlines of
Stalin's and Lenin's doctrine about the alliance of workers ana peasants
in conditions of capitalism. Stalin pointed out in the Foundations
of Leninism (1924) that the working class needed to win as allies and
lead the mass of the peasantry; if a bourgeois democratic revolution
was to be achieved, then the whole of the peasantry could be mobilised,
but for a Socialist revolution the workers would find allies only in
94the poorest, exploited sections of the peasantry. It was patently 
absurd, however, for the Australian Communists to identify Australian 
farmers, even tne poorest of them, with European peasants. If any- 
tning, farmers in Australia share the values of the urban bourgeoisie, 
particularly in their attachment to the ethics (if not the practice) 
of individual enterprise and free marketing, and even those who are 
poor look forward with confidence to improving their socio-economic
94
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status and becoming gentry in the long run. Wheat-farmers and dairy- 
farmers in the twenties and early thirties often put forward radical 
demands for compulsory produce polls and agricultural banks; in some 
cases, they gave a leftist tinge to Country Parties, particularly in 
Victoria. The State Labor Government of Queensland, through its 
willingness to meet the needs of the small farmers, obtained a wide­
spread agrarian following in the early twenties. But this phase in 
rural politics has long since passed. The farmers of the prosperous 
fifties were generally content with the policies pursued by the Liberal- 
Country Party coalition, provided that the structure of organised marketing 
and overseas trade agreements (established mainly in the late thirties) 
was maintained. In so far as they still had grievances they expressed 
them through the Country Party and the various farmers’ associations.
The Communists were concerned in the first instance to radicalise
these farm associations, such as the Farmers and Settlers' Association
of New South Wales, and the Farmers* Union of Western Australia, to
wean them away from the Country Party, and to bring them into alliance
with the Communist Party and other progressive organisations. The
Agrarian Programme noted that such organisations 'have a fine, early
tradition of struggle in defence of their members' interests', but
that they had become dominated by the rich farmers and the
95representatives of monopoly capitalism. J.C. Henry explained the 
implications of this control:
Farmers & Workers Together for a Better Life, pp.13-14.
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From t h i s  v an tag e  p o in t  th e  r i c h  fa rm ers  work to  in f lu e n c e  
farm p o lic y  to  th e  advan tage of f in a n c e  c a p i t a l  and r ic h  fa rm e rs , 
and to  campaign amongst th e  fa rm e rs  and peop le  o f th e  c o u n try s id e  
a g a in s t  th e  w orking c la s s  to  keep tu e  w orking fa rm e rs  and th e  
w orking c la s s  d iv id e d .
The C ountry  P a r ty  le a d e r s  th e n  b e tra y  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f t h e i r  
s u p p o r te rs  by c o a l i t i o n  w ith  th e  L ib e ra l  P a r ty .
The le a d e r s  o f th e  C ountry P a r ty  a re  th e  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  o f  
f in a n c e  c a p i t a l  and o f th e  b ig  landow ners in  th e  c o u n try s id e , and 
th e y  work th ro u g h  th e  C ountry P a r ty  and mass farm  o r g a n is a t io n s .
The f i r s t  ta s k  f o r  th e  sm all and m idd le fa rm e rs , th e n ,  was ' t o  p la y
a f a r  more a c t iv e  r o le  in  th e  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e i r  farm  o rg a n is a t io n s  to
b r in g  them under r e a l  dem o cra tic  c o n tro l  and r i d  them of r e a c t io n a ry
97in f lu e n c e  in  th e  le a d e r s h ip .*  The C ountry P a r ty ,  to o ,  had begun w ith  
a r a d ic a l  im pulse u n t i l  i t  came under th e  c o n tro l o f b ig  b u s in e s s ,  whose 
a g e n ts  were th e  C ountry P a r t y 's  l a t e r  le a d e r s .  To a l t e r  t h i s  s t a t e  o f 
a f f a i r s ,  th e  sm all and m iddle fa rm e rs  were ex h o rte d  n o t on ly  to  re g a in  
c o n tro l  of t h e i r  v a r io u s  o rg a n is a t io n s  b u t a ls o  to  i n s i s t  t h a t  th e  
Country P a r ty  adop t a p ro g re s s iv e  p o l ic y ,  broke i t s  a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  
L ib e ra l  P a r ty  ( ' t h e  open and d i r e c t  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  th e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f A u s tr a l ia n  and o v e rse a s  monopoly c a p i t a l i s m ') ,  and form an a l l i a n c e  
w ith  th e  w orking c l a s s .  'S m all fa rm e rs  shou ld  e x e r t  t h e i r  in f lu e n c e  
to  ensu re  t h a t  lo c a l  b ran ch es  o f th e  C ountry P a r ty  do n o t fu n c tio n
96
Communist Review , Septem ber 1954, p .2 6 4 .
97
Farm ers & W orkers T o g e th e r f o r  a B e t te r  L i f e , p p .14-15
292
in isolation, but co-operate with trade unions and other progressive
98bodies to advance their mutual interests. ’
What part could the Communists play in this transformation of
the Country Party? J.W. Bailes pointed out that 'the majority of
farmers have a deep-seated hatred of monopoly', resented 'the betrayal
of their top leadership' and were ready to be persuaded that an alliance
99with the workers would be to their interest. They resented the 
Country Party's alliance with the Liberal Party, and could be shown that 
the Labor Party's alleged agrarian programme was a sham. 'They would 
respond to the policy outlined in the Communist Party's Agrarian 
Programme, whose main points were closer settlement, debt relief, 
co-operative schemes, a guaranteed price for produce and organised 
marketing. J.C. Henry outlined a strategy for bringing the programme 
before the small and middle farmers (althougn he, personally, had some 
doubts about the reliability of the latter); as a first step, the 
Communist Party's locality branches in the country towns needed to 
be strengthened; the second step was to establish a mass united front 
with working people in the country areas, particularly amongst tne 
members of the A.W.Ü. and the limber Workers' Union; the tnird step 
was to involve the small (others would have added, 'and the 
middle') farmers in the united front and to help them in radicalising
98
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the Country P a r t y . T h e  Party's Agrarian Commission apparently 
disagreed with Henry's recommendations on some points of detail, 
and stressed the necessity for establishing the broadest possible 
alliance (that is, one including the middle farmers from the outset). 
The Commission also urged that questions regarding the nationalisation 
of land should be avoided and persuaded the 17th Congress to direct 
m e  incoming Central Committee to organise and supervise the drafting 
of National and State Rural Workers' Programmes.
This whole episode reveals the difficulty which the Communist 
Party faced in its effort to widen its social basis beyond the 
industrial workers of the more militant of the trade unions. At one 
level it illustrates the theme of isolation which runs right through 
the Party's history; at another it reveals its doctrinal and strategic 
rigidity when working in fields outside the trade union movement.
It is important that the Party approached the problem of radicalising 
the farm associations and the Country Party as if they were comparable 
in structure and social character to the trade unions and the Labor 
Party - but it is incredible that it credited itself with any chance 
of success.
Internal stresses in the Communist Party
Two articles included in the Communist Review oi O^ober 1954 
highlighted the problems which had arisen for the Party because of its
TÖ0 ~
Ibid., September 1954, pp.263-4.
101
Ibid.» June 1955, p.lttb
294
united front strategy. Joe Goss warned about the dangers of left 
sectarianism, particularly in the case of those Communists who 
persisted in regarding the A.L.P. as virtually the second party of 
capitalism and in refusing to work with its progressive elements
102against 'Social Democratic, opportunist leaders and capitalist ideas.' 
E.W. Campbell suggested, on the other hand, that Communists should not, 
in eschewing sectarianism, fall into tne opposite error of right oppor­
tunism by being uncritical in their support of the A.L.P. and its 
103leadership. One often has the impression, in reading such catalogues 
of error, that there was practically no middle way between sectarianism 
and opportunism, and that one or other of these deviations had to be 
tolerated if the Party was to act at all in politics. There is some 
evidence to suggest, however, that the Communist leaders were never 
wholehearted in recommending the united front strategy, and that 
their predeliction for the cut-and-dried issues of the social Fascist 
and 'adventurist' periods inclined them to turn a blind eye on those 
guilty of sectarianism. This certainly is the implication of some 
comments made by J.R. Hughes when writing for the Communist Review 
in 195b, in which he suggested that Stalin's strategic principle 
of directing tne 'main blow' of the revolutionary forces against 
Social Democracy (represented by the A.L.P. in the case of Australia)
102
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was not v a lid  g iv e n  A ustra lian  c o n d it io n s . 'The dogmatic acceptance
o f S t a l in ' s  form ula i s  an example o f the tremendous in flu e n c e  of
104th e c u lt  o f the in d iv id u a l .'  S ta lin  used th e 'main blow' 
p r in c ip le  to  ex p la in  the s t r a te g ie s  pursued in  th e  S o v ie t  Union a f te r  
th e  October R evolu tion ; he wrote th a t the fo r c e s  o f  the R evolution  
aimed th e ir  main blow to  ach ieve ' i s o la t io n  o f th e  p etty -b o u rg eo is  
dem ocrats, i s o la t io n  o f  the p a r t ie s  o f the Second In te r n a tio n a l, which
c o n s t itu te  the main support o f th e  p o lic y  o f compromise w ith
. ,105im p e r ia lism .'
The dangers o f r ig h t opportunism were g r e a tly  in creased  once 
the c r i s i s  in th e  A .L .P . had g iven  the im pression th a t the party  
was moving le ftw a rd s  unaer E v a tt 's  leadersh ip* M ilita n t  workers who 
had p rev io u sly  sym pathised w ith  the Communist Party now s h if te d  th e ir  
a lle g ia n c e  to  th e  A .L .P ., w h ile  some Communists, i t  would appear, 
were prepared to  g iv e  u n con d ition al support to  E vatt in  h is  s tru g g le  
w ith  the Groups. Dixon f e l t  con stra in ed  to  p o in t out th a t the  
A*L*P* remained a reform ist party and th a t i t s  p ro g ressiv e  p o l i c i e s ,  
as adopted a t th e  Hobart C onference, needed to  be seen a lo n g sid e  
th e r ig h t-w in g  Labor Governments o f  New South W ales, Queensland, Tasmania, 
and Western A u s tr a lia . He continued:
104  '
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The ferment in the labour movement and the swing towards the 
left...has resulted in the growth of opportunist illusions 
among militant workers ana also some members of the Communist 
Party. We have examples of Party members tailing behind the 
left in the Labour Party...and we have instances of submergence 
of the Party. We know of militant workers who, instead of 
joining the Communist Party, have joined the A.L.P. 
believing that it is now a militant workers' party.
The problem touched on here was a serious one. Unless the Communist
Party could maintain a distinct border with the A.L.P., and preserve
the impression that the ideological differences between the two bodies
were fundamental, it would stand no chance of attracting mass support.
There was the further difficulty of ensuring that the tactical
cautiousness dictated by the united front strategy did not foster
reformist illusions instead of awakening the workers to the need for
revolutionary action. Snarkey complained:
The more progressive attitude adopted by some of the A.L.P. 
and trade union leadership in recent times has strengthened 
reformism....
^apparently
This is the basic reason why masses of workers support 
Party campaigns, work beside us in the struggle, but as yet 
do not feel the need to join the Communist Party.*®7
For all these reasons, the Party was unable to enlarge its
membership; Sharkey, indeed, said in December 1956 that the membership
108had been steadily dwindling in recent years while later it was
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revealed that the circulation of the Party press had fallen by 1,617
109issues between October 1955 and October 1956. One remedy for 
this situation was organisational reform, and the Party appears to have 
paid some attention to this possibility. L. Aarons declared that there 
was a need for better trained and informed cadres at the lower levels 
in the Party’s organisation,^^ and in January 1955 he called for a 
'higher ideological level of party education'. He derived some satis­
faction from the fact that for the first half of 1955 all branches would 
study the resolutions being submitted to the 17th Congress in May, 
and that in the last half they were to study political economy, with 
the aid of a textbook written by E.W. Campbell.***
Difficulties arising from the situation in Australia were aggra­
vated by the important changes in tne international Communist line in 
1955 and 1956, The setting for a policy of 'peaceful co-existence' was 
established in 1955; the ending of the Korean and Indo-Chinese Wars 
in 1953 and 1954 respectively had removed two serious irritants from 
the international scene, and the proceedings at the Geneva 'summit 
talks' and the Soviet Union's reconciliation with Yugoslavia gave 
rise to expectations that Soviet policy was changing very much for 
the better. At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the
109
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S o v ie t Union in  F eb ru ary  1956, K hruschov denounced S t a l i n 's  p o l i c i e s
and th e  man h im se lf*  When, a f t e r  a s h o r t  d e la y , tn e  news reached
W estern c o u n t r ie s  a f i e r c e  c o n tro v e rsy  began in s id e  a l l  th e  m ajor
Communist P a r t i e s ;  th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  in  p a r t i c u l a r  c a l le d  f o r  an end
to  ' t h e  c u l t  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l*  and f o r  th e  s t re n g th e n in g  o f  ' i n n e r -
P a r ty  dem ocracy '*  The c o n tro v e rsy  had an e f f e c t  on th e  A u s tr a l ia n
P arty *  The Communist Review f o r  A p ril 1956 c a r r ie d  an a b rid g e d  t e x t
112of K h ru scn o v 's  sp eech , w ith o u t e x p la n a to ry  comment* In  May th e  
C e n tra l  Committee a d m itted  t h a t  th e  ' c u l t  o f  th e  p e r s o n a l i ty ' had 
in f e c te d  th e  P a r ty  and t h a t  i t  had ta k e n  th e  form  o f 'e x a g g e ra te d  
p r a is e  and a d u la t io n  o f in d iv id u a l  P a r ty  l e a d e r s . '  I t  went on to  adm it 
t h a t  th e  view s o f S t a l i n  (and Lysenko) had been u n c r i t i c a l l y  acc e p te d  
th u s  c au s in g  th e  'a l i e n a t i o n  o f  some h o n e s t P a r ty  members and suppor­
t e r s * '  N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e  C e n tra l Committee s ta te m e n t concluded , th e s e
sho rtcom ings had n o t le d  to  any 's e r io u s  v io l a t i o n s  o f  P a r ty  p r in c ip le s  
113o f o rg a n is a t io n .*  But th e s e  ad m issio n s  d id  n o t s a t i s f y  th e  le a d e r ­
s h i p 's  c r i t i c s  who were h e a r te n e d  by th e  r e tu r n  to  power o f Gomulka in
Poland* The P a r t y 's  P o l i t i c a l  Committee in  J u ly  is su e d  a c a l l  to
114'c lo s e  th e  ra n k s '*
1T2
I b i d *, A p r il  1956, p p .99-122*
113
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114
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During these months few of the Party's intellectuals, apart
from J* Staples in Sydney who was circulating roneoed material amongst
115the rank-and-file, were prepared to engage the leadership in a
head-on battle and it was left to a few full-time Party functionaries
to express publicly the doubts in the minds of many intellectuals.
In August, W.J. Brown deprecated the 'adulation* which had been given
116to Sharkey and Miles, and in the following month he accused certain
Party leaders of 'lack of faith in the Party rank and file' and of
holding 'an old, authoritarian type of approach that is alien to the 
117new period,' The leadership was also censured for not informing
the membership on the overseas developments relating to the Stalin 
118issue. In addition, Brown declared that the tendency of many
Party members to regard the Soviet Union as beyond criticism was 
119'un-Marxist'. Paul Mortier wrote that
there are a thousand influences impelling us to belittle the 
role of the masses and to exaggerate the role of the leaders,.••
115
See J. Staples, Statement on Attitude of the C,C,, C.P,A, to the 
Stalin Issue, Sydney, 12 July 1956, Staples subsequently issued a 
roneoed version of the U.S, State Department's text of Khruschov's 
full speech at the C.P.S.U's 20th Congress. In November, he was 
expelled from the Communist Party.
116
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117
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In my view the very handling of the discussions flowing 
from the 20th Congress revealed this.
In far too few cases did leading comrades, confronted with 
unexpected and unsolved problems, seea assistance from the rank 
and file or the masses. On the contrary, the attitude was widely 
expressed that the rank and file faced with these problems would 
make shocking blunders.
He continued: 'The idea even became current amongst some good members of
the Party that to discuss the cult of the individual was to help the 
120class enemy.' Even Sharkey admitted that 'tendencies' towards the
'cult of the individual' existed in the Party, particularly in relation
121to Miles, Dixon and himself.
Nevertheless, despite the leadership's problems with some of the 
younger functionaries and the intellectuals and despite the danger of 
right opportunism amongst the trade union cadres, the Party's position 
in the early days of October 1956 was healthier than at any time since 
the beginning of the 'adventurist' period in 1947. The Soviet leaders 
seemed to be taking 'peaceful co-existence' seriously, tne Australian 
Party had regained some of its former strength in the unions, a working 
relationship had been formed with many left-wing Labor Party members, 
and there was a good deal of overlap between the immediate programmes 
of the Communist Party, the A.L.f. and the A.C.T.U. The Party's 
confidence, however, was to be shaken abruptly by events in Hungary.
120
Ibid., September 1956, p.310.
Ibid., July 1956, p.210.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE REVISIONIST DEFECTION AND THE WEAKENING OF THE 
UNITED FRONT, 1956-1958
Khruschov*s statements at the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. 
and the Hungarian insurrection of October 195b combined in their 
effect on the Communist Party of Australia. A considerable number 
of dissidents, who were labelled 'revisionists' by the Party's 
leaders, left the Party when they found that their views were not 
being taken seriously by its central bodies. The Party was weakened 
as a result; its membersnip declined ^especially in Victoria), the 
sale of its press fell away, its front organisations lost direction. 
Sharkey and Dixon were able to hold their Farty to a surprisingly 
orthodox line and to preserve solidarity of a sort - but the cost 
had been high.
Perhaps too high in view of the difficulties which the Party 
was experiencing in its political and industrial action. Whereas 
in 195o Dr Evatt's campaign to defeat the Industrial Groupers had 
appeared likely to become a generalised struggle against all right- 
wing and anti-progressive forces inside the Labor Party, by 1957 
it was clear that this would not be so. The split in the Victorian 
A.L.P. had proved the exception, and other Branches of the Labor 
Party ^except, to some extent, in Queensland) still contained 
influential right-wing groups. The Anti-Communist Labor Parties 
of 1955 had meanwhile become the Democratic Labor Parties of 1957,
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and were joined in that year by a sister organisation, the Queensland 
Labor Party. They soon showed that they had sufficient popular 
support to survive as an electoral (if not a parliamentary) force, 
and they announced tneir intention of entering trade union politics 
with a vengeance, their prime objective being to isolate and then 
destroy the Communist Party. As a step towards these objectives, vhey 
aimed at forcing the A.L.P. to prevent its traue union members from 
participating in unity tickets with Communists.
The Communist Party soon realised that the situation in the 
trade union movement was no longer in its favour. In particular, 
the united front which it had worked so hard to establish began to 
show signs of breaking down.
The defection of the revisionists
'There is no uouut', admitted Dixon in January 1957, 'that the 
revelations of the cult of the individual led to much inner-Party 
discussion and inner-Party struggle.’* Subsequent developments 
indicate that this was, if anything, an understatement. Two in 
particular of ahruscnov's statements before the 20th Congress had 
sparked off controversy inside the Australian Party; that the 
transition to Socialism would differ from country to country, that
2it 'need not be associated with civil war under all circumstances',
1
Communist Review, January 1957, p.13.
Ibid., April 1956, p.114.
2
3ü3
and that in the past too much importance had been attached to the 
Party leader (the 'cult of the individual’) and not enough to the 
role of the Party and the masses and to the role of collective
ß
leadership in the Party. With reference to the Australian context, 
the revisionists appear to have suggested that the Party needed to 
revise its strategy and doctrine to take account of the possibility 
that a revolutionary situation might not arise and that the people 
would be able to take power by peaceful methods, such as electoral 
success; they also appear to have gone further than this by attacking 
the Party's leadership for their dogmatism and inflexibility in past 
situations. Throughout the winter of 1956 criticism of this kind 
was made within the Party and some concessions were made by the leader­
ship. The tension thus generated, however, was built up to breaking 
point when the Party adopted the Soviet line in its explanation of 
the Hungarian uprising of October 195b.
Tribune was quick to describe it as a revolt of 'fascist forces',
backed by American imperialists and aimed at restoring the authori-
4tarian regime of pre-war Hungary. On his return from a visit to
Peking, Sharkey placed roughly the same interpretation on events when
g
reporting to the Central Committee which in March 1957 published a
3
See the statement from Pravda reproduced in ibid., May 1956, 
pp.139—43.
4
Tribune, 31 October 1956.
5
Communist Review, December 1956, pp.389-91.
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0
lengthy booklet justifying its standpoint. The revisionists, finding
that both their protests against the Party’s treating the Hungarian
incident as a fascist counter-revolution and their suggestions for
more inner-Party democracy were ignored, began leaving the Party.
Their defections continued through 1957 and into 1958. Most of them
were intellectuals of middle-class background; some later came together
in support of Outlook, a socialist journal established in 1957, and of
7Socialist Forums in Melbourne and Sydney. The latter, however, broke 
up after a few years following disagreement over a number of issues,g
including their attitude to the peace movement. A few ex-Communists 
9became Trotskyists but the great majority of them joined the A.L.P. 
and, in Victoria, revitalised the Fabian Society. It would be 
misleading to isolate any one factor as having ’caused' the exodus 
of the revisionists from the Party. Certainly the Hungarian affair 
came as the last straw to many who had been disgruntled by their lack 
of recognition earlier in 1950, but it would be truer to say that the 
impact of the 20th Congress set in motion the forces which led to the
6
Basic Questions of Communist Tneory: Documents Relating to the 
Cult of the Individual and to Hungary, Sydney, 1957.
7
Alan Barcan, op. cit., pp.13-14.
8
Jim Jupp, 'What Happened to "The New Left*", Bulletin, 15 
September 1902.
9
Alan Barcan, op. cit., pp.18-19, 32. See also Observer, 19 March 
1960; Nation, 27 August I960.
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defections. Nor snould the conflict between tne older and younger
leaders be ignored in this respect; Sharkey, Dixon and Thornton were
intellectually uneasy in the doctrinal cross-currents of post-Stalinist
Communism; their attitudes had been shaped during the hard industrial
struggles, and the depression troubles, of the inter-war years, and
even while they sought to reinterpret their strategies in terms of
Khruschov’s recent pronouncements, they continued to hope for the sudden
economic crisis, tne hardening of class divisions, the revolutionary
situation, the institution of People’s Power. Many of the younger
leaders, such as Ian Turner and Stephen Murray-Smith, were more at
home in the language of the 20th Congress and more capable of thinking
their way through the new situation. One has only to compare the
intelligent and lively articles of Outlook with the dull, tortous
features of the Communist Review to become aware of such contrasts.
The reasons for the revisionists’ defections (and, in some cases,
expulsions) are not as important as the issues they raised within
the Party. One of their main complaints had been the lack of inner-
Party democracy; an anonymous contributor in Outlook once argued that a
number of intellectuals had left the Party
not because they were sure that the USSR had done the wrong 
thing £in HungaryJ, for the situation had become so complicated 
tnat the issues were by no means clearly defined, but because 
they were sure that the Australian Party was adopting a dogmatic 
approach and not allowing its members to consider the problems 
for themselves
1Ö
Outlook, March 1959, Vol. 3, No. 2, p.15.
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It would appear that the Party leaders had attempted to smother
discussion on the issues raised by the 20th Congress as if they were
slight differences of opinion, capable of being settled by vote
and by the obedience to majority decisions which the practice of
democratic centralism required. The revisionists appear to have
taken the line that the issues warranted full and free discussion
at all levels in the Party, and to have maintained their objections
long after the leaders believed the disputes to have been settled.
The restlessness thus engendered continued for some time. In July
1968, for example, Ian Turner was expelled for condemning the execution
of Imre ftogy by the Hungarian Government** whereupon his close friend
12Sxephen Murray-Smith resigned from the Party. Sharkey, in particular
saw in the revisionist dissent a threat to the Party’s organisational
principles. ’If democratic centralism did not exist’, he observed,
’then these comrades perhaps feel they should have a better chance to
impose their revisionist, petty-bourgeois-idealist and Browderite
13views on the Communist Party.' Sharkey's choice of adjectives 
points to his and Dixon's picture of the revisionists as men affected 
by reformist and ’petty-bourgeois' ideas that capitalism was evolving 
towards socialist forms of organisation, and that it would hence be
n
Herald, 17 July 1968; Tribune, 23 July 1958.
12
Alan Barcan, op. cit., p.17.
Basic Questions of Communist Theory, p.4.
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possible for the people to take power and institute the socialist
order without resort to revolution. These illusions, they felt,
had been created by the lengthy post-war period of prosperity. Tne
revisionists, having left the Party, would adopt an anti-Soviet,
14anti-Socialist and anti-working class position.
Doctrinally, the revisionists had most disturbed Sharkey with 
their claim that the transition to Socialism in Australia could be 
achieved by peaceful methods, including the gradual extension of 
the existing public sector of the economy. In strategic terms, 
they argued that if the Communist Party accepted the possibility 
of a peaceful transition to Socialism it had to stop contemplating 
the prospect of violent revolution and make a decisive bid for electoral 
and parliamentary power, formulating interim 'reformist' policies 
which would enable it to work in close accord with the A.L.P.
The substance of such interim policies had already been suggested 
(as it turned out, fruitlessly) in pamphlets written by two Labor 
theoreticians, Professor H.W. Arndt and Dr John Burton. Professor 
Arndt had stressed the role which the A.L.P. could play in introducing 
a more egalitarian tax structure, better social security measures,
14
See Sharkey in 18th Congress. April, 1958. Report of L.L. Sharkey, 
Resolution, A Land of Plenty Free from War. Sydney, 1958, pp.38-40;
Dixon in Comaunist Review, January 1957, p.14, See also Sharkey in 
ibid., November 1958, p.4ö9, and ibid., July 1959, p.269.
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15and th e p ra c tic e  o f Keynesian c o n tro ls  in  r e g u la tin g  th e  economy 
w hiie  Dr Burton had emphasised the n e c e s s ity  fo r  improving th e w elfare
s ta te  s tru ctu re  e s ta b lish e d  by th e C h ifley  Government, n a t io n a lis in g
V 16 fu r th er  in d u s tr ie s ,  c o n tr o ll in g  m onopolies and checking p r o f ite e r in g .
A u stra lian  Communists saw in  th ese  two pamphlets a lo c a l  rep resen ta tio n
o f the ’r e fo r m ist' id ea s  advanced in  Great B r ita in  by such d is s im ila r
f ig u r e s  as John Maynard Keynes, P ro fesso r  G.D.H. C ole, John Strachey
and Lord B everid ge. They were apprehensive l e s t  th e  p ro g ress iv e  fo r c e s
in the A .L .P ., perhaps in conjunction  with th e  r e v i s io n i s t s ,  might
become the dominant group in  the A u stra lian  L e ft ,  a t tr a c t in g  away from
the Communist Party  what l i t t l e  mass support i t  did en joy .
A r t ic le s  appeared in  th e Communist Review a tta ck in g  Keynesian
17id ea s  w ith unusual determ ination , w hile Sharkey s e t  h im se lf  the
d i f f i c u l t  ta sk  o f proving th a t the p r in c ip le s  o f Marxism-Leninism
could s t i l l  be ap p lied  to  th e problems o f a p eacefu l tr a n s it io n
to  S o c ia lism . He made h is  f i r s t  length y  rep ly  to  the arguments o f
Burton and Cole in  S o c ia lism  in A u s tr a l ia , published  in  June 1957;
in  'Marxism-Leninism and Economic C r i s i s ' , published  in  th e Communist
Review of Ju ly  1958, he c a r r ie d ’ some of h is  economic arguments a 
_
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John Burton, The L ight Glows B r ig h te r , Sydney, n .d .
17
See J .  B ea sley , 'J.M . Keynes and th e  A .L .P .' ,  Communist Review,
June 1957, p p .201-2; Andy W allace, 'The T heories o f J.M. K eynes', 
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steige further; but the main defence of his position was contained
in his Report to the Party Congress of April 1958. His argument in
these places ran as follows. Despite the claims of the 'reformists*,
the long post-war boom had not shown that Keynesian controls were
enabling capitalism to develop without danger of a crisis comparable
to that of 1929-33. The boom, as Khruschov had shown at the 20th
Congress, was due to several special factors, namely, the expenditure
involved in the repair of wartime damage, the re-equipment of industry
delayed during the depression years, and the re-armament programmes
18occasioned by the Korean and Cold Wars. Once these special factors
had worked themselves out, however, a further crisis would occur.
It is, of course, not excluded that there may be a 
temporary revival, that the economic crisis may not develop 
along a straight line, that palliative measures can have a 
temporary success, but economic crises remain inevitable 
under the capitalist regime.
Sharkey argued that Keynes had erred in regarding crises as 
arising from under-consumption, in turn due to a lack of purchasing- 
power amongst the consumers. On the contrary, Marx had shown that 
over-production, inevitable in an economy characterised by an 
extensive private sector, was the basic cause of crisis and that, 
as such, it could never be eliminated unless the State controlled
lb
L.L, Sharkey, Socialism in Australia: Communist View on Democratic 
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19
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all industries. Capitalism 'continually creates the conditions of
20a crisis of overproduction.' For this reason, Sharkey claimed, 
the Communist Party had to retain the strong organisation and solidarity 
which would enable it to act as the vanguard of the working class 
in crisis, if not revolutionary, politics. His bitterness towards 
the revisionists, and his concern about their strategic views, is 
revealed in the following coiiment.
Crises and class struggle and unemployed armies now 
belonged to the crude and untutored past, according to the 
revisionist wiseacres. Consequently, Marxism-Leninism and 
the Communist Party were likewise outdated. All that was 
needed was discussion, debate, a loose Socialist 'association', 
not a vanguard party, 'because now, don't you see, capitalism 
has undergone such a drastic change that there is little 
difference between it and socialism already, today, and it is 
evolving to socialism in any case'.^1
G.D.H. Cole, in World Socialism Restated, had not only criticised
Marx's theory that the development of capitalism would be accompanied
by ever-worsening crises but had pointed out that instead of the
working class ami the capitalist class becoming the dominant classes,
in terms of number and power, the twentieth century had seen the
rapid growth of the middle class and a parallel transformation of
22living standards in Western countries. Sharkey professed to find 
similar views informing Dr Burton's pamphlet, The Light Glows Brighter,
20
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23and he defended Marx’s predictions. As if to make this point
with reference to Australian conditions, L. Aarons wrote two rather
obscure articles for the Communist Review on 'Australian Class 
24Structure*. Aarons* big problem was to extend his class of pure 
capitalists, composing about 1 per cent of the population, and the 
urban proletariat (numbering about 1,500,000) until they included 
large sections of the rather amorphous middle classes. He achieved 
this feat by deciding that each of the main middle-class groups (the 
farmers, the white-collar workers and (to some extent) the professional 
groups) was under attraction from the two poles in the class system, 
capitalists and workers, and that each could therefore be divided 
into lower, middle and upper strata. The upper strata (top civil 
servants, army officers and university professors in the case of the 
white-collar group, and rich farmers) were virtually at one with the 
capitalist class, while the middle strata (such as the scientists, 
technicians and teachers of the white-collar group) comprised the 
servants of the capitalist class, and were thus bound to them 
materially and ideologically. The lower strata, and the small and 
middle farmers, constituted potential allies of the working class. 
Aarons failed to work this analysis through consistently, however, 
and finished up by distinguishing between four classes, roughly 
composed as follows:
23
L.L. Sharkey, Socialism in Australia, p.7•
24
Communist Review, December 1957, pp.400-11; January 1958, pp.37—40.
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Big bourgeoisie (33,000): monopolists, squattocracy, big
capitalists, top civil servants and company executives.
Upper middle class (360,000): middle and small capitalists, 
rich farmers, such professional people as lawyers and 
doctors, and another layer of top administrators and ' 
executives.
Lower middle class (921,000): middle and small farmers, small 
businessmen, a further layer of the professional group, 
and the middle stratum of white-collar workers.
Working class (1,818,000): industrial and rural workers, and the 
lower stratum of white-collar workers.
Aarons was not clear on what alignments would arise if an economic 
crisis developed, but he may have assumed that the upper middle class 
would cleave to the big bourgeoisie while the lower middle class 
(perhaps minus the middle stratum of white-collar workers) would 
become the ally of the working class. He based his figures on occu­
pational groupings given in the 1947 Census but did not explain how 
the remaining categories of the population fitted into his scheme 
of things.
The immediate task of the Communist Party in Australia was to
develop the class consciousness of the industrial and rural proletariat,
which was still prey to arbitrationist and reformist illusions. At
the same time, as J.W. Bailes pointed out to the 18th Congress, the
Party had also to think of winning as allies the small and middle 
26farmers. The danger to which Dixon, in particular, drew attention
25
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26
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was that Party members might assume, as had the revisionists, that
Ithe peaceful transition to socialism could be achieved other than by 
means of class struggle.
The idea of peaceful transition to Socialism does not 
embrace the idea of class peace or class collaboration. In 
fact the Marxist conception of peaceful advance to Socialism 
implies great economic and political struggles waged against 
the capitalist class. The class struggle does not die away 
but grows and sharpens to the point where the working class 
and its allies take over political power and expropriate the 
capitalist class.^
But having given this warniug, Dixon and his colleagues were still
faced with the difficulty of explaining what lines of action the
Communist Party should pursue in the electoral and parliamentary
fields. The first essays in this direction were also made at the
18th Congress in April 1958. Dixon claimed that whereas the A.L.P.
subordinated everything to its electoral and parliamentary work, such
work for the Communist Party was part of the class struggle, serving
'to build working class unity in the struggle against monopoly 
28capital.' E.F. Hill argued that since the Australian parliament 
had become unrepresentative and unduly subject to the influence of 
monopoly capitalists, the Communists should alert the people to the 
necessity of electing their own ^i.e. Communist and progressive) 
candidates to parliament. By such means would the 'peaceful transition' 
be achieved.
27
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We contemplate that this Parliament - today remote from 
the people - will become really representative of the people»...
The State will be needed to end the resistance of the holders 
of power and privilege - it is needed to carry into effect 
the extension of the already advanced socialisation of production 
in Australia, as evidenced by the growth of monopoly itself, into
socialised ownership,29
The defection of the revisionists also affected the efficiency of
the Party*s front organisations. A number of those who left the Party
had been prominent leaders of several of these organisations. Having
resigned lor been expelled)t they were replaced by Communists in most
cases; thus, in 1958 K.D. Gott was succeeded as Secretary of the
Victorian Branch of the Australia-China Society by Mrs M, Zyk; Ian Turner
by Lea Greenfield as Manager of the Australasian Book Society; and
Cecil Holmes by B.J. Millies as Managing Director of New Dawn Films
(distributors of Soviet films). Stephen Murray-Smith also resigned as
Organising Secretary of the A.P.C. but the literary journal Overland
(founded by the Realist Writers' Group in Melbourne in 1954), of which
he was editor, remained in the hands of the revisionists. Communists
continued to contribute to Overland despite Rex Cniplin's attack on
30it in a Tribune review. However, after a number of Communist writers
31objected to the tone of Chiplin's criticism, the Party pursued a 
more conciliatory line towards the journal.
29
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30
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The Hungarian uprising placed the peace movement in a difficult
position. The various peace bodies, in which the Communists were
influential, quickly condemned the Anglo-French action at Suez
but they were slow to adopt a position on Hungary, mainly because
32of internal differences. The Australian Assembly for Peace opposed
33the use of force in Hungary; on the other hand, H.G. Clements,
Secretary of the Western Australian Peace Council and a non-Communist,
praised Tribune for ’the firm straight-forward line taken on happenings
34in Suez and Hungary.’ The South Australian Peace Council opposed the
Soviet intervention in Hungary although it added that the 'international
35position is not clear'. A reluctance to interpret the Hungarian
situation adversely affected the Communists’ position in the A.S.L.F.
which was captured by the Sydney and Melbourne University A.L.P. Clubs
36in 1957 and disaffiliated from the International Union of Students.
The execution of Nagy in 1958 led to protests from a number of 
progressive middle-class people, most of whom were usually well disposed
32
See World Peace Council statement in ibid., 5 Decemoer 1956, in 
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33
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36
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37towards the Soviet Union, but they continued to participate in the 
activities of front organisations.
The Communist Party's membership had been steadily declining 
since the end of the war, but the decline was considerably accelerated 
by the revisionists' revolt. Barcan has estimated that the membership
qo
fell from 8,000 in 1955 to 5,500 or 4,500 in 1958. The higher 1958
figure squares with tnat indicated by Campbell's estimates (given to
the 18th Congress) of Tribune sales per member in each state; if his
figures are converted into membership totals they give a national
strength of 4,580. The individual totals for each state and centre
39are as follows (in rounded figures):
New South Wales 2,920
Queensland 960
Western Australia 230
Victoria 260
South Australia 240
Tasmania 60
Darwin 10
TOTAL 4,580
Since the Melbourne Guardian's circulation could not have been higher
37
See letter from Vance Palmer, C.B. Christesen et al in Age,
10 July 1958, and from Rev. N. St C. Anderson, S.E. Wright et al 
in S.M.H., 4 July 1958.
3ö
Alan Barcan, op. cit., pp. 16, 23.
39
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by the numbers of newspapers per member distributed.
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than 7 , 0 0 0 and since it sold about 5^ Tribune and Guardian copies 
per member, 1,270 members have to be added to the Victorian membership, 
giving an Australian total of approximately 5,850. Thus, in 1958, one 
half of the Party's members were concentrated in New South Wales and 
just under one quarter in Victoria. The smallness of the total 
membersnip lends respect for the Party's ability to influence so many 
workers; the circulation of the Party’s newspapers was still over 22,000 
in 1958 and the Party polled over 26,000 votes in tne election to the 
House of Representatives in December 1958. It should also be remembered 
that the Party's influence in such unions as the W.W.F. and the Miners' 
Federation was essentially a function, not of Communist membership in 
these unions, but of its standing with large numbers of militant and 
A.L.P. unionists.
Such speculations offered little comfort to the Party's 18th
Congress; by all indices, xne Party's influence was shrinking far too
rapidly for comfort. The sharp fall in Tribune's circulation figures
told their own story; its sales had declined by over one quarter in
three years, from 22,428 in 1955 to 16,618 in 1958, by which stage
41it was losing the Party £200 an issue.
40
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The 18th Congress, in so far as it dealt with Party affairs,
was partly an occasion for wound-licking and for stocktaking. In
his Report to the Congress, Sharkey claimed that the Australian Party
had not been as affected by the revisionists' revolt as the Communist
Parties of England, France, Italy and the United States had been by
their defections. He took pride in the reasons for this difference.
The major factor in this was the unity of our leadership, from 
C.C. to the branch executives, and the solidarity of the rank 
and file.
Unity of the leadership and of the Party and our strong 
working class base and composition were the decisive factors.
On both points, Sharkey was probably correct. The leadership (apart 
from one or two waverers like W.J. Brown) did remain solid between 
1956 and 1958, but there remains one question mark - what would have 
happened had not Blake and Henry been demoted in 1954 and had not 
Sharkey and Dixon refused to admit young men with middle-class back­
grounds from holding executive positions? For in many ways, the 
exclusion of the revisionists was the exclusion of the men of the 
forties by the men of the twenties. There may be more than meets 
the eye to the complaint made by J.R. Hughes that the Party was
1 ageing* and that it was ’not maintaining tne youthful quality that 
43it should*. Sharkey's other suggestion, that the Party was well 
served by its proletarian base, also invites the discussion. It
42
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may be that the high proportion of intellectuals and middle-class 
people amongst tnose who left the Party made it more of a workers* 
party than it had been hitherto. A report in I960 placed the
44proportion of 'industrial workers' in the Party at over 90 per cent,
which is certainly larger than that indicated by the figures which
45
Aarons gave the 17th Congress in 1955. Most of the industrial
workers in the Party, where they bothered themselves with doctrinal
questions, were mainly concerned with their immediate affairs in the
trade union field, and took little account of wider speculations
about the peaceful transition to Socialism and the cult of the
individual. If anything, they probably despised the intellectuals
for having made such a fuss about these matters. E. Aarons once
reported to the Central Committee:
we are far from having the necessary theoretical level. With 
the exception of a small core of comrades headed by Comrades 
Snarkey and Dixon, our theoretical level is not high.4**
Although by the 18th Congress most of the revisionists had left
the Party, their challenge remained to be faced. Was the Communist
Party to continue basing its strategies on the assumption that a
major economic crisis was looming ahead, or was it to face the hard
realities of controlled capitalism and non-revolutionary politics?
44
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Was it to retain its doctrinal and organisational rigidity, its
narrow dependence on the industrial proletariat, or was it to make a
bid for the leadership of a broad progressive front embracing small
farmers and middle-class groups? By pretending that these choices
were not posed, the Communist leadership was running the risk that
the Australian economy, apart from an occasional recession, would
continue to prosper, and that the leadership of the Left would be
placed, if not on a rejuvenated A.L.P. then on a new Social Democratic
party, including amongst its leaders some of the erstwhile revisionists.
In either event, it would oe difficult to prevent many of the Communist
Party's remaining supporters, and perhaps some of its members, from
joining such a party. Sharkey told the 18th Congress that revisionism
47rather than sectarianism remained the Party's chief danger; Dixon
had earlier complained that the difficulties of the early fifties
had made many Communists afraid to witness their faith in the Party
48and that they had 'submerged' themselves in united front activity;
Hill had warned that 'certain comrades’ still sympathised with the
revisionists and the Central Committee should 'call upon them to
49change their position.' The Congress did adopt a new clause 
(Rule 4, clause e) for the Party's Constitution which set out the
47
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traditional right of Party members to 'reserve opinions’ but also
t
defining narrowly the circumstances under which that right could be 
exercised. L. Aarons, explaining why the stable door was being closed 
at that late stage, pointed out:
A Communist who differs upon tactics or some specific 
decision has the right to reserve his opinions as set out in 
this rule.
It does not extend to those who have abandoned a Communist 
standpoint, advocate alien views, and reject Marxism-Leninism. 
Those who have such a stand should, if they are honest, reserve 
their opinions by leaving the Party if they no longer accept 
its basic theory, ideology, programme and organisational 
structure.
Three parties on the Left
In 1957 and 1958 the Democratic Labor Party (D.L.P.) consolidated 
its position in the Australian party system. The title, first adopted 
by the New South Wales organisation, was accepted in February 1957
51by the Tasmanian and South Australian Anti-Communist Labor Parties 
and later in the year by those in Victoria and Western Australia.
The Victorian, South Australian, Tasmanian and New South Wales parties 
held a conference in March 1957 at which they decided that they would
50
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oppose the recognition of Communist China, support SEATO, advocate the
retention of court-controlled ballots in trade union elections and,
significantly, that they would not include a socialisation objective
in their platform.  ^ The position in Queensland remained obscure
until the winter of 1957, when the Labor Party in the State broke
into two; the crisis arose when the State Labor Government, headed by
V.C. Gair, refused to legislate for certain leave arrangements requested
by the A.L.P's Queensland Executive. Gair's supporters became the
Queensland Labor Party, acting in sympathy with the D.L.P. elsewhere,
while the Executive group, led by J. Duggan, remained the official
53A.L.P. Branch in Queensland. The split helped the Liberal and 
Country Parties to win the State election of 2 August 1957 and to form 
Queensland’s first non-Labor administration since 1932; the Queensland 
Labor Party (Q.L.P.) managed to hold 11 of its 25 seats, a good showing 
under the circumstances.
In Victoria and Queensland the new party retained something of 
the character of an A.L.P. splinter group, but in these as in other 
States it became clear that the D.L.P. was acquiring its own, 
distinctive identity. This was suggested by several observers after 
the Victorian State election of 31 May 1958, at which the D.L.P.
52
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increased its vote from the 1955 level of 12.7 per cent to 14.4 per 
54cent. Writing in Outlook, Ian Turner suggested that the regional
distribution of the D.L.P's voting strength indicated 'that a
substantial proportion of DLP voters are former anti-labour voters*
rather than former A.L.P. supporters; he also suggested that the
D.L.P. was becoming a 'Catholic Centre Party', with the interesting
difference that whereas the Christian Democratic parties of Europe
drew their support from rural areas the D.L.P. seemed likely to be
55based mainly on the towns. Professor Webb said that tne Victorian 
results had strengthened the impression that the D.L.P. was 'no 
ordinary Labour splinter group* and that, as a centre party, it could
Q g
be expected to win support from Liberal as well as Labor sources.
With a determination wnicn betrayed their uneasiness, the
Communists refused to admit that the D.L.P. was likely to become a
Catholic centre party. Sharkey consistently portrayed it as an agent
of the Liberal Party, established to divert a portion of Labor's voting
strength to the Right, to prevent the election of Labor Governments,
to isolate the Communist Party from the masses and to weaken the trade 
57unions. The Party persisted in regarding the D.L.P*s supporters
54
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as workers who had been misled by a small clique of unscrupulous 
leaders.
Great emphasis is needed on the winning to a progressive 
policy of the workers misled by the Group leaders, These workers 
are necessarily included in the struggle for a united working 
class. In this regard a struggle must be waged against all forms 
of religious sectarianism.5®
The Communists watched the developments within the A.L.P. with
apprehension, still afraid that the right-wing and Grouper elements
within its New South Wales branch in particular might foment a revolt
against the leadership of Dr Evatt and F.E. Chamberlain, the Federal
President, thus paving the way for a reconciliation with the D.L.P.,
almost certainly on an anti-Communist policy. The A.L.P. Federal
Conference at Brisbane in March 1957 gave an appearance of endorsing
the progressive policies adopted at Hobart, but in many ways confirmed
the impression that the A.L.jT. was once more shifting slowly to the
Right. Chamberlain's presidential address bore out this contrast;
while he dwelt significantly on the words 'Democratic Socialism' and
warned that the Groupers still planned to subvert the A.L.P., his
remarks could nave been uttered by any well-intentioned liberal of
59the nineteenth century. The Conference reaffirmed the more
58
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important of the Hobart decisions, about the necessity for recognising
Communist China and for the withdrawal of Australian troops from
Malaya, and declared for the substitution of voluntary for compulsory
military training, and for the reduction of State interference in
trade union affairs (implying the repeal of the 1951 - but not the
1949 - amendments to the Arbitration Act). At the same time,
however, it watered down even further the party's weak Socialisation
Objective and forbade A.L.P. members to allow their names to appear
on tickets for trade union elections alongside the names of members
of other parties opposed to the A.L.P. (that is, either Communist
or D.L.P.). Sharkey reported to his Party's 18th Congress that
the Brisbane Conference had produced encouraging results, and
that the Industrial Groups had suffered a reverse in the A.L.P. and
the trade unions. The Resolution adopted by the Congress noted that
'strong rightwing elements continue to resist the development of
61progressive policies and working class unity.' Similarly, 
while urging later in the year that the Communists should work 
for the return to power of the Labor Party, Sharkey cautioned his 
readers:
60
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there still remains a powerful rightwing within the A.L.P., 
composed of such elements as the A.W.U. bureaucracy, together 
with similar reactionaries in control of other big unions, 
Grouper remnants and so on....
There is no great ideological unity even among the 
progressive elements. There exist a dozen and one groupings, 
alliances, shadings and factions inside the A.L.F. today.
In trade union politics, meanwhile, a confused situation was
developing. The Communist Party continued working for a united
front against the Groupers in the unions but it now found itself
fighting on two fronts. On the one hand, the Victorian D.L.P.,
having been joined by most of the former Groupers, was doing its
best to continue the fight against the Communists - and their united
front - along the old lines; in other States, also, the newly formed
Democratic Labor Parties were threatening to enter tne unions, the
President of the New South Wales branch declaring that his party
63favoured the re-establishment of tne Industrial Groups. In fact, 
however, in States other tnan victoria and, to a lesser extent, 
Queensland the majority of Groupers had remained within the Labor 
Party and a number of the important Group-controlled unions had 
retained their affiliation with the A.L.P. Their reverses of 1954 
and 1955 had left the Groupers wiser men, and they now set themselves 
62
Communist Review, September 1958, p.372.
S.M.H., 21 December 1956.
63
327
to concentrate on driving the Communists from the unions without
at the same time trying to gain ascendancy in the A.L.F. In the
background, reputedly directing the Groupers' renewed industrial
crusade, was the National Civic Council (N.C.C.), with B*A. Sontamaria 
64as its President. The Communists had to vary their tactics according
to the circumstances; in Victoria they found themselves able to make
common cause in the unions with progressive A.L.F. members in combatting
the D.L.P. and its associated Industrial Groups, but elsewhere the
situation was more like that which held before the Labor split of
1954-55, that is, Groupers and Communists both working to influence
a directionless centre grouping of A.L.F. and traditionalist unionists,
the only difference being that the Industrial Groups were no longer
officially attached to the A.L.P,
Let us consider first the Victorian situation. Here the State
Branches of the F.I.A. and the F.C.U., along with three or four 
65smaller unions, were affiliated to the D.L.P. and were supplying it
66with political funds. 72 other unions, including the State Branches
64
See D.W. Rawson, 'Political Chronicle*, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, November 1958, Vol. IV, No. 2, p.245.
65
Rawson gives different figures for the number of unions affiliated 
with the Victorian D.L.P.; in one place he says there were five (D.W. 
Rawson, Australia Votes, p.ll) and in another, six (ibid., p.45).
66
According to the A.L.P. State Secretary, J. Tripovich (Sun, Melbourne, 
7 November 1958), Rawson gives 63 as the figure (D.W. Rawson, op. cit. 
P.ll).
328
of the A.R.U. and the B.W.I.Ü. and the Melbourne Branch of the W.W.F.,
remained affiliated to the Victorian Branch of the A.L.P. which, as
Rawson has suggested, had owed a great deal to its trade union
67supporters after the 1955 split. With a strong interest in countering
the D.L.P’s industrial activities, the Victorian Branch of the A.L.P.
chose to ignore the ban on unity tickets proclaimed by the A.L.P.
Federal Conference with the result that united fronts became tne rule
in most of the important unions. The trend towards two-party patterns
in trade union politics, discussed in the preceding chapter, became
stronger in 1957 and 1958 in Victoria. In the State Branch of the
F.I.A., for example, a well integrated faction took shape behind
A.H. Houlper, who at the union ballot of December 1958 made a strong
bid, with overt A.L.P. and covert Communist support, to defeat the
strongly entrenched Grouper administration, headed by R. Campbell
(President) and R. Lundberg (Secretary). The result was much closer
than the previous poll in 1955; Campbell defeated Houlper for the
Presidency by 2,870 to 2,300, the other Grouper officers being returned
68by comparable majorities. The two-party pattern was also pronounced 
inside the State Branch of the A.R.U. (17,000 members), in which 
J.J. Brown's united front alliance (the Militant United team) lost 
ground to the Groupers at the executive elections of June 1957•
67
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United front strength on the union’s Council fell from 33 to 29 
(out of 54 members) as a result of the ballot, while the voting for 
the officers again betrayed the existence of coherent electoral 
groups, despite the A.R.U's dispersed and segmented electorate. The 
results were as follows (Brown was not standing for re-election at 
this poll):^
Militant United Industrial Grouper
State President R.J. Pauline 4476 A.F. Mithen 3895
Vice President E.C. Bone 4505 J.N. Winter 3859
Assistant Secretary W.H.L. O’Brien 4471 A.N. Pearce 3883
Industrial Officer R.J. Haining 4097 M.E. Heagney* 4471
*Heagney, who was standing for re-election, appears to have enjoyed 
a considerable personal vote.
In other States, however, the A.L.P's objections to unity
tickets and the continued presence of Groupers within Labor's trade
union factions altered the terms of the conflict. Dr Evatt, anxious
to eliminate the unity ticket issue from the 1958 election campaign,
favoured making the ban recommended by the Brisbane Conference an 
70effective one. In August 1958 the A.L.P. Federal Executive 
ordered State Branches to implement the Federal Conference’s decision, 
warning tnat Federal intervention would otherwise be considered. 
Subsequently, the New South Wales State Executive expelled from the 
A.L.P. four members of the W.W.F. and the B.W.I.U. for violating
69
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this embargo, and similar charges were made in a number of other
cases. Twenty-seven New South Wales unions thereupon petitioned the
A.L.P. Federal President, F.E. Chamberlain, requesting him to prevent
such interference in union affairs. The rate of expulsions appears
to have dropped after this complaint/1
Despite such obstacles, the Communists persevered with the
united front strategy throughout 1957 and 1958. They remained in
effective control of the fortress unions, such as the W.W.F., and
the Miners' Federation, and kept up a steady pressure on the Groupers
in several unions of the inner defensive ring, more particularly
tue F.I.A., the A.R.Ü. and the A.E.U. United front gains in the A.E.U.
were particularly impressive: in 1957, a militant A.L.P. member,
d.D. Garland, had been elected Secretary of the union's Commonwealth 
72Council, and in 1958 C.G. Hennessy, a Communist member of the
73Council, was re-elected unopposed to his old post. L. Carmichael, 
a Communist, was elected Secretary of the Melbourne District Committee 
of the A.E.U. in 1958/4 Within the F.I.A., however, Short's 
administration held its ground; according to Alan Reid, Thornton and
71
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McPhillips sought to build up a united front opposition to Short
around an 'Ironworkers Strengthen our Union* Committee, formed in
July 1958 and a direct descendant of the Rank and File Committee of 
751956. In the campaign for the F.I.A. ballot held in December, 
straight A.L.P. teams (supported by militants and Communists) were
7 6put forward but were easily defeated in all States except Victoria.
The Victorian results so disturbed Short that he wrote to the 
Secretary of the F.I.A's Victorian Branch suggesting that his execu­
tive's poor showing indicated 'that there is considerable dissatisfaction
among ironworkers over the question of your branches' (sic) continued
77affiliation with the D.L.P.' His suggestion that the Victorian 
Branch should discontinue its association with the D.L.P. was not well 
received.
The Communists were uncomfortably aware, however, that the 
united front was gradually losing its momentum and that, unless 
conditions altered, a stalemate in the overall struggle with the 
Groupers would soon be reached. The problem was not one of leader­
ship: although many of the British Communist Party’s trade union 
officials had resigned during the revisionist crisis, the Australian
75
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78Party retained the loyalty of its important industrial leaders.
The problem, as Healy told the 18th Congress, was that the trade union
v
movement would never be strong (that is, well organised, militant and
class conscious) while many trade union leaders were reformists, while
low union membership fees were the rule (producing a loose membership),
and while the workers retained their faith in the arbitration system.
'Many workers have come to believe that it is only the Award that
79protects their wages and conditions, not the union.' Nevertheless, as
McPhillips observed in a pamphlet, many traditional unionists were now
80regarding the arbitration system with hostility, but this trend was
being offset by the entry into trade union ranks of immigrant workers,
especially those from Eastern Europe, many of whom were predisposed to
hate Communists on sight. H. Stein reported to the 18th Congress on
the need to devote attention to New Australian workers and to prevent
81tension developing between them and 'old' Australians. In the last 
resort, however, the Communists were banking on trade union militancy 
arising in a situation of economic crisis and widespread unemployment. 
Instead, the economy continued to thrive; there was an average of
78
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56,722 registered unemployed in 1957 and an average of 64,736 in 
821958. Dixon suggested that the Party should work with the
83unemployed in requesting more benefits and in forming committees
but this course of action was not seriously pursued in 1958.
Two political factors strengthened the united front in 1957
and 1958; one was the consolidation and increased militancy of the
A.C.T.U. and the other was the D.L.P's campaign to obtain the
abolition of compulsory union levies for political funds. The
A.C.T.U*s 1955 Congress had decided that a special committee should
advise on methods which would permit representatives of the affiliated
unions (arranged in groups according to industry) to be elected to the
Interstate Executive. In a report to the A.C.T.U. Congress of
September 1957, the committee recommended that six such representatives
should be elected directly by the Congress delegates whereas previously
only the four officers had been elected by the Congress itself, tue
remaining ten executive members being appointed by the individual
84State Branches of the A.C.T.U. The proposed changes were adopted 
by the Congress despite right-wing opposition, and, in the subsequent 
elections for the six new executive members, three Communists (J. Healy
82
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G.M. Dawson and G. Seelaf) were returned. These, along with
A. MacDonald, the Communist delegate from the A.C.T.U's Queensland
branch, constituted an active minority group on the new executive.
As in 1956, an alliance of Communist, militant and traditionalist
delegates dominated the Congress and passed resolutions condemning
the «Japanese Peace Treaty, calling for a 35-hour week and criticising
85the Arbitration Court’s handling of the basic wage question. The
Interstate Executive, even before this Congress, had followed a radical
course on a number of issues: it sent two delegations to Communist
86China, both of whicn attended May Day celebrations in Peking, and
it delegated its Vice President to represent it at the All-China
87Trade Union Congress in 1958. Healy reported with satisfaction
to the 18th Congress that the A.C.f.U. ’has become more stabilised,
88its authority as a national centre has become stronger.’ Its value 
in reinforcing the united front was considerable.
The united front was given an additional boost by the hostility 
shown by unionists to attempts made in 1958 to deprive trade unions 
of the right to impose compulsory political levies on ^heir members.
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In May 1957, H.E. Holt, the Minister for Labour, had told the House 
of Representatives that the Government was contemplating legislation
89to protect unionists not wanting to contribute to compulsory levies, 
a statement which disturbed the A.L.F«, whose financial dependence on 
trade union contributions was known to be considerable« The D«L«P« 
had an interest in breaking the practice of compulsory union levies 
because its main chance of becoming a major party depended on its 
ability to attract support from the A«L«P«, which would have had 
difficulty in finding additional sources of electioneering funds before 
the election of December 1958« All these motives and fears come to 
bear on a dispute which arose in the Hobart waterfront early in 1958« 
Frank Hursey and his son Denis, both D«L«P« supporters and members of 
the Hobart Branch of the W.W.F., were in February 1958 expelled from 
their union and prevented from working on the waterfront because they 
had not contributed to a compulsory levy of 10/- per member on
902 October 1956 to provide funds for the Tasmanian Branch of the A.L.F.
The Hurseys soon became the centre of a cause celebre, and received
good notice in the mainland newspapers« In March, Holt reminded the
House that the Government might introduce a measure to prevent the
91exaction of compulsory union levies for political purposes; in
89
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April, the Federal Council of the Grouper-controlled F.C.U. asked
92the Government to Dring forward such legislation. “ The Hurseys,
meanwhile, were being attacked by the Communists and lionised by the
D.L.P.; at a large Sydney meeting, Frank Hursey said that the Hobart
93watersiders had tried to murder him. With D.L.P. encouragement,
the Hurseys took their case to the courts. The Tasmanian Supreme
Court came out in their favour; in delivering His judgment on 7 November
1958, Sir Stanley Burbury, C.J., held that the Hurseys had been within
their rights in not paying the disputed levy, the imposition of which
was not within any express or implied power conferred by any W.W.F.
94Federal or Branch Rule. The Hobart Branch of the W.W.F. appealed
to the High Court, which in September 1959 ruled that the union had
validly imposed the compulsory levy and reduced the damages awarded
95to the Hurseys from £5,000 to £2,000.
At the time of the 1958 election, however, this outcome had 
not been expected. As the parties developed their campaigns in 
October and November, two symbols were extracted from industrial 
politics - the Hursey case and the unity ticket. Both were to 
seriously embarrass the A.L.P. and Dr Evatt.
92
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The 1958 election
In a pre-election survey, which appeared in the Communist Review
tor September 1958, Snarkey sketched in the broad lines of the strategy
96the Party would pursue in the forthcoming campaign. The defeat
of the reactionary wenzies Government was the principal objective,
he declared, because ’Menzies’ opposed the peace movement, served the
interests of American and Australian monopoly capitalists, and
acted as the agent of American imperialism in South-East Asia, lie
had tola the 18th Congress that the return of a Lahor Government would
nean a better Australian foreign policy, a tougher policy towards
nonopolies and a more progressive administration generally.
We Communists do not believe that the Labor Party’s 
program can finally answer the problems raised by monopoly 
capitalism. We do not believe that the Labor Party leader­
ship can establish the socialist order of society.
Only a militant revolutionary vanguard party, the 
Communist Party, can successfully fulfil those historic 
tasks.
But a Labor Government with a progressive immediate 
program of reforms at home and a peaceful foreign policy 
is possible if Menzies can be defeated at the forthcoming 
elections. That would be a step in the right direction in 
existing conditions.^
The Party’s tactics were to follow the usual pattern. It would 
-un a minimum of candidates and direct its supporters to give their
)6
See especially Communist Review, September 1958, pp.367-73; 18th 
Kongress, April, 1958. Report of L.L. Sharkey, pp.12-14, 57.
)7
Ibid., p.32.
338
98second preferences to Labor candidates. At the same time, it was
to use whatever influence it possessed to persuade the D.L.P.
to exchange its preferences with the A.L.P., so long as the latter
was not obliged to accept the D.L.P’s ’reactionary, semi-fascist
99outlook and policies.' Sharkey still insisted that the D.L.P*s 
rank-and-file belonged by temperament to the Labor movement and that 
they would not side with the Right in the last resort. He stated 
in his pre-election survey;
We advocate this line of approach because we believe 
there are honest workers, temporarily misled by the false 
propaganda of the D.L.P. and the capitalist press, who will 
eventually return to the ranks of the labour movement.
A political atmosphere snouiu be created wherein the 
D.L.P. leaders would be compelled, willv nilly, to direct 
their second preferences to the A.L.P.^0
Although evidence is lacking on this point, it is probable that the
Communist Party directed some of its workers to assist progressive
A.L.P. candidates combat the D.L.P.; the Communist worker whom
Westerway found supporting Leslie Haylen in Parkes may not have been
♦ • 101 an exception.
98
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102The Communists' e l e c t i o n  programme was m oderate by t h e i r
s t a n d a r d s , though n o t  by o th e r  p a r t i e s * .  The P a r ty  recommended
such m easures a s  a c u t  in  defence  e x p e n d i tu re ,  th e  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n
o f  m onopolies ,  r a i s i n g  th e  f e d e r a l  b a s ic  wage to  th e  le v e l  i t  would
have reached  bu t f o r  th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  the  q u a r t e r l y  ad ju stm en t in
1953, th e  r e p e a l  o f  r e p r e s s iv e  l e g i s l a t i o n  a g a in s t  th e  t r a d e  u n io n s ,
and b e t t e r  c r e d i t ,  d rough t r e l i e f  and f r e i g h t  r a t e s  f o r  fa rm e rs .
In  t h e i r  propaganda, however, t h e  Communists dw elt w ith  en thusiasm
on t n e i r  f a v o u r i t e  h a te  symbols. Tne Tribune* s c a r t o o n i s t ,
H. M cClintock en joyed  h im se lf  immensely in  com piling  a ca r toon
pamphlet e n t i t l e d  'Bob and His Weird Mob', in  which 'M enzies '
appeared  in  v a r io u s  s ta g e s  of d r e s s  and un d ress  b e t r a y in g  th e  p e o p l e 's
i n t e r e s t s  w ith gay abandon, in  th e  'C ase  o f  th e  M issing  M i l l i o n s '
a c o rp u le n t  M enzies, a r ro g a n t  and heavy jow led , i s  shown runn ing
p a s i  puzz ied  c i t i z e n s  w ith  a huge sack  c o n ta in in g  £1 ,570  m i l l i o n ;
he ig n o re s  th e  p le a s  o f  people  w anting t h i s  money f o r  in c re a s e d
p e n s io n s ,  endowments, e d u ca t io n  g r a n t s ,  and th e  l i k e ,  and f i n a l l y
pours  i t  th rough  a d r a i n - g r i l l  t o  be c o l l e c t e d  by a K i tc h e n e r - ty p e
g e n e ra l  and a d ecaden t businessm an , both  i n t e r e s t e d  in  in c re a s e d  
103arms e x p e n d i tu re .
A ll  th e  Communists counted  f o r  in  th e  campaign, however, 
was t h e i r  v a lu e  to  th e  Government p a r t i e s  and th e  D .L .P . as  a bogey 
102
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with which to embarrass the Labor Party, A Country Party member,
P.E. Lucock, had suggested to the House in April that another
referendum should be held to ban the Communist Party, whereupon Holt
had announced that the Government would not consider another attempt
104until the A.L.P. was prepared to advocate the ban as well. In duly,
Menzies had stated that the Communist threat would be the main issue
105in the Government’s election campaign. In the event, as Rawson
106has noted, Menzies did not make extensive use of such issues 
as unity tickets, the Petrov Case and the A.L.P’s alleged connection 
with the Communist Party (although he did tell a Sydney audience 
that he still favoured banning the latter) during the actual 
campaign - but he hardly needed to, because the D.L.P. made its 
main concern the stressing and restressing of these very issues. 
Despite its moderate policy, the A.L.P. was unable to counter effec­
tively such charges, and, despite Dr Evatt's offer to resign in
108exchange for D.L.P. preferences, it was unable to reach any under­
standing with its new rival.
The results did not alter the position of the parties very much, 
which came as a blow to those Labor supporters who had hoped that
104
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t h e i r  p a r ty  would d em o n stra te  by i t s  in c re a s e d  s t r e n g th  t h a t  th e  
D .L .P . d id  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a s e r io u s  danger .  In  th e  House o f  R epresen­
t a t i v e s ,  th e  L ib e r a l  P a r ty  ga in ed  one s e a t ,  b r in g in g  i t s  t o t a l  to  58, 
and th e  Country P a r t y ,  which a l s o  g a in ed  one p la c e ,  reached  19 members, 
g iv in g  a t o t a l  c o a l i t i o n  s t r e n g t h  o f  77 in  a House o f  122; L abor’ s 
t o t a l  f e l l  from 47 to  45 . The Government a l s o  won a m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  
S en a te  p la c e s ;  when th e  new members to o k  t h e i r  p la c e s  a f t e r  1 J u ly  1959, 
th e  s t a t e  o f  th e  p a r t i e s  was Government 32, A .L .P . 26 and D .L .P . 2, so 
t h a t  th e  Government once more r e g a in e d  th e  c o n t ro l  o f  th e  Sena te  i t  
had l o s t  in  1956. There was some su g g e s t io n  t h a t  th e  G overnm ent's  
g a in s  in  th e  House o f  R e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  were due to  th e  h e lp  i t s  members 
r e c e iv e d  from D .L .P , p r e f e r e n c e s ,  which he lped  th e  L ib e ra l  and Country 
P a r t i e s  to  win 20 o f  t h e i r  s e a t s .  I n t e r e s t  a l s o  c e n t re d  on th e  showing
of th e  D .L .P . and th e  ß*k .P .»  who t o g e th e r  p o l l e d  9 .40  per cen t o f  th e
, 109
v o te s  in  th e  House e l e c t i o n  and 7 .6  per  cen t  in  th e  S ena te  e l e c t i o n .
In  V i c t o r i a ,  where th e  D .L .P . p o l l e d  14.75 per  c e n t  o f  th e  v o te s  c a s t  
in  t h e  House e l e c t i o n ,  Rawson found t h a t ,  on th e  whole, th e  p a r ty  
had l o s t  ground in  Labor s e a t s  and ga ined  ground in  L ib e ra l  and 
Country P a r ty  s e a t s ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  i t s  s o c i a l  base  was changing . 
Rawson concluded t h a t  th e  D .L .P 's  Labor b i a s  had ' c e r t a i n l y  been 
s h a rp ly  reduced .
Tü9
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The Communist Party stood 20 candidates for the House of 
Representatives and polled 20,337 votes, or 0.53 per cent of the 
total vote. Of the 20 seats, 17 had also been contested at the 1955 
election and in 15 of these the Communist vote declined appreciably. 
This decline was partly attributable to the fact that many progressive 
voters may have voted for the Labor Party to support it against the 
D.L.P., which intervened with effect in most of Labor’s blue ribbon 
seats. The Communists' Senate teams won 134,263 votes (or 2.6 per 
cent of the total), 101,516 of which came from New South Wales, where 
the Party again won first place on the ballot paper. Yet here again 
a general decline may be noted if these results are compared with 
those of 1955; in Victoria, for example, the Communists were not placed 
first on the ballot paper in either poll and there the Party's Senate 
vote dropped from 13,471 in 19o5 to 11,525.^**
The Party's commentators made heavy weather of interpreting 
the results, which were discouraging from every possible angle - the 
A.L.P. had not improved on its 1955 position, the D.L.P. had shown 
its staying power and, to cap everything, the Communist vote had gone 
down. Tribune warned its readers against seeing too much in the 
Party's loss of votes.
This is not due to any decrease in support for Party 
policy but must be attributed to the strong desire among 
workers to get rid of Menzies.
_
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There i s  s t i l l  la ck  o f  c l e a r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  system  of v o t in g .
T h is  caused many w orkers  who ag ree  w ith  th e  Communist 
P a r t y ’ s program t o  n e v e r t h e l e s s  g iv e  t h e i r  No. 1 v o te  to  
A .L .P , c a n d id a te s  ou t o f  f e a r  o f  s p l i t t i n g  th e  an t i-M en z ie s  
v o te  i f  th ey  gave i t  to  th e  Communist P a r ty .
O ther f a c t o r s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  th e  r e s u l t s ,  a cc o rd in g  t o  T r ib u n e , were
th e  D .L .P ’s second p r e f e r e n c e s ,  t h e  i n t e r n a l  d i v i s i o n s  w ith in  th e
A .L .P .  and L a b o r ’ s u n in s p i r i n g  c a m p a i g n . W r i t i n g  f o r  th e  Communist
Review in  J a n u a ry ,  Sharkey r e p e a te d  th e s e  p o in t s  and added some o f h i s
own. P ro p o r t io n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  he su g g es ted  was ’ th e  only  way to
113s e c u re  a more f a i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  in  a b o u rg eo is  ’’dem ocracy"' .  The
'w o rsen in g  economic p o s i t i o n . . .was l a r g e l y  concea led  from th e  people
d u r in g  th e  course  o f  th e  e l e c t i o n  cam paign , ' and ' t h e  b u lk  of th e
D .L .P . s u p p o r t ’ had been drawn from th e  Labor P a r ty ,  th u s  weakening i t
114in  i t s  f i g n t  a g a i n s t  th e  Government. Tue h e a r t - s e a r c h in g  w ith in  th e
A .L . r .  was much more p a i n f u l .  F .E .  Chamberlain sugges ted  t h a t  L abo r’ s
d e f e a t  was 'due  to  th e  f e a r  o f  Communism, p a r t i c u l a r l y  on th e  p a r t  o f
a s e c t i o n  o f  th e  community whose r e l i g i o u s  p e rs u a s io n  makes i t  su sc e p -
115t i n l e  t o  th e  s u s t a in e d  propaganda to  which i t  has been s u b j e c t e d . '  
O thers  were say ing  t h a t  had th e  A .L .P . ta k en  a s t r o n g e r  l i n e  a g a in s t
112
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u n i t y  t i c k e t s  b e fo re  th e  e l e c t i o n  t h e  Communist bogey would n o t
have proved so p o te n t  a weapon a g a i n s t  i t .  The P a r t y ’ s f a i l u r e  to
make up th e  ground i t  had l o s t  a t  t h e  1955 p o l l  r e in f o r c e d  th e
im p ress io n  t h a t  th e  D .L .P . was c o n t in u in g  to  a t t r a c t  a good dea l of
su p p o r t  from form er Labor s u p p o r te r s ,  and t h a t  w h ile  Dr E v a t t  remained
le a d e r  of th e  P a r l ia m e n ta ry  P ar ty  i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  win th e s e
back to  th e  f o l d ,  E v a t t ’ s p o s i t i o n  was c e r t a i n l y  weakened by th e
e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t .  The Conanunists were once more v i s i t e d  by t h e i r  o ld
f e a r  t h a t  r ig h t -w in g  e lem en ts  w i th in  th e  A .L .P . might swing i t  away
from th e  p ro g re s s iv e  l i n e  marked ou t by th e  d e c i s io n s  o f  th e  Hobart
and B risbane  C onferences  and even r e s u l t  in  i t s  forming a new agreement
w ith  th e  D .L .P , A lready  in  September 1958 Sharkey had spoken o f  th e
116need to  ' s t r e n g th e n  th e  independen t r o l e  o f  th e  Communist P a r t y . ’
These and o th e r  s ig n s  su g g es ted  t h a t  th e  p e r io d  o f  t h e  u n i te d  f r o n t  
might be coming t o  an end .
116
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CHAPTER NINE
THE COMMUNIST PARTY REAFFIRMS ITS IDENTITY AS THE 
A.L.P. MOVES TO THE RIGHT
Since the 1956 Federal Election, the Communist Party has faced 
considerable difficulty in acting out its general strategy of the 
united front. Both Dr Evatt and later A.A. Calwell, who became the 
Labor leader in March 1960, used all their powers to break down the 
practice of unity tickets in trade union elections and generally to 
dissociate the A.L.P. from the Coomunists. Recent years have also 
seen the gradual rebuilding of anti-Communist feeling in some quarters, 
especially in such organisations as the R.S.L. and those associated 
with various Catholic lay movements, such as Santamaria1s National 
Civic Council. The Communist Party's response to these difficulties 
has been cautious; to the present, it continues to advocate the united 
front strategy but it has now chosen to emphasise certain new tactical 
schemes. For one tning, the Communist leaders have been stressing the 
need for the Party to preserve its separate identity, on the grounds 
that only a strong and open Communist Party can show the people the 
way to Socialism; this line contrasts with that of the mid-fifties, 
when the Communists had spoken of a possible radicalisation of the 
A.L.P. and of its eventual fusion with the Communist Party.
To describe the shifts of the period 1959-62 in these terms 
is to oversimplify what was an extremely involved process of adaptation. 
This chapter will follow the development of the Party's latest situation
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in  t h r e e  s t a g e s ,  b eg inn ing  w ith  th e  p e r io d  c o v e r in g  Dr E v a t t ' s  l a s t  
y e a r  as  Labor l e a d e r .
The A .L .P ,  ad o p ts  a  to u g h e r  p o l ic y  on th e  u n i ty  t i c k e t  i s s u e ,  1959-60 
The Communists' i n t e r e s t  in  th e  morphology o f  th e  A .L .P . was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t r o n g  a f t e r  th e  1956 e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  had been announced. 
Along w ith  many o th e r  A u s t r a l i a n s ,  th e y  were a sk in g  them se lves  how long 
Dr E v a t t  would remain th e  l e a d e r  o f  th e  P a r l i a m e n ta ry  P a r ty ,  and w hether 
th e  A .L .P . as a whole would begin s h i f t i n g  t o  th e  R ig h t in  an e f f o r t  
t o  c u t  th e  ground from under th e  D .L .P . W ri t in g  f o r  th e  World M arx is t  
Review. Thornton s a id  t h a t  th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  w orkers s t i l l  suppo rted  th e  
A .L .P .  because th e y  b e l ie v e d  t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  i t s  p a s t  f a i l i n g s ,  i t  was 
sound a t  h e a r t  and because  th e  'p r o t r a c t e d  boom', which had l a s t e d  
s in c e  th e  Second World War, had g iven  them th e  i l l u s i o n  t h a t  c a p i t a l i s m  
had b rought p r o s p e r i t y  t o  A u s t r a l i a .  Under e x i s t i n g  c o n d i t io n s ,  he 
f e l t  t h a t  th e  Communists in  th e  t r a d e  un ions snou id  c o n t in u e  t o  p r e s s  
f o r  u n i t e d  a c t io n  w ith  th e  Labor u n i o n i s t s  and t h a t  th e y  shou ld  n o t  
become im p a t ie n t  because  c e r t a i n  u n i o n i s t s  remained 'b a c k w a rd ' .
Trade un io n s  a r e  n o t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  and i t  i s  u n re a l  
to  expec t  th e  membership always t o  have th e  same a t t i t u d e  to  
a l l  q u e s t i o n s .  The p o l ic y  pursued  by th e  union  shou ld  be one 
whicn i s  g e n e r a l ly  in  th e  i n t e r e s t s  of th e  members, b u t  so 
des igned  as t o  g e t  th e  su p p o r t  o f , a l l  or a t  l e a s t  th e  over­
whelming m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  members.1
1
E rn e s t  T horn ton , 'More A c t iv e ly  Put Forward th e  P o l ic y  o f  th e  
P a r t y ' ,  World M a rx is t  Review. December 1959, V o l.  2 , No. 12, p p .5 1 -4 .  
T h is  a r t i c l e  c o n ta in e d  th e  s ta te m e n t  t h a t  th e  boom had l a s t e d  s in c e  th e  
F i r s t  World War; Thornton s a id  l a t e r  he had meant th e  Second World 
War ( Communist Review. F ebruary  i9 6 0 ,  p .6 5 ) .
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Illusions of prosperity and faith in the A.L.P. had made the workers
blind to the failings of their reformist leaders, whose policy Aarons
later described in the following terms;
Their policy is: in the political field, there is only one 
form of action - to vote for a Labor Government and leave 
everything to it; in the trade union field, leave everything 
to the officials, go to arbitration, put a good case, and hope 
for the best. These two policies fit in together to make a 
whole: the policy of class collaboration, of upholding
capitalism
That the A.L.P. was 'the second party of capitalism1 in Australia 
was still the central point in the Communists1 analysis of the Labor 
movement, but Sharkey, in summing up the situation early in 1959, drew 
attention to the tensions between different groups within and without 
the A.L.P. On the extreme Right, he placed the D.L.P. as a party of 
reaction, even of fascism; its supporters, he suggested, were formerly
Q
Labor supporters. Within the A.L.P., however, was an important right- 
wing group whose outlook and policies were similar to those of the 
D.L.P., except that it preferred to subvert the A.L.P. rather than 
intimidate it into accepting anti-Uommunist policies. It followed 
the course prescribed by Cardinal Gilroy, wnile the D.L.P. was acting 
in keeping with the ideas of Archbisnop Mannix.
The difference is in tactics, not principle. The one 
supports the D.L.P. in order to try to protect capitalism
2
Ibid., duly 1961, p.2S0.
3
Ibid., January 1959, p.9. See also S. Aarons in ibid., February 
1959, p.64.
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against the socialist revolution, the others believe the 
same end can be attained by working within the official 
A.L.P. to combat progressive trends and swing the A.L.P. 
to the right, to fascist-like anti-Communism.^
Besides this clerical right wing, Sharkey also distinguished a strong
group of '"traditional" Kightwing reformists' who were concerned to
depose Dr Evatt from party leadership, and who were opposed to the
progressive policies adopted by the party at Hobart and Brisbane. On
the Left of the party was a progressive group, whose outlook was best
represented in the Victorian State Executive. These then were the
main elements of Labor politics; a clerical and neo-fascist D.L.P.
acting as a right-wing pole of attraction; two right-wing groups, one
clerical and the other reformist; and a progressive group. One
danger here was that the two right-wing groups might bring about a
reconciliation with the D.L.F. on the basis of anti-working-class
and anti-Communist policies. The role of the Communist Party under
these circumstances was to bring 'understanding and conviction' to
those A.L.P. supporters who were already class conscious and progressive,
but who nevertheless continued to place mistaken trust in their
reformist leaders. The latter in tneir turn affected an interest ing
progressive policies 'as a sham to deceive the workers.1
In plotting the future course of the Labor movement the Communists 
were unable to rid themselves of their morbid interest in economic
4 “
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5
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6
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crisis. Sharkey reported to the Central Committee that present
indications were for 'a further economic decline, a growth of
reactionary tendencies in all fields' and an attack by the Government
7on the Labor movement and on democratic rights. Dixon said that as 
this crisis developed, unemployment and poverty would spread, the 
capitalists would attack the workers' living standards, and the class 
struggle would intensify. In anticipating the shape of crisis 
politics, however, the Communists provided a different interpretation 
from that which they had offered a few years before; the advice was 
now that the Communists should concentrate on their own Party, affirming 
its identity and building up its strength, and not expect the left- 
wing group in the A.L.P. to save the day. J.R. Hughes reported to 
the Party's New South Wales State Committee:
Comrades, if it were possible to turn the A.L.P. into a 
Socialist Party there would be no need for a Communist Party.
We would fold up our Harty and join the A.L.P. But Lenin 
proved, ana all history confirms, that such a course would 
behead the working class and deny its historical mission to 
advance to socialism. There is only one way forward, one way to ^ 
strengthen socialist ideas, that is to build the Communist farty.
Building the Communist Party necessarily implied providing it with
strong allies amongst the trade unions. Dixon pointed out that the
7
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8
Ibid., p.154.
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Labor Party had sought to create the convention that the A.L.P. should 
deal with politics and the trade unions with economic affairs, within 
the framework of the arbitration system. On the contrary, he argued, 
the trade unions needed more, not less, politics in their affairs.
'A great political and educational campaign is necessary to arouse 
the trade unions to the nature of the capitalist attack, to build 
union solidarity, to develop the political consciousness of the 
workers and to popularise Socialism.'1** Dixon obviously envisaged a 
stage being reached when several of the major trade unions, such 
as the W.W.F. and tne Miners' Federation, would affiliate with the 
Communist Party and supply it with funds. The building up of the 
trade unions around a strong and progressive A.C.T.U. framework was a 
related objective.*1
The Communists' ideas about the A.L.P. were informed by their 
impressions of the Labor Party's Federal Conference, held at 
Canberra in May 1959. Although the Conference had been preceded by 
a rather heated discussion about whether or not the Parliamentary 
Party should have supported the increases in members' and ministers' 
salaries recommended by a special commission, the real issues before 
the delegates (there were six from each of the six State branches) 
was whether the party snould strengthen its ban on unity tickets and
10
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water down tne policies approved by the Hobart and Brisbane 
Conferences. Both steps, it was held, would enable the A.L.P. either 
to reach an understanding with the D.L.P. or to attract away its 
popular support. Labor's disappointing results in tne 1958 election 
had left the impression that the D.L.P. was, for all its unpleasant­
ness, the real obstacle to power, and Dr Evatt and other leaders now 
came under strong pressure to make concessions to the party on their 
Right. Left-wing opposition to such concessions was expressed 
principally by the Victorian State Executive of the A.L.P. and, to 
a lesser extent, by a strong minority faction in the New South Wales 
Branch of the Party. The unions affiliated to the A.L.P. were already 
starting to take two sides over the issue; unions controlled by united 
front administrations tended to oppose concessions while those which 
remained under ex-Grouper or right-wing control, such as the F.I.A., 
urged the need for conciliation. The unity ticket now became the focal 
symbol in the dispute; the left wing defended the practice as a 
legitimate function of trade union politics, arguing that the A.L.P. 
should not interfere in union affairs, while the right wing took the 
view that the party snould break the practice to witness its good
faith as an anti-Communist force. Dr Evatt described unity tickets
12as a 'running sore' which might 'destroy' the Labor Party.
S.M.H., 8 May 1959,
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The A.L.P's Federal Conference did not alter the general frame­
work of the Hobart policies but neither did it add to their number• 
Motions were passed calling for an end to nuclear testing, declaring 
the party's faith in democratic socialism (still undefined) and 
requesting the Federal Parliamentary Party to continue pressing for 
the repeal of the 1951 amendments to the Arbitration Act« The debate 
on unity tickets sharply divided the delegates; those on the Left spoke 
for a motion declaring opposition to interference in trade union affairs 
'providing that the name of the A.L.P. is not used in such a way as to 
create political unity with any other political party', while those 
on the Right supported an amendment reaffirming the previous ban on 
A.L.P. members participating in unity tickets teams and further 
declaring 'the responsibility of all A«L«P« members to ensure that the 
Trade Unions remain in control of Executives sympathetic to and 
supporting A«L.P« policy.' The amendment became the motion and was
passed by 20 votes to lb, the Victorian and South Australian delegations
13voting in the minority along with four Western Australians. Dr Evatt
had, according to all reports, been active behind the scenes to
14obtain this decision. Dixon commented that Evatt*s attack on unity 
tickets, as well as his support of salary increases for parliamentarians,
13
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15shoved that he vas nov on the Right of his party. The Victorian
State Conference of the A.L.P., held in June, asked tue Federal
1 ÖExecutive to reconsider the unity ticket ban but this request,
t
having been opposed by the right-wing Nev South Wales and Tasmanian
17 18State Executives, vas rejected in August by the Federal Executive.
The ban on unity tickets had been instituted primarily to prove
that the A.L.P. vas not soft in its dealings with Communists, in
party politics this would help it to meet the charges being levelled
against it by the D.L.P., but the implications of the ban in trade
union politics had not been seriously considered. The principle of
the ban had been set by the Federal Conference as early as 1957; the
1959 decisions marked an apparent intention to secure its enforcement.
'Enforcement* in what sense? The first stage, obviously, would be to
step up the expulsions from the party of unionists who allowed their
names to be associated with those of Communists, but it was equally
obvious that the A.L.P. would be driven eventually to challenge
the united fronts of the A.L.P., militant ana Communist members which
held in such important unions as the A.R.U., the Miners' Federation
and the W.W.F. In short, the tougher the A.L.P's line on unity
Tö
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tickets the more certain would be its positive intrusion into trade 
union politics - against the Communists and with the ex-Grouper and 
moderate forces represented by such union administrations as Short's 
in the F.I.A. and Dr Lloyd Ross's in tue New South Wales Branch of 
the A.R.U. For in most of the unions where unity tickets were a 
serious issue a rough 'two-party system' had developed. It was clear 
that, if the A.L.f.followed through its ban into direct intervention, 
it would have to form a united front in reverse against the Communists.
In 1959, however, the A.L.i>. took no action in enforcing its 
ban beyond expelling a few of its members here and there. The trend 
in trade union politics, if anytning, was still to the Left. Unemploy­
ment figures were still high, averaging 63,666 in 1959 as compared with 
1964,736 in 1958, and unionists were dissatisfied with their wage rates. 
The A.C.T.U. had been pressing three demands; that the quarterly 
adjustment of the basic wage, suspended in 1953, should be resumed; 
that the basic vage should be substantially increased, not only to take 
account of an alleged fall in the value of real wages since 1953 but 
also to reflect Australian industry's increased productivity since that 
date; and that margins should be restored to their previous ratios 
with the basic vage, the 1947 margin in the case of tradesman fitters 
and that vhich existed before 1954 for all other categories of vorkers. 
There vas videspread dissatisfaction amongst unionists vhen, on 6 June 
19
Keith Hancock, 'Unemployment in Australia1, Australian Quarterly, 
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1959, th e  Commonire&lth C o n c i l ia t io n  and A r b i t r a t io n  Commission
d e c la re d  a g a in s t  th e  A .C .T .U 's  ca se  fo r  r e s to r in g  q u a r te r ly  a d ju s tm e n ts
and gave an in c re a s e  o f  1 5 /-  p e r  week in  th e  b a s ic  wage, which th e
20u n io n s  h e ld  to  be q u i t e  in a d e q u a te .  The wage d e c is io n  sparked  o f f
a s t r i k e  in  th e  B .H .F . s te e lw o rk s  a t  N ew castle  and P o r t  Kembla; S h o rt
d id  h i s  b e s t  to  g e t  F .I .A .  members back to  work and re fu se d  to  a llo w
h is  un ion  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  a 2 4 -hou r stoppage  s tag ed  in  l a t e  J u ly
by a number o f le f t -w in g  and t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  c r a f t  u n io n s , d e s p i te  th e
f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  d em o n stra tio n  had th e  back ing  o f th e  New South  Wales 
21Labor C o u n c il. S h o r t 's  r e s i s t a n c e  to  s t r i k e  a c t io n  p robab ly  p lay ed
in to  th e  hands o f  th e  F . l .A 's  o p p o s itio n  f a c t io n ,  which became more
a c t iv e  a s  d is c o n te n t  sp re a d . L a te r  in  th e  y e a r  two F .I .A .  members
22were f in e d  fo r  a t te n d in g  an u n a u th o r is e d  m ee tin g .
In  most o f  th e  m i l i t a n t  u n io n s  th e  a l l i a n c e  betw een m i l i t a n t s ,
Communists and le f t -w in g  A .L .P . f o r c e s  co n tin u ed  u n im p a ired . In
V ic to r i a ,  J . J .  B row n's u n ite d  f r o n t  a d m in is t r a t io n  improved i t s  p o s i t io n
23in  th e  A.R.U. b a l l o t  o f  Ju n e , w h ile  a D .L .P . a tte m p t to  c a p tu re  th e  
20 ”
A u s tr a l ia n  C ouncil o f T rade U nions. E x e c u tiv e  R eport f o r  c o n s id e ­
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24Amalgamated Postal Workers* Union was foiled. A united front
also lay behind the election of B.M. Nolan ^A.L.P.) to succeed
N. Bird, a Communist, as Secretary of the Victorian Branch of the 
25Seamen*s Union. Mo serious attempt was made to disturb the united 
front administrations in other States; in Queensland, for example, 
the left-wing groups remained in control of the State Branches of 
the Meat industry Employees' union, the Transport Workers' Union, 
the A.E.U., the A.R.U., and the B.W.I.U. and of the Brisbane,
Townsville, üockhampton and Cairns Branches of the W.W.F. At the 
Federal level, the election of W. Mahon iA.L.P.J to succeed G.H.
Neiily as General Secretary of the Miners' Federation passed off 
without any fuss.^
The A.C.i.U. interstate Executive, meanwhile, had earned prestige 
by its energy in pressing the case for an increased basic wage and 
margins before the Arbitration Commission. In January, the A.W.U., 
wnich had never been affiliated to the A.C.T.U., proposed that a
rival trade union federation should be established on the grounds
27that the present one was Communist-controlled. Its chances of forming 
such a body were destroyed when in June the F.I.A's National Conference
24
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28voted to remain within the A.C.T.U. But the F.I.A. had already
become the centre of a right-wing faction within the A.C.T.U., and
rallied sufficient support to dissuade the Interstate Executive from
persisting with its original plan to have trade union representatives
29from Communist countries attend the next A.C.T.U. Congress• The
Congress, held at Melbourne between 31 August and 4 September, was
nevertheless dominated by the majority of Communist, militant and
traditionalist delegates which had swayed the decisions at the 1955 and
1957 meetings; except when the Communist group became imprudent, and
suggested courses of action unacceptable to the centre delegates, the
right-wing faction found itself at an extreme disadvantage in
proceedings. The Congress endorsed the principle of visits from
overseas trade unionists, called for the satisfaction of its demands
for increased wages and margins, and severely criticised the Govern-
30ment's economic policies. It also condemned the penal provisions
of the Arbitration Act but rejected the Communists' proposal for strike
ölaction in protest by 245 votes to 178. In the Executive elections, 
the Communist representation was cut down from four to three;
28
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30
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G.M. Dawson and J. Healy were again appointed as the respective
delegates of the Building and Transport Groups, but G. Seelaf was
defeated in the voting for the Food and Distributive Group delegate 
32by 29 to 24. A. MacDonald had previously been re-elected to
represent the Queensland State Branch.
By this time, it had been widely rumoured that Dr Evatt would
soon be retiring from politics and that under new leadership the
A.L.F. would make a new bid for power. E.F. Hill wrote in the
Communist Review that the bourgeoisie, alarmed at the possibility
that the decline of the A.L.P. might allow the Communist Party to
win mass support, were now trying to repair the damage; 'the Labor
33Party is vital to the maintenance of capitalism.' In February 19ö0 
Evatt resigned as party leader to become Chief Justice of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court; A.A. Calwell and E.G. Whitlam soon emerged 
as the leading candidates for the positions of leader and deputy 
leader respectively. The left-wing groups within the A.L.P. and the 
trade union movement believed that Calwell, if he became leader, would 
move to effect a reconciliation between his party and the D.L.P.
They rallied behind the candidature of R.T. Pollard, an ai.H.R. from 
Victoria; a meeting of about 20 left-wing trade unions at Sydney
32
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33
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34came out in his favour. The Caucus of the Parliamentary Party met 
for the election on 7 March; Calwell defeated Pollard for the leader­
ship by 42 to 30» while Whitlam defeated E.J. Ward for the deputy
35leadership by 38 to 34. Tribune claimed that the contest for the
leadership had been a clash between Left and Right within the A.L.P.
The cleavages in caucus reflect deep conflicts through 
the whole Party. And these in turn are a reflection of the 
A.L.P*s basic contradiction - its two-class nature.
It relies for support on the working class» but pursues 
policies acceptable to capitalism.'^0
Hill suggested later that C&lwell would serve as an instrument
for rehabilitating the Labor Party, 'to cleanse it of Left and
mass influence and restore it to a real bourgeois parliamentary
opposition.' Calwell, he claimed, would soon be attempting to bring
37the A.L.P's policies into line with those of the D.L.P. Dixon
speculated later whether such a shift to the Right would result in a
• 3 8further split in the Labor Party. Spokesmen for the D.L.P. were 
meanwhile denying that Evatt's departure had opened up the possibility 
of a rapprochement between the two parties. In April, Senators Cole
34
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and McManus said that their terms for reconciliation were the rein­
statement of industrial groups in the trade unions, a reversal of 
the Labor Party's foreign policies, the restoration of the 'old*
Victorian and New South Wales State Executives and an amnesty for
39D.L.P. members rejoining the A.L.F«
The A.L.P's drive for power, 1960-61
Senators Cole and McManus were overstating their case; a more
balanced view of the D«L«P's expectations was presented by B.A«
Santamaria in an article published in the Sydney Morning herald on
5 January I960» Santamaria pronounced himself in favour of a
reunified Labor Party and made clear that his conditions were twofold;
a strictly enforced ban on unity tickets in the trade unions and a
40reversal of Labor's 'Hobart' foreign policies« Santamaria was in a 
strong bargaining position; in Victoria, where the D«L«P» had the 
backing of the Church hierarchy, it had shown its ability to hold 
its vote under strong pressure (its share of the vote in Victorian
41State Elections was to rise from 14.4 to 16«9 per cent in July 1961 ).
Its trade union influence was important only in Victoria, where it
39
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retained the affiliation of the State Branches of the F.C.U. and 
the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, along with a 
few smaller unions, but in other States it had already proved its 
nuisance value« The real question, however, was whether the A.L.P, 
would ever win back those of its supporters who had joined the D.L.P.; 
by 1960 the D«L«P. gave all the appearance of becoming a Christian 
Democratic party of the centre Right, with conservative social as 
well as foreign and industrial policies. Santamaria may well have 
been making an offer which he could not have fulfilled, put to the 
test. But at least he added strength to those groups inside the 
A.L.P. who believed that some agreement with the D.L.P. was feasible 
and who therefore pressed for concessions to its outlook. To that 
extent Santamaria1s offer had an important effect.
The tensions within the Labor Party increased considerably
in 1960 and 1961. The Victorian Executive remained as the rallying
point for the left-ving factions and unions while the New South
Wales Executive, especially after C.T. Oliver became its President 
42in November 1960, became more openly anti-Communist and conservative 
in its policies. Victoria and New South Wales were the key States 
as far as the Labor Party was concerned; in Victoria, the right-wing 
forces looked to the leadership of the State Parliamentary Labor 
Party and to Senator Kennelly for guidance, while in New South Wales
S,M,H., 12 November I960.
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a strong, union-based left-wing faction was making its presence felt. 
The Queensland Executive inclined towards the Left, even after the 
State Branch of the A.W.U. reaffiliated with it in July 1 9 6 1 , the 
Western Australian and South Australian Executives tended to keep 
to the centre, and the Tasmanian Executive usually sided with New 
South Wales in serious disputes. As Federal President, and later as 
Federal Secretary, of the A.L.P., F.E. Chamberlain employed his 
considerable personal influence to strike a balance between the two 
sides, but it soon became clear that good offices would not be 
sufficient to avoid divergence. The unity ticket remained the outward 
issue in dispute, the Left claiming that the party should keep out 
of union affairs and the Right claiming tnat it had to provide anti­
communist leadership to the mass of A.L.P. unionists. But the under- 
lying, and possibly more important issue, concerned the A.L.P*s 
future relationship with the D.L.P.; whereas the Left claimed that 
it was not only anti-Communist but anti-Labor and anti-Socialist 
in orientation and that it should therefore be regarded as a 
conservative force, the Rignt within the party claimed that its 
supporters were Labor men at heart and that many of its leaders, 
particularly those with an A.L.P. background, were reasonable men. 
Even if reconciliation could not be achieved in the near future, they
Courier-Mail, 27 June 1961.
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argued, at least the D.L.P. might be persuaded to allocate its second 
preferences to the A.L.F. if the latter took a firm line on unity 
tickets.
Could the D.L.P. vote still be regarded as a potential Labor
vote? There is every indication that Calwell, Whitiam and Senator
Kennelly, for example, thought that it was, and that an electoral
agreement was possible and essential between the two parties. A
special committee established by the A.L.P. Federal Executive to
report on election prospects reported in December I960 that Labor
44could defeat the Government with the aid of D.L.P. preferences. At
the same time, of course, the Labor leaders realised that if' they
made too many concessions to the D.L.P. to obtain such an agreement
they might aggravate the differences within their own party to breaking
point. Senators McManus and Cole made an offer late in 19t>0 to arrange
a preference exchange provided the A.L.P. took steps to enforce its ban
45on unity tickets and changed its foreign policy but this overture
46was rejected by the Federal Executive. The extent to which the 
Federal Parliamentary Party had lost touch with progressive feeling 
in tne Labor movement was borne out during the discussion on the 
Crimes Act Amendment Bill, introduced by the Attorney-General,
_ _
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Sir Garfield Barwick, in September i960. The most objectionable 
features of the original Bill were its exceptionally wide definitions 
of treason, treacnery and espionage; for example, a person was supposed 
to commit the crime of treachery by assisting 'by any means whatever 
an enemy at war with a proclaimed country’, that is, a country 
proclaimed by Parliament. The Communist Party objected to such 
provisions immediately, and the A.C.T.U. and most of the important
unions followed suit; but it was not until late October that the
47Parliamentary Labor Party came out against tne Bill.
The A.L.P’s 24tn Federal Conference, also held at Canberra, in 
April 1961, was most significant- for its clandestine than its public 
politics. Publicly, it passed resolutions which indicated certain 
important shifts from the spirit, if not the letter, of the Hobart 
policies; its motion on West New Guinea, favouring the right of self 
determination by the native people and U.N. mediation, implied a 
denial of the Indonesian claim to tne territory; while urging the 
recognition of Communist China it asked that ’a sympathetic and 
informed attitude be taken to the problem of Formosa'; while calling 
for the withdrawal of Australian troops from Maiaya, it expressed the 
desire to see SEATO become more of a cultural and economic than a 
military body - but accepting its continuation all the same; other 
47
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motions were passed advocating a revision of the Crimes Act and
the Arbitration Act, to remove its penal clauses and supporting, by
working througn the appropriate agencies, increases in wages and
salaries«40 The clash on unity tickets took place behind the scenes;
the Victorian delegates had planned to make an issue of their demand
that the ban on unity tickets be relaxed, but were persuaded just
before the conference began to drop the motion they had submitted to
that effect. During the conference, the right-wing delegates from New'
South Wales and Tasmania did their best to raise the issue but the
matter was glossed over, the conference simply reaffirming its previous 
49decisions. In the months following the conference, however, Calwell
made statements which linked the two central problems; on the one hand
he expressed the opinion that many D.L.P. voters would return to the
A.L.P. at tne impending Victorian and Federal Elections^ and on the
other he warned that A.L.P. members knowingly standing on unity tickets
51would be expelled from the party.
In July the election for the officers of the A.L.P. Federal 
Executive were held. In the ballot for President, the right and 
left-wing candidates, W.E. Colbourne and J.V. Stout respectively,
48
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obtained equal votes; Colbourne's name was then drawn from a hat.
A former Grouper, Colbourne soon showed that his term of office 
would be an eventful one; before long he was railing against the
Communist Party as 'a subversive, anti-God and anti-Christian organi-
53sation.* Meanwhile, events in Victoria had brought the unity ticket
issue into the limelight once more. Unusual prominence had been given
in the press to the election of the Victorian A.R.U. Branch, held in
dune, in which J.J* Brown's united front team (which included a
member of the State A.L.P. Executive) again easily defeated the 
54Groupers. The Victorian State Election, held on 15 July, resulted 
in another defeat for the Labor Party and an increased D.L.P. vote; 
the Victorian Parliamentary Labor Party blamed its poor showing on 
the prevalence of unity tickets in the State and reported this opinion 
to the A.L.P. Federal Executive. The latter decided to meet in 
August to consider what action, if any, it should take against the 
Victorian Executive; three Victorian unions, including the State 
A.R.U. Branch, warned against direct intervention, while officials 
of several New South Wales unions and party branches petitioned
55the Federal Executive opposing any electoral pact with the D.L.P.
52
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When the Federal Executive met, Whitlam and Senators McKenna and
Kennelly urged strong action on the grounds that unless the ban on
unity tickets were enforced Labor would be at a disadvantage in
56contesting the coming Federal Election; the Victorian and Queensland
delegates are reported to have opposed intervention on principle while
Calwell and Chamberlain urged the need for conciliation. Indeed, there
is every likelihood that their reluctance to proceed to strong measures
was partly governed by their fear that the Left might break away from
the A.L.P. and attempt to establish a Social Democratic party, in the
event, the Executive confirmed its previous decisions on the ban,
declared that it favoured members of the A.L.P. contesting union
elections against Communists, and asked the various State Branches to
57report back on what steps were being taken to enforce the ban. In
September, Calwell expressed the hope that the D.L.P. and the Q.L.P.
would agree to an exchange of preferences with the A.L.P.; his
58proposal was promptly rejected by D.L.P. spokesmen.
The months preceding the election saw the Victorian Executive 
put up a brave show of 'enforcing the ban'. It called upon three 
members of the Melbourne Branch of the W.W.F. to answer charges of
56
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59supporting Communists; later it expelled tiro A.L.P. members for
supporting a Communist against an A.L.P. team in the B.W.I.U. State 
60Branch ballot. The A.L.P. team von the latter contest, which
meant that the B.W.l.U. Branches in Victoria, Canberra, Tasmania and
61western Australia had now been freed from Communist control. The
New South Wales Executive, under Oliver's Presidency, had been
conspicuously vigorous in expelling unity ticketeers; in September two
members of the Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union were expelled from
the party on unity ticket charges, while in November two A.L.P.
members of the Electrical Trades Union were expelled for the same
reason. Expulsions were also being effected in South Australia 
„ 64and in other States.
Already the A.L.P. was being driven beyond the stage of 
merely enforcing its ban on unity tickets to that of directly 
intervening in union affairs. This was dramatically illustrated in
59
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the widely publicised election of the General Secretary of the
W.W.F. in late 1961. The death of the former General Secretary,
J. Healy, on 13 duly 1961 came as a severe blow to the Communist
Party; Healy had held that position since 1937 and had become a
figure of respect and affection amongst waterside workers in all the
main ports, dust before his death he had been re-elected by 16,031
t)5votes to the 3,683 accorded his Grouper rival, V.C. Alford. As
his successor the Communists nominated Tom Nelson, Secretary of the
Sydney Branch of the W.W.F. and a well-known Party member; the A.L.P«
responded by putting forward its own nominee, C. Fitzgibbon, President
of the Newcastle Branch of the W.W.F. and a member of the New South
Wales A.L.P. Executive. Fitzgibbon's candidature was openly supported
by Calwell and Colbourne and was actively canvassed by the D.L.P. and
66Santamaria's N.C.C. The ballot, held on 14 November, produced a 
surprise result; Fitzgibbon defeated Nelson by 11,088 votes to 8,921 
(two other candidates polled small totals) indicating a shift of
6Tabout 8,000 votes since Healy's re-election earlier in the year.
The Communist Party's vulnerability, even in one of its fortress 
unions, was fully exposed, and once more the lesson was driven home 
that its support in the unions more often reflected the popularity and
65
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efficiency of its officers than the appeal of its ideology. Nelson
von majorities in the Sydney, Port Kembla, Cairns, Launceston and
Urangan Branches of the union, but elsevbere Fitzgibbon emerged a
68clear winner. The votes in the chief ports were)
Fitzgibbon Nelson
Sydney 1,676 3,110
Melbourne 2,210 1,682
Adelaide 1,210 413
Brisbane 1,163 774
Fremantle 1,362 417
Hobart 923 494
Fitzgibbon, following his election, faced the difficulty of working 
with an Executive composed of militant and Communist unionists, but 
the value of his election as a symbol was immense.
By the end of 1961, the Federal Labor leaders were becoming 
accustomed to intervening in union elections. Whitlam supported 
the A.L.P. nominee who came close to defeating J.W. Bevan in the
69election for the General Secretaryship of the Boilermakers' Society;
Calwell sent a congratulatory telegram to Short when his administration
70again won a clear majority in the F.I.A. election of December 1961.
The Communists scored a few successes here and there (a Communist, 
dI . Gallagher, was elected Federal Secretary of the Builders Labourers'
68
Courier-Mail. 16 November 1961. For the background to the election, 
see R.J. May, ’Political Review', Australian Quarterly. December 1961, 
Vol• XXXIII, No. 4, pp.103-4.
69
Bulletin, 21 October 1961; Tribune, 22 November 1961.
70
See Age, 5 December 1961; Tribune, 6 December 1961.
371
71Federation, formerly under traditionalist control ) but on the 
whole they found themselves losing positions, even in the fortress
unions. In the A.E.U. their hold became less firm; in February 1961,
v
a Communist, C.M. Southwell, narrowly defeated three opponents to
72secure election to the union’s Commonwealth Council - this meant
that all three members of the Council were Communists but the size
of the opposition vote had been disquieting. Later in the year, one
of the Communist councillors, A. Wilson, was defeated by a non-party,
73anti-Communist candidate, C. Shearer. In October, the Communist
Secretary of the union’s Melbourne District was re-elected by a 
. 74very narrow margin.
As the new offensive against the Communists gathered momentum in 
the individual unions, moves were being made in the trade union 
movement as a whole to reduce the amount of left-wing influence in 
A.C.T.U. affairs. The A.C.T.U., however, was in a particularly strong 
position; in duly 1961, following its representations, the Arbitration 
Commission granted an increase of 12/- in the basic wage (although 
the A.C.T.U. had pressed for 49/-) and agreed to an annual adjustment 
of the new level by the Consumer Retail Price Index, which was preferred
71
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7öto the older 'C Serie» Index. These gains were widely appreciated
throughout the trade union movement. The A.C.T.U. was under attack
on several fronts. In 1960, Senator Cole had revived the D.L.P's
longstanding complaint about trade union's imposing compulsory
political levies upon their members and in August 1960 announced his
intention of introducing a private member’s bill to allow unionists
7 6to refuse to contribute to such levies. The A.C.T.U. parried this
move by declaring its opinion 'that a compulsory political election
77levy should not be applied by affiliated unions'; although this was no
more than a recommendation , the Federal Government declared itself
78satisfied with the statement as a declaration of policy. Cole's 
bill was defeated on the second reading division in November, four
79Government Senators voting with the two D.L.P. members in its favour.
A more serious attack was developed over the reciprocal visits issue.
In May 1960, the A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive decided to impose a levy
75
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on its affiliated unions to help finance reciprocal visits between
Australian unionists and union delegations from other countries,
gOincluding Communist countries. The A.C.T.U. invited both a 
British Trades Union Congress delegation and the Secretary of the Inter­
national Confederation of Free Trade Unions to visit Australia but
neither accepted; in late I960 a delegation from Communist China arrived
81for a rather stormy visit and later an A.C.T.U. delegation visited 
82China. During this time, however, a number of right-wing unions, 
including the F.I.A., the F.C.U. and the Australasian Society of 
Engineers had roused strong opposition both to the special levy and to 
the principle of reciprocal visits with Communist countries. In May 
1961, in an effort to appease the opposition, the Interstate Executive 
decided to suspend future visits (a delegation from the Soviet Union 
had been expected) until the A.C.T.U. Congress had considered the
83matter. Fully eighteen unions had by July aligned themselves with
the F.I.A. in refusing to pay their affiliation fees unless the special 
levy were dropped, but the A.C.T.U. President, Ä.E, Monk, refused to 
give way on the essential principle. As a result, none of the 18 
unions attended the A.C.T.U. Congress in September 1961. There was
80
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some talk afterwards of their forming a rival trade union federation®4
but subsequently only one of the lb disaffiliated with the A.C*T«U.;
by the end of the year the Interstate Executive was exploring the
85possibilities of a reconciliation«
In the absence of the 18 right-wing unions, the A.C.T.U. Congress 
was expected to be a riotously left-wing affair, but in fact it 
maintained the moderate tenor of the previous congresses. It endorsed 
the Executive's line on the special levy and reciprocal visits issue, 
declared that the basic wage was still 48/— per week short of the 
desired level and called for increased margins« The Executive 
elections showed a decided drop in Communist influence, despite the 
absence of the 18 dissenters« G.M. Dawson was elected as the Building 
Group representative by a decreased majority while G. Seelaf's defeat 
in the ballot for the Food and Distributive Group representative was 
even more decisive than in 1959; Mealy's place as representative of 
the Transport Group was taken by a non-Communist militant, M. O'Brien, 
Federal Secretary of the A.R.U«; the Communists' representation on 
the Interstate Executive was maintained at three only because T« Wright
84
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of the Sheet Metal Workers' Union, was elected unopposed as the •
representative of the Metal Group, a result which would certainly
87have not occurred had the F.I.A. been present.
The Communist Party's reactions to these trends inside the Labor 
Party and the trade union movement were mixed; enthusiasm for united 
front work appears to have fallen off considerably in I960 and 19öl, 
especially amongst the Party's trade union cadres, and once more com­
plaints about left sectarianism began to outnumber those about right 
opportunism. But Sharkey and Dixon continued to develop the doctrinal 
points they had laid down in 1959; the A.L.P. is shifting rightwards 
under the attraction of the D.L.P., but its own left wing will prevent 
it from going too far. Therefore, the united front should be main­
tained, if for no other reason than to ensure the defeat of the 
Menzies Government. The Party's 19th Congress of June 19bl gave the 
leaders an opportunity to state their case at length. Sharkey's 
criticism of the Menzies Government followed the usual line (the agent 
of U.S. imperialism, a war administration etc. ), and he continued 
to explain its long term in office by the 'protraction' of the post­
war boom and its use of press, radio and television as 'an enormous 
propaganda machine.♦.which practically brainwashes the people with
87
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lying propaganda and bourgeois ideology twenty-four hours per day,
89every day,' But the theme which he and Dixon highlighted was: 
'Menzies, the agent of the Monopolies' - a theme which was to form 
the centre piece of the Party's election propaganda. Ralph Gibson, 
writing in 1959, had drawn attention to the existence of three main 
monopoly groups in Australia, each more or less interlocking; the 
metal group (consisting of B.H.P., the Collins house group of com­
panies and the National Bank of Australasia Ltd), the sugar group 
(dominated by the Colonial Sugar Refining Co* Ltd) and a powerful 
group of British overseas companies. Growing up alongside these was
a new group composed of American subsidiary companies, such as General 
90Motors-Holden's . Dixon spoke of the monopolies supplying the funds
91of the Liberal and Country Parties although Aarons claimed in 1961
that the Menzies Government served the special interests of the metal 
92group. The Resolution adopted by the Congress made a special point
93of condemning monopolies and demanding measures for their control.
The Communists' analysis of trends within the Labor Party still 
conformed to the main lines set down in 1959. In his Report to the
89
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19th Congress, Sharkey again illustrated his argument with references
to two right-wing groups, the one clerical and pro-Grouper and the
other traditionalist and opportunist, and a smaller progressive section 
94within the A.L.P, There was now, however, greater stress laid on the 
ambitions of the pro-Grouper wing of the Party, seen as the power 
behind the agitation for banning unity tickets. According to 
L. Aarons:
The main danger is the extreme rightwing within the 
Labor Party - the DLP fellow travellers like Short and company, 
and others who fully accept the main tenets of Grouper policy 
and want an unprincipled compromise with the DLP.
This rightwing has stealthily regained power in the ALP 
against the wishes of the majority of ALP members and supporters, 
Some prominent leaders of the centre and even some of those 
called Left ALP’ers are compromising with this rightwing.^5
It will be noticed that Aarons talks here of 'the extreme rightwing1 
and 'the centre' rather than of two rightist groups; this classifi­
cation found greater favour in 1962, as we shall see shortly.
Sharkey argued that the pressure of these two groups had swung 
the A.L.P. to the Eight: 'The trend in the A.L.P. today is further 
towards the extreme Right, to a more open position as the alternative 
party of capitalism.'" The shift was intended to bring the A.L.P.
94
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into line with the D*L.F* on policy matters, with a view to 
arranging either an electoral pact or a reunification of the two
parties; it could be measured by the fact that the Labor Party’s
foreign policy in particular was becoming indistinguishable from
the Government’s* For example, Sharkey cited the fact that the
A.L.P. had not supported Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea, that
it had come to accept SEATO as a desirable alliance, and that it had
97recommended 'a sympathetic and informed attitude' towards Taiwan.
For all this, Sharkey argued, the Communist Party still needed to 
pursue its united front strategy.
We are always prepared to form a united front for progressive 
measures of benefit to the working class. We strive to influence 
Labor policy in favor of the working people, while retaining 
freedom to criticise and to oppose the reactionary aspects of 
their policies, both foreign and domestic. Such is our fixed 
Leninist attitude, based on the fact that the main base of the 
Labor Party is still the working class and that this demands the 
application of the line of the united front in order to strengthen 
the working class in its struggles and win support for socialist 
ideas.^
Left sectarianism, although the right-wing character of the A.L.P. 
invited such a response, was to be avoided. At the same time, however, 
the Communist Party should clearly mark out its differences with its 
neighbour.
9?
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R e je c t in g  f a l s e  t h e o r i e s  o f  ‘ j o i n in g  th e  A .L .F . t o  convert  
i t  in to  a  r e v o lu t io n a r y  p a r t y , ' we Communists know v ery  w ell  
t h a t  th e  way t o  in f lu e n c e  th e  A .L .F . membership and awoken 
t h e  working c l a s s  f o r  s o c ia l i s m  i s  t o  b u i ld  a  more powerful 
Communist P a r ty  based  on s c i e n t i f i c  s o c i a l i s t  p r i n c i p l e s ,
on M arx ism -L enin ism .99
In h i s  a t t a c k s  on th e  D .L .P . ,  Sharkey reached  new h e ig h ts  o f
p o lem ic .  The D .L .P .,  a s  he saw i t ,
s u p p o r ts  th e  savage d i c t a t o r s h i p s  t h a t  e x i s t  in  th e  w orld .
I t  i s  a runn ing  so re  on th e  body p o l i t i c ,  a s e m i - f a s c i s t  
ty p e  o f  p a r ty ,  a su p p o r t  o f  r e a c t i o n  a t  home and ab ro ad .  I t  
must be r u t h l e s s l y  fo ugh t and e l im in a te d  from th e  la b o r  
movement and th e  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  th e  c o u n t ry .  T h is  i s  th e  
t a s k  n o t  on ly  f o r  Communists, bu t f o r  a l l  p ro g re s s iv e  f o r c e s .
In  an a r t i c l e  w r i t t e n  a f t e r  th e  C ongress ,  Ken M i l l e r  su g g es ted  t h a t
th e  D .L .P . was be ing  f in a n c e d  by t h e  monopolies and by th e  Ü .S. S t a t e
Departm ent b u t  he to o k  ca re  t o  p o in t  ou t t h a t  s in c e  i t s  e l e c t o r a l
s ta n d in g  was s t r o n g e s t  in  i n d u s t r i a l  suburbs most o f  i t s  v o te r s  were
drawn from th e  ran k s  of th e  w o r k e r s . T h e r e  was no su g g es t io n  in
1961 from th e  Communist P a r ty  t h a t  an exchange o f  p re fe re n c e s  shou ld
be a r ran g ed  between th e  A .L .P .  and th e  D .L .P . ,  a s u g g e s t io n  which i t
had g la d ly  made in  1958.
Looking to  th e  f u t u r e ,  th e  s p e a k e rs  a t  th e  19th Congress ag a in  
a l lu d e d  to  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  s e r io u s  economic c r i s i s  b r in g in g  
w ith  i t  w idespread  s o c i a l  d i s c o n t e n t .  L. Aarons p r e d ic te d  t h a t  a s
99
I b i d . , June 1961, p .2 2 3 .
100
I b i d . ,  J u ly  1961, p .2 7 3 .
101
I b i d . , O ctober 1961, p p .403-7
380
this crisis developed the workers would find allies in other classes
with an interest in defeating monopolies; the small and middle farmers,
the urban middle class, and the small and middle capitalists were
amongst the likely allies he mentioned.Sharkey claimed that the
Government's assistance to the monopolies at the expense of the 'petty-
bourgeois and middle capitalists' as well as the workers would lead
103inevitably to 'mass struggles'. From such ideas, and from the
general themes about monopoly exploitation expounded at the Congress,
emerged the Party's election slogan - 'The People Against Monopoly, for
104Peace, Higher Living Standards, Democracy'.
In the campaign for the Federal Election of 9 December 1961, 
the Communist Party again urged its supporters to give second preferences 
to the A.L.P. and to vote for Labor candidates where no Communists 
were offering. W.J. Brown enjoined Communists to make the campaign 
an occasion for strengtnening the united front.
An important task of campaign directors, candidates, and, 
in fact, all campaign workers is to develop the widest possible 
united front discussion with rank and file A.L.P. workers during 
campaign meeting rounds, leafleting or paste-up activities.
Friendly relations should be established with the A.L.P. 
campaign headquarters. The question of exchange of preferences 
should be raised in a correct way, re-stating that Communist 
policy is to give the Labor candidates second preferences and
102
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p o in t in g  o u t in  a f r i e n d l y ,  n o n - s e c ta r ia n  way t h a t  A .L .F . 
p re fe re n c e s  shou ld  go to  th e  Communist P a r ty ,  a w orking c la s s  
p a r ty  and n o t to  th e  p a r ty  o f th e  w o rk e rs ' enem y,105
The g e n e ra l campaign r o l l e d  on above th e  Communists' h e a d s . S in ce
th e  Government p a r t i e s  cou ld  s a f e ly  le av e  th e  Communist is s u e  to  th e
D .L .P , th e y  d id  n o t p la c e  undue em phasis on th e  q u e s tio n  a lth o u g h
t h e i r  c a n d id a te s  f r e q u e n t ly  r e f e r r e d  to  u n ity  t i c k e t s  and th e  T re a s u re r ,
H .E. H o lt ,  a l le g e d  t h a t  fo u r  Labor S en a te  c o n te s ta n ts  were Communists
106o r f e l l o w - t r a v e l l e r s .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e y  d id  n o t use  th e  Communist
bogey to  any g r e a t  e x te n t ,  d e s p i te  th e  f a c t  t h a t  in  1960 th e  L ib e ra l
107P a r ty  had w idely  d i s t r i b u t e d  an an ti-C om m unist pam phlet and M enzies
had r e f e r r e d  a t  le n g th  to  th e  d an g ers  o f Communism a t  a  L ib e ra l
108m eeting  in  M elbourne. Tue le a d e r  o f th e  Country P a r ty ,  J .  McEwen,
l e f t  th e  s u b je c t  w ell a lo n e  d u rin g  th e  cam paign; t n i s  was p ro b ab ly
due p a r t l y  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he was le s s  g iven  to  anti-C om m unist po lem ics
th a n  h i s  p re d e c e s s o r ,  S i r  A rtn u r Fadden, and p a r t l y  to  th e  s p e c ta c u la r
in c re a s e s  in  th e  s a le s  o f wheat and wool to  Communist C hina, which
109had become A u s t r a l i a 's  f i f t h  b e s t  custom er in  1960-61. The D .L .P .
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of course, maintained that Communism was the principle issue of the
, . . 110 G X G Ct> X Oil •
The election produced an unexpectedly close result, but although
v
the Labor Party secured more votes than the Government parties, tne 
latter retained power with a majority of two, having held many seats 
with the aid of D.L.P. preferences. The Government had nevertheless 
lost control of the Senate which after 1 July 1962 was composed of 30 
Liberal and Country Party, 28 Labor, one D.L.P. and one Independent 
member. The Communist Party, whose 21 candidates for House seats 
polled 25,429 votes, tended to increase its vote in seats contested 
by right-wing Labor candidates and to lose support in seats contested 
by left-wing Labor men.11* With the exception of Kooyong, the Party 
nominated candidates only for blue-ribbon Labor seats or non-Labor 
seats containing strong working-class enclaves. The Communist Senate 
vote slumped because, for the first time since 1951, it failed to 
secure the first place on the ballot paper for the New South Wales 
contest in which it polled only 18,702 votes. Had it not been for 
the fact that tne Communist team in Victoria (which gained first 
place on the ballot paper) attracted 45,310 votes, the Party’s 
Australia-wide vote would have been far below the 78,i48 (1.6 per 
cent of the total) which it in fact recorded.
TTÖ
S.M.H.t 30 October 1961.
Ill
See Joe Palmada in Communist tteview, February 1962, p.40.
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At this point, there is room for considering whether the 
Communist Party has substantially increased its political following 
since the Second World War. The two tables given below, the first 
listing the Communist Senate votes for the three Eastern States since 
1949 and the second setting out the Communists' percentage votes in 
six representative House seats since 1943, indicate a steady decline 
in the late forties and a levelling out at a low level in recent years. 
The Senate table shows first, the distortion which 'first-place-on- 
the-ballot-paper1 produced, particularly in New South Wales, and second
COMMUNIST SENATE VOTES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE VALID VOTES
New South Wales Victoria Queensland
1949 1.70 3.53* 1.73
1951 3.59* 1.45 1.39
1953 4.48* 3.48* 1.12
1955 6.33* 1.14 4.15*
1958 5.90* 0.89 0.94
1961 1.05 3.35* 0.71
* First place on the ballot paper.
that the decline of Communist support in these States, taken as 
a whole, has been steady; from 1.73 to 0.71 per cent in Queensland, 
from 1*70 to 1.05 per cent in New South Wales and from 1*45 (1951) 
to 0.89 per cent (1958) in Victoria. The House of Representatives 
electorates chosen for the second table cover the range of backgrounds 
in which the Party has worked since the war. Hunter encloses a 
number of mining communities, Newcastle an industrial area, West
384
Sydney and Yarra are based on working-class suburbs, Herbert includes 
the port of Bowen (with militant traditions) and Kooyong, the black 
sheep in this grouping, is a middle-class suburban seat held by the 
Prime Minister, whom the Communists have taken a consistent delight 
in challenging.
COMMUNIST VOTES IN CERTAIN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
SEATS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE VALID VOTES
Herbert Hunter Kooyong Newcastle West Sydney Yarra
1943 34.20 — 8.18 11.34 10.83
1946 15.33 — 6.42 7.12 8.42 6.12
1949 5.24 9.58 — 3.23 5.01 2.78
1951 3.23 7.24 4.15 4.30 10.45 4.22
1954 3.53 6.13 1.60 1.98 6.07 3.37
1955 6.51 7.83 1.19 2.19 6.15 2.05
1958 1.79 — 1.07 — 4.33 1.46
1961 2.76 5.70 0.99 — 5.60 1.72
F.W. Paterson had sufficient personal backing in Herbert to attract 
the exceptionally high vote of 34.20 per cent in 1943; under first- 
past-the-post voting this would have brought him within reach of winning 
in a three-cornered contest but under preferential voting a Communist 
candidate, unless he could win Labor's second preferences, would have 
to obtain at least 46 or 47 per cent of the primary votes to stand 
a chance of remaining ahead on the final count. The 1943 and 1946 
votes at Herbert were highly exceptional; in only three other cases 
did a Communist poll over 10 per cent of the valid votes, at Newcastle 
and Yarra in 1943 and at West Sydney in 1951. Providing allowance 
is made for the boundary changes made in the electoral redistributions 
of 1949 and 1955, the trends in these electorates (except in Kooyong)
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give some idea of how the Party's fortunes fluctuated in areas where 
it had some social basis. The decline from 1943 to 1949 is quite 
marked, but the pattern of change in the fifties is confused. There 
was a recovery in three seats in 1951 balanced by a decline in two 
others; in 1954 the vote fell in all seats except Herbert, and rose 
in all except Kooyong and Yarra in 1955; a further fall occurred in 
the four seats contested in 1958, followed by a slight recovery in 
1961 in all cases except Kooyong and (possibly) hunter. The overall 
trend in the fifties, however, was unmistakeably a downward one; 
it is most unlikely that the slight upturn of 1961 represents the 
beginning of better electoral days for the Party. Social unrest is 
more likely to increase support for the left-wing Labor figures who 
represent such radical electorates as West Sydney, Hunter, Newcastle 
and Yarra. At the same time, it is quite likely that the size of 
the concealed Communist vote is considerable and that, as Sharkey 
has often suggested, it would do much better under proportional 
representation•
The Communist Party in 1962
The Communist Party of Australia enters its forty-third year 
with its illusions intact. The troubles of the revisionist defection 
are almost forgotten and Sharkey and Dixon, now 64 and 57 respectively, 
remain apparently unassailable as leaders. But although their broad 
interpretations of Australian conditions and the Party's strategic 
problems remain virtually unchallenged, they have had some difficulty
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o f  l a t e  in  h o ld in g  th e  P a r ty  to  th e  S o v ie t l i n e  in  th e  c u r re n t
d is p u te s  w ith in  th e  in t e r n a t io n a l  Communist movement. The p o in ts
o f d i f f e r e n c e  betw een th e  S o v ie t Union and China a re  w ell known;
w hereas th e  R u ss ian s  su g g es ted  t h a t  war w ith  th e  c a p i t a l i s t  c o u n tr ie s
was n o t in e v i ta b l e  and t h a t  th e  co n v en tio n s  o f 'p e a c e fu l  c o -e x is te n c e '
w ould p e rm it a p e a c e fu l t r a n s i t i o n  to  w orld  S o c ia lis m , th e  C hinese
le a d e r s  h e ld  to  th e  view  t h a t  war between th e  Communist and im p e r ia l i s t
112
c o u n t r ie s  rem ained i n e v i t a b l e .  The S o v ie t le a d e r s  b e lie v e d  t h a t  
w ar cou ld  be p re v e n te d  because th e  b a lan ce  of power had now a l t e r e d  
in  fav o u r o f th e  Communist c o u n t r ie s  ana because th e  S o v ie t Union 
p o sse sse d  a tom ic w eapons. At f i r s t  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  P a r ty  ten d ed  to  
s id e  w ith  th e  C h in ese , w ith  whom i t  had en joyed  c lo se  c o n ta c ts  
th ro u g h o u t th e  f i f t i e s ,  a number o f i t s  young f u n c t io n a r ie s  hav ing  
been im pressed  by th e  en th u siasm  w hich th e y  en co u n te red  on v i s i t s  
to  C hina . B e s id e s , Sharkey  and Dixon were by tem peram ent and co n v ic ­
t i o n  o rthodox  in  t h e i r  re v o lu t io n is m ; f o r  them th e  S o v ie t p o s i t io n  
savou red  o f re v is io n is m  and th e  C hinese p o s i t io n  o f o rthodox  L en in ism . 
At th e  C onference o f 81 Communist P a r t i e s  a t  Moscow in  November 1960
th e  A u s tr a l ia n  P a r ty  was one o f  th e  fo u r  w hich to o k  C h ina1s p a r t
113in  th e  p ro c e e d in g s . T r ib u n e , how ever, d e sc r ib e d  s t o r i e s  o f a 
H 2
See Ion T u rn e r, 'Moscow and P ek in g : War o r C o -e x is te n c e ? ',
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S in o -S o v ie t  d iv e rg e n c e  as  'b a s e l e s s ' ;  b u t i t  emerged l a t e r  t h a t  
th e  d is p u te  had c re a te d  d i f f e r e n c e s  amongst members o f th e  A u s t r a l ia n  
P a r ty .  G. McDonald, an o rg a n is e r  o f  th e  V ic to r ia n  Branch o f  th e  
B .W .I.U ., was e x p e l le d  from th e  P a r ty  in  1961 f o r  u rg in g , in  roneoed  
l e a f l e t s ,  t h a t  th e  r a n k - a n d - f i l e  sh o u ld  be a llow ed  to  d is c u s s  th e  
i s s u e s  a t  s ta k e .
In  O ctober 1961, Sharkey v i s i t e d  Moscow as  a  d e le g a te  to  th e  22nd 
C ongress o f th e  C .P .S .U ., where K hruschov ag a in  r e f e r r e d  in  s tro n g  
te rm s to  th e  e r r o r s  connec ted  w ith  th e  c u l t  o f th e  in d iv id u a l  w hich 
had p r e v a i le a  in  S t a l i n 's  t i ro e s . He made no c r i t i c a l  m ention o f th e  
C hinese bu t s t ro n g ly  a t ta c k e d  th e  A lban ian  P a r ty  o f  Labour f o r  hav ing  
an o u tlo o k  which was u n m istak eab ly  in  sympathy w ith  t h a t  o f th e  C hinese
1 I
P a r ty .  Enver Hoxha, F i r s t  S e c re ta ry  o f th e  A lban ian  P a r ty ,  r e p l i e d
in  a speech d e l iv e r e d  a t  T ira n a , A lb a n ia , on 7 November, in  which he
a t ta c k e d  th e  C .P .S .U ., accused  i t s  le a d e r s  o f r e v is io n is m  and o f
faw ning to  im p e r ia l ism . S h a rk ey ’ s f i r s t  r e p o r t s  to  A u s t r a l ia  were 
117m ild ly  p ro -S o v ie t and a f t e r  H oxha 's  speech  he ap p ea rs  to  have swung 
even more f irm ly  to  th e  S o v ie t  s i d e .  He had sooie d i f f i c u l t y  in
_  —
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sw ing ing  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  P a r ty ’ s le a d e r s h ip  beh ind  him . In  th e
March 1962 i s s u e  o f  th e  Communist Review a s ta te m e n t r e b u t t in g
H oxha 's  c o m p la in ts  and a f f irm in g  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  P a r ty ’ s su p p o rt
f o r  th e  r e s o lu t io n  ad op ted  by th e  81 P a r t i e s  in  November 1960 was 
118p u b lis h e d . T h is  s ta te m e n t had been adopted  a t  a m eeting  of 
th e  P o l i t i c a l  Committee on 20 December 1961 and had su b se q u en tly  been 
th e  s u b je c t  o f  d is p u te  amongst th e  members o f  th e  C e n tra l Com m ittee. 
When t h i s  body met e a r ly  in  F eb ru ary  i t  endorsed  th e  P o l i t i c a l  Com­
m i t t e e 's  s ta te m e n t by 35 v o te s  to  2 , w ith  one a b s te n t io n .  D ixon, who
had been i l l  b e fo re h a n d , was s a id  to  have su p p o rted  th e  ad o p tio n  o f  
119th e  s ta te m e n t .  An anonymous co rre sp o n d e n t in  th e  B u l le t in  claim ed
l a t e r  t h a t  f u l l y  s ix  members o f  th e  C e n tra l Com m ittee, in c lu d in g  Hughes
and T horn ton , had opposed th e  s ta te m e n t ,  t h a t  th r e e  had v o ted  a g a in s t
i t ,  and th a t  Dixon had ex p re ssed  doub ts  abou t i t s  c o n t e n t s . S o m e
o b je c t io n s  were r a i s e d  by th e  V ic to r ia n  S ta te  Com m ittee, which came
121i n to  l i n e  fo llo w in g  a v i s i t  by S h ark ey . E .F . H i l l ,  i t  would a p p e a r, 
had com m itted h im se lf  r a th e r  h e a v i ly  to  th e  C hinese p o s i t io n ,  and he 
l o s t  h is  p la c e s  a s  S e c re ta ry  o f  th e  V ic to r ia n  S ta te  Committee and a s
TTs
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a member o f th e  four-m an S e c r e t a r i a t .  He n e v e r th e le s s  rem ained
on th e  P o l i t i c a l  Com m ittee, th e  C e n tra l  Committee and th e  V ic to r ia n  
123S ta t e  Com m ittee. ” W ith H i l l ' s  dem otion , th e  f l u t t e r  in  th e  dove­
c o ts  su b s id e d , w ith o u t hav ing  produced much s e r io u s  u n re s t  amongst th e  
r a n k - a n d - f i l e  m em bership.
A lthough d a ta  on t h i s  s u b je c t  i s  skim py, th e  P a r t y 's  membership
does ap p ea r to  have been in c re a s in g  ag a in  r e c e n t ly .  A r e p o r t  from
B risb a n e  in  1959 s a id  t h a t  43 members had been r e c r u i te d  th e r e  and t h a t
124
lo c a l  T ribune  s a le s  had in c re a s e d  by 10 p er c e n t .  An A dela ide
r e p o r t  s a id  t h a t  th e  P a r t y 's  Sou th  A u s t r a l ia n  membership had been
125in c re a s e d  by 25 p e r  c e n t ( t h a t  i s ,  abou t 60 members) in  1958. R ecent
126e s t im a te s  o f  t o t a l  membership have ranged  from 5 ,0 0 0  in  1959 to  
1275 ,8 0 0  in  1961. The l a t t e r  f ig u r e  i s  p ro b ab ly  to o  low; i t  would
128be s u r p r i s in g  i f  th e  1958 t o t a l  o f  abou t 5 ,850  h as  n o t been exceeded
122
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by at least 1,000 additional members. Tne indications are that the
new recruits are in many cases young men and not old hands returning
to the 'old factional rat-race*. The Adelaide report cited above
spoke with some enthusiasm about the new men.
Our new members constitute a large percentage of the most 
active core of Party activists in South Australia. In many 
cases they seem keener to participate in Party work and study 
than some of our older, more experienced comrades. They have 
come to the Party in a different, more favourable period and 
therefore seem to lack some of the inhibitions, inferiority 
complexes and fear of the masses that pervade the work of quite 
a section of our older members.*^9
At the same time, the frequent references to the need for better cadres
130and more ideological education suggest that the Australian Party
has not yet developed the high degree of integration and organisation
which would enable it either to expand very far beyond its present
size or survive an extended period of clandestine activity.
Information on the Party press is also incomplete. Tribune sales
have risen again lately ^circulation in New South Wales is reported
131to have increased by 1,300 in 1961 ) and in November I960 publication
of the Queensland Guardian began again after a gap of six years. On 
the debit side, however, it remains true that the Tribune suffers from 
a lack of inspired reporting from the local branch level, and that
129
Communist Review, September 1959, p.3/8.
130
See, for example, B. Taft, ’Our Cadre Policy’, ibid., February 
1960, pp.81-3, and Sharkey in ibid., July 1961, p.276.
131
Ibid., June 1962, p.180. Tribune sales are reported to have 
gone up by 1,835 between June and November 1961 (Tribune, 6 December 
1961).
391
t h e Communist  Review r e t a i n s  i t s  lab o u red  and ja rg o n - r id d e n  s ty le «
I t s  a n a ly s e s  o f  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  and p o l i t i c a l  t r e n d s  
a r e  s t i l l  overdrawn and loaded  w ith  a f a l s e  sen se  o f  melodrama.
The P a r ty  i s  s t i l l  f a r  from a t t a i n i n g  any o f  i t s  immediate 
c l a s s  o b j e c t i v e s .  I t  s t i l l  works on th e  assum ption  t h a t  th e  u n i t e d  
f r o n t  s t r a t e g y  and i t s  t r a d e  union c o n n ec tio n s  w i l l  u l t im a te ly  b r in g  
i t  th e  'c o n t a c t  w ith  th e  m asses ' which would red u ce  i t s  i s o l a t i o n  in  
A u s t r a l i a n  s o c i e t y  and i t s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  w i th in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  system . 
I t s  in f lu e n c e  i s  s t r o n g  only  in  a few s e c t i o n s  of th e  working c l a s s ;  
th e  w a te r s id e  w orkers  o f  t h e  main p o r t s ,  th e  m iners  ( e s p e c i a l l y  th o s e  
b e lo n g in g  to  th e  H unter V a l ley  and N ew castle  com m unit ies) ,  seamen 
and some groups amongst th e  i ro n w o rk e rs ,  railwaym en, b u i ld in g  w orkers 
and e n g in e e r s .  Wnere i t s  t r a d e  union power has  l a r g e l y  been a  fu n c t io n  
o f  th e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  i t s  w orkers ,  i t s  p o s i t i o n  has a l re a d y  been 
th r e a t e n e d  by th e  A .L .P 's  p e r s i s t e n t  e f f o r t s  to  b reak  th e  p r a c t i c e  
of u n i t y  t i c k e t s .  The f r o n t  o r g a n i s a t io n s  th ro u g h  which i t  hoped to  
in f lu e n c e  th e  u rban  m iddle c l a s s e s  do n o t  p o sse ss  l a rg e  memberships; 
i t s  you th  and s tu d e n t  o r g a n i s a t io n s  have l o s t  t h e i r  former d r iv e ;  i t s  
e f f o r t s  to  g a in  r e c r u i t s  and s u p p o r te r s  amongst th e  r u r a l  poor have 
been f r u i t l e s s ,  and w i l l  c o n t in u e  to  be so u n le s s  i t  can ach iev e  th e  
n e a r  m i ra c le  o f  w inning over th e  A.W.U. Above a l l ,  th e  P a r ty  must 
reckon w ith  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  i t s  sm all membersnip and i t s  la c k  
o f  p o p u la r i ty  may ag a in  i n v i t e  an a t te m p t  t o  ban i t  by l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  now t h a t  Dr E v a t t  has  r e t i r e d  from p o l i t i c s .  A marked
392
deterioration in economic conditions might increase its support
amongst the working class, provided international considerations did
not force it to adopt strong anti-reformist and adventurist rather
than united front strategies, but this possibility remains remote.
Recent political trends have increased the Party's discomfiture.
The A.L.P's good showing in the 1951 election, although it dispelled the
myth that the loss of some Catholic votes had left it electorally
enfeebled, nevertheless whetted the appetite of the Labor leaders for a
stiffer policy towards unity tickets. The fact which most troubles them
is that although the A.L.P. did very well in most States, and exceeded
expectations in Queensland, it failed to make up its Victorian losses:
at the 1954 election, the A.L.P. won 15 Victorian seats, but this total
fell in 1955 to 10 as a result of the split; none of the five seats lost
was regained at either the 1958 or the 1951 elections while the D.L.P.
132vote has remained constant at 14.75 per cent. There was no
surprise, therefore, when in January the A.L.P. Federal Executive ordered
the Victorian Branch to take action against the use of unity tickets,
133particularly in the A.R.U. The Victorian Branch refused to be 
pushed too hard and later claimed that the evidence against A.L.P. 
members alleged to have stood on A.R.U. unity tickets was not sufficient
132
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X 34to warrant expulsion. Dr J.F. Cairns, the left-wing Victorian
asserted that trade unionists 'should have freedom to associate
with whom they like', a statement to which the Federal President,
135W.R. Colbourne, took exception. In New South Wales, on the other
hand, the pressure on unity tickets was strictly maintained. C.T,
Oliver, the A,L,P. State President, stated in June that A.L.P. members
X36must vote for A,L,P. candidates in union ballots, a directive which 
marked a further stage in the A.L.P's slow drift towards a direct re­
intervention in union politics. Expulsions for breaches of the unity
137ticket ban continued in New South Wales.
The Communists claimed to see in such developments a further
indication of the A.L.P's drift to the Right. Sharkey reported to
the Central Committee a few months ago that the right-wing forces in
the Labor Party were consolidating their control with a view to making
important policy concession to the D.L.P. Their aim, of course, was
to achieve an electoral pact with the D.L.P., even if Labor principles
138were sacrificed in the process. Sharkey then went on to elaborate
134
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his conception of the three groupings inside the Federal Parliamentary 
Labor Partys identified with the clerical Right were 20 or so members 
from States other than Victoria 'who represent much the same ideology 
as the expelled D.L.P'ers'; the largest grouping 'is that of Mr,
C&lwell which is also Rightist and is endeavouring to conciliate the
D. L.P.' by 'indulging in reactionary anti-Communism'; on the Left was
a third group, which, with the backing of militants in the Labor
movement, 'is struggling for progressive policies and fighting against
the extreme Rightwing,* Sharkey nevertheless claimed that the need
for the united front remained; the Calwell group, he pointed out, still
upheld 'traditional A.L.P, reformism' and the Communist Party would
support it when it put forward proposals for the benefit of the 
139working people. Even so, the dangers of left sectarianism spreading 
through the Party had become greater. Just before his death,
E. Robertson warned that unless the Party avoided sectarianism and 
dogmatism it stood a strong chance of becoming isolated in the Labor 
movement. Reporting to the Central Committee in August, Sharkey 
said:
While Right mistakes, in glossing over reactionary trends 
in A,L,P. policies or creating illusions about the role of a 
Federal Labor Government are damaging to our Party and the 
working class, left errors in this situation constitute the 
main danger.
139
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Just before the Federal Election of 1961, Sharkey had warned
that the Groupers had launched a new drive, backed by Santamaria*s
N.C.C.; their aim, he said, vas to split the A.C.T.U. and to gain
142control of certain unions. Since then, the Communists have played
up the N.C.C. bogey with a care suggesting that they see in it a
means of reviving traditionalist fears of the Groupers and restoring
their faith in united front activities. Joe Falamada suggested that
the N.C.C. acted as a general staff directing the operations of the
D.L.P. and the Q.L.P.;^^ Paul Mortier claimed that it wished to
convert the trade unions into 'servile instruments of imperialism in 
144the cold war* 5 Sharkey saw it working in league with the security
police to change the unions into 'fascist type unions such as those
set up by Mussolini and Hitler, subordinated to the monopolies and 
145warmongers'; Tribune described both the N.C.C. and the D.L.P.
as the agents of monopoly capitalism - behind them was the 'sinister
146Black Hand* of Santamaria. In a recent pamphlet, Mortier warned 
that the N.C.C. was redoubling its efforts to split the A.C.T.U., 
subvert the A.L.F. and frustrate the 'united and active movement of
142
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working people1 which had come into being. 'That is why an urgent
task, part of the fight against monopoly and the Menzies Government,
147is to destroy the influence of the N.C.C. in the labour movement•'
The Party is also disturbed about the spread of virulent 
anti-Communist propaganda in recent years, not only by such Catholic 
lay bodies as Santauaria's N.C.C. and the Knights of the Southern 
C r o s s , b u t  also by a number of East European migrant associations 
which have become active of late. A number of federal parliamentarians, 
including Senator G.R. Cole, Sir Wilfred Kent-Hughes and Senator 
J.G. Gorton, have publicly supported the right-wing and separatist 
Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, vhose membership overlaps to some 
extent with that of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, founded 
in South Korea in 1954. Tne League, wnose ties with the D.L.P. in 
Western Australia and Victoria are extremely close, was recently 
established on a federal basis in Australia with F.P. McManus, the 
former Victorian D.L.P. Senator, as Federal Secretary and a Liberal, 
Senator G.C. Hannan, as Federal President. However, the Communist 
Party does not regard the immigration programme today with as much 
suspicion as it did in the late forties and early fifties and it 
favours increasing the intake of Southern European migrants, parti­
cularly Italians and Greeks. In August 1962, Tribune commenced a 
regular political and industrial column in tne Italian language.
147
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148
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With anti-Communist strength rising in a number of trade unions,
the R.S.L, launched yet another campaign to 'expose' the activities
149of the Communist Party. The Menzies Government declared that it
IdOwould 'assist' the R.S.L. in its campaign. However, it met with
a poor response from many metropolitan newspapers, mainly because of
the wildly exaggerated and melodramatic statements which the League
issued to the press. On the other hand, tne R.S.L. claimed that it
received strong support from East European migrants and a number of 
151 152unions, including the A.W.U., and the Victorian Branches of the
153F.C.U. and the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners.
Sharkey depicted the R.S.L's anti-Communist drive as a 'screen for
war preparations' and an attack on civil liberties and the Labor 
154movement.
In the trade unions, the Communists lost control of the A.E.U. 
in February 1962 when one of the two Communist members of the union's 
Commonwealth Council, C.G. Hennessy, was defeated by J « McDowell
155(A.L.P.) by 6,182 votes to 2,957. McDowell, together with another
149
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anti—Communist, C , Shearer, was able to outvote the sole remaining
Communist, C.M. Southwell* Although McDowell did not receive
official support from the A.L.P's leaders, he did secure (as
157Shearer had done in 1961) considerable backing from the N*C*C*
In June, the union's Sydney District Secretary, A. Searle, a Communist,
was defeated by an A*L*P* member following C*T. Oliver's direction to
158A.L.F. members to support Labor Party candidates. Recently,
however, the Executive Council of the A.E*U. in London has directed
the Commonwealth Council of the Australian body to conduct future
ballots in accordance with its own rules, that is, without resort
159to court-controlled ballots. It is still too early to tell whether 
this directive will have any effect on the Australian situation.
Within the A.C.T.U., also, the Communists have found their influence 
dwindling; in August 1962 the A.C.T.U. Interstate Executive assured the 
dissident right-wing unions that the levies imposed on member unions 
would not be used to finance visits of trade union delegations from 
Communist countries.*
156
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Recent tren d s in  sev era l unions su ggest th a t th e  A .L .P’ s
l a t e s t  in tr u s io n  in to  in d u str ia l p o l i t i c s  i s  beginning to  break down
th e u n ited  fro n t p a ttern  of the la t e  f i f t i e s .  In stead  o f the tw o-
party system s which took  shape a few years ago, an oddly balanced
th ree -p a r ty  s itu a t io n  i s  d ev elop in g , w ith A .L .P . members forming
amorphous cen tre  groupings between m ilitant-Com m uniat and Grouper
extrem es. In the recen t b a l lo t  o f  th e  Melbourne Branch o f the W.W.F.,
fo r  example, th ree  teams were in  com p etition ; an In d u str ia l Group
t ic k e t  supported by th e D .L .P ., a t r a d i t io n a l i s t  A .L .P . group, and a
m ilitant-C om m unist u n ited  fro n t team (which again  nominated J.H .
Cummins, a Grouper, fo r  the post o f P r e s id e n t) . The la t t e r  team
was returned  to  o f f i c e ,  d e sp ite  th e  fa c t  th a t the combined v o te s
101o f th e Grouper and A .L .P . teams was alm ost equal to  t h e ir  own.
S p l i t  v o t in g , in  f a c t ,  could be one o f th e  co n s id era tio n s  driv ing
cen tre  A .L .P . teams to  form u n ite d - fr o n ts - in -r e v e r s e .  In the V icto r ia n
Branch o f  the A .R .U ., a ls o ,  some A .L .F . members have formed a
P ro g ressiv e  U nited Union Team to  c o n te s t  the 1963 e le c t io n ;  the
S ecretary  o f  the u n ion 1s In d u str ia l Group has a lready in v ite d  i t  to
162make common cause w ith  h is  s id e .  Whether th e  A .L .P 's  in terv en tio n
w il l  produce t h i s  th ree -p a r ty  e f f e c t  in  other S ta te s  has y e t  to  
be seen; but the problem ra ised  in  V ic to r ia  a p p lie s  e lsew h ere . Can
_
Age, 15 June 1962, 3 Ju ly  1962, 4 Ju ly  1962, 13 J u ly  1962.
I b id . ,  16 Ju ly  1962, IT Ju ly  1962.
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the A.li.F. stop at simply banning unity tickets; will not the logic 
of its intervention drive it into an alliance with the ex-Grouper 
and right-wing unions against the Communists and militants? Short's 
forecast that if the A*L*P. continued its present policy the 
Communists would be driven out of the unions in three to five years* 
assumes a positive answer to these questions.
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PART FOUR
CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most difficult task of Australian Communist leaders 
has been to maintain the faith of their followers in the certainty of 
ultimate success. The constantly receding mirage of the revolutionary 
crisis has sustained the Party through the whole of its forty-two 
years. The doctrine has altered from time to time; during the period 
1030-34 the Party pursued a strong anti-reformist strategy, presenting 
its members with the hope of sudden revolution in which the organised 
proletariat would seize State power and institute a class dictatorship. 
Organisationally, the emphasis was on the Party's being geared for the 
rapid assumption and exercise of revolutionary authority. Between 
1935 and 1939 and between 1941 and 1946, the doctrine was that, as 
Australian capitalism developed, the proletariat would broaden and 
become more class conscious and that, in consequence, the social basis 
for a large progressive party would be provided. The usual assumption 
was that the liberal-bourgeois A.L.P. would be supplanted (the exact 
sequence of events was not made clear) by a truly Socialist party, 
comprising the Communist Party and the progressive elements of the 
former Labor Party. The Party was depicted as playing a moderate role 
in the course of this transition. A reversion to the extreme 
strategies of the 1930-34 period occurred during the years 1947-49, when 
the Party implemented its 'adventurist* strategies. Since 1950,
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however, it has pursued a further variant of the united front strategy: 
at first, the theory was that the A.L.P. would be transformed into a 
genuinely Socialist party with which the Communist Party would fuse to 
institute People's Power although in recent years, in reaction to the 
split of the Labor Party and revisionist talk within the Party about 
the peaceful transition to Socialism, the Communist leaders have tended 
to re-emphasise the independent role of the Party in attracting pro­
gressive support in pre-revolutionary politics. Communist doctrine has 
always been directed towards a vision, or visions - the revolutionary 
crisis internally and the triumph of Socialism on the world scale. 
Sharkey's claims of impending economic disaster have now become part 
of the Communist ritual, but he attracts attention when he suggests 
that the Soviet Union will within the next decade outstrip the United 
States as an industrial power, marking a further step towards the 
triumph of international Communism.^
Doctrinally, however, the Australian Communists have found 
difficulty in squaring their stress on the Party's revolutionary mission, 
suggesting the need for organisational solidarity and discipline, 
with their claim that it should play a responsible role in 
pre-revolutionary politics, by taking part in election campaigns, 
forming a party in parliament should the occasion arise, and assisting 
the A.L.P. in its struggle with the Right. In his work on the British
Communist Review« October 1960, p.407.
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Communist Party, Henry Pelling concluded: 'All the absurdities of the
history of the party spring from this one fact, that it has been a
2revolutionary party in a non-revolutionary situation.' His comment 
could well apply to the Australian Party. The internal disputes 
sparked off by the C.P.S.U's 20th Congress of 1956, and culminating 
in the defection of the revisionists, brought the conflicting impli­
cations of these two policies into the open. The revisionists claimed 
that if the Party agreed that the transition to Socialism would be 
achieved peacefully within the structure of the liberal, democratic 
State, then it had to adopt an organisational form appropriate to the 
special circumstances of the transitional period; it would have to 
become an 'open* party, democratically organised; it would have to 
admit the co-existence of different points of view; it would have to 
study more carefully the problems of obtaining mass electoral support 
on non-Coranunist policies. The Sharkey-Dixon leadership replied, 
not by counter-argument, but by driving the revisionists out of the 
Party and by asserting the continued need for democratic centralism 
in organisation; they claimed that the Party had still to formulate 
its strategies on the assumption that the transition, while peaceful 
in the long run, would nevertheless be characterised by sharp class 
tensions and some vicious rearguard fighting by the bourgeoisie.
But there was more to their reaction than that. Sharkey and Dixon 
2
Henry Polling, The British Communist Party: A Historical Profile« 
London, 1958, p.182.
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remained revolutionaries and orthodox Leninists at heart, as is shown 
by their support of the Chinese case in the Sino-Soviet dispute until 
1961. The revisionists' arguments have still to be answered, and their 
chief accusation, that the Communist Party had not become a mass party 
because of organisational and doctrinal rigidity, retains its sting*
As we suggested in the first chapter, the explanation for the 
Communist Partyfs failure to develop a mass following lies partly in 
its overseas connections and partly in the character of the Australian 
Labor movement; most groups of the Australian working class have 
enjoyed a level of material welfare which compares favourably with 
those prevailing in other Western countries, and they have found little 
reason to question the desirability of working within the arbitration 
system and giving political support to the A.L.P*, which has shown on 
several occasions that it can secure socio-economic reforms which 
benefit the underprivileged* The charge that the Communist Party is 
nothing more than an agent of the Soviet Union, deputed to foment 
revolutions in Australia, has been sustained by the way in which 
Australian Communists adjusted their strategies to suit changes in the 
international line - in 1929, 1935, 1939, 1941, 1947 and 1950* In 
addition, the Communists' activities during the 'adventurist' phases 
of 1930-34 and 1947-49 were sufficiently reckless to bear out many 
of the things their detractors had been saying about them* The 
memories of these periods are easily evoked by anti-Communist organi­
sations wishing to ban or isolate the Party* Furthermore, both the
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'adventurist' periods occurred at times when the Party had good 
opportunities of building up a mass folloving; had it not adopted a 
hostile attitude to the Labor Party during the great depression, but 
instead pursued a united front strategy, it might veil have emergedv
as an electoral and parliamentary force of consequence instead of 
condemning itself to continued isolation. Again, had it not embarked 
on the vild industrial policies of the late forties it might have 
retained, and possibly expanded, the considerable support its vartime 
activities had brought it.
The Communist Party in Australia bitterly resents the suggestion 
that it serves as an agent for a foreign pover, and is alien to 
Australian society. Rebutting such charges, J.R. Hughes maintained 
that the Party's policy and programme vere 'thoroughly pro-Australian 
and based on the best traditions of our people in the struggle for a 
completely free and independent Australia.' It is important to 
recognise that Australian Communists do identify themselves vith the 
great radical symbols of the Australian Labor movement; they see 
themselves as embodying the values of the insurgents at Eureka in 1854 
and of the vorkers during the great strikes of the early nineties. 
While it is true that the Australian Communists' interest in things 
Russian (and Chinese), and particularly their addiction to the 
abstruse jargon of Marxism-Leninism, convey the impression that their
Tribune. 18 July 1952.
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Party has been unduly affected by its overseas connections, it is 
also true that they pride themselves on their Australianism and their 
sympathy with the values of the Australian working class« At public 
meetings Sharkey and Dixon speak in the direct and idiomatic language 
of industrial leaders« As Louise Overacker has observed, the Party 
'has largely established its claim to the tradition of militancy 
running far back in the history of the [LaborJ movement.'4
Tne united front strategy of the fifties, chiefly aimed at 
defeating the Menzies Government, was hardly capable of obtaining the 
Party a mass following« Its implementation would have been extremely 
difficult had the A«L.P« not been in opposition at the federal level 
throughout the fifties. It was, at best, a defensive arrangement, 
particularly in the trade union movement, and its effectiveness as a 
means of extending the Party's influence was Hampered in the first 
instance by the A.L.P's determination to seal off its political member- 
snip from Communist penetration and, in industrial affairs, to discourage 
co-operation between Labor and Communist unionists. In addition, the 
united front strategy, since it involved a public blurring of the 
issues separating the Communist and Labor Parties, hindered the work 
of educating Communist cadres and militants about the importance of 
their Party's special doctrines and long-term objectives. The 
Communist Party's recent difficulties in defining its separate identity,
Louise Overacker, The Australian Party System. p«195.
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and in securing the acceptance of that identity by its rank-and-file, 
are borne out by the constant references to right opportunism and 
'submergence* as the errors of united front enthusiasts. Only in the
trade unions does the Communist Party stand for a distinctive outlook;
\
in election campaigns its policies are hardly noticed except when they 
appear, distorted, in the polemics of anti-Communist politicians. In 
Australian society, the Communist Party has not, except for a few 
years at the end of the Second World War, been accepted as a party 
wishing to play a * responsible* role in the party system.
If a crisis, economic or otherwise, does occur in the near future, 
the Party may have a chance of expanding its following amongst the 
working class in the main industrial centres, but such an expansion 
would not provide it with the electoral strength it would need to take 
power. It faces a further handicap in that many of the unions in 
which its standing is most secure, such as the Miners' Federation and 
the W.W.F., are based on declining groups; to maintain its union 
power it must penetrate the organisations representing white-collar 
workers. The Party's enduring handicap remains the narrowness of its 
social base; it has failed conspicuously to gain any appreciable 
following amongst either the small farmer or middle-class groups, 
both of which would be seriously affected by an economic crisis. Their 
political response in this event might be a progressive one, providing 
the Communists with class allies, but it could equally well be a 
negative, possibly reactionary one, as the New Guard and Social Credit
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movements of the depression period would appear to indicate. The 
Communist Party is thus at a political disadvantage on two counts; 
its following is not only limited amongst the working class but it 
has no basis at all for recruiting support in other classes*
The Party's main point of access to the working class is its 
control of certain important trade unions. In trade union politics, 
also, the Communists have weakened their position in the past by 
reckless policies, particularly by involving unions under their 
control in strike action for political purposes. Their failure to 
extent and sustain the great coal strike of 1949 not only revealed the 
limits of their power in the trade union movement; it discredited 
Communist cadres in the eyes of many traditionalist Labor unionists 
and provided the opportunity for the Industrial Groups' offensive 
of the early fifties. Had the Party in the late forties not pursued 
its 'adventurist' strategies and instead continued its earlier policies 
of drifting with the tides of unionist feeling, working within the 
arbitration system without complaint, using the strike weapon sparingly 
(and then only to attain economic ends) it would have entered the 
recent decade in a much stronger position* The set backs of 1950-52 
have in many cases never been made good; the loss of the F*I*A. and 
the F«C*U. were particularly serious ones. The united front counter­
offensive of 1954-56 served to push the Groupers back from some 
positions but it did not provide the Communists with the opportunity 
for establishing specifically Communist control of militant unions, and
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of using that control to further the Party's programme of obtaining 
mass support*
The rise of the D*L*P* following the Labor split of 1955) and the 
subsequent reassertion of right-wing leadership within the A*L*P*, led 
to the campaign against unity tickets (and the sanctions employed to 
back them up) which has recently shown signs of becoming an organised 
intrusion by the Labor Party into trade union affairs* The irony of 
this development is that it has been conditioned by considerations of 
Labor's electoral advantage rather than by circumstances in trade union 
politics* During the period of the united front) indeed, the Communists 
have shown considerable restraint in advancing their interests, and 
in resisting the Grouper and right-wing attacks; while working for 
good relations with A*L*P* unionists, the Communists have shown 
considerable skill in diplomacy and manoeuvre* The recent moves against 
unity tickets have placed the Party at a profound disadvantage, but as 
yet it still has more to gain by sustaining the united front, if only 
in the hope that the Groupers, backed by the National Civic Council, 
will again overplay their hand and drive the mass of traditionalist 
Labor unionists to the Left* There is also the possibility that the 
A.L.P's intervention may be cut short or limited should its own left- 
wing groups become too discontented*
As small today and as limited in its social basis as it was during 
the early years of the Second World War, the Communist Party remains 
highly vulnerable* The danger of repression remains very real;
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anti-Communist feeling has, if anything, been heightened in recent 
years by the sustained propaganda of the D.L.P. and by other bodies 
such as the R.S.L. and the N.C.C. A fresh move to have the Party banned, 
perhaps by another constitutional referendum, cannot be excluded - nor 
can the possibility that it might succeed; the vote against the 1951 
referendum proposal was a very narrow one and it is difficult to see 
either Calwell or Whitlam emulating Dr Evatt*s example in defending 
civil liberties with passion and political recklessness. Were a ban 
imposed, the Communist Party has sufficient organisational discipline 
and integrity to go underground, but it is extremely doubtful whether, 
as a clandestine organisation, it would be able to hold together over 
a long period, let alone extend its mass support. Judging from mis­
givings expressed from time to time in the Party press, it would appear 
that many of its cadres lack either the training or the doctrinal 
grounding to cope adequately with a long period of underground work.
In one sense, the Communist Party is little more than an embattled 
faction in trade union politics, though a faction characterised by 
excessive discipline and doctrinal pretensions; most of its members are 
unionists, its best cadres man its factory branches, its tactics in 
trade union affairs are subtle and well-calculated. Yet even here it 
has to serve the conventions dictated by the great mass of unionists; 
economism, strikes for economic ends, faith in a reformist A.L.P., 
reliance on the arbitration system, these are the values which the 
Communists have either to serve or accept. Outside some of the Branches
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of the traditionally militant unions, such as the Seamen*s Union, 
the Miners' Federation and the W.W*F., Communist control of a 
union remains a function of the Party's ability to observe and 
exploit conventions which doctrinally it abhors*
Yet in another sense the Communists are correct when they point 
out that their importance in Australian politics will ultimately 
be determined by the fact that they represent here the values of the 
Communist world* At the Party's 19th Congress Sharkey reminded 
delegates that 'a very considerable part' of its strength was due 
to the fact that
we are not alone in the world but are an integral part of the 
great communist movement whose vanguard is the Soviet Union*
We are part of the most influential movement in the present 
day world* We are part of that movement that is advancing and 
marching to even greater victories on a world scale*. *.®
The connection which has served them so badly in the past (except for the
period 1941-45) may in the end prove their greatest advantage if the
Soviet Union (and later Communist China) does succeed in surpassing the
Western countries in industrial productivity, technological advance and
living standards. Isaac Deutscher has written that the future economic
ascendancy of the Soviet Union 'tends to place a huge question mark over
the structure of Western society*' In underdeveloped countries such as
5
Communist Review, August 1961, p*342*
6
Isaac Deutscher, The Great Contest: Russia and the West* London,
1960, p*66* See also lan Turner and F. Knopfelmacher, 'An Argument 
on the Cold War', Melbourne University Magazine, Spring 1959, pp.51-63; 
and Ian Turner in Nation, 12 August I960.
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In d ia  and Burma th e  Communist b lo c 's  m a te r ia l example i s  a lread y  th e  
Communists' g r e a te s t  a s s e t ,  bu t in  A u s tra l ia  i t  s t i l l  does n o t co u n t. 
For the  p re sen t and th e  immediate fu tu re  th e  Communist P a rty  of 
A u s tra lia  rem ains e le c to r a i iy  in s ig n i f ic a n t ,  i t s  im portance r e s t r i c t e d  
to  i t s  power in  th e  tr a d e  union movement and i t s  sym bolic ro le  in  the  
p o l i t i c s  o f f e a r .
APPENDIX
BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF PROMINENT COMMUNISTS AND 
EX-COMMUNISTS
U n f o r t u n a t e ly ,  b io g r a p h ic a l  in fo r m a t io n  r e l a t i n g  t o  a number o f  
im p o r ta n t  Communists i s  e x t r e m e ly  d i f f i c u l t  t o  l o c a t e ,  so t h a t  a 
p e r s o n ' s  e x c l u s i o n  from t h i s  l i s t  in  no way i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  he (o r  s h e )  
d o e s  (o r  d id )  n o t  occupy a l e a d in g  p o s i t i o n  in  t h e  P a r t y .  Most o f  
t h e  prom inent Communists who do n o t  appear in  t h i s  l i s t  have  
i n d u s t r i a l  w o r k i n g - c l a s s  b a ck g ro u n u s .  d e t a i l s  about Communists (and  
ex-C om m u n ists)  w i th  m i d a l e - c l a s s  backgrounds a re  more r e a d i l y  
o b t a i n a b l e .  The b io g r a p h i c a l  in fo r m a t io n  w hich  a p p ea rs  below h a s  
been c u l l e d  from s e v e r a l  s o u r c e s ,  o f  wnich t h e  most im p o rta n t  a r e  th e  
P a r t y ' s  own p u b l i c a t i o n s  and p r i v a t e  c o r r e s p o n a e n c e . P e r so n s  who 
a re  known t o  have been born o u t s i d e  A u s t r a l i a  have had t h e i r  c o u n tr y  
o f  o r i g i n  i n s e r t e d  in  p a r e n t h e s e s  a f t e r  t h e i r  d a t e s  o f  b i r t h .  The 
re m a in d er ,  t o  t h e  b e s t  o f  my k n o w led g e ,  were born in  A u s t r a l i a .
Only p e r s o n s  wno a re  (o r  w ere)  known t o  be d e f i n i t e l y  members o f  t h e  
P a r t y  have been in c lu d e d  in  t h i s  l i s t .  Former Communists have been  
c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d  and th e  r e s t  are  (o r  w e re ,  a t  th e  t im e  o f  t h e i r  
d e a t h s )  presum ably  s t i l l  members o f  th e  F a r t y .
In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n s  u sed  in  th e  main body o f  t h e  
t h e s i s ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a b b r e v i a t i o n s  a r e  useds
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C.P. Communist Party
Educ. Education
H.S. High School
Pres. President
Sec. Secretary
Univ. University
AARONS, Eric John. Son of Sam Aarons (q.v.). Born 16 March 1919. 
Educ. Sydney Boys' H.S., Sydney Univ. (6.Sc., 1942). Joined 
C.P., 1936. C.P. functionary since 1945. Member of Central 
Committee, C.P.
AaRONS, Laurence. Son of Sam Aarons (q.v.). Born 19 August 1917. 
Educ. Sydney Boys’ H.S. Served in World War II. Former 
Sec., Newcastle District Committee, C.P. Memner of Secretariat 
C.P. since 1954.
AARONS, Sam. Fougnt with International Brigade in Spanish Civil War 
Sec., Western Australian State Committee, C.P., in forties and 
fifties.
ADAMSON, Bartlett. Born 22 December 1884. Poet. Former Pres., 
Fellowship of Australian Vriters. Died 4 November 1951.
BACON, Edwin Alexander. Born 10 September 1913. Educ. Christian
Brothers' College ('Warwick), Queensland Univ. Served in World 
War II. Sec., Queensland State Committee, C.P.
BACON, Mrs Kathleen Mary. Born 17 May 1921. Educ. Queensland Univ. 
(B.Sc., 1942). Former Queensland State Sec., E.Y.L. Sister 
of J.P. Callaghan (q.v.).
BAILES, Joseph William. Born 1903 (London, England). Arrived in 
Australia, 1924, Joined C.P., 1933. In 1940 elected Pres., 
Queensland Poultry farmers' Union. In 1946 elected Sec., 
Australian Poultry Farmers' Association, Chairman, Agrarian 
Committee, C.P.
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BARCAN, Alan R aphael. Born 30 October 1921. Educ. Sydney H .S . ,
Sydney U n iv . (B .A . ,  1946; M .Ed., 1958), A u s tr a l ia n  N a t io n a l  
Univ. Former P r e s . ,  A .S .L .F .  S e c . ,  Sydney U niv . Labor Club, 
1945. S e c . ,  N a t io n a l  Union of  A u s tr a l ia n  U niv . S tu d e n ts ,
1 9 4 6 -4 8 .  L e f t  C .P . ,  1947; su b seq u en t ly  jo in e d  A .L .P . S e c . ,  
A u str a l ia n -Y u g o s la v  C u ltu ra l  A s s o c ia t io n ,  1949 -53 . V i s i t e d  
J u g o s la v ia ,  1958. L ecturer  in  H is to r y ,  N ew cast le  T ea ch ers’ 
C o l le g e .
BEARLIN, David John, Born 19 May 1929. Educ. Melbourne Univ,
J o in ed  C .P . ,  1948. S c h o o l te a c h e r ,  1950, W aterside worker, 
195 1 -5 6 .  A s s i s t a n t  S e c . ,  Melbourne Branch, W.W.F., 1955-56 .  
S c h o o lte a c n e r  s in c e  1957. L e f t  C .P . ,  November 1956. Jo ined  
A .L .P . , 1958.
BEASLEY, Harold John. Former e l e c t r i c i a n .  A c t iv e  in  R e a l i s t  W riters '  
Group, Sydney. Manager, A u s tr a la s ia n  Book S o c i e t y .  Married to  
Mrs Pamela Howard B e a s ley  (nee N ixon) M.A. (Sydney), a s i s t e r - i n -  
law o f  Dr J.W. Burton, former S e c . ,  Department o f  E xterna l  
A f f a i r s .
BESBY, M iss  D o r is .  Daughter o f  S i r  George Beeby. For f i f t e e n  years  
A s s o c ia t e  t o  her  f a t h e r ,  a Commonwealth A r b i t r a t io n  Court judge .  
Educ. Sydney Church o f  England G i r l s ’ Grammar S c h o o l .  Jo ined  
B r i t i s h  C .P . ,  1939. Returned t o  A u s t r a l ia  s h o r t ly  a fterw ards  
and became O rgan iser ,  Sheet  M etal Workers' Union. Former 
Canberra correspond en t o f  T r ib u n e . Died 17 October 1948.
S i s t e r  o f  Mrs Joyce  M e tc a lfe  ( q . v . j .
BIRD, W illiam  H a rr iso n .  S e c . ,  Queensland Branch, Seamen’ s Union, 
1 941 -43 . S e c . ,  V ic to r ia n  Branch, Seamen's Union, 1943-59 .
BLAKE, Mrs Audrey E l s i e .  Jo in ed  C .P . ,  1933. V i s i t e d  S o v ie t  Union, 
1937. Former member o f  Central Committee, C.P. N a t io n a l  S e c . ,  
E .Y .L . ,  1941 -  A p ril  1952. Married t o  J .D .  Blake ( q . v . ) .
BLAKE, John David . Born 25 May 1909 (E ngland). A rr ived  in  A u s t r a l i a ,  
1920. Former c o a l-m in e r .  J o in ed  C .P . ,  1927. V i s i t e d  S o v ie t  
Union, 1937. Served  in  World War I I .  S e c . ,  V ic to r ia n  S t a te  
Committee, C .P . ,  f o r  many y e a r s  ( r e t i r e d  1 9 4 9 ) .  Member o f  
S e c r e t a r i a t ,  C .P . ,  1 9 4 9 -5 4 .  Married t o  Mrs Audrey Blake ( q . v . ) .
BOUND, Max A lan . S e c . ,  Tasmanian S t a t e  Committee, C.P.
BR2SLAND, C h a r le s .  Born 19 J u ly  1926. j o in e d  C .P . ,  1944. Former 
N a t io n a l  S e c . ,  E .Y .L . ( e l e c t e d  t o  p o s i t i o n  in  1 9 5 2 ) .  Member o f  
C entral Committee, C.P.
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BROWN, John Josep h . Born 4 A p r il  1912. Began t r a i n i n g  fo r  Roman
C a th o l ic  p r ie s th o o d  in 1929 but l e f t  a f t e r  two months. Jo ined  
C .P . ,  1935. S e c . ,  V ic to r ia n  Branch, A .R .U .,  1942-54 and s in c e  
1956 ( A s s i s t a n t  S e c . ,  1 9 5 5 -5 6 ) .  Federal P r e s . ,  A.R.U. s in c e  
1944. Member o f  Central Committee, C.P.
BROWN, Wilton John. Born 11 A p ril  1917. Served in  World War I I .  
Tribune j o u r n a l i s t .
BUCHANAN, dames. Born 1912 ( S c o t la n d ) .  A rrived  in  A u s t r a l ia ,  1928.  
S e c . ,  South A u s tr a l ia n  Branch, Seamen’ s Union s in c e  1951.
BUCKLEY, A lfr e d  R. S e c . ,  N e w ca st le  Branch, B oilerm akers'  S o c i e t y ,  
1935 -4 3 .  F edera l S e c . ,  B o i ler m a k e rs ’ S o c i e t y ,  1949-61  
( A s s i s t a n t  Federa l S e c . ,  1 9 4 4 -4 9 ) .
BULMSR, Eawin W ill ia m . Federal P r e s . ,  B .W .I .U .,  s in c e  1946.
BURCHETT, W ilfred  Graham. Born 16 September 1911. Educ. B a l la r a t  
i i .S .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  famous w ar-corresp on aen t  and au th or .  
R e s id e n t  in  Communist c o u n tr ie s  s in c e  1949. For fu r th e r  d e t a i l s ,  
s e e  'A F e llow  j o u r n a l i s t ' ,  he Chose Truth: The I n s p ir in g  S tory  
o f  W ilfred  B u r c h e t t , M elbourne, 1953.
BURNS, G i l b e r t .  Born 1903 (E ng land).  Coal-m iner in  England u n t i l
em igrated  to  A u s t r a l ia  a t  age o f  20 . C a n e-cu tter  in  Queensland  
f o r  many y e a r s .  Jo in ed  C .P . ,  1927.
BURNS, W ill iam  Fardon. Born 1912. Educ. Sydney Grammar S cn oo l ,  
C h r is t ia n  B r o th ers '  C o l leg e  (W averley) . Tribune j o u r n a l i s t ,  
1 9 4 5 -4 8 .  W aterside worker.
CALLAGHAN, John P i e r c e .  Son o f  J .L .  C allagnan, former member o f  th e  
Queensland Land Court. Educ. Queensland U niv . ( B .S c . ,  1937; 
M .S c . ,  1 9 3 9 ) .  Former b io c h e m is t ,  Royal North Shore H o s p i t a l .  
Former Chairman, A rts  and S c ie n c e s  Committee, C.P. Former Deputy 
Chairman, New South Wales D i v i s i o n ,  A u str a l ia n  A s s o c ia t io n  of  
S c i e n t i f i c  Workers. Brother  o f  Mrs K athleen Bacon ( q . v . ) .
CAMPBELL, C larence H art. Former i n d u s t r i a l  c h e m is t .  U n su cc e ss fu l
F edera l Labor P ar ty  can d id a te  a t  1934 Federal E l e c t i o n .  In 1946 
e l e c t e d  S e c . ,  A u s t r a l ia - I n d o n e s ia  A s s o c ia t i o n .  In 1947 appoin ted  
Indon esian  Trade Commissioner in  A u s t r a l i a .  C .P . fu n c t io n a r y  
f o r  many y e a r s .
CAMPBELL, E rn est  W alter .  Jo in ed  C .P . ,  1930. Member o f  Central
Conmiittee, C .P . ,  s in c e  m i d - t h i r t i e s .  Former e d i t o r  o f  T r ib u n e .
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CARRUTHERS, Andrew N ew e ll . S e c . ,  South  A u s t r a l i a n  Brancn, Gas 
E m ployees’ Union, 1946-50. E x p e l led  from C .P . ,  1950.
CHANDLER, H e rb e r t  B o v y ll .  Born 24 October 1904. Former m aster 
p r i n t e r .  Former P r e s . ,  M acquarie D i s t r i c t  Assembly, A .L .P .
Former Mayor o f  L itngow . S e c . ,  S t a t e  Labor P a r ty ,  1941-44.
J o in e d  C .P . ,  1944. Member of C e n t ra l  Committee, C .P . ,  s in ce  
1948. Member of C ontro l Commission, C .P. f o r  many y e a r s .
CHANDLER, Joseph  C h a r le s .  S e c . ,  V ic to r i a n  Branch, B .W .I.U .,  s in c e  
1945 (O rg a n is e r ,  1940-44).  L e f t  C .P . ,  1955; subsequen tly  
jo in e d  A .L .P .
CHIPLIN, Hex. Former i n d u s t r i a l  worker and r a d io  s c r i p t  w r i t e r .  
E d i t o r ,  p r o g r e s s , 1944-45. T ribune j o u r n a l i s t  s in c e  1945.
CHRISTOPHERS, Dr Barry  Eastwood. Born 6 September 1922. Educ.
ivielbourne Univ. (M.B., B .S . ,  1945; B .S c . ,  1950). P r e s . ,  Council 
f o r  A b o r ig in e s '  R ig h t s .
CHURCHWARD, L loya Gordon. Son of Rev. Spencer Churchward, M ethod is t  
m is s io n a ry .  Born 18 October 1919. Educ. Melbourne H .S . ,  
Melbourne Univ. (B .A ., 1939; D ip. E d . ,  1941; to .A ., 1941).
Former member of bo th  A .L .P . and S ta t e  Labor P a r t y .  Jo in ed  C .P . ,  
1944. S en io r  L e c tu re r  in  P o l i t i c a l  S c ie n c e ,  Melbourne Univ. 
jNephew of Rev. Dr C.M. Churcnward, Chairman of th e  A u s t r a l i a -  
R u ss ia  S o c ie ty  (1 9 4 8 -^9 ) .
CLANCY, P a t r i c k  M a r t in .  S e c . ,  New South Wales Branch, B.W.I.U. 
s in c e  1953 ( A s s i s t a n t  S e c . ,  1947-53).
CLARKh , Raymond George. Born 1 Jan u ary  1916. Served in  World War I I .  
jcixpeiled from A .L .P . ,  Novemner 1950. O rg a n is e r ,  Democratic 
R ig h ts  Council (N.S.W .) in  e a r l y  f i f t i e s ,  m a rr ie d  to  Mrs Joan 
C la rk e ,  f i r s t  Chairman o f  R e a l i s t  W r i t e r s '  Group, Sydney.
CLAYTON, W alte r  Seddon. Born 1906 (New Z e a la n d ) .  A rr iv ed  in
A u s t r a l i a ,  1931. jo in e d  C .P . ,  1933. member of both C e n tra l  
Committee and C on tro l Commission, C .P . ,  1943-51.
COATES, W alte r  Roger. Born 19 A p r i l  1928. Educ. Melbourne H .S . ,  
Melbourne Univ. Former N a t io n a l  S e c . ,  A .S .L .F .  Former S e c . ,  
Melbourne Univ. Labor Club. S c n o o l t e a c h e r .
COLLINSüN, L au ren ce .  Born 1925 (E ng land ) .  S c h o o lte a c h e r  and p o e t .  
L e f t  C .P. a f t e r  Hungarian R e v o lu t io n .
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COULL, James. Former member of Revolutionary Socialist Party.
Sec., Victorian Branch, Liquor Employees' Union since July 
1948.
COUNIHAN, Noel. Born 4 October 1813. Joined C.P., 1931. Artist.
Cartoonist for Melbourne Guardian. Visited Soviet Union, 1956.
CURRAN, Walter j . Assistant Sec., Victorian Branch, Australasian 
Meat Industry Employees' Union since December 1958. Sec.,
Young Labor Association, Victoria, 1958-9. Left A.L.P. in 
early sixties.
CURTHOYS, Geoffrey Carlton. Born 25 November 1918. Educ. North 
Sydney H.S., Sydney Univ. (B.Sc., 1942). Senior Lecturer in 
Chemistry, Newcastle Univ.College. Chairman, Newcastle District 
Committee, C.P. Married to Mrs Barbara Curthoys, daughter of 
former Liberal Senator, J.A. McCalium.
DAVIES, Lester Lioyd. Born iO June 1922. Educ. Christ Church Grammar 
School, Western Australia Univ. (LL.B., 1948;. Served in World 
War II. Solicitor.
DAViS, Miss Florence Amy. Sec., Hotel, Club and Restaurant Employees' 
Union (N.S.W.) since 1947 (Assistant Sec., 1943-47).
DAWSON, Gerald Macadam. Former Pres., Queensland Trades and Labor 
Council. Sec., Queensland Branch, B.W.I.U.
DEVANNY, Mrs Jean. Born 7 January 1894 (New Zealand). Former school­
teacher. Joinea C.P., 1931. Visited Soviet Union, 1932.
Novelist. Died 1962. married to Francis Harold Devanny, publisher 
of Workers' Weekly in thirties. Her daughter, Patricia, married 
Ronald Hurd (q.v.).
DIAMOND, Ricnard Francis. Born in England. In December 1944 elected 
Sec., Victorian Branch, Actors' Equity (succeeded by Victor 
Arnold, active in Melbourne New Theatre, in the early fifties). 
Spent several years in Nortn Vietnam in early fifties. Author 
and playwright (wrote the New Tneatre success, 'Reedy River').
DIXON, Richard. Born 26 May 1905. Former Post Office messenger 
boy. Joined C.P., 1928. Member of Central Committee, C.P. 
since 1929. Visited Soviet Union, 1930-32. Assistant General 
Sec., C.P., 1937-48. Pres,, C.P. since 1948.
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DOBBIN, Dr Alexander Hamilton. Born 10 dune 1911 (Scotland;. Educ.
St Andrew's College of Medicine ana St Mungo’s Medical College, 
Glasgow (L.K.C.P., L.R.C.S.). Member of Williamstown City 
Council, 1941-45. Left A.L.P., 1945. Joined C.F., 1945.
DOWLING, Alec. Sec., Newcastle Trades Hall Council since 1947.
Left A.L.P., 1949.
DYSON, Edward Ambrose. Born 15 December 1908. Son of tne artist, 
Ambrose Dyson, ana nephew of both the artist, Will Dyson, and 
the writer, Edward Dyson, Unskilled worker until 1936. Served 
in World War II. Artist. Cartoonist for Melbourne Guardian.
Died 26 November 1952.
EBBELS, Robert Noel. Born 18 August 1918. Educ. Melbourne Univ.
(LL.B., 1947; B.A., 1948). Served in World War II. Former Sec., 
and Pres., Melbourne Univ. Labor Club. Sec., Students' 
Representative Council, Melbourne Univ., 1948. Sec., National 
Union of Australian University Students, 1948-49. Sec., 
International Union of Stuuents, 1950-51. Pres., A.8.L.F., 
1951-52. Died 7 February 1952.
ELLIOTT, Eliot Valens. Born 12 September 1902. Sec., Queensland
Branch, Seamen's Union, 1937-40. Feaerai Sec., Seamen's Union 
since 1940. Member of Central Committee, C,P.
EMERY, Dr Frederick Edmund. Born 27 August 1925. Educ. »Vestern
Australia Univ. (B.Sc., 1947), Melbourne Univ. (Ph.D., 1953). 
Former Lecturer in Psychology, Melbourne Univ. Left C.P. 
after Hungarian Revolution.
ENGLART, Edward Conrad. Sec., Brisbane Branch, W.W.F., 1943-50 
(Vigilance Officer, 1938-43).
EVANS, Walter Patrick. Born 1889. Served in World War I. Sec.,
New South Wales Branch, A.L.P., 1939-40. Sec., State Labor 
Party, 1940-41. C.P. candidate at 1946 Federal Election.
FARWELL, George Michell. Born 3 October 1911. Pres., Fellowship 
of Australian Writers (N.S.W.), 1944-46. Left C.P. in late 
forties.
FIELD, Herbert William. Sec., Queensland Brancn, Australasian Meat 
Industry Employees' Union since 1957 (Acting Sec., 1955-57).
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FINGER, Dr Alan henry. Born 6 December 1909. Sduc. Melbourne Boys’ 
H.3., Melbourne Univ. (M.B., B.S., 1934;. Former Pres.,
Melbourne Univ. Labor Club. Joined C.P., 1931. Medical 
Superintendent, Infectious Diseases Hospital, Adelaide, 1936-47. 
Member of South Australian State Committee, C.P. since 1937 
(rres., 1944-52). Visited Soviet Union, 1958. Married to 
Mrs Joan Mary Finger (nee Hardiman), M.A. (Melbourne).
FISHER, John. Son of Right Hon. Andrew Fisher, former Labor Prime
Minister of Australia. Born 7 June 1910. Herald journalist for 
many years; later Moscow correspondent for AAP and sub-editor, 
Moscow Daily News. Returned to Australia, 1939. Spent several 
years in Czechoslovakia after World War II. During the thirties 
and forties successively a member of A.L.P., State Labor Party 
and C.P. Appears to have withdrawn from C.P. During the fifties 
worked as a letter-sorter in P.M.G. (Adelaide). Died 25 August 
I960.
FLANAGAN, B.F. Born 8 November 1900. Joined C.P. in late thirties. 
Served in World Wars I and II. Sec., Victorian Branch, F.I.A., 
September 1939-52 (Organiser, 1937-39). Returned to merchant 
service in 1952. Died 31 March 1956.
FOX, Leonard Phillips. Born 28 August 1905. Educ. Scotch College, 
Melbourne Univ. (B.Sc., 1927; Dip. Ed., 1928). Former school­
teacher. Visited Soviet Union, 1933. Former Victorian State 
Sec., Movement Against War and Fascism. Journalist and poet.
With his wife, the playwright Mona Brand, ne spent 1956-57 in 
North Vietnam.
FRANK, George. Joined C.P., 1931. Federal Sec., B.W.I.U., 1945-47 
(former Sec., Victorian Branch). Died December 1958, aged 68.
FREEilILL, Norman Randolph. Born 21 March 1892. Educ. William Street
Public School. Journalist. Sec., Queensland District, Australian 
Journalists’ Association, 1913-14 (Pres., 1917-19). Vice-Pres., 
New South Wales District, Australian Journalists’ Association 
during mid-forties when he was Tribune chief of staff. Lived in 
China for several years.
GANDINI, John Rivo. Sec., Western Australian State Committee, C.P.
GARLAND, Tnomas. Born in Scotland. Former member of British Labour 
Party. Sec., South Australian Branch, Gas Employees’ Union, 
1937-46. Pres., Adelaide Trades and Labor Council, 1936,
1944-45 (Sec., 1946-49). Left C.P., October 1945. Died 14 
February 1952, aged 58.
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GEORGE, Leonard. Sec., Illawarra Trades and Labor Council in the 
forties.
GIBSON, Ralph Siward. Son of Professor W.R. Boyce Gibson (Melbourne 
liniv.). Born 19 February 1906. Educ. Melbourne Grammar School, 
Melbourne Univ. (B.A., 1927J, Manchester Univ. (M.A., 1930).
Sec., Melbourne Univ. Labor Club, 1925-27. Former member of 
A.L.P. and British Labour Party. Joined C.F., 1932. Visited 
Soviet Union, 1933. Member of Victorian State Committee, C.P. 
since 1933 (for the greater part of this period, nas held the 
positions of either Secretary or President of the State Committee). 
Member of Central Committee, C.P. since 1937. Brother of 
Professor A. Boyce Gihson (Melbourne Univ.) and Associate 
Professor Q.B. Gibson (Australian National Univ.).
GILES, Dr Ronald. Educ. Melbourne Univ. (M.B., B.S., 1948). Served 
in World War II.
GLAS30N, Eric H. Sec., New Soutn Wales Branch, Wool and Basil Workers’ 
Union. Member of Central Committee, C.P. Died 8 July 1949.
GOLLAN, William Eric. Born 20 August 1904. Educ. Fort Street H.S., 
Sydney Univ. (B.A., 1926^. Former member of Central Executive, 
State Labor Party. Member of Central Committee, C.P. since 1944. 
Chairman, New South Wales Peace Council in early fifties. Brother 
of Dr Robin Gollan, Fellow in History, Australian National Univ., 
whose wife Mrs Daphne Eileen Gollan, B.A. (Sydney), was Sec.,
New housewives' Association (N.S.W.) in t,ne late forties. Both 
Dr R. Gollan and Mrs Daphne Gollan left C.r. after Hungarian 
Revolution.
GORDON, Terence Bruce. General Sec., Ships, Painters and Dockers'
Union since 1945.
GOTf, Kenneth Davidson. Born 22 March 1923. Educ. Melbourne H.S.,
Melbourne Univ. (B.A., 1947). Former B.B.C. journalist. Former 
Press Officer, International Union of Students, Prague. Import- 
exporter, engaged in Australia-China trade, 1953-54. Visited 
China, 1954. Sec., Victorian Branch, Australia-China Society 
in mid-fifties. Left C.P. after Hungarian Revolution. Melbourne 
correspondent of Perth Daily News and contributor to Nation.
GOULD, Llewelyn harry. Born about 1900 (Dublin, Eire). Came to
Australia, via Canada and tne United States of America. Joined 
C.P., 1934. Former Editor of Tribune. former Director, Marx 
School, Sydney. C.P. functionary since 1935. Member of Central 
Committee, C.P.
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GRAHAM, Albert Leslie. Assistant Sec,, Brisbane Branch, W.W.F., 
1944-51.
GRANT, Hugh. Sec., Sydney Branch, BoilermaKers’ Society since 1944.
GRSVILLE, Mrs Henrietta. Born 9 October löbl (New Zealand).
Unsuccessful A.L.P. candidate at 191? Feaeral Election. Active 
in Workers’ Educational Association for many years. Joined 
C.P., 1942. Awarded M.B.E., 1958.
HANSON, E.J. Sec., Queensland Branch, Operative Painters and 
Decorators’ Union.
HARDY, Francis Joseph, horn 21 March 191?. Educ. Christian Brotners' 
College and State scnoois until age of tnirteen. Former fruit 
picker, seaman and factory worker. Joined C.P., 1940. Served 
in World War II. Author.
HATFIELD, William. Born lb March 1882 (England). Educ. Nottingham 
Univ. College. Came to Australia before World War I. Served 
in World War II. Active in C.P. in the forties,
HEALY, James. Born 22 Marcn 1898 (Manchester, England). Served in
World War I. Arrived in Australia, 1925. Former memner of A.L.P 
Visited Soviet Union, 1934. Joined C.P., 1925. General Sec., 
W.W.F., October 1937-61. Died 13 duly 1961.
hjjALY, Kevin Martin. Born 30 September 1909. Served in World War II. 
Chairman, Western Australian State Committee, C.P. for many years
HEALY, Michael. Arrived in Australia, 1931. Joined C.P., 1933.
Sec., Queensland Trades and Labor Council, 1943-52.
HEINDE, Bernard. Born about, 1914. Assistant Sec., Victorian Branch, 
B.W.I.U., 1951-60 (Organiser, 1947-50). Died 27 September I960.
hENRY, John Clyde. Born I9u4. Joined C.P., 1931. Sec., Queensland 
State Committee, C.P., 1937-48. Member of Secretariat, C.P., 
1949-54.
iilLL, Edward Fowler. Son of J.F. Hill, Principal of Melbourne Boys’ 
H.S., 1934—43 and a patron of A.S.L.F. Born 23 April 1915.
Educ. Melbourne Univ. Barrister and solicitor. Member of 
Central Committee, C.r. since 1948. Sec., Victorian State 
Committee, C.P., 1949-62. Member of Secretariat, C.P., 1954-62. 
Attended 20th and 21st Congress of tue Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, 1956 and 1959 respectively.
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HOLMES, Cecil. Served in World War II (Royal Navy). Dismissed
from post of Director of New Zealand Film Unit because of C.P. 
membership (News-Weekly, 5 January 1949). Film producer.
Sec., New South Wales Peace Council in early fifties. Managing 
Director of New Dawn Films until late fifties. Left C.P. after 
Hungarian Revolution.
HUGHES, Morris John Rodwell. Born 14 April 1910. Educ. Kogarah
H.S. Joined A.L.P. at age of sixteen. Pres., New South Wales 
Labor Council, 1937-40. Vice-Pres., New South Wales Branch,
A.L.F., 1939-40. Vice-Pres., State Labor Party in early forties.i**., 
New South Wales Branch, F.C.U., 1942-52 (Assistant Sec., 1933-41). 
Federal Vice-Pres., F.C.U. until 1952. Member of Central Committee, 
C.P. since 1944. C.P. functionary since early fifties.
HURD, Ronald. Educ. Melbourne H.S. Fought with International
Brigade in Spanish Civil War. Sec., Western Australian Branch, 
Seamen’s Union.
JEFFERY, Norman G. Born 1894. Former member of I.W.W. Foundation 
member of C.P., 1920. Visited Soviet Union, 1928. Member of 
Central Committee, C.P. Sec., Pastoral Workers’ Industrial Union 
in early thirties.
JOHNSON, Francis Thomas. Born about 1902. Former bootmaker. Joined 
C.P., 1931, Sec., Victorian State Committee, C.P. since 1962 
(former Pres.).
JOHNSON, Paul Wesley. Born 25 December 1922. Educ. North Sydney
Boys’ H.S., Sydney Univ. In 1955 appointed Australian represen­
tative on World Federation of Democratic Youth. For many years 
active in E.Y.L. (retired as National Pres, in 1961).
JOHNSTON, Elliott Frank. Born 26 February 1918. Educ. Prince 
Alfred’s College, Adelaide Univ. (LL.B., 1940.) Solicitor.
Served in World War II. Former Sec., South Australian Branch, 
Actors’ Equity. Member of South Australian State Committee,
C.P. Married to Mrs Elizabeth Johnston (nee Teesdale-Smith),
LL.B. (Adelaide), who was Sec., South Australian Branch, F.C.U. 
in the mid-forties.
JOLLY, Dr Alexander Thomas Hicks. Born 24 February 1910. Educ. 
Melbourne Univ. (M.B., B.S., 1935). Served in World War II.
Elected to Midland Junction(W.A.) Municipal Council in 1947.
Former Chairman, Committee for Defence of Native Rights,
Western Australia.
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JONES, Claude. Born about 1916. Joined C.P,, aged sixteen. Pres., 
Queensland State Committee, C.P. for many years (except during 
the early fifties when he wa3 Chairman of the New South Wales 
State Committee, C.F.).
JULIUS, max Kordau. Born 9 March 1916. Educ. Brisbane Grammar School, 
Queensland Univ. (B.A., 1938; LL.B., 1940). Member, Queensland 
State Committee, C.P.
KAISER, Dr Thomas Reave. Born 2.May 19ü4. Educ. Univ. H.3.,
Melbourne Univ. (B.Sc., 1943; M.Sc., 1946), Oxford Univ.
(D. Phil., 1949), Manchester Univ. (D.Sc., 1956). Member of 
A.L.r., 1944-46. Joined C.P., 1946. Employed by C.3.I.R., 
1943-49. Senior Lecturer in Physics, Sheffield Univ. Left 
British C.P. after Hungarian Revolution.
KAUEMAN, Walter. Born 19 January 1924 (Berlin, Germany). Left
Germany, 1939. Arrived in Australia, 1942. Served in World 
War II. Former seaman and butcher's labourer. Author. Returned 
to East Germany in mid-fifties.
KEHSING, Albert. Born 25 April 1909. Served in World War II.
Manager, Current Book Distributors.
KING, John Hodge. Sec., Western District, Miners' Federation.
Alderman, Lithgow City Council for several years.
LAMBLE, Lloyd. Son of W.1I.S. Lamble, former Federal Sec., Musicians' 
Union. Radio actor. Pres., Actors' Equity, March 1942-September 
1946. Member of C.P. during forties.
LAMBERT, Eric Frank. Born 19 January 1918. Former seaman, coal-
heaver and factory hand. Served in World War II (Mentioned in 
Despatches). Author. Awarded Commonwealth Literary Fund, 1950. 
Visited Hungary, late 1956. Left C.P. after Hungarian Revolu­
tion. Now resident in England.
LETTER, William. Pres., Coal Miners' Industrial Union, Western 
Australia since April 1952.
LAURIE, Edward Andrew Hevingham. Born 31 August 1912. Educ. Scotch 
College, Melbourne Univ. (LL.B., 1935; LL.M., 1944). Served 
in World War II. Barrister. Former Research Officer, Queensland 
Trades and Labor Council.
LEGGE, John Williamson. Born 3 April 1917. Educ. Melbourne Univ.
(B.Sc., 1938; M.Sc., 1946). Joined C.P., 1935. Reader in Bio­
chemistry, Melbourne Univ.
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LOCKWOOD, Rupert Ernest. Born 10 March 1908. Educ. Wesley College, 
Melbourne. Former Herald, ABC Weekly and Sun (Sydney) 
journalist. Former Editor of tne Ironworker. Tribune journalist. 
Editor of Maritime Worker and Research Officer, W.W.F. Brother 
of Surgeon Rear-Admiral L. Lockwood and the well-known author 
and journalist, Douglas Lockwood.
LOUDON, F. Sec., Newcastle Trades Hall Council until 1947.
McCAFFREY, Charles Joseph. Joined C.P., 1938. Former Pres., Newcastle 
Trades Hall Council. Sec., South Australian Branch, F.I.A. 
from early forties until early fifties. Visited Soviet Union and 
China, 1959.
McCLINTOCK, Herbert. Nephew of the artist Alexander McClintock.
Born 20 November 1906. Artist. Tribune cartoonist.
MacDONALD, Alexander. Sec., Queensland Branch, F.I.A. until 1951.
Sec., Queensland Trades and Labor Council since 1952.
McHENRY, P. National Vice-Fres., F.I.A. during tne forties.
McISAAC, John. Born 31 March 1912 (Scotland). Served in World War II. 
Joined C.P. in mid-forties. Editor, Labor News (organ of F.I.A.) 
until early fifties. Former Tribune journalist. Left C.P. after 
Hungarian Revolution.
M cmEEKIN, Dr Hedley James Parker. Born 25 February 1916. Educ. 
Melbourne Univ. (ivi.B., B.S., 194ö). For many years Broken 
Hill’s leading Communist.
McPHSE, James D. Sec., Hospital Employees' Union, 1946-54. Visited 
China, 1953. Died 30 August 1954.
McPHILLIPS, Leslie John. Former member of A.L.P. Joined C.P., 1931. 
Assistant National Sec., F.I.A., 1942-52. C.P. functionary since 
1952.
McRAE, Miss Doris Mary. Educ. Melbourne Univ. (B.A., 1926). Vice- 
Pres., Victorian Teachers' Union in late forties.
MAKINS0N, Dr Richard Elliss Bodenham. Born 5 May 1913. Educ. Sydney 
Grammar School, Sydney Univ. (B.Sc., 1935), Cambridge Univ.
(Ph.D., 1939). active in Australian Association of Scientific 
Workers in mid-forties. Reader in Physics, Sydney Univ.
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MALONE, Patrick John. Sec., Victorian Builders Labourers’Federation 
since 1941, Member of Central Committee, C.P.
MANIFOLD, John Streeter. Born 21 April 1915. Educ. Geelong Grammar 
School, Cambridge Univ. (B.A.). Joined C.P., 1937. Served in 
World War II. Poet. Associate Editor, Overland, 1954-60.
Pres., Brisbane Realist Writers’ Group.
MARGINSON, Maxwell Arthur. Born 12 March 1928. Educ. Melbourne
H.S., Melbourne Univ. (B.Sc., 1947). Lecturer in Biochemistry, 
Melbourne univ. Joined C.P., 1946. Left C.P., 1957. Foundation 
Chairman, Melbourne Socialist Forum, 1957-58. Joined A.L.P., 
1958.
MARTIN, David. Born in Budapest, Hungary. Educ. Berlin, Germany.
Fought with International Brigade in Spanish Civil War. Arrived 
in Australia, 1949. Poet and author. Left C.P. after Hungarian 
Revolution.
..iAXWELL, Ronald A. Vice-Pres., Sydney Branch, W.W.F. Alderman,
Sydney City Council, 1953-56.
METCALFE, Mrs Joyce Olive. Daughter of Sir George Beeby. Born 29 
October 1904. Educ. Sydney Church of England Girls' Grammar 
School, Sydney Univ. (B.A., 1924). Sister of Miss Joyce 
Beeby (q.v.).
MILES, John Bramwell. Born 5 September 1888 (Scotland). Former
member of Indepenuent Labour Party. Arrived in Australia, 1913. 
Joined C.P., 1920. General Sec., C.P., 1931-48. Member of 
Central Committee, C.P.
MILLAR, Thomas McLellan. Pres., Queensland Collieries Employees’ 
Union.
MILLER, Kenneth Craig. Born 2 April 1913. Joined C.P., 1934.
Served in World War II. member of Central Committee, C.P.
MILLISS, Bruce Joseph. Former guest-house proprietor. Expelled
from A.L.P. in 1946, after 30 years' membership. Joined C.P., 
1947. Managing Director, New Dawn Films, his son, Roger 
William Milliss, B.A. (Sydney), a former Sec., Sydney Univ.
Labor Club, is Tribune drama critic and Lecturer in English, 
Wagga Wagga Teachers' College.
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MILNER, Ian Frank George. Born 6 June 1911 (New Zealand;. Educ. 
Canterbury Univ. College (M.A.), Oxford Univ. (B.A., 1937).
New Zealand Rhodes Scholar, 1934. Lecturer in Political Science, 
Melbourne Univ., 1940-44. Member of Department of External 
Affairs, 1944-46 (Acting Head of United Nations Division). 
Employed at Unit/ed Nations Headquarters, New York, 1946 - October 
1951. Lecturer in English Literature, Charles Univ., Prague, 
Czechoslovakia.
MORAN, Stanley James. Born 1 May 1903. Former member of A.L.P. 
Treasurer, Sydney Branch, W.W.F. since 1941.
MORGAN, Richard Campbell. Former Sec., Newcastle Branch, F.I.A. 
(defeated 1949). Expelled from C.P., 1951.
MORRIS, David John. Born 24 April 1910. Educ. Brisbane Grammar
School, Queensland Univ. (B.E., 1931; B.Sc., 1936; M.E., 1950; 
Dip. Comm.). Joined C.P., 1931. Served in World War II. 
emigrated to Cnina, 1958.
MORTISR, Paul Francis. Born 8 September 1919. Pres., Australian 
Laoor League of Youth in early forties. Unsuccessful State 
Labor Party candidate at 1941 State Election. Served in World 
War II. Organiser, New South Wales Peace Council in early 
fifties.
MORTIMER, Rex Alfred. Born 11 February 1926. Educ. Melbourne H.S.,
Melbourne Univ. (LL.B., 1947). Barrister and solicitor. Visited 
Cnina, 1957.
twOTEN, Miss Mavis June. Born 1 June 1930. Educ. Melbourne Univ. 
National Sec., E.Y.L. Married to Alec Robertson (q.v.).
MULLIN, Leslie William Vincent. Joined C.P., 1934. Sec., Illawarra 
Trades and Labor Council, 1948-54.
MURRAY-SMITH, Stephen. Born 9 September 1922. Educ. Geelong Grammar 
School, Melbourne Univ. (B.A., 1947; B.Ed.). Served in World 
War II. Joined C.P., 1945. Sec. and Pres,, Melbourne Univ.
Labor Club, 1946-47. Sec., A.S.L.F., 1947. Journalist in 
Czechoslovakia, 1949-51. School-teacher, 1952-53. National 
Organising Sec., A.P.C. and Organising Sec., Victorian Peace 
Council, 1953-58. Former, editor Realist Writer. Editor, 
Overland since 1954. Left C.P., 1958. Joined A.L.P., 1958. 
Former editor of the organ of Victorian Teachers* Union. Engaged 
in research, Faculty of Education, Melbourne Univ. since early 
sixties.
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NELSON, Ch ar le s .  Born 16 November 1896 ( S c o t l a n d ) .  Arr ived  in  
A u s t r a l i a  b e fo re  World War I .  V i c e - P r e s . ,  Western D i s t r i c t ,  
L i n e r s ’ F e d e r a t i o n ,  1931-34 .  P r e s . ,  Miners'  F e d e r a t io n ,  1934-41 .  
E x p e l l ed  from C .P . ,  1940.  Died May 1948.
NELSON, i’hotuas. S e c . .  Sydney Branch, W.W.F. s i n c e  1948 ( P r e s . ,  1942-43  
1945-46 ,  1 9 4 7 - 4 8 ) .
O’DAY, Dr Gerald P a t r i c k .  Born 18b0.  Educ.  Melbourne Univ.  (M.B.,
B .  S . ,  1910; ivi.D., 1917 ) .  Jo ined  C .P . ,  1931.  V i s i t e d  S o v i e t  
Onion, 1958.
OGSTON, Adam. Born 4 December 1905 ( S c o t l a n d ) .  Former memoer of  
A.L.P.  Served in  World War I I .  Member o f  Central  Committee,
C.  P.
OLD, i^iss  N e l l .  Daughter o f  famous r a c in g  c y c l i s t ,  Ernie  Old.  
S c h o o l - t e a c h e r .
CLIVE, Arthur Horace.  Born l ö 9 6 .  Served in  World War I ( M i l i t a r y  
Medal, 1 9 1 8 ) .  Former cane c u t t e r  and cane farmer.  Jo ined  C .P . ,  
1934. Former F . I . A .  o r g a n i s e r  and C.P. f u n c t i o n a r y .  S e c . ,
North A u s t r a l i a n  Workers' Union, 1950-51 .  Died 8 December
1951. Brother  o f  Douglas C. O l i v e ,  C.P. f u n c t io n a r y  in  Queensland
OPIE, Will iam Alexander .  S e c . ,  Workers’ Spor ts  F e d e r a t io n ,  V i c t o r i a  
in l a t e  t n i r t i e s .  In 1951 e l e c t e d  S e c . ,  Queensland Branch,
Legion o f  Ex-Servicemen ana Women. Married t o  Mrs Marjor ie  Opie,  
C.P.  f u n c t i o n a r y  (d ie d  I 9 6 0 ) .
ORR, Wi l l iam. Born 25 Apri l  1900 ( S c o t l a n d ) .  Served in  World War I .  
Former member o f  A .L .P .  S e c . ,  M in e r s ’ F e d e r a t io n ,  1933-40 .
Died 17 march 1954.
O'SHEA, Clarence L. S e c . ,  V i c t o r i a n  Branch,  Tramways' Union s in c e  
1947 ( P r e s . ,  1 9 4 6 - 4 7 ) .  Federa l  P r e s . ,  Tramways' Union s in c e  
1961 (Federa l  S e c . ,  1 9 4 2 - 4 4 ) .
PALMER, miss  f ie len Gwynneth. Daughter o f  the  author ,  Vance Palmer.
Born 9 may 1917.  Educ. P r e s b y t e r i a n  Ladies '  C o l l e g e ,  Melbourne  
Univ.  (B .A . ,  1939; B .E d . ,  1 9 5 2 ) .  Served in World War I I .  
S c h o o l - t e a c h e r .  L e f t  C.P.  a f t e r  Hungarian R e v o l u t io n .  E d i t o r ,  
Outlook s i n c e  1957.  V i c e - P r e s . ,  New Soutn Wales Branch,
A u s t r a l ia - C h in a  S o c i e t y .
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PARKINSON, William. Born 1907 (England). Arrived in Australia,
1926. Former Pres., Southern District, Miners' Federation.
Pres., Miners1 Federation since 1955. Member of Central Committee,
C.P.
PATERSON, Frederick Woolnougn. Son of a railway fettler who later
became a farmer. Born 13 January 1897. Educ. Brisbane Grammar 
School, Queensland Univ. (B.Ä., 1920), Oxford Univ. (B.A., 1922). 
Queensland Rhodes Scholar, 1918. Served in World War I.
Barrister since 1931. Communist M.L.A., 1944-60.
PEEL, Gerald Kingston. Born lb March 1909. Educ. Harrow, Cambridge
Univ. (B.A., 1931; M.A., 1935). Former Headmaster, Christ Church 
Boys' School, Jubbulpore, India. Former National Sec., League 
for Peace and Democracy. Tribune journalist in the forties.
Active in Australia-Indonesia Association in mid-forties. Now 
resident in England.
PHILLIFS, Evan Thomas. Born 1907 (Wales). Arrived in Australia,
1922. Joined C.P., 1924, Coal-miner.
PIKE, Arthur William. Born 19 September 1922. Educ. Sydney Univ.
Served in World War II. Sec., A.S.L.F. in early fifties. Sec., 
International Union of Students in early fifties. School-teacner.
PIZER, Miss Marjorie. Born 3 April 1920. Educ. Melbourne Univ.
(B.A., 1943). Authoress. Married to the poet Muir Holburn 
(Born 20 December 1920. Educ. Sydney Univ. (B.A., 1943).
Died November I960). Both of them left the C.P. after 
hungarian Revolution.
PRESCOTT, John Francis. Born 23 June 1914. Joined C.F., 1937.
Served in World War II.
PRICHARD, Miss Katharine Susannah. Born 1884 (Fiji). Foundation 
member, C.F., 1920. Former member of Central Committee, C.P. 
Visited Soviet Union, 1933. Authoress. Married to late Captain 
Hugo Throssell, V.C.
PURSE, Frank. Federal Sec., B.W.I.U. since 1947 (former Assistant 
Federal Sec.).
RAWLING, James Normington. Born 27 July 1898. Educ. Syaney Univ.
(B.A., 1929; M.A., 1946). Served in World War I. Joined C.P., 
1925. Former National Sec., Movement Against War and Fascism. 
Former National Sec., Australian League for Peace and Democracy. 
Expelled from C.P., December 1939.
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REILLY, Miss Betty. Active in Union of Australian Women. Former
Sec., Women's Committee, C.P. Employed by Women's International 
Democratic Federation, Berlin, 1952-55.
RICH, Harold. Born 25 February 1916. Sduc. Northam H.S., Western
Australia Univ. (LL.B., 1939), Served in World War II. Solicitor. 
Sec., Democratic Rights Council (N.S.W.) in early fifties.
ROACH, Edward Charles. Sec., Port Kernbla Branch, W.W.F., 1938-42. 
Assistant General Sec., W.W.F. since 1942.
ROBERTSON, Alec. Son of Alec Robertson, former editor of Daily
Standard (A.L.P. organ in Queensland). Born 25 August 1918.
Educ. Brisbane Grammar School. Served in World War II. Dismissed 
from position of Sub-Editor, Courier-Mail, in October 1949 
because of his activities in the peace movement. Sub-Editor,
Argus, 1949-June 1950. In 1950 became National Organising Sec., 
A.F.C. Tribune journalist. Married to Miss Mavis Moten (q.v.).
ROBINSON, Edward George. Born 1925. Former Sec., South Australian 
State Committee, C.P. (retired 1961). Member of Secretariat,
C.P., 1962. Died May 1962.
ROSE, Dr Frederick George Godfrey. Born 22 March 1915 (London, England). 
Educ. Whitgift Middle School, Cambridge Univ. (B.A., 1936; M.A., 
194ü). Joined C.P., 1940. Member of Commonwealth Public Service, 
1937-March 1954. Former farmer and waterside worker. Emigrated 
to East Germany and obtained degree of Dr Habit. (Humboldt Univ., 
Berlin, 1958). Director of the Institut fur Völkerkunde und 
deutsche Volkskune, Humboldt Univ. since September 1959.
ROSS, Edgar Argent. Son of the well-known Socialist, R.S. Ross.
Born 20 October 1904. Educ. Univ. H.S. (Melbourne). Former 
Sub-Editor, Barrier Daily Truth, Editor, Common Cause (organ 
of Miners' Federation) since 1935. Member of Central Committee,
C.P. Visited Soviet Union and China, 1955. Brother of Dr Lloyd 
Ross (q.v.).
ROSS, Dr Lloyd Maxwell. Born 28 February 1901. Educ. Univ. H.S., 
Melbourne Univ. (M.A., LL.B., D.Litt.). Sec., New South Wales 
Branch, A.R.U., 1935-43, 1952-54 and since 1955. Expelled from 
C.P., 1940; joined .i.L.P. Director of Public Relations, Depart­
ment of Post-War Reconstruction, 1943-49. Pres., Australian 
Association for Cultural Freedom since 1961. Brother of Edgar 
Ross (q.v.).
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ROWE, Edward John, Joined C.F., 1930, Member of Commonwealth
Council, A.E.U,, 1943-52. Member of Political Committee, C.P. 
Chairman, New South Wales Committee, C.P, Died October 1960, 
aged 54,
RUDKIN, Arthur William. Born 30 October 1908 (England). Educ.
Loughborough Grammar School (England;, fertn Technical College, 
Western Australia Univ. (B.Sc., 1945). Member of Western 
Australian State Committee, C.P., 1933-45. Former Editor, 
Workers' Star. Member of Science Committee, Victorian State 
Committee, C.P,, 1945-49. Former employee of C.S.I.R. Since 
1950 a research chemist with the Sydney Metropolitan Water Board. 
Resigned from C.P., 1950 (over Party's uncritical support for 
Lysenko). Active in New Theatre, Sydney.
SALMON, Malcolm Frederick. Born 7 February 1925. Educ. Melbourne 
Univ. Guardian (Melbourne) journalist. Spent several years 
in Nortn Vietnam in tne fifties.
SCANLON, Henry. Vice-Pres., Northern District, Miners’ Federation, 
1936-41, 1944— 48 (Pres., 1942-43).
32ARLE, Arthur E. Sec., Sydney District, A.E.U., 1944-62.
SEARLE, Mrs Henrietta. Former member of A.L.P. and State Labor 
Party. Former Sec., Women's Committee, C.P.
SEELAF, George. Born 4 April 1914. Educ. Wiliiamstown H.S.
Sec., Victorian Branch, Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ 
Union since 1948 (Organiser, 1943-48).
SSNDY, Jonn Alan. Sec., South Australian State Committee, C.P.
SHARKEY, Laurence Louis. Born (of Irish-Catholic parentage) on a 
farm near Orange, New South Wales, 6 August 1898. Former 
member of I.W.W. Joined C.P., 1920. Pres., C.P., 1931—48. 
General Sec., C.P. since 1948. Member of Executive Committee, 
Communist International, 1935-43. For further details, see 
W.A. Wood, Tne Life Story of L.L. Sharkey. Fighter for Freedom, 
Sydney, 1950 and articles in News-Weekly, 7 April 1954;
Observer, 19 September 1959; and Nation, 2 June 1962.
SHARP, Geoffrey Bryce. Born 5 May 1926. Educ. Melbourne Grammar
School, Melbourne Univ, (B.A., 1949; M.A., 1953). Lecturer in 
Social Studies, Melbourne Univ. Married to Mrs N o m e  Sharp,
B.A. (Melbourne), formerly active in A.S.L.F.
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SHARPLEY, Cecil Herbert. Born 1908 (England). Educ. Weymouth
College. Arrived in Australia, 1928. Former member of A.L.P. 
Joined C.P., 1935. Former Assistant Sec., Victorian Branch, 
Munition Workers’ Union (and F.I.A.). Member of Victorian 
State Committee, C.P., 1946-49. Left C.P., 1949.
SHAW, Roderick Malcolm. Born 17 September 1915. Publisher
(Edwards and Shaw) and book illustrator. Former Pres., Studio 
of Realist Art. Left C.P. after Hungarian Revolution.
SIMPSON, John Spencer. Served in World War I (Awarded Military
Medal and Distinguished Conduct Medal). Joined C.P. in late 
twenties, member of Political Committee, C.P. Died 18 July 
1957, aged 68.
SMITH, B. Sec., Sydney Branch, Seamen’s Union.
STAPLES, James Frederick. Educ. Canterbury H.S., Sydney Univ. (B.A., 
1950; LL.B., 1953). Former Pres., A.S.L.F. Joined C.P., 1947. 
Unsuccessful C.P. candidate at 1956 New South Wales State 
Election. Expelled from C.P., November 1956.
STEIN, Harry. National Pres., S.Y.L. for many years (retired 1952).
THOMPSON, John Joseph Meagner. Born 20 December 1907. Educ.
Melbourne Grammar School, Melbourne Univ. (B.A.). Left C.P. 
in late forties. Served in World War II. A.B.C. Producer 
since 1950.
THOMSON, Donald David. Born 11 August 1906. Joined C.P., 1934.
Sec., Victorian Building Trades Federation, 1936-52. Federal 
Sec., Operative Painters and Decorators' Union, 1944-52.
Expelled from C.P., 1952. Joined Commonwealth Public Service. 
Sec., New South Wales Branch, Administrative and Clerical 
Officers' Association.
THORNTON, Ernest. Born 13 March 1907 (England). Arrived in Australia, 
1924. Joined C.P., 1931; expelled 1932; readmitted 1933. Sec., 
Victorian Branch, F.I.A., 1936-39 (Organiser, 1935-38). Federal 
Sec., F.I.A., 1936-50 (became a full-time position in 1939).
World Federation of Trade Unions functionary, Peking, 1950-53.
C.P. functionary for several years. Member of Central Committee, 
C.P. For further details, see article People, 19 May 1954.
TEEG2AR, William Hamilton. Born 2 July 1921. Educ. Wesley College. 
Joined C.P., 1940. Served in World War II. C.F. functionary 
since 1945.
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TROY, Patrick Laurence. Born 17 January 1908. Educ. Christian 
Brothers' College (Fremantle). Former member of A.L.P.
Joined C.P., 1934. Member of Western Australian State Committee, 
C.P. since 1938. In 1948 elected Sec., Coastal, Dock, Rivers 
and Harbour Workers' Union.
TURNER, Dr lan Alexander Hamilton. Born 10 March 1922. Educ.
Geelong College, Melbourne Univ. (LL.B., 1946; B.A.),
Australian National Univ. (ph.D.). Served in World War II.
Sec. and Pres., Melbourne Univ. Students' Representative Council, 
1946-47. Former Sec. ana Pres., Melbourne Univ. Labor Club.
Former Sec., A.S.L.F. Joined C.P., 1945. Unsuccessful C.P. 
candidate at 1952 Victorian State Election. Former National 
Organiser, A.F.C. Former Manager, Australasian Book Society.
Left C.P., 1958; joined A.L.P. Lecturer in History, Adelaide 
Univ. since 1961.
WALSHAM, Edward N. Vice-Pres., New South Wales Branch, A.R.U.,
1943-45. Sec., Central Council of Railway Shop Committees,
New South Wales.
WALSHE, Robert Daniel. Born 28 December 1923. Educ. Sydney Boys'
H.S., Sydney Univ. (B.A., 1951; Dip. Ed., 1952). Served in World 
War II. Former Pres., A.S.L.F. Schoolteacher. Left C.r. 
after Hungarian Revolution. Joined A.L.P., 1958. Member of 
Council, New South Wales Teacners' Federation.
V/ATEN, Judah Leon. Born 1911 (Russia). Arrived in Australia, 1914.
Educ. Christian Brothers' College (Perth,!, Univ. H.3. (Melbourne). 
Sec., Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Anti-Semitisin,
1949-52. Author. Chairman, Australasian Book Society.
WATT, Alfred. Born 2 September 1907. Former member of A.L.P.
Joined C.P., 1927. Editor of Workers' Voice and Guardian 
(Melbourne) in the thirties. Served in World War II. Sec.,
South Australian Committee, C.P. during forties and early 
fifties. Former Editor of Tribune. Member of Central Committee, 
C.P. Married to Mrs Elsie Ray Watt (nee Ballantyne), M.A. 
(Adelaide).
WELLARD, Reginald Edward, Born 3 June 1909. Former Assistant Federal 
Sec., F.C.U. Sec., New South Wales Branch, Amalgamated Postal 
Workers' Union, 1948-54.
WELLS, Harola Clyde. Born 3 November 1908. Joined C.P., 1931.
Pres., Miners' Federation, 1941-47. Left C.P., 1947, and became 
Assistant Manager, 'Western Building and Construction Co., Sydney.
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WELLS, Jack. Served in World War II (Awarded Military Medal). 
Vice-Pres., Rehabilitation Committee, C.P. in mid-forties.
WHITFIELD, Mrs R, Educ. Sydney Univ. (B.Ec.). Sec., Women’s 
Committee, C.P. in mid-forties.
WILLIAME3, Walter Tharratt Gladstone. Born 1898. Served in World
War I (Awarded Military Medal, 1917). Dairy farmer. Unsuccess­
ful A.L.P. candidate at 1943 Federal Election. Left A.L.P.,
1945. Joined C.P., 1945.
WILLIAMS, Mrs Cathleen Mary Isobel. Organiser, Victorian Branch,
Liquor Employees' Union since 1948. Sec., Equal Pay Committee, 
Melbourne Trades Hall Council.
WILLIAMS, Herbert C. Vice-Pres., New South Wales Branch, E.Y.L. 
in mid-forties. Sec., World Federation of Democratic Youth,
1945- 53.
WILLIAMS, Idris. Born 1896 (Wales). Served in World War I.
Arrived in Australia, 1920. Joined C.P. in early thirties.
Pres., Victorian District, Miners' Federation, 1934-46 (Sec.,
1946- 47). Pres., Miners' Federation, 1947-55. Member of Central 
Committee, C.P. Died October 1960.
WILSON, Alan. Former member of A.L.P. Member of Central Executive, 
State Labor Party, 1940-44. Member of Central Committee, C.P. 
since 1944. Member of Commonwealth Council, A.E.U., 1947-54, 
1956-61.
WOOD, William Arnold Whitfield. Son of Professor G. Arnold Wood 
(Sydney Univ.). Born 3 December 1911. Educ. Sydney Grammar 
School, Sydney Univ. (B.A.), Oxford Univ. (B.A., 1936; M.A., 
1945). New South Wales Rhodes Scholar, 1932. Former Pres., 
Oxford Union. Member of editorial staff, Daily Telegraph, 
1936-38. Foreign Editor, Labor Daily, 1939-40. Served in World 
War II. Editor, Progress, 1942-45. As late as 1945 he was 
a deacon in the Anglican Church (Communist Review, February 
1945). In 1947 appointed Foreign Editor of Tribune. Brother of 
the author Alan Wood and the New Zealand historian Professor 
F.L.W. Wood.
WRIGHT, Thomas. Born 1902 (Scotland). Joined C.P., 1923. Sec.,
C.P., 1924-29. Visited Soviet Union, 1927. Vice-Pres., New 
South Wales Labor Council in late thirties and early forties. 
Sec., New South Wales Branch, Sheet Metal Workers' Union since 
1936. Federal Pres., Sheet Metal Workers' Union since 1940. 
Member of Central Committee, C.P. Alderman, Sydney City Council, 
1953-59.
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YOUNG, Charles. Joined C.P., 1936. Sec., Melbourne Branch, W.W.F. 
since 1954.
ZW0LSMÄN, John Francis. Born June 1891 (Amsterdam, Holland). Served 
in World War I (Awarded Military Medal, 1918). Former member 
of l.W.W. Served in World War II. Expelled from R.S.L., 1950.
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others are held in the Archives of the Australian National University. 
Most of the important Communist Party pamphlets are referred to in the 
text. A select list follows:
(i) Communist
AARONS, L., Party of the Working Class: Organisational
Principles and Methods of Work of the Communist Party of 
Australia. Sydney, 1959.
DIXON, R. and SHARKEY, L.L., A Free World Without Violence, 
Sydney, 1945.
GOULD, L. Harry, Marxist Glossary, 3rd ed., Sydney, 1960.
HUGHES, J.R., Keep the Unions Free, Sydney, 1949.
McPHILLIPS, Jack, Penal Clauses - Menzies* Weapon Against 
Unions and Wages, Sydney, 1958.
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MORTIER, Paul, Danger, NCC At Work, Sydney, 1962,
SHARKEY, L. (ed.), Australia Marches On, Sydney, 1942.
SHARKEY, L.L., Australian Communists and Soviet Ruaeia, 
Sydney, 1947.
SHARKEY, L.L., The Labour Party Crisis, Sydney, n.d.
SHARKEY, L.L., An Outline History of the Australian Communist 
Party, Sydney, 1944.
SHARKEY, L.L., Socialism in Australia: Communist View on 
Democratic Socialism, Sydney, 1957.
SHARKEY, L.L., The Trade Unions, Sydney, 1942, revised ed., 
1959.
THORNTON, E., The Communist Party and You, Sydney, n.d.
THORNTON, E., Trade Unions and the War, Sydney, 1942.
Annals of the A.C.P., n.d.
Ballot Riggers at Work! Melbourne, n.d.
Basic Questions of Communist Theory: Documents Relating to 
the Cult of the Individual and to Hungary, Sydney, 1957.
Catholic Action at Work, Melbourne, 1945.
On the British Communist Party*a Policy» Correspondence 
Between the Central Committees of the Australian and 
British Communist Parties, Calcutta, 1948.
(ii) A.L.P.
ARNDT, H.W., Labour and Economic Policy, Melbourne^ 1956.
BURTON, John, The Light Glows Brighter, Sydney, n.d.
Fighting Communism - The Democratic Way (Fabian Society 
of n Ts .W.), Sydney, 1951.
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(iii) Miscellaneous
CARR, Michael, Betrayal: Being a Short History of
Australians Fifth Column (SaneDemocracy League). Sydney, 
n.d.
DOYLE, Brian, Catholics and Labor's Socialist Objective, 
Sydney, 1949.
HOGAN, E.J., Cause and Extension of Split in Labor Party. 
Melbourne, 1969.
HOGAN, E.J., Facts Everyone Should Know About Communism, 
Melbourne, 1958.
LAMB, Michael, Red Glows the Dawn, n.d.
MAxNES, J.P., Conquest by Stealth. Melbourne, 1961.
SHARPLEY, Cecil, I Was a Communist Leader. Melbourne, 1949.
The Communists v. The People« Brisbane, 1946.
The Face of Communism: A Threat and a Challenge to Free 
Men Everywhere (Liberal Party of Australia). Sydney.n.d.
Speakers* Notes: Referendum on Communism, Sydney. 1951. 
(Liberal Party of Australia), Sydney, n.d.
The Menace of Communism, Joint Pastoral Letter of the 
Australian Hierarchy, 1955. Australian Catholic Truth 
Society, 1220.
Spotlight on Santamaria. Melbourne, I960.
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ARNDT, H.W., and SANTAMARIA, B.A., 'The Catholic Social Movement', 
Australian Journal of Politics and History. May 1957, Vol. II,
No. 2, pp.181-95.
CAMPBELL, Ian, 'An Aspect of A.L.P. Industrial Group Development', 
Australian Quarterly. March 1961, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, pp.60-7.
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CHURCHWARD, L.G., 'The American Influence on the Australian Labour 
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7 . BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS
(a) Major works of Marxism-Leninism
LENIN, V.I., Selected Works (12 vols), London, 1936-39.
MAO Tse-tung, Selected Works (4 vols), London, 1954-56.
MARX, Karl and ENGELS, Frederick, Selected Works. (2 vols),
London, 1950.
STALIN, J., Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1947.
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